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iriAtion o f  Determinism; moreso, because I t  co n ta in s  
the  most Im pressive  th eo ry  o f  Determinism In the  
h i s t o r y  o f  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  th o u g h t ,  namely th a t  g iven  
by Jonathan Edwards.
I t  I s  not cladcned th a t  any f u l l  and f i n a l  co n c lu s io n  
can be reached upon t h i s  a n c ie n t  debate o f  L ib e r ty  end 
N e c e s s i t y ,  but I t  I s  hoped th a t  th e  p resen t  T h es is  w i l l  
g iv e  some I n s ig h t  In to  I t s  co n t in u in g  im portance.
T his T h e s is  has never been p resen ted  f o r  any degree  
b efore  t h i s  o c c a s io n ;  en d ,ap art  from th e  u su a l guidance  
g iv en  by the  U n i v e r s i t y , I t  I s  the r e s u l t  o f  my own, 
unaided work.
The p resen t  T h e s is  I s  an attempt to  examine the  
more Important a sp e c ts  o f  Kant’ s e x p o s i t io n  o f
Freedom; and I t s  p r in c ip a l  fe a tu r e  c o n s i s t s  In th e  -U■ijargument th a t  Kant’ s view o f  Freedom Is  r e a l l y  what
■Ihe s t a t e d  I t  to  b e ,  th a t  I s ,  a Defence o f  Freedom. ||
I t  I s  argued th a t  such a Defence o f  Freedom can be Iunderstood o n ly  by an exam ination o f  th e  background ,t
r
o f  D e te r m in is t ic  thought a g a in s t  which Kant wrote |
h i s  e x p o s i t io n  o f  Freedom. I t  I s  b e l i e v e d  th a t  th e IE ig h tee n th  cen tu ry  p ro v id es  ample scope fo r  an exam-
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**Thi« law (#0 fa r  aa ra tional being# are ooneemad) give# to  the world of eeneo* which i# a eeaeible cyeten of natnro, the form of a world of the understanding• th a t ie .  of a
general eenee, 1# the exleteaee of thing# under lew#. The #en#ihle nature of ra tiona l being# in  general i#  th e ir  ewietenoe under law# eap iriea lly  eonditioned, #&ioh, from the point of view of rea#on. i#  heteroaear. the euper*b einp7  m lS e  other hand, i#seneible nature of the _th e ir  exietenoe aooording to  la w  which are independent ofevery e s ^ r io a l  eondition, and therefore belong to the amtoniwg of pure roaecm. And, ainoe the law# by Ohich the eaaotenoe of thing# depend# on eognitim  are prao tioa l, #uper#en#ible nature. #o fa r  a# we earn form any notion ofi t  I ie  nothing else than a mratem of nature under theMMKXW Of PUM JTOOUimI  RwOR."
Kwt. K. p. V. u e .
'%o#t Of Sant*# theory of freedom ooneist# of a rapid Ofauffle between one «âd the other hom of thi# dilemm, and reaecblee an unekilful pevfonmnoe of Ü%e three«oard trio h  rather than a aeriou# pitiloeophioal argument."
Ihr. C.D. Broad. Five lype# of Kthioal theory. Page 138,
*It was the merit of Kant to see these two factors ofknowledge have meaning only in  unity. ......... qy thi#essen tial insight he was led to a new in tefg ration  ofthought. ........  So n a ^  has th is  f e r t i le  idea changed theaspoot# of the in te lle o tu a l world, tha t there i#  not a e iz ^ e  problem of philosophy tha t doe# not meet us with a new faeet mod i t  i s  perhaps not unfair to say, that the speeulations of a l l  ^ o ee  who have not learned the lesson of Kant are beside^ the point#
Dr. isdward Caird. The C ritioal Philosopher of Kant.V ol.I. Pago lao.
"The defenoe of freedom i s  neeessaxy fo r the defence of morality# and i f  iUiat*s defenoe is  not to be regarded a# suooessfUl. a t  le a s t he ha# shewn us the oharaoter of the problem and perhaps even suggested some of the line# on which i t  may be solved. "
Dr. H .J. Paton. The Categorical Imperative. Pogo 278,
-  « -
The problem Involved in  the discussion of Liberty md
Seoossity i s  one of the e ld es t, and s t i l l  continues to  be
m e of the most complicated problème which has confronted
the ymimn mind. However, there are some thinkers, of itisa
Psnlsen might be taken as typ ica l, who are assured tha t
philosophy has misdirected i t s  energy and a tten tio n  by
making th is  problem cen tral to  i t s  discussion*
"The problem ef the metaphysical freedom of the w ill is  s t i l l  regarded by some as m e of the g reatest and most d if f ic u lt  problems of philosophy. I  do not regard i t  as such. I t  i s  a  problem itiich owes i t s  o rig in  to ce rta in  conditions, and w ill d is w e a r  with these ooaditim si i t  beXengSLto philosophimng theology, or schdasticism . " '
Whether Cpinosa, Leibnia, Bums and Kant belong to th a t type
of thought Which i s  known as "g^olastioism " i s  a  matter
w hi^  i s  open to considerable doubt; yet there can be no
doubt about the veagr isi>ortant place given by these thinkers
to the "metaphysical freedom of the w ill" . Farther, even
such modem thinkers as Berdyaev, JBddingtm, (^^Bergssn,
sad Baritain,(G) to  mmtion m ]y a few, find  i t  quite
iiW>ossible to discuss the world and society without iavslving
s u ^  a discussion in  th is  oncient problem of Liberty md
Beeessity. Again, in  much of the "Psyehologica&l" li te ra tu re
of the modem world there i s  a  cmoealsd bias in  favour of
e ith e r lib e rty  or necessity , Which, lAiether i t  i s  intended
or no t, gives d is tin c tiv e  colouring to the psychological
evidence available#
William James I s  typ ical of th is  tendency When he w rite s* ...
W  cm  b e lie f i s  tha t the queatim  of f r e e w il l  i s  i nsoluble  on s t r ic t ly  peyUhologlc grounds . . . . .We can therefore leave me freo -^h^  question altogether out of our account." (o)I A System of a th io s. Page 404. C lea ry  and Freedom.The Batura of the Ihyslcal World.Time and Free Will.Freedom in  the osdem world, selected Papers on Philosophy. Ch. S.
i
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Yet, James leaves tha frse«w lll question out of oooount 
only fo r a few pages of th is  woarit, then, he oonsluâss with 
eonsicterable eloqumee tha t man can over-come a l l  ths 
d if f ic u lt ie s  of l i f e  and the Boiverss by the fa s t of "Pgre 
l a m #  Therefore, James does not leave out
of oooount fre e -ed ll, but he does ignore the problem of 
how th is  "pure immrd willingness" i s  possible in  a creature 
if» i^  i s  subject to sensuous impulse and endless desire*
The p la in  and s i s ^ e  fac t appears to be th a t the problem 
of Liberty end Beoessity does not belong to  aiy particu lar 
period of thought, but is  involved in  the very texture of 
thought which is  concerned with God, man, moral e ffo rt mid 
fa ilu re , causation, evolution and everythl% related to  
human and cosmic destiny* Of course, i t  i s  not aiguod 
tha t a l l  works relevant to the above-mentioned subjects 
ihouia bo prefaced by a discussion of U berty  azn H eoesei^, 
but i t  is  urged that th is  problem i s  s t i l l  central and 
basic to a l l  such discussions and ought to  reocivo fa r  more 
serious a t te n t iw  than i s  generally available in  modem 
philosophy* Been a P o litica l crusade which builds i t s  
ideology upon "Four" freedoms cannot be gxanted ocmvUete 
exsiAPtion from the serious, and perhaps tedious task of 
providing adequate grounds for i t s  po liU cal point of view, 
îhe present effo rt i s  c<moemed with Kant's Defonce of 
Freedom, and th is  Introductory Section i s  concerned with 
discussing some of the reasons which made such a defmce 
necessary, and some of the prelimi nary d if f ic u lt ie s  in  sucdi 
a defence of freedom. However, such matters can be d is­
cussed only within very r ig id  lim ita tions, a t  th is  early  
stage of the examination, and the whole treatment must be 
ten ta tive  u n til  i t  i s  possible to  indicate the outlines of 
Ktot*e aefanoe m  that defm a. u « ,  w a tt .w d  throughout
i
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the jT itlc a l PhlloeojgAy. Yet, In  epite of the Ineonoloeive 
nature of th is  Introduotory section, i t  ie  neoeeeary* Per,
without such a general and ten tative statement of the 
problems involved, i t  might not be possible to ju s tify  
Kant's somewhat ponderous and often circuitous analysis of 
th is  important oeneept, Freedom. Further, i t  might be 
argued th a t, i f  careful attm tiom  had been givm  to ce rta in  
objections to Kant's view of Freedom, the Whole treatment 
would have been d iffe ren t, or i t  would never have been 
attempted. Therefore, i t  i s  hoped that th is  very lim ited 
treatment of Kant's Defence of Freedom in  th is  Introductory 
Section w ill lessen, i f  not remove seme of the principal 
objections to h is  analysis of Freedom, and provide 
roasonablo grounds fo r proceeding with an examination of 
h is  Defence of Freedom.
(1) The element of Determinism in  human thouidit.
Kant's contribution to the analysis of Freedom can rooeive 
adequate appreciation only as that contribution is  viewed 
against the background of Determinism as an important 
facto r in philoscphicaX thought. As a "positive" statement 
on human Freedom, Kant's analysis of the concept has grave 
defec ts. Yet, i f  h is  exposition of Freedom i s  regarded 
as a  "Defence" against on aggressive and all-pervading 
Determinism, there is  more hope of a ju s t appraisal of what 
he has attempted and what he has accomplished# I t  i s  for 
th is  reason tha t so much violent and eloquent critic ism  of 
Kant on th is  point of hiaaan Freedom becomes u tte rly  
irre levan t. For, in  the la s t  analysis, a l l  tha t rea lly  
m atters is  not the symmetry, or the beauty, or even the 
id ea lity  of the comploted structure of bSMS Freedom, but 
i t s  u t i l i ty  as a habitation , and i t s  in v io lab ility  against 
a resourceful and re len tless enemy. Horitain sees the value
-  e •
of th is  argm sntf without mmy opooial reforome to Kant, 
he laOioatea the weakneaae# of the "ahstraot" freedom 
of louaooau, and the "dynasde" freedom of Hegel. (1)
However, the main point of the pre##mt argument ie  that 
any exposition of Freedom must have a positive and a 
negative eharacter in  the sense tha t i t  must empound the 
basic fac t of humm spontaneity and i t  must re s is t  every 
oonoeivahle insinuation of human bondage. I t  i s  believed 
tha t Kant has attempted to  blend these two fac to rs , end 
th a t h is  most valuable contribution l ie s  in  the negative 
phase of h is  work; tha t i s ,  in  h is "Defenoe"of Freedom 
against the imtnmions of any form of Determinism.
In  order to s ta te  fu lly  and correctly th is  'Viegative" 
contribution made by Kant another work d ifferen t from the 
present would be required. Yet, a few h in ts  upcn the 
Determinlstio background can here end now be made available. 
(A) I t  i s  sign ifican t tha t the ancient world of thought 
appears to  be everywhere dominated by some form of Fatalism 
idiich i s  only a crude and immature form of Determinism.
The terms "Moira" (Greek), "simtm" (Babylonian), "Shai" 
(Egyptian), "Karma" (Indian), and "Kismet" (Mohammedan),
N Ù Ta l l  suggest some type and degree of Fate rdiioh was only 
related to  human existsnoe, but dominated and decreed i t s  
course and destiny* 3ven the "gods" of the ancient world, 
who lived above the struggle of human beings, were, in  the 
f in a l analysis, only "secondary" d e itie s . For, behind and 
above them a l l ,  there was Fate to  whose f in a li ty  a l l  must 
bow. Further, the old Teetammt, while giving an exalted 
view of God end man, and denying the cxistonoe of Fate 
external to i t s  God, made i t  perfectly  (Avions that the 
Divins w ill was bound to  prevail in  the earth#
(1) Freedom in  the modem world. Page 41.
0C QoA «m@ MOf cmd w W titaW l th . id* , of mtttMbood Im 
@#a fw  M>« MvrntffitSTf toot &$# M sltdd trlw  of «m U Wfi - '
#l#o dMpiMd ^  ccnacpt of hi—m "im AHity"# —a i t#
W Ê
rW'
inphasie won the Grace of —d m e e—ily  perverted la te  #  
ü g id  tmm e f  oete—W em. m e eto iee —de # vaU—I
 ^ attempt te  expo—d re a l h—  freed—, hat i t  had no real
care fe r  m e irh erea t F a ta li— ef i t #  moadht, —A, a#
-I |kr. #.L. h—lde— eheervee, s td e ie n 'e  ecntrlhatian te  , 
t htn—I freed— eeneiated in  a  —tioaal recognition of the
taflC K lhility ef the eoemic order and a hr—e end oheerfWL #
to the facte  of life#^^)
Da the F ifth  eemtmer Aji#, m m U m  —do # #emAhe effo rt
to  —dhat the s p i r i t  of h ie  age and the Deteredniem of the
dhorch %y —#1% tiuit the he—a  w ill m e f r — to accept or 
# ^ e c t the w ill of mod. ttm w er, he failed  to ro ll hash 
- ÿ  ^  m e tide of Deterolnistlc th—m t heea—e he lacked the
J psydhelegieal 1—i # t  of hie epp—wt$ A#mtlBe; he Wd 
' vL very imperfect training In  h e i^  principle# ef —ra litp f
end he could —t  l i f t  the feet ef human freed— f r— i — 
P;M; ' "IheQlegieal"— extf
ThereferCf i t  me quite rmee—hie fe r Luther to eey in  the 
eimteemth c—tmgri**..*
L  "the very — , Free-w ill, m s odious to a l l  theFaHiers * H—ce, m  conclude la  aeneral. th a t
' m a n .  w t t h A W t  T f . a l v  A m m C .  « j p i d  A a A i f i  a m t iIS®1—her stressed  the devastating e ffec ts  "Oxigl—1" d a ,
■•S' j:-/ #nd Chlvin caphasised the fore-dandcdge of eed issuing in
the doctrine ef f red es tin a ti—, hut both f e l t  th a t th#y were
, ithout the Hdy —ost# an  @od*e Grace, can do no th ing— t  s in  . . . . .  and f r — one d n  f a l l s  in to  another.
the ecrip tures in  re s is tin g  ai#r attempt to  s ta te  th a t hmmm
V , —peeseSns the eerrcc t teaching ef the Chur—, t r s d i t i— —dpa
.. 4 ^
P  I  a >  » .  «Ittif enM . 1 . 8 . 8 1 8 .(a) » M # . » w $ * M 8MMÜ1 #
',p , •#/ : W S p # # S \ j Ê # i
.'■■ V - - t . 'i . - '^'i.\^ .. "vv.pv p pp' "'.’ ' . .
tM*«idUül (Mrt aaiettw ai te e ts lM  .«aid tMlcag to tu# 
i  ' -P : «rtA t or «wntfrt. a». J«m# «Mrtlnooa «htiiko «tot «w  
•BQ—n" aspect ^  <M êU m  « It—ce pot op a  reeeceetle 
f ig h t fo r h—ao frecdm  in  th a t i t  "alone eaved aay a b i l i ty  .S| 
in  wm to  obey m e o lU  of #od,"(^) m ,  the eeoti—e# 
ceph—ia  opco the — e of God and the —ana of 0—  — a 
i t  douhtfol —em er the ROaan in t—p rc ta tim  of froo-wUl 
wee vaatly  aw oaicr to  th a t offered fey Pdagio#. Both 
. Paoteatw t and Rcaam theodooiam would tunw agreed that 
s®#:,:,#imout the (hraee of dod man wae incapehle of freedom in
i
■P''vy. . : aoy real eenee* i t  mm the mmaraneee ef th is eommm gromad 
th at proapted maammaa to —he. an cmenraiom into  Thoology 
in  m e work 'm  mhero ^ h iW o " . and i t  w— wmdertaken |
—m the hope that both Proteotant and Roman theologiaaa 
woiAd aee how much they had in  oommon wpon an import—t  
tyeatiQn, and therwhy aaeiat In healing m eir diviaiooa# . #
MS
;m» foiimmliig emtraet ie  tarpidai a t a l l  that m—aama m ote .- '4 #  
. V.. .wpott the Praadon ef the w ill:# ..#  ^
'W l^ io a  a—cm to have attrifemted more then enoaik . ®>to free w ill, daotwa rather ahmdently# Lathermm: a ttrim ta  aome^ng to free w ill, but moat to the _  O n ., «f « 4 .-W )- ' . :Tvisr-ÜM aboaw foo tati— ia  important bacauae i t  indioataa how |e —ly and widely the impUcatioaa of Datamini— had fimad
W w w lw e 1# iwfm thought, mm#*# Is  aot # tbwiegU at
IM  IM bad Ma A n#*  *  DM SM#« or M# #wy « m* M M
• jtawerer, Imtber, with a ll the w ai^ t of dhriatian trad ition
ega, and| aa a rosy aatute apekeaman, he indicet— the wary 
lim ited paegreaa made in  the eaaeept of hwmen freedom*
.WhW him, make# the paaitien of seaaama appear l i t t l e
; ■- : ' # ( # #  Im dW a##
p  (1) A B M r of Bmligiaa# Val.m# PmgelW#& ; ( \  (8) Hâckunan» Luther and the Reformation# Vol.B# ha— W #'"In ^ •
y - ' J.'?:'-'/', "
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SMI fOVOlt Of JalMO A—W «0 —o W t W #
— S# of th# h—  «&U — 0 do—of to fodium# Wo—  ho 
0—34 not o4—«tvo of h—  fPiOfl— o—t t  f r — —# pro- 
— iUono of oon— mqr theology. B# #—  to W 
0 — od that W can eolv# ovosy probl— of — a ffood— 
fey My—td— the t —t  . . .  "Bithout —, y# #— do nothing"#3.V% ifM—ioh — 0  oU that —thor end Calvia fOfUi—d to —ho thoir 
p—lUo— a tm  —  000—## H tH —I —loh B— d l—otly
dori—d f—a the —otioo of the th lrto —#  go— y, odght 
have —id 00—thing worth While for h—— f r eed— i f  i t  
had pmld —re atton ti— to  Ohiioti— d—trino and la— to 
Ohrioti— "f—Ung". HO—wot ,  ito  p w eeo—a t l — with 
piety of 00— t  rath— th— olaxity of th—ght lo ft i t  
on a oido-dino — fa t — Swologiool t —o—tru o ti— was
00— d. Smu —a t found hi—olf oonfmAod wi— a typo 
of — Iflgloa1 ootoxmtni— which hod a l l  the prowUgo of 
Ohfiatiaa thought and t —d iti—, —d wbiW* had —l ow—d the 
W#xy to— o of phileo—hy and —t—hyoi—•
(H), Ala— oddo #  W^o fhodogioal Dote—daian, the— —a 
g—dually owoM— What Wight W tatmod a typo of "ooio—ifio " 
Ooti—tai—I The —io atifio  die— tioa of oopo—io—,
BOplor end d a lll— had igpottaat iapHoatica# fo r  o—toopo—xy 
philoatphy, and the— at# clear iadi—t i —o Siat BChh— woo
1—tooaod With the la — of —t i — ia tl—tod fey duAil—«CD 
%a f—t ,  ho w— the f iro t to atto—t  to  t — for —— 
phygioal ph— I to puyWhalogy, —d, wp— the haaia of 
—oh a t— fore—#$ ho o—owndod a —w and challo—lag %p# 
of "HyOhol—i —I * note—Ini—• Ho ia  not fcdly o— ipatod 
f —B the "thociogioal" pro—pp—i t i —a of hi# go— tient 
hot ho —t  ia  —t i — a world of i —  which only — hod
—tw rity i n  JO—th— Hd—rd a ...# . —hWa writ—#-
(1) —oyl. of —a g i— aad Bthi—# V d. g. Pago 7—.
J
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"aW rty  necessity are ooasletm ti  —Ich,because they proceed from th e ir  w ill, proceed from lib e rty , and y e t, because every ac t of men's w ill, and every deuLre, and Inclination  prooeedeth from some cause, ««d that from another cause, im a continuai Chain, —ose f i r s t  link  i s  in  the hand of God. —e f i r s t  of a l l  causes, proceed from neeesG lty."\^'
This le  a new approach to the question of Determinism emd
lopressed i t s e l f  upon splnosa, Leihnls and Locke, except
th a t Splnosa had a special contribution to mako to the
question of Determinism and I t  might be said to be a mixture
of mathematical genius and relig ious penetration quite
beyond the capacity of Hobbes.
The contribution of Locke to Determinism must be examined 
In  greater d e ta il a t  a la te r  period; yet, here and now, i t  
i s  possible to indicate how deeply he was Impressed with 
the arguments of Theological Determinism. Bis d ifficu lty  
Is  stated  In a le t te r  to Holynsux, a few years a f te r  he 
had completed h is work "Sssay on Human understanding".
Locke w rltesi-
"X cannot make freedom in man consistent with omnipotence or omniscience In God; though I  am fu lly  persuaded ofboth as of any tru ths I must freely  assent to . And iHerefore I  have long le f t  off the consideration of that question, resolving a l l  Into th is  short conclusion — tha t I f  I t  be possible for God to make a free agent, then man i s  fre e , though I see not the way of lt." v 2 ;
Here, Locke is  expressing the position of a host of thinkers 
of h is  generation —o had discovered tha t Theological 
Determinism had received fu rther confirmation from "Scientific 
or Psychological" Determinism. Bishop Butler (ld9£-1752), 
placed a l l  the power of h is  position and learning on the 
side of human freedom, but h is  effo rt was Ineffective 
because he declined to take time to understand Determlniam 
In e ither i t s  Theological or Psychological form, and d is ­
missed the —ole under the charge of Fatalism. Dr. Richard 
Price (1723-91), Blade a very resmarkable stand for the
(1) Leviathsn. Pt.B. Oh. 81#(8) Hssay on Human Understanding. Fraser, Vol.Z. Page 316.
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; - '  #:.® -###lity 0f f r —40», sud, —  s t i l l  g rsa ts r  a t ts a H —'t#
^  h ls  ssntxal —#ss$ #Wht bsv# —tW pm tW  fitfxl. BvWiV—,
H h# fin&lsd to  fo lio#  up mis Iwportoot dl##ovs%y of tb#
® < m m l l«ni and ths msMmmX xmtmm of —&| oni hl# M m t#
p ÿ ^ ® :  ' with Dr. MostlOQr —  Froodo» and Dsts—lnlsm oan only
b# daoorihad in  t s —s of o osll-ordsrad and dignified
" F—  fo r # s  — 0  of ha—m fo—don» Lntor, Im #
% V anaatnstion of the Detemdnl— of Jonathan ndnard#, i t
t d l l  h# oh##F##d th a t mny woioea were —lead on hoh a lf
® ® of hman freedom, hot net one pee— ed the a b ili ty  to  oWUL
a  h a lt  to the hold and — H e r  Determinism apparent in
QoUlne and mm* i t  i e  ne enedderation te  say Hmd
colline  and Rome simply rode through the ranks of the few
#  fig h te rs  f e r  huann freedom with a  disdain ehioh me# 1—0—19—
for them to eem—n l. —ward# was f a r  more — hie on th is
f —stism  of U herty  and fe e e se itr  —an Colline or H—a,
—d h is  —St— e f Betexmtni— ie  e—P—te ly  free  f r — am—
p ® tempt fo r h is  ojwenante. f a t ,  —e pt—Lioati— of h ie  wesh' ■ '''V'y # " "  In  1791 ——sd to  s e t t le  the i — f e r  a l l  t l —f —d
r
i
to  the prehlam. — logieal m — i— had be— toott^
Detexmtni— was t r t —ph—t*
th is  was the s ta te  of a f fa ir s  t —If —a t —«nid h ie  a tten H —
M X: — ed hy "fioi—t i f —" netexmfnien, —d th is  fernIdahla 
a l l ia —e seemed Inoapahie ef defeat, so d e #  w— thiO
— i a t l — th a t, mesy years a f te r  — 'a  bmr—ee of Freed—L<-'' '
. . .I . ' '% W , W m  w ew a tod i Btnrt HmmM . m MA m t* > >
' ' "The ereot s t r —gle bet—  the determlnlst and the , inda ternW et,oetw een  the epp— t  and stsstai—r  o f , ' the free—m of the w ill , has —ded te«^iy, a f te r  —reth— 8,000 y e a r^  eospletely in  f— r  o f 'th e  detezm niet. The hum— w ill h— no —re freed— ——at of the higher animals. . . . .  In  the la s t  o—tuzy, îthe dog— of lib e rty  was fo%ht with g—eral philosophie ^; r . and ooamslesi—1 arwum—te .  The ninste—th e—tncy ^has g i—a — vexy d iffe r—t  weap—a f e r  i ts  off—tive d—trw eti— . . . . .  the powerfm w—P—s —iflh — find in  the arsenal of 0—paratl— physiology and S—In ti—«"U)
(1) The Riddle e f  the Uhiver—• Ch.7.
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Am tHtmâr iftaM » I t  la  «Ojr «ei&iwt t t ia  Damagrom l  af 
DataaMalatta « n * » t «ant'a aaoWWUon le  m a i *  
mau te  mMemrteaâ. «tta awaatUM  et w i i t i m atm te 
AaaaMy ra te tte  aad afpaate ie  «Ma iWa ta  
tew M l. Zf a a »  eppeattlea ia  oaiam talan aaai te  
iarinafl la  iaaaa mt «MtaUva* Meatea, * •  I t  hla aapoalilaa 
a f "Veatilaa* »>i*»a aapaaaa wwalaiaa ia  t t ta  aaa aa> 
pealeaaet item, » aaa  faaia w a t te  aaaaaiad aa laaviiatea* 
■aewver, e t amaa telmga l a i  la  aw laaaa , ami i t e a  aM 
tea i ih la  B aiaatoU ila iWa aaai te  tmarn* a d  aaaia j mli 
ami that ih« te a i a *  Im a i a  l i  a a  te  faaad and v a l a i*  
la  ia  aaw ia a ^ te fa ia  t a  team  taat e a , te  a d lia « -■ESwrttiS
d—iJ S ^ ie e â i»la re  fieeâi  àm—wlB##" (*)
(»  TTii mmiiS r  nurfir îriTir-iinifim "  rntrr ifrrîîm
I t  ie  (ttitid d lt te  eh—  — g the m ltitud#  of — egeo 
«feUehXe im  Xoal eo emtrmet —  #  hie — o itim  
to  Dote—Mem in  plein md «i—A* teme« témoin the 
feUewUlB éUA serve the pnvpoeei*
m m ie ee e e # t te  h# tm » sosel sense he — t
g t j s  a  S u
As the oontimlng pessogs W leetes, Kent is  hsss dsfytng 
the tenets ef theeloctesl flotemlnlm mieh tsu ^  thet mm 
hsd been sseeted m— %" %y ded# end# further, met ty 
esms ef "irvesÊstlhte" d— $ "enred" ma me the reoipient 
ef "HOoessitstéd" geedsess*
A s type e f Iheelogteel oeteateiesi thidh —de en #  # 
deetvtne psseliae edeht oppeer — te  or net oheedste, end
{ai io îJS ien* 4BU
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K(—i'«  W m ce of Froedom against such ideology miaht 
«pp—t  —tiq —t#d$ Yet# i t  oust be ineisteô that i t  ie  
quite iapoesible to  mderetmd mmt'a view of Freed— 
without dee tegerd to thi# type of m tem W etie  envi—1« 
ment. Furthevi i t  w ill be mode clear a t # la te r eteg# Of
the di&oweion thet only those tW  w m  0 vetsr supesfleisil 
hnowle%o of the preblmm inhereot in  Liberty end 9— Oily 
wan afford to im ore the e#pee#d antiquated ao tl—s Of 
Thedogiml Detemini—# Be th is  a# i t  way# %mt# hawiag
grounded Frsedem upon dO if'##tem im tiw  aad W ated the## 
too ooQoepts to Sbmlity# i s  pm^eetXy wssse that # *  0 
&sld atateswnt ia  no sure defenoe against Theologieai 
Bet—slmiem# Ms esanat ignore the ewstaml — e#t of 
swm Determinism# that ia# dad; and he is  eowpelled to 
take into aooount the inplieatiess 9S suoh a e—a # t  for 
Freedom sad —m iity# font sees th is need very early in  
h is espesitisa ef freedom# sad say* something eWoh asst 
have some aa a lAe# to fheolegioal DeterwWets sad ewe# 
to  Theological M bertarisns
"3b look, hovever# on a l l  rewards end pmiah#wt# is merely the neêhlnery in  the hmd a higher power#Wbdah la  to serve only to set rational or—tores striving a fte r #&eir fin a l nod (happdneaa)# th is  is  freeSa®»t$^^ w ül to  a wohanism destruotive
#sse# Sant is  nehi## xwfe— e to  the dsstrwetlve t —dsoeiea 
inherent in  shat he te r— «— erwseny"# axri la te r he ssAea 
i t  quite d e a r tw t even the w ill of wed #reoted  to n—
#m. he a fern ef W s  het#%emas#.(^) i t  w ill heees# e W e #  
no the ewMrfnati— ef nsat*s view ef iweeden pr— ds that 
ho has WBtesed we# a# entre—]y d iffieu lt t a ^  she# he 
t nshled Miis — 1 paroble# of Theelegieai Deterudnla»# 
fveq— ly h is as#s#e#t is  iaacmdstent# but the main point 
i s  that he is  eenee—ed with *e#atih@ # e  in s li—tiens of
m
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V th is  type of Detexmlhism, end, vi|M  te the vemy end of ;
 ^ Mm # p W tlw  of Freedom# he # tt# P t#  t# etete hi# pomitlm
In elearer languege* Pexhep# the following extroet give#
the meet edeq—te Imte— teUon M hie peint of vie#:-
"avexythiem mankind fm eie# he oan do# over mod Ohove good morel oonduat# in  order to make hlmealf  .ae—ptahle to God# la  mere faiae worahip of the Deity#"W
’"t.:
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Further# i t  —at be noted thet Samt«e etteoh mpen the }j
X^.y. [ uletive" mag—mate fo r the emietanee of God eet forth
in  "The Critique of Pore Re— " emaatitet# mm indiroet
etteok upon TheologieAl Detarmini—, The eoneeptimm ef S
God thieh i# here eritie ieed  im the eoneeption shiOh ie  
eemdeeiv# to aooh petermlniaw» I t  ie  not eoggeeted that 
S # t —eeeeded in  th ie teak — la g—orally  enppoeed# hotV h ie  —in  purpose ia  to  peetulate a God ahoee operation and -.-iM 
MiOF—te r  ehall be e—eieten t with the fhmde—mtal valaee 
e f — l i l y  mad Freedom, sent ham been eha—ed with .
making God a  mere appendage to an already eadating eyetem 
ef human morality# and there are ample g— da fo r eog& #  
ehargo. Further, i f  the log ical eoneaqa—eea ef X—t*a 
e ta t—m te mpen God had been worked out# there eon be M ttl#  
doObt tha t Sent'a deity  eeuld he abe— to  be "limited"# i f  
mot impotent# and th ie  In # i t#  ef a l l  the —rtaphyaieal" 
a ttribu te#  K—t  aeerlbes to  Ged ap— grounds ef mozality.
FOt# the import—t  feet is  that Hast deUberately "eenSitieosd ' 1 
God in  thie new moral emsee# b— so he —  quite elearSy ^  
that the God ef traditional Theology is  the sure fotmdatiem 
of Theelogieol Dotermimi—; and Smnt's i —1—ehle oppoMtiWt 
to  eWk a type ef Bets—Inism is  great e——h to eempel him ^  
to re^ereate even God. This relentless opposition to 
Theolegieal Determinism driv— Sent into entremely a # —— * 
situotloms. For# h—img pestulated God upon moral gre—ds#
‘ V
(1) heligiem. BempleFs Transi Rk.4* dpotome S. eeet*#*
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«nd thereby —king Ela the very core and c itadel of moral 
values, Kant sees another grave danger In such a posta* 
la tio n . I f  God is  fu lly  and fin a lly  a "Moral" being, 
then I t  follows tha t a l l  moral laws must flow from Kls 
w ill. However, i t  Is  the "Divine" w ill that Kant h— 
regarded as a source of heteronssy, and even a "morally" 
Divine w ill oan be a danger to man's essen tia l autenosy» 
Therefore, th is  dread of "determinism" in  God makes Kant 
perfoim some rather dubious fea ts  in  Theology. Having 
postulated God as a, moral Being, he declines to postulate 
Rim as the — —" ef moral Laws.
"Fer i t  i s  these very laws that have led us# in  v irtue ef th e ir  Inner p rac tica l necessity, to the postulate of a self»suff ia ie n t cause, or ef a wise Ruler of the world, in  order tha t throi%h such agency effect may oe given to them. Ve say no t, w erefore, in  reversal of such procedure, regard th— as accidental and as derived f r — the mere —11 of the Ruler, especially as we have no conception of su— a w ill, except as formed in  accordance with these laws. go fax, then, as p rac tica l reason has the righ t to serve as our guide, we sh a ll not look UP— actions as obligatory because they are the ecmmands of God, but —a l l  regard th— as divine oommandÿ^^ecause wo have an inward obligation to
To say the very le a s t ,  th is  is  a remarkable and clever 
illu s tra tio n  of special pleading or even question-beggtng 
argument. However, i t  is  impossible to deal with th is  
important matter a t th is  early stage, and, la te r ,  i t  w ill 
be observed that Kent i s  cosqxelled to modify th is  dubious 
aigunmnt when he attempts to postulate the existence of Ged 
as the "judge" ef the correct re la tion  between Happiness 
and Virtue, Here and now, th is  point ie  raised to  in d i­
cate Kant's opposition to every conceivable in trusion  ef 
Theological Determinism, and to  indicate th a t, in  ths 
absence of an adequate grasp of such opposition, h is  Defence 
of Freedom becomes almost u n in te llig ib le .
(1) K.r.V. A. 818.
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iC squally —«ksA* Im foot# I t  ie  sms of the —Am strçnds
im Me Dsfsnos of Frssdsou This typ# ef ustm inisoi hsd 
ma— sARpert from —pirioim»# sud the —ois of Ths c n t i s i l  
Philoso—y asm he ssid te  hs s  reply to the ohsllmgs of 
mspiFioism,(^) I t  is  mot possible to est— —em m detsilod 
soooust of Xamt'e reply to "ooieatifio" Dete—Inism, for 
thi# is  ths mejSF tssk of ths pressât so—# smd most hs 
dealt with a t a la te r period of th is  ommrtnwtlom of mmt's 
Defooo# of Pffssdsm* YOt# i t  is  possible to gfirs a few 
hints opem the msmaer im —ieh Kant spisroaehes th is task# 
firs t#  XoBt sooepts the arguasst for the in flsx ih llity  #f 
the eaosal series# hot hs attempts $e prove that if  # e  
—«sailed eansal series oonstitote the only interprétation 
of — elity# them# the se—ept hesemes imvolrsd im 
eemtradiatiOB#
ie —ad# there most he s  type ef osnsality ehi— is  sem» 
sisten t with ths oeneept of Preedem# and ehioh makes i t  
peSeiMe to segard fre edom end ’tetuxal" eausatiom as 
eslstind side hgr side.
Third# i f  mm is  solely and simply Determined ty  the eemsal 
series# them i t  beeoaes impe—iMe te  give m  adequate 
aaeotint of desert, guilt# even sspiriQal rewards sad 
puni—monts# and the rea lity  ef taw meral Imm vanish— 
under the deluge of sense impressions#
AS the luwoeeding emmsdmatim m ill indieate# Kent Ivrelve» 
h is  Defense ef FTeeden im almost endless sanifieatiens e f 
these basie faets, but i t  m ill besoms clear that a ll the# 
he has to say is  more imoliaed to be dirested against a l l  
fosns of irntermimiem than fo r a positive statement upon
ir
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d )  Dr# H*J« hatem# The Catégorisai Imperative. Page
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th is  deoislve, uzioompzoalslag opposition to  DotozsLnlsn 
to  found ia  a  varie ty  of forme in  Kent. I t  ie  the founda­
tio n  upon —ioh he ereote h ie nouawnal and phenomenal 
worlds f the pivot from which he attempt e to  in te rp re t 
natural and freedom causality , and the reason Why he re ­
je c ts  "Happiness", in  the ascepted sense, aa oompatihle 
with rea l virtue* Therefore, those c r i t ic s  of Kant Who 
find a fa ta l  defect in  h is  exposition of Freedom because 
i t  i s  largely  a  *9egative" Freedom, overlook th ie  important 
fac t th a t , in  the main, Kant could not help being negative 
because the g reater p a rt ef h is  exposition i s  conseznsd with 
opposition to DetezminisBU fu rth e r, they f a l l  to  under­
stand the depth of the hold Determinism had upon a l l  forms 
of thought, and the depth of i t s  continuing challenge to 
a l l  forms of freedom, Kant denies tha t ho is  able to 
ju s tify  and "explain" human freedom, and, i f  h is  om words 
are to have may w ig h t, the whole of The critique of Pure 
Reason was taken up with the task of proving the "possib ility" 
or "thinkability" of freedom*
fu rth e r, he declined to enter upon a "Refutation" ef 
Determinism but purposely termed h is  exposition a "Defence" 
of freedom. Again, h is  pre-occupation with Freedom com­
pelled him to make i t  one of the main, i f  not the principal 
object of metagdmrsical thought,(8) but he i s  careful to  
point out th a t freedom is  cnly an Idea. Thus, Kant has 
expressed h is  opposition to Theological and aaientifle 
Determinism, and i t  i s  in sis ted  tha t h is exposition of freedam 
cannot be understood unless due regard is  paid to  such 
opposition*
1) Preface to  K,p,V, Ô) Preface to K.p*V* 3) Qd. 94.
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(3) fr  — P*te»i i inl te.
me leading exp—onle #  —teemWem in the e ig h t# # #  
oentvry are Antheny colU— (1—M Tad), Levd taam  (1#&# 
178a)s D—Id  martl— <170G«1757}| JWmthm 3d«asd» (ITOSNLTfiS), 
Bwrid m a i (1 7 ll« l7 7 e) m d joeeph Priestley (1733#— ) ,
%t ie  Impevtmt to ohe—  thmt the hbovementiomd p—  
do not eonetitnto m »t might be tonad  m — 1" of 
Betoxminim. i t  ie  t a n  that they had erne thing in  oemmm 
md that m e a pmfomd — io tim  that the dehat# #en#em- 
ing liberty  and Maoeaeity aould# aad oaght to be# aattled  
upm atxiotiy —piviaal gromdg# Yet fan or the onpment# 
of Datendnim would have bam preparad to aao # t the 
and a—m ativa m piria im  of man. y— inatamee# Janathm 
—aaipdai the damtwmt f  ignta of eightae«%h«omta— Dot—« 
winiamf had am— in  aaanm with the Xdealim of — eley ,(l) 
and# although hie Detamiaian ataada related to that af 
Wam$ he deplarea axgr attagpt ty  hi# oaotanporariea to 
aasooiate hie eyatam with that af Sma*^^ ytirthati L—d 
Im aa, While admiilng  nueh of man*# phil— hy# fa it  i t  
inpaaatiwa to  d iffe r from him upon v ita l qmatione in  Morwlm 
md naligim , md hi# wo— maaaya on the Prinaiplea af 
—ra lity  and mtmml naiigim " (17—) ## waa w rittm  to 
oarxwat, i f  not to rahaha m»a*« handling a f thane aWhjaota* 
dgadn# m  bmad philoaophiaal gromda# Prioatley had naan 
in  aannm with hi# "yraa f i l l"  apponmt, Hiehaxd P—aa 
(1783#1701) t thm  with Hartley whoae sobearvntiona on Mm** 
(17—) m e written to  mwa—$ m  j—yaiolagiaal ground## 
the ——m inim  im which P—entley waa ao deeply in te r—tad# 
— my OoUina am  bo tamed a —iat# but i t  ia  — tf — 
Whether my of the ahovemmtlonad anpemota af n a tm — m
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claaalfiid  unàar aueh a tern# and i t  w —# W gfoit&y 
i m  to  M ii—t  that Doim mold — identified —
■ —teifwdwim.
 ^ a>  She DdtemWem #  Remee i#  MLIt, to a v # y  Im## 
dogroof open that eopomdod fey A—hofly co llim  (1717), 
enteyt im erne po—ape rathe# movel fea— . Lord Rmee
eemo— that am  baa a real eeaeeioomee# of wedea* fb a t 
jUf earn baa a profomd vealimg" that he ie  free im hie 
ew iee and aetUae* herd m—  argom that —ie  feeling 
af Freedom «net net he ignored fey Deter—niete , fer i t  ie  
^N - ja feeling Which ie  tmpamtéd fey Ged te  «are earn from deogadr.
Xm other aorde, men ie  Petemined in the meet «mot mmner 
In  a l l  his wil l i ng and ae%h%# hot thie fee lii#  ef rreede# 
ie  iapertant in  that i t  ie  a hind ef diviae deeeptiea  ebieh 
preaotee morality end prerente degpair. Lord Rmee hae 
l i t t l e  eqpport fo r eeeh aa «eplanatiom ef liberty  ami neeeeetty 
from any w riter cm —texaiaUa* Jmathea adearde repaa|« 
ate# e—h am em lm atioa of preedem a# being imemeietemt 
with morality im god #md mm. Therefore# i t  ie  fe lt th a t 
a  reaeenable enpoeitlon of Detmmimiem fey colUne w ill 
Joetify the neglect ef Lord Rmee#
(g) The eeatribetien of Hartley to Detezniniem ie  la —ely 
wpom phyeiol ogteal gromde# Me bee l i t t l e  to eey W may 
iaportaaee upon the central problem ef —bcioe"# and he 
d—ifeepataly ignorée a l l  eontenporery egpoeitione ef rreedem 
mtd Heceeeily. Hie banditng of the ebbject of DotereWgm 
iadieatm  that he hae merer reed Maw# end hie —edogieal 
imterpretatiom of Detexmiai«n ie  tee emüRmted to receire 
eerie— attemtiom. Therefore# cem—deratiom ef Hame'e —  
tribution to DetemW m b U i mete than ocapeoeate fo r # e  
neglect of Hhrtlcy*
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(3) The Detezmln&em of Prioetley eoiulete of a veigr 
U slted  Ixitoxpsotatloa of th a t eapomdad by Jomathm 
aawaNt# Fxieatler had more In teree t in  9hemi#tiy thm  
In theology # and he f a l l s  to reprodaee large saetlons of 
admards* argument for Determinism eb ile  h is mmtaphysioal 
aaalygls of Determinism i s  elementary. Therefore# i t  i s  
f e l t  that a diseussion of the expositions of oetendnism 
offered by Oellims# aume end sdmards m ill provide the basis 
princip les necessary to enderstamd the Determinism of the 
eighteenth eenttny*
Hemsver# before proceeding to  an analysis of the easwsitions 
of Collins# Hume and Sdeards# there are tmo important points 
Ohioh must be noted;-
F ir s t ; I t  i s  impossible to  proceed to  the analysing of 
eighteenth-oentnry Detexmiaima s ith o st a lim ited discnssien 
of Looks. As already stated# the common fac to r shieh 
underlies suA  Determinism i s  the rhole#hearted acceptance 
of Jsmplrlclsm# and the aipiriclsm  of eighteenth«oontary 
Determinism i s  the aqpirieism of Locke# shidh had been 
Inherited from HObbes. Collins# a fa ith fu l d isc ip le  of 
Imoke# i s  coasineed th a t h is  master mas agslnst the aooeptanse 
of the Freedom of the Will#(^) Yet# i t  w ill become clear 
in  an examination of Locks tha t Collins uas viewing only one 
aspect of h is  m aster's exposition on Freedom. Be as 
i t  may# lecke must receive seme amount of a tten tion  because 
of two very important reasons* (a) Leske l i f t s  the problem 
of Liberty and Necessity out of i t s  age-long G eological 
contant# and# Vhether he w illed or not# Locks i s  one of the 
boildsrs o€ rhat might be termed "PsyWuAogieal Detenoinlsm".
(b) Locke also ankes a real a t t e s t  to re la te  the debate 
upon Liberty and lecessity  with concepts of m orality.
(1) A Philosophical Znqfoity Qoncemix^ Human Liberty. Page 41.
♦ ao ^
Qollias gxnsped these two Important cMntribotime of Xodce# 
and w r ite e t*
«X have miaertsken to Whew th a t the sotlona X edvanoe ere . eo fa r  from belag Inoeneletent with# th a t they are the sale fouadatleoa ef morality .  . .*1 have Ino titu ted  my dieaooree, a  A il(#% M ael Xasulry e t a . ,  beoauae X prepoee only to prove my poiat by eoMsienee and reaeoQ*. oidlttlns a l l  ooneidmnatioQe a t r ie t ly  Xheologleal*'' (*)
OetlixM does not keep to th ie  la s t  resolution in  a e tr io t
mnmer# fo r he does make sone referanoe to  Geology in  hi#
diaaoaeim  of aetemininn# but hi# referenoe# are auadliaxy
not fUBdanontal to h ie theaia .
in  aeleoting colline# Hune md a&#arde ae tru ly  ^
repr eeeptative of eiaht eenth«*oentuxy D etem W etio  thought#
i t  ie  inevitable th a t the ##haaie nuet be upon the oontxi*»
bution node by adeard# fo r i t  la  f e l t  th a t he alone graaped
the e o n o ^  of Deteminlaa with a l l  i t#  eaeential faut#
end lap lieationa. There men be l i t t l e  doubt th a t aduarde
i e  the greatoat exponm t of B etendaisa in  the hietosy of
philoeephy, #nd$ in  the f in a l aoalyeie, the Bhntiaa Defenoe
of gr eeden m e t be a  defenee of f r eedom against the agreeeive
and mamsive in te rp re ta tim  of Detendniea offered by Mmorde.
guah a  statement m e t sm ear degpatie a t  th is  early stage
of the dl sonssiem of the Kant ian  Defense of Freedom# and,
to  reduce th is  elemmt of dagmatim# the foUemlng points
m y be of value#
(a) fraditifln  has lepged marked Jomathan mdu&rd# as the 
greatest G e o l ^ m  m d mtagSysieian prodooed by smerioa. (9) 
muever# h is  lafluenee baa not been oenfined to  Aasvioa# 
and B ritish  sm olar# have reoogoleed h is  genias in  no mmm»» 
t a ia  terms. WLr James msek intssh , a  oonte&yorary of mdmrds 
«rote th a t G is  pover of subtle argument i s  perhaps mmatehed# 
esvtainXy msmpaseed among men.» Dugald s teu a rt th o u ^ tHi :A IM toM sM tal 2bgi#xv Coaouslqg Boam U W rty . PrcfaM .WeeflWMge BiXagr* M m otn thought. Fugo n .
. g i ­
be ought to be ranked with Leilmls and Kant# and S ir Leslie 
Stephen appears to ooafixB th is  view. Dr* I  .A. Dormer 
tioUlht that Msards had w ritten the most acute work on the 
Freedom of the W ill,(^) end James HoCoah says: W s  Freedom
of the Will is  the aoutest work ever w ritten on th is  per­
plexing subjeot.'*(^) Gomas Huxley has paid a merited trib u te  
to adwards When he w ritesi-
**In 1764# the famous Calvinistio divine# Jonathan adwards * . . .  produoed in  the in te re s ts  of the s ts lo te s t orthodoxy# a demonstratiom of the neoessarisn thesis# G ieh  has never been eq u a lly  .In power# and certain ly  has never been refuted."
IB) Bdwards is  almost the perfect exponent of what has 
been termed "PayWhologieal Determinism"# but he i s  also 
the master of the richest heritage of " G eological Deter­
minism"# and here he i s  f i t  to be ranked with Augustins and 
Calvin# and appears vastly superior to LuGsr. He does 
not make th is  aspect of Determinism fundamental to  h is work# 
but he loses no opportunity of making i t  a formidable buttress. 
(C) Before produsing h is  work on G e Freedom of G e Will# 
adwards had given very serious consideration to Ge contri­
bution of Hume on Determinism# sad# although he repudiates 
G e conclusions of Hume in  morality and kindred questions, 
he stands greatly  indebted to Hume in  h is  treatment of 
Causaticm. Bdwards declines to accept the major premise 
of Hume upon th is  important subject# but ho refra ins from 
Charging Hume wiG G e denial of b e lie f in  Causation WhiG 
was hurled a t Euse by Reid. B&Ger, Bdwards uses G e 
implications of Hume's essen tial view of Causation to create 
a system of Philosophical Hecessity Which i s  a real con tri­
bution to h is  system of Determinism*
(1) Hours in  a lib ra ry , Vol*Z, Page 404,(2) A gystem of Christian e th ics . Page 264,(3) Scottish Philosophy. Page 183,(4) Bsssy on Hume. Page 224.(5) G e Active Powers of G e Human MGd, SesSy I .  Chapter 4,
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W% G# WMNM*% Me natore amd «xpcManaa
takaa # #  fom  #f an Zdaalima a#W& amvad Mm twm G# 
MaptloUm of #m a, #m& #w# Mm am in a l^ t  la to  real 
jmvaMty WMG 1# Mamat xantlam la  itm foam and pamaion* 
la rG ari Ma aapaaW  amphaala apam Twaiaa aakaa i t  I#* 
paaaiMa fa r Mm G  aaoapt tha Matma of mama G at the 
maaeea aaa Ge almve of the paaaiama. Mt# Me amttamaXlmi 
M# aatMma af the efaw>oonfid«tae aa appaamt la  # e  
DotaamMam i f  coXlima#
(B) Za adMtlam to G# maWtyaleM «M il M Maaa## he 
la  erne of the gaeatoat aapeaW etal paqwholMlata of amOaam 
timaa# Me %m# ^  **A »arm tivf M MmMalmg oamaemMema* 
(1730) «- la  the eaaefoi aaooa# of fiietGm M  ahaaveetieme# 
and eaa be reeked M G that *oM of William Jamie 
«IbMatlea #f aeUgioea mmpMdamee" ^  eaeeptimg G at WÊmxâm 
meie eoGel pexaoaM eemtaat MG the ««GjeeG of am# 
golifllaaa ##eM«me«m# therefore, Me pematmtleg Gaetave* 
tioea am ae#  #Moa«0M#i3L oonoepG am GMiwaticm* am# 
beeed upon G et may tm Wmef "CllitlG ie #etm# ami mwMGImgly 
beooma l#ae#M G .
G e abewe awmtlomed feaGxem of Ge meteaMMm ê t  
moeeada ImOleeG and maatt # ig>e«ial t ieetment of Me am^  
poMtiam# and i t  1# beped G et fuwGae ammlyala of adGtewG# 
#m tmy imtermWm w ill oonflma G la point of Mew#
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and idoaUsm alike  are faced with a problem to ehleh| 8 0  f a r ,  phlloeophy hme found no eatiefaotory eolutlen. Thie ie  the problem of ehoeing how we have knowledge of other things then ourself and the operations of our own mind. Locke oonZders th is  problem, but idiat he says is  obviouslyunsatisfactory.   ...................................... .....................................Locke s ta tes  th a t lib e rty  depends upon the necessity of pursuing true happiness and upon the government of our passions. This opinion he derives from h is  doctrine tha t private and public in te rests  are iden tical in  the long run . . . ,
(Bertrand Bussell. History of Western Philosophy.,Pages, #35, #38.)
**ind thus, by a due consideration, and examining any good proposed, i t  is  in our power to ra ise  our desires in  a due proportion to the value of tha t good, whereby in  i t s  turn and place i t  may come to work upon the w ill, and be pursued. Per good, though appearing and allowed ever so great, yet t i l l  i t  mas raised desires in  our adnds, and thereby made us uneasy in  i t s  want, i t  reaches not our w ills , we are not within the sphere of i t s  a c tiv ity , our w ills  being under the deteaatnatlom only of those uneasinesses which are present to us, idtieh (whilst we have any) are always se lio itin g | and ready a t  hand to give the w ill i t s  nextdetermination.................................................. . . .  . . .  . . .  . . .Per. the mind having in  most cases, as is  evident in  ex­perience. a power to suspend the execution and sa tisfac tion  of any of I ts  desires; and so a l l ,  ene a f te r  another, i s  a t  lib e rty  to consider the objects of them, examine them on a l l  sides, and weigh them with o thers.*
(Locket Be say Concerning Human TMerstanding."Power". 47-48.)
"Pree agency with Locke thus consists a t  la s t  in  "power to  suspend" vo lition . But unless in  th is  man r ise s  above a merely natural causation of motives, he is  no more eth ica lly  free in  suspending the voluntary execution of a desire than in  any other exercise of w ill. A power to suspemd vo lition  necessarily thus dependent, leaves man s t i l l  a part of the mechanism of nature."
(Dr. A.C. PTaser: Poot-aote to Locke*s Bssay.v o l. I ,  page 345,)
"Mr. Locke sayst- "The w ill s ign ifies nothing but a power ora b ility  to prefer or choose"............But the Instance hementions, does not prove tha t there is  anything else in  wil l i hft* but merely p referring ; . . . .  so ^ t  i f  we carefully dLstlhgulch the proper objects of the several acts of the w ill, i t  w ill not appear by th is , and such-like instances, tha t there is  any difference between v o lition  and preference."
(Bdwards, The Preedom of the Will: Part 1, Sect. 1 .)
J
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There can be l i t t l e  doubt tha t Loeke se t out to expound a 
eye tern of Determini#*. Ae already observed, hie intim ate 
friend and dieoiple$ Colline, had no doubt th a t Loeke «me 
a Detexaialstf and there ie  a very in te resting  Observation 
by lecke upon the a b il i ty  of Collins to grasp h is rea l 
meaning. I t  i s  quoted by or# A.C. Praser in  h is  in tro ­
duction to Locke's ThiBsy on the Human understanding.
Writing to  Collins, Locke says: . . .  "You have # ccsprehcnsive 
knowledge of i t ,  and do not s tick  in  the incidents, ehiOh 
I  find momy people do#"(^) Sovovor, i t  i s  possible to  ask 
«Aether the system of Determinism esqHxmded by Locke in  
th is  work i s  consistent with i t s e l f .  Re ra ises  a host of 
problems, which, i f  pressed to th e ir  logical oenolusion, 
would have compelled him to  modify the system of Determinism 
he was se t upon expounding. Bis le t te r  to Molyneos, a l ­
ready quoted, indicates the very deep tnoertalndy, i f  not 
inconsistency of his views won Liberty and Beoessity, and 
h is  elaboration of these views In the Bsssy does not decrease 
the imoortainty.
m  the chapter en title d  "Power", he se ts fo rth  upen the 
troubled waters of th is  vast and complicated subject, and 
i t  i s  obvious th a t by the term "Power" he means the causal 
process. He does not use th is  la t te r  term in  say diroot 
and f u l l  meaning, but i t  i s  clear th a t i t  i s  the csnsal 
process which leads him to the discussion of the w ill. 
Purther, «Aen he comes to  discuss the "Ideas of Relation of 
Cause and Bffect", in  a  la te r  chapter, he has very l i t t l e  
to  say because he has exhausted the theme under the heading
Cl) The Bsssy on the Human bhderstanding# In tro , page 65.
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Of "Power"* He begins by observing th a t tabs mind sm ss 
to  tbs kaoeledge of tAe oanssl prooess or "Foeer" by 
"sefleeting also on what passes within i t s e l f ,  and obeerr> 
lag a  w n stsn t <Aaz%# of i t s  ideas, sometimes by the im- 
praseion of sutwasd ohjeots on the s m e s ,  end sometimes 
by tbs deteminatiOB of i t s  own ohoioe#"(l) IM te  would 
have h is  readers beliewe th a t "Power" i s  thas a  "WLw^e"
I6m  whiah Is  the re su lt of msay other ideas# i s  #
theosf of the causal process Ihhssdted by msse, but ssALfied 
in  a  weiy constderahle mssnsr. However, to Lecke, the 
iwocess has a  positive and a negative sw ee t, th a t 
i s ,  Fewer to  %mhe" a  Wecge mad Power to  "reeeive" a change, 
o r, as he terms i t .  Active and Passive Power#
The sceptiaiSR of Hume is  apparent in  Locke upon tbd# 
question of insigh t in to  the causal process* Ve have a 
very imperfect idea of th is  % ctive" power, s t i l l ,  he does 
not press such scepticism on the shatraot idea of power, 
bnt goes on to  focus a tten tio n  upon the power chserved in  
tho W ill. Hsw, i t  i s  ju s t  a t  th is  point tim t Locks b% ins 
to  get h is diseussien of Determinism in to  rea l d i f f iw l t ie e .  
He gives the isp ressiaa  lAat I* has a wealth of ideas cm 
th is  sUhjeet a t  h is  dUposal, bet he is  not qtdte sure as 
to  the eutecme of the dtscwsificn ef these ideas# Be «moeurs 
to  be finding h is way smcmg a vest array of data without aiy  
decisive idea of the sod towards «A1A he neves# i t  i s  
ohviems tha t be i s  most snmioas to  avoid dsgmatism upen th is  
isM S Of Liberty and Hecessity, and he conveys # ie impressim  
th a t he is  permitting the fac ts  to  speak fo r themmelves, 
th a t i s ,  to  h is  readers and even to  himself# th is  pains­
taking gsesAng fo r tr a th , th is  deliberate te s tin g  Of the 
tCKture of arguments fo r value i s  very commsmdshle. y e t, 
th is  permitting the facta  to  speak fo r themselves o ftm
(1) few##* seeta#
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resu lt#  in  Inoko ra ic lna problem# whioh are tmaaswered, 
and making etateraonte Whloh, I f  allowed to epoah fu lly  for 
thmoeelwee, would involve b is omotral argument in  endless 
tw istings and tusniags, and even oontradlo tiw , o r , a t  
le a s t ,  grave modification of the previous statement. Looks 
c^pears to look a t  tb s problem of Liberty and Beoessity 
from, a t le a s t, four d ietinotive points of view* These 
points of view are aU  highly relevant to the quostioa 
under dlsousslm , but the basic queetlon i s ,  how can these 
respective points of view be tmited in  one cen tral theme 
and doctrine of Determinism? What does Looks rea lly  teach 
hpoB Human Freedom? Perhaps the beet way to see the value 
of such a question I s  to  allow Looks to  put h is  points of 
view in  tho following order. ihe t i t l e s  used are not 
Looke'e, but i t  i s  f e l t  tha t they sum up what ho i s  saying 
i;pon each of these aspects#
U) ix m sm  m Êm  Uiwrrty of Astioq
Perhaps the most emphatio extract of th is  point of view i s  
the following*-
"8e th a t the Idea of lib e rty  i s  the idea of a power in  any agent to  do or forbear any p articu la r action , acoerding to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby e ither of them Is  {nreferred to the other;Where e ither of them is  not in  the power of Qie agent te  be produced by him according to h is v o ll t lm , there ho i s  npt^at lib e rty ; that agent i s  under necessity* "
inanimate objects cannot bo said to possess Freedom, fo r such 
Freedom is  Intimately related to  "Thought", and, therefore, 
such objects cannot be capable of preference* Locke I s  
always ra ther anbigÿwws about thie question of preferring 
and w illing . Later, i t  w ill be observed, tliat Bdwards 
declines to  allow Locke's d istinction  between preferring and 
w illing . Here and now, i t  ic  of in te re s t to  sec how Locks 
compares these two ideas#
Cl) Fewer, s e c t . 8#
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V9m rnmm tmUm W# qwssUs## $m # fss ta o ts , "üH bs# 
is s s  m is  sbsids arig iaats?^  th is  i s  a r saaonabi s  # s s t i s n  
f a r  m s m o is  St wsks»s tm tM n i  s r  tb s  tu X f  w% i t s  
rsisvanss bsss i s  q sss tim ab ls . tb s  psisv q m stiss  i s ,
# y  dsss &ssks distiAgsish bstsssn tbs act #  tbs miod tb  
Shoosiag sad Sirsstins# asd «^st€rriiB;"7 BSssrds ssnast t-assspt muk a distiastisn# and Lssks*# ratbsr bUtaksa
vi#m #sm m i# psW  lead Mm is  mabs a  distlmstlmi sbA
dittsranoe bstwem "dboiss" and Ossirs* Bsaevssr# bsoks's
pMat i f  vis# m  tbs diftm m i# bstsssm ^pstamriAB and mss##^
lag sssaa ts  bs basksd sp by bis iasistsnos that thsrs as#
msmy imstansss Sbm tbs bsdr ssts Mtbodt any sowWLtatim
of Oboiss* ib# boast bsatSf tbs blood sissuXatoSf tbs ,
lidbs mm ssmvulsivMy sis» , a ll imMsats that masy Ttnaan
asis ars apart from Obslss. A asm m«ar *^ pvsfsr" a sta ts
d iffsrm t from that in  sMsb bs finds bissM f, bat sirssm#
stsmsss, svst which bs bs# no ssa trs l, porsvsnt Ms pwsfsr- :
m ss from bMsg aetoaUssd» bosks, mow, sssms to modify
tM s distimstiom bstwssn ohMss and srsfsrsams by ssylmgM»
powsr ts  tab# i t  srsRos of tbs
. ' f i
SOS is  sMb, that ws bars  op , or lay  i t  by, assordlag to tbs_prsf - I ws are a t  Ubsrty»* Wsdadf tb m Mbsrty.
Fnrtbsr, bs aassrts tM t sompslMm is  "ssmlrary to tbat 
pssfsrsnss sf tbs mind." U)
Sbsn tbsss ssWgMtisa are allswsd to pass, isstes is  ' 
sssm nmMnd a rsacy o lssr distiiistism  abost tbs diffsrsnss 
sf tbs w ill bsisa Frss, and tbs asm bsiag yrss* 
ib is  is  an impartant smtribmtism ts  U bsrty mod msssssity, 
mad i t  is  sonfimsd and sxploitsd by mdssrm im a rmqr far#
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MoMing aM 4M W l tiM MM a«t «  tfe* MiMa R« t r t w  
t* tU s «tatineUon.ljr aagrlag «W  * M« MT . "i:<^ pqMfw* f^rlag %# mlMag* y*l« Mo mk Mgr «»« M #w# -> <
ftilM to fly . %a «pit# of t&M# rsthor Mbiou# dUtteO-
tl4M botaodi pMfOMBM ,«M «MlO#, WOKO MkM tW # - *#.3
W M tM t MntvUjtUoBO %0 tho qoMtlm of Uborty M R ..
RoooMlV* MOy MM (*), M io M W i— m o t o tn a  loXatoi 
to the MB or t»0 M ièti w t *0 * SMpeeod fW Bltyw 
pr«C>«xty of iM t <b)f awoRtlat UMHy eoooleta la  Hm .
pmnm #  do @r net ts  #s #sti<«## (s), Mm 1# ,#% %
Idborty to ds as bs <fploooda" *
"#br bo# om # 0  W ak any mm from , tbaa to bam# tbo p##ar to do aa wbat be #UU •«« do that in  reapaat of ( aottoQo «IttiiB tb# raaob of ou<di a  poamr in  m*# aman m g# a^ i^ÿpa# aa i t  is  poaolbla fo r Faoodma to
'##### om tributim a to  the aoluticm to the paoblm of ^
M boriy and ifaaaaai% am by no moan# tinlflirtfiooalt  Ojifc  ^ |
M  MM MM aHRMd ty th# abWM-wntleeM wftt tillUM» , g
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Oitb thooa thro# point# mad# aooaro, tbaro are  indim tioa#
# * t Imobo mOM barn# Jibod to b##o mdod bio dioooaaimi of . ? 
baamn Mberty, bot b# baa to pxooood to  fo rth #  qam tim a, 
f #  thiob bo bimnoa tb# % o#iai#vo" «lad #  « #  # « # « #  to  
\ 'Pot Off from bimmlf tho foot» of g u ilt a# th is atamia ro#
%' ' ' bated to  «aooaaily* Bo tblbke that tba## i# a aomood of '
I  thought, or olaa# of opiaiom obiob argooo tb a t tbio obooo"
L-k. amtionod vioo of froodom i# moot iaadaqaato, and proa#,"
• . .  ■  i, .'i
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dospor to sta te  the dU fieeltf If  not absurd dootatnet-
"A at a aaa is  not free a t a l l .  If  be be nettes free te  «111 as be is  te  eat abat fie v illa ."
Looks is  obviously iepatieat with th is type ef qasstian,
yet, bs takes ooneldeaabls tiam and apses to reply to  i t .
Be f i r s t  aakea i t  vary elear tbat tbs aet of ViU is  a
«leoeasaiy ae t. ones an aet is  pvepoaed to MB mind ef
aeting or not aetlng, tbs w ill must eons to  mm dsALeion,
and th is  deeialon is  an aet of the w ill, and tberefore,
that partloular set of tbs w ill is  a aeoeaaaiy aet#
inoke says I-
<Vs eaanot avoid v illing  tbs mdLateoee, or non* esiatemeo of tbat aetlon."
I f  bs bad pondered bis sen vorda, be would bave seen that
altbougb there mgr be the eeietoaee or non-exiateoee ef an
aetlon, th is does not mbs the aet of the w ill negative and
poeitivs, aa the aotloaa are , b e t, aa Bdaarda points out,
th la really naans a "positive" aet of the w ill, neeever,
th is is  not the main point a t th is  stage. The iapertant
thing la  tbat Looks teaohea that the aet ef the w ill i s  a
«Vieeeasasy" ae t. Bee, th is nrnna that the w ill osmet be
free in the sense that sons persons are prepared to define
Freedom, that is , aa Bis ab ility  ef the w ill to set or net
to act aooordlng to i t s  own laberm t power. Woke pointe
out Biat au #  a kind of Free&n of Will would involve a
prior se t of Will, and eo on *ln infinitum". Inohe
trie s  to atreogtbma th is argomant with a ref orenoe to
*!Zmpulaive" aetieos, and be rs*affirms bis dietum that lib erty
is  do as one pleases. Msoh of What Looks says here w ill
be pot in more osmhatle terms by Bdwards, and th is indioatee
hew deeply Bdwards stood indebted to Lseke,
(1) Fsmer. seat. 88.(8) " " 86.
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Bad# W # aecUon, Looks asks tb# ##stlm $ Bmat dotsg^
MtaSs ths ffUUt" smd bis ismsdiats wWÿ i s  "tbs mud"* 
y s t | %#sk# kassa th is short reply la  mst sw g h  to ju stify  
h is point sf vise, so, ha aotsra upon a ra # s r  novsX Idsa 
of motivation# 8s aagm# that ths mW is  dstsmdnad by 
mmossinsas". I t  assma that hia paspsa# in aayia# W #  
i s  to avoid m# statmmmt that tha Will is  dstarndiisd hy 
ths dasdÿ that is ,  in  ths fu ll and final mssm% of that taaaa. 
deaia, adaarda a m  find adsqhsts rsaama to  dWht JUo#s's 
aXPlanatlon #  motivation in  ths aWm tssma, and hs saznst 
giant «bat Lssks is  lad ts  sonoluda that "tha Will i s  pap* 
fso tiy  distinguishad twm dsairs"#(^) man haoks has 
doubts osaasmlng th is  kind of motivation, and hs i#  A # >; 
from sonaiatsnt lAin hs aayai-
"that # lo h  immsdiatsly  dstsrmliiaa ths W ill, from tims  ^ to  tims, to svsry volumtaxy astion, is*gm  imrmirl'nTM of Usairf* fim d  on asms shasnt Ssod»*v3r
Zt Look# is  aaksd to dafins ths mood, hs r# iis #  "hspplMHi^*^^^
"tharsfmrs, «hat has an aptnaaa to.sv* w , .  . _i s  that «S s a il mgd..and «hat is  apt tb prodasa pain to  w  M  w U  aiil»C**TO)
prsdaaa m 1plsasurs in
,• ■ :
(3) s m # ) ? . #  % • M  fflf.
Aftsr Laaks has "fslt"  his «ay to  ths visa tW t ths « il l  i s  
dstsrminad by a fu lfilm n t of ths ossd hassd upon «msasinssS, 
and as i t  is  somaslvsd as W sasurs", hs finds that th is  im 
fa r from a somplsts definition of ths Dstsrmnatisa of tha 
m il  hsaauas m ffsront pm ons havs diffm snt ideas #  «hat 
i s  tm # type of mod.<d) tapthsr, he is  m ths #iniom #m t 
the a2#oluts Used ought to  dstsradna ths w ill, W  hmt Wm 
Ha mat viaibls in  aspaiiaias", and ths mSnd of ton puvmgaa 
tr if ls a . sbia a ttsn tim  tS mn*s higher e# mtiomal nature
<1)(2)(3)(4)(5)
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provldae Looks with asm# more d tffloo lU oa ooooaming lib e rty  
and Ifeoeesity. Again, i t  la  obvioua thet be la  feeling b ia 
may along tbla Une of ergnmmt, end trying to find every 
elaawni of tro th  available from tbe foota of eaiperlenoe* 
Further, he ie  InoUned to ^Ive a  a ligb tly  d ifferen t meaning 
to the term "Bind", end inoludea on element of jedgmemt ahieb 
moa not ao evident in  him previoua analyala of t i# t  eenoeyt#
LreaOood, eberetarin  i t a  tarn  end plea# I t  may oeme to mark mpm tbe « i l l ,  and be ponued*" Cl)
Bare, ie  a  m odifioatiw  of the te e# in g  th a t the Will ia
determined d lrea tly  by th a t mhtoh ia  pleoauroble. Further,
here ia  Inoluded th a t element of judgment or deliberation
shioh lead# Loohe to a nee view of Freedom. This tAird
aapeot of hie view ef wmman Freedom ia  pot in  these term s:-
"For, the mlad twming in  meat oaaea, oa ia  evident from experienoe, a power to  jg ^ ^ n d  the eKeoct|en end amtia-feotiam e f  any o f i t a  deairea; and #o e l l ,  one eftmr another, i a  a t  lib e rty  to  eonalder the objeota of them, eanmine them on a l l  iddee, and meigh them m i^  o thers. "(8)
Looke ia^#nvinoed th a t th is  power of auapenaion of desires
la  the very core of mrnmn Freedom, How, as Looks atatea
“mispenaioa" of d esire , be ie  soadng vexy near to oontrm-
dieting h is  dietum th a t the ae t of the w ill ia  a neoessary ae t,
and going a  lang way to undev«edne hia ayetsm of Deterainima.
Here snapensiem ef eKeeutiam ef desires la  not in  I t s e l f  a
oontradlotiem of Determinism, but i t  ia  the anbignity e f
Looks upon th is  important point wbioh endangers hie previous
eveeitlom  tha t the ae t of the w ill la  aneeeasary ae t. Here
i s  an indloation of b is  ra th e r loose eapreaaiem —
H ot during th la  euapeawlen ef any desire , before the « i l l  i s  determ ined^  ae tion , and the aotien (wbieh fe lleea  th a t Betemâmatlen) &me, we have opportunity te  emamine, view, end jw ^e of tbe good and the wvil of What we are  going to da#"
Fewer# seot# 46. " " 47.
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This typo o f  argunon t w i l l  be used by niojiy ad voca tes o f  
Freedom r e p u d ia te  th e  b a s ic  t e n e ts  o f  Jotarm in iem , and 
i t  w i l l  be observed th a t  iiidwards w i l l  have to  jo  to  g r e a t  
tr o u b le  to  d e f in e  t h is  power of su sp en s io n  w ith  g r e a te r  c o r e .  
Howovorj Locke does n o t  appear to  r e a l i s e  how near ho has  
come to  a  re p u d ia t io n  o f  h is  fundam ental n o t io n s , bu t p a sse s  
on to  ob serve  th a t  t h i s  e lem en t o f  judgment in  tho determ ina­
t io n  o f th e  W il l i s  a v a lu a b le  argument a g f iin s t the " I n d if fe r -  
ency" of th e  W ill. Locke b e l ie v e s  th a t  th e r e  are  c e r ta in  
a c t io n s  about which men arc  " in d if fe r e n t" , but oven h e r e , on  
t h is  sm a ll p o in t ,  3dwards cannot f in d  h im se lf  in  f u l l  a g ree ­
ment w ith  Locke. Y e t, sa y s Locke, th ere  are acme a c t io n s  
about which rran canno t be in d i f f e r e n t .  Man must be d e te r ­
m ined "by th e  l a s t  r e s u l t  o f our m inds". I n  one pcussage, he  
becomes alm ost K antian in  h is  a p p r e c ia t io n  o f  "understanding"  
ae an slam ant in  tho  D eterm ina tion  o f th e  J i l l .
".%nd, th e r e fo r e , every  man is" put under a n e c c s t i t y ,  by n is  c o n s t i t u t io n  a s  an i n t e l l i g e n t  b e in g , to  be  determ ined  in  w i l l in g  by h i s  own thought and judgment what i s  b e s t  A x  him to  do; e l s e  he would be under  th e  d e term in a tio n  o f  some o th er  th a n  h im s e l f ,  which i s  want o f  l ib e r ty * "
H ere, i e  on in s ta n c e  o f a  sta tem en t «M oh, i f  a llow ed  to  be  
p r e sse d  to  i t s  f u l l  l o g i c a l  c o n c lu s io n , would s e r io u s ly  
m odify L ocke's p rev io u s system  o f  D eterm inism . In  f a c t ,  
much o f th e  fo l lo w in g  e la b o r a t io n  o f t h i s  p a r t ic u la r  s t a t e ­
ment i e  K antian i n  s tr u c tu r e  and to n e . At one p la c e ,  he 
and Kant u se  alm ost th e  ex a c t  i l l u s t r a t i o n .  (8 ) However, i t  
i s  o n ly  f a i r  t o  Looks to  say  t h a t ,  alth ou gh  ho goes very  near  
th e  com p lete r e p u d ia t io n  o f  h i s  own system  o f D eterm inism , 
he i s  c a r e fu l  to  r e fr a in  from sa y in g  an y th in g  wîiich i s  i n  
f l a t  c o n tr a d ic t io n  to  th a t  sy stem . I t  i s  h i s  am b igu ity , 
r a th e r  than h is  in c o n s ls to n c y ,  which c r o a te s  th o  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
f o r  h is  rea d er . He d is c u s s e s  tho "summum bonim" and d e c id e s
(1) Power, sec t, 49,
(2 )  " " 6 4 , end K .p .V . s e c t .  14 1 .
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This t» m% qu its  # as# i# ia t  of vi#* won Human FvoodMi ta  
LMk% W t rn th #  % logionl «ttsaaion of h is 'ooU«? tha t 
Wrmôem U  omtxW in  tho po«*r ahloh th# 9m m M a$ hm  of 
m poaâiag  tho oxooutlm of coeiro. Hooevor, i t  xooolvoo 
A  V; . . ;. g # f |« |« a t  pWm #%# onAmolo t a  Woko to m # tt  oopomte 
ooaotoomttw* Woh# B8#ox» to «oggoot th a t ohm # mm 
omoiém# oWy ^ ro o m t*  ooodf tho oot of tho wlU to  * 
noeoooooy mot ; but ohoa ho ooaoidem » wtomoto» ##&$ W 
ho# tho 9 0 0 #  te  ouopond tho Dooixo m ieh  mhoo tho oot of 
tho w ill Qooooooiy. Boro t#  h #  w W o #  OOmomW »«omte»
-, èooôi--
HWo a  mm moy m o p o #  tho #3t o f hie oW e# fom  hoèm Ootmmlnoa f #  ex ogalnet tho thiag prepooodÿ ia  Itmolf end omooqctmmof te  mho him hoppy ex not, Fex$ ohm ho hao cmo ehoom I t ,  eaû th o rn y  i t  le  hmoao a past -'A' e f  hio bapptaoeof i t  xaiooo Doolxo, and th a t pxopor-' .r :% r t i m a ^  mvo» hm  umaoiaoeo# « h i#  deto^WLnee hi# o l l l ,  mmd eoto mm a t  work iap u x o u it of hie Ohoioo m  a l l  eooaoiome th a t e f f# # " W  
.  ^ fo mgr tho loao t eaneoznlng eueh a otatommt# I t  raloo# a  . 
hoot of pxohlom for weko^m #etom  of Dotonm^Umi»
V . ho wpoaro to toaoh th a t there are eooaaim# end oaaoo Ohm 
; the mdoroteadlag ie  tw  dotmmlaor of tho e l l l .
I t  i e  th ie  hoeaueo i t  ha# a  vioo ' #  the oeod, end) having ’ 
go th ie  # 0 0  ar tho oeedf i% m% only em tru le  or euepoad#
^  : Doairoi but eon "oroato" aooivoy oMoh# in  tuam, mm iotam*
# % '  . mime tho «U1* Ttt$s im eaothoo eogommt obich # o  oxpoamt# 
of mmam Fxoodem m ill mo to wpmo mtomWLom# ami mOmxûm 
mULl again be ooopoHoa to point out m at omh a vim  of 
rnmm Prooâm omnot mko my dlffoarmoo %o tb# ALotmm that 
tho aot of f i l l  1# a «Booo#oa«y" ae t. in  #bhm ooxd#t ty  
#WWo aoAigmitioo upon tho a # je a t of hi» oma m atm  of
(1) Fmox. amt» ag.
W.iSi
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Datenstnlsnif taoke le  providing arguasnte for hJU oppoiiant» 
whiehÜü groat and ardcaat dlsolplO| .^dnards, m ill bo forood 
to ropudiuto*
Locko is  qui to euro tliat alUicugb, In  asaay Instancooy tho
la s t  d ic ta te  of tlic under»tandln£i Cooo îict doternlao the f i l l )
i t  ou£:ht to  do th is ,  and i t  i s  only when i t  is  cono that men
con olain real Ftoodoa*
'That they can suapmd th is  prosoautlon in  p a rticu la r oaeee* t i l l  they nave looked before them, and informed thoQkolvee «Aether th a t p articu lar thing vEdLoh i s  then propeeed or deelred l i e  i a  the may to  th e ir  main end, waâ make.q rea l part of th a t wiûan ic  th e ir  g reatest Good#"
la te r , he m ritm t—
"The prinoiple eaterolee of Freedom la  to stand s t i l l ,  open the eyes, look about, and take a vi^ nv of the ooaeequeneee of vtmt me are going to  do, as muoh ae the w e i^ t of the m tto r  r e q r l ’©§."(8)
Ke a ls o  adm itc th a t  t h is  i s  tho id e a l  etaU» o f  a f f a i r e ,  and
roqulTcc come tiling like  a '’new" b lrtli to b.ting i t  in to
a c tiv ity . (3)
I t  would be unjust to  Woke to  soy that ho ju st rambles cm 
without any' aim or puroose in  th is  treatment of Human lib e rty , 
but i t  ie  true  to  eay that he of ton fa lls  to eoe the mood 
because of h is a tten iitm  to  the trees . Yet, ho makes a very 
sincere e ffo rt to ovoid dogmatism, and he never h es ita tes  
about modifying h is point of view to su it the foots of esperi- 
enoo. Ao already s ta ted , Locke is  almost Kantian a t  times 
In  h is  (Imaand th a t men use th e ir  "understanding" to determine 
th e ir  t i l l s .  He in s is ts  th a t God alecys # o o s #  th a t mhteh 
the highest Qood and yet He is  also a Being of perfect 
Freodoci. I t  i s  th is  shadow of the "ought" in  Locke
tdxloh provides the g reatest d ifficu lty  in  h is  system of 
Determinism# Hweriense convinces him tha t men often choose 
th a t which i s  ^Vil, thinking i t  i s  th e ir  Good, but they o u # t
(1) Fewer# se c t. 68#<2) " " 69 .(3) " " 68#<4) " " 6 0 #
 ^'  . '%*' ' ■  ^ ;:w!:jRk f . ' Y ' ".. r
B» <0kB*N0ai tawKlk «SdLoak U  the g r c a tü i  #W k %m W tp  $A# 
iMnre # *  gmm  to hold bmok$ or w # o o à  Ooolrec for # #  
iAPOXf oot Oloodf max doUboroto upon Bm rew to or ultlmot#
Good, m  other word#, esperlm oe prevldoe bio with the 
fOcte th a t wiUiiie ie  a  oeoeeeery ao t, W t experiimoe alee 
providee him «dta the f a s t  th a t i t  ought not to he eo* 
th a t om  ean I n t e r e s t ,  aeapeod th ie oeeaeeaxy a e t, mod oake 
th e ir  aot# Of ffiU  to  he detomtaed tgr the "aaderataading*, 
ahd < » ^  aa IA #  do th ie  are  t h #  rea lly  rraa* a l l  th ta  
O W haim  m #  appear a  ehoer m e te  of time and apaoe, bat 
i t  m e t he home in  mind th a t Loohe ia  tsy&as to  mho eenee 
of m e fae te  of em erim ee, and try iag to  be ju e t to  e v e #  
oomeivable poin t of view* fa r  i net anoe, then he i a  d ie - 
i aim#A8 the ia p lio a tlw e  of th ie  ae t of "em#emeiem" he e# e# — 
I  "3Ar i t  i e  p re tty  hard to  e ta te  i t  between thea, i.e *
A u ----------- --— aco  #  the « iU  iiaeeaiotely folOem the
>;* T  S ' j t Æ â . ' ï ï r *judgment of the mMoratanding, mem Liberty in  a e ta te  of darkneee*" w to  me to  plaee
k
' .
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$n other worda, he suepeota that thie aet of eu#«aiem  w ill 
ha interpreted ae a sta te  of the Hndlffereaey" Of the Will# 
bet he m ute to heap i t  free from eoOh aeeo@latime§ yet, 
ho can see hoe hard thla ie  goia# to be, end ebaHmgee big '  ^
readore to try and find a plaoe fa r i t  ia  the prooeme Of 
Bman W illing, hoeevwr, i t  ie  obvioue that he has no clear 
aolutiem to offer on thie very eeepiieated aapeot e f hnman 
volition, but he hae looked a t i t ,  end noted it#  d iffieu ltiee , 
and th ie erne up hie eontriWtiom to the problm of Liberty |
and heoeeeity. i t  eaam t be eaid that haek# eopomded a 
# eten  of Determiniem ia  a #  reel eeme, and, eomotimee, i t  
ie  d iffio u lt to eey whether he ie  the advoeate ef aetermSniem
tmetA vpm  aw ir« , »r A# #f ffwUM MmR upm
tbe IkiâMwtwaiqg* «M e. %M w tfU M ta i peinte of A ot
(X) MM». *#% . 7».
• I'rtim'ilrrIII "n-^
find  acpree&ion «ad support In h is  enaiysls of "Powsr", sad 
I t  I s  on ly me the one i s  taken and tho other lo f t  th a t a  
doggatio statement ean be made oonosmlag h is haale teeahiag 
upon lib er ty  and Nooopslty#
Perhaps the best way to  stsn up Lseke'# Contribution to th is  
dlf:?iouit question i s  to  allow him to s ta te , in  h is sen words, 
h is aim and h is aehteyoDszxt in  th is  d irection. y r ltia g  te  
Bolyaeua in 1698, he (a)#* —
"I do not wander you think #  discours# about Liberty a  l i t t l e  too fin e  spaa. . . . .  when the mmneotiea of the parts of try subject broimht me to  the om ildera- tlo n  of jpewey, I  bad ao desire to  med#e with tbe question of idbcrty . but barely pursued ay thoughts u i the eootesplaiion of th a t pew*r in  man of ohooeigg or preforrlnSiVhleh vw o&ll W ill, ae far ae they w w d  lead ae , without say the le a s t bias to  one side or theother; or i f  there me any leaning in  sy mind, i t  ra ther to the omtrmry side of that where I  found my­se lf  a t the end of #  pursu it. But doubting th a t i t  bore a  l i t t l e  too hard on men's Liberty, i  mewed i t  to a veiy iogeolus and professed Arainiaa, and desired him, a f te r  he had aonsidered I t ,  to  t e l l  me h is objee- tio a s ,^ lf  ^,ybo frankly otmfesced he eeuld
Was Loc^e a Detexslixlst? The above extraot indioatea th a t 
h is syotera of Determinism passed the careful omsorship of 
an Amnlnian mbo was ea tic fied  th a t i t  went as fa r  as i t  
possible in  the airootlcn  of Human Freedom. ôuOh a oosh 
pre&dso is  hardly the basis for a foroeful and convinelng 
expomitim of Determinism#
(1) The Bsssy ef the Human Dhderstaoding. Fraser, Vbl«Xpage
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Locke leave* the qaeetlon of Free w ill and Determlniam in  
o moat uneatiefeetosy oonditloa. Hie paeelon fo r toXeim- 
tlo n  enabled him to  see both aide# of the ieeue, but i t  did 
not permit him to  give a elear lead in  any direotion.
CoUine eq# an ardent d iaeiple of Looke and he ie  eonvinoed 
th a t he ie  in terp reting  the re a l teadkizig ef Woke When he 
esq>ounde a r ig id  eyetem ef Determiniem. There can be l i t t l e  
doubt tba t Bdwarde vae indebted to G ellina, and therefore a 
survey of the Determinlem of colline ie  iadiepeneable te  em 
af^roolation of Bdearda* Oelline enpreeeed tha oeeenee of 
hie ayetam of Determiniem in  a work -  "A fhiloeophie#^ inquiry 
OQBa.mlnR U bw ty  «m pohUalMd In  1717. H«
begin* by observing th a t i t  ia  a oommon aeeuaption in  
fhiloeophy th a t there stre certain  idea* about «Aioh i t  ia  
quite iapoeeible to apeak clearly  and dietinotly* One euoh 
idea ia  th is  idea of Xdberty and Heoeeeity, men have 
w ritten tpon the aubjeot with heaitation  and ambiguity.
The time haa oome to destroy th is  covering of myetery «nd 
examine the question in  a thoroughly ra tiona l maniwr. He 
ie  oonvinoed th a t Woke'a defin ition  of an "Idea" ie  adequate, 
but he would point out th a t ideas must be brought to  a new 
and unoompromisin^ te s t  of ra tio n a lity . I t  matters not 
«Aether sueh ideas are "PraotieaX" or "Theovetieal", they 
oust bo ra tio n a l. to  have an idea Which i s  impossible to  
put in  c lear and d is tin c t terms i s  quite inadequate fo r 
ilAilosofAical discussion. i f  such ideas cannet be put into 
precise terms there i s  grave doUbt about th e ir  v a lid ity .
Sbr instance, there i s  m  ree l reason why the idea of God 
should not be as c lear and d is tin c t as the idea of a trimcgle#
Xt Qod i s  an Ida», tha very fac t that i t  la  on idea about 
a Divin# perasm oam ct #av# sndh m  Idas fvon standing tha 
te a t of c la r ity  and i n t d ü g i b i l i t y .  Bven the idea of Ood 
atoat amha #en### and to anke aenao i t  meat b# aapreaaad la  
c lear and precise term#. Collin# ia  quite v ill in g  to adnlt 
th a t there are certa in  idea# lAioh eaamot be ekhasmted by 
tho language in  «diich they are eapreaaed, bu t, aa fa r  a# 
they go, they khould be In  p la in  and simple terms. Be 
aAklta th a t there are g reat d if f ie u lt ie s  in  giving a f a l l  
and f in a l eapreasim  to  the idea ef (Sod, but he in s is ts  
tha t the defin ition  and d if f iw l t ie e  of the Idea of God 
should be expressed in  fearless and clear te rn s . Ambiguity 
and systery nay be neeeseary to M yerstitien , but t s  p h il­
osophical discussion they are dangerous and p y o fltle ss ,
OoUlns goes on to give three reasons for th is  th esis  upen 
Rationality in  ideas* (1) An inadequate idea i s  no leas 
"D istinct" than an adequate one, tha t i s ,  as f a r  as i t  gees, 
and th is  measnre of c la r ity  i s  the measure ckT i t s  v a lid !# *
(2) I f  ce rta in  ideas, such as Ged, contain d if f ie u lt ie s  
th is  i s  no re a l sense fo r systexy, but rather a * n r  to  
industry, (3) The only way in  Which an idea can be saved 
fee# being le s t  in  ^  bogs of sgrstery is  to  s ta te  i t s  in -  
ade^pacy in  clear and precise terms. All ideas, in  thesH 
salves, ere d e a r  and d is t in c t ,  tha fau lt i s  not in  our ideas 
but in  oorselvas, Philosophy has mdo hesdoay only by sens 
few thinkers deeUnlng to be put o ff with # s te x y  as a  scA- 
s t i tn te  fo r  W larity. dollins i s  ccovineed th a t there are  
re a l reasons fo r  BumUity in  the diseussicn ^  ideas, but 
there i s  no need fo r Obsduri#*
Bevihs given e lea r expression to  an unoospxemisi% Batienslimm, 
doUins tom s b is a tten tion  to the matter under d seo ssien , 
and he believes th a t the vexed question of fre e  w ill snd 
Detexsdmlsm sen be se ttle d  one# and fwr a l l  by glvihg a  c lear
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answer to  two quaationai- (1) Daaa man coma wLtldn the 
iinlvereal ayatem of CaueetieiiT (8) Oan man, a t  any p e ta t 
or awy time, break through th ie  uniwereal oyatma ef OameatiQmy 
Here, aaya aoXXIna, la  the rea l omx of the whole eeatro- 
veray, and here there la  no need for ambiguity or ewaaiem.
Let thinker# be honest, e lear and simple in  th e ir  treatm m t 
of these pivotal questions, and the phXXotophioaX ean flie t 
w ill be a t  an end.
How, there ia only one way in  m&ioh these questions eon he 
answered, and th a t i s  by viewing these questions from the 
Bolid ground of "Hwperienee". He says tha t the defenders 
of the Freedom of the Will have always appealed to expezl- 
one# and ocumaon-sense, and to  oomoon-sense eiqierienee they 
oust go,
f i r s t . Collins in s is ts  th a t the vezy aet of Perception i s  
a twoessary" ae t. The perooption of an idea oomnot be a 
"free" ao t, beeause ideas Whether the r e w l t  of sensation 
or reflec tion  are presented to  the mind. Thought i s  a  
neoessary prooeas. Conseiousnees i s  not "voluntary"; i t  
i s  Inevitable. "We must think about something", in  f a s t ,  
ideas appear to  have a power of diotatonmiip over the husmn 
mind. The human mind is  given the m aterials, end me 
pattern  of thought i s  fixed .
seeend. Collins examines the "feeling" of freedom which i s  
eaq;>erianeed by a l l  human beings, but he eharges the whole 
"feeling" with ambiguity and laok of reasonable inspeotim .
He admits we are eonsoious of th is  feeling of freedom, but 
we deoeive ourselves in to  thinking that I t  ie  "real" Freedom 
of the Will. I f  a rig id  iaspeotiom of motives i s  earried 
out, i t  w ill be dlseovered th a t th is  feeling of freedom is  
under-mimed. For instanee, how many persons who boast of 
th is  feeling of freedom ever take the trouble to ask (a) 
Whether they have the power to refra in  from a  simple ae t of 
volitiom; (b) whether they are oapahle of rea l ehsiee bets,
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a no&Aer of objects. v o lition  i s  a neoessaxy a c t. Vo 
oamot f a l l  to  w ill in  the presence ef objeots, and the 
vo litio n  i s  alwaye a  preponderance of tho se lf  in  the aot 
of voU ticn . We have th ie  feeling  of Preedom because we 
do wt^t we "please", but the rea l question i s  whether doing 
what we please i s  the seme as ree l Freedom*
Third* Colline examlnoe the fac t of "Repentance", w hi^  i s  
a fac t of experience* He admits th a t i t  i s  a  common thing 
to  fee l sorry for what has been done, and we Icmgino th a t 
we oould have acted d iffe ren tly , but th is  i s  an instanee ef 
over-sim plification. We oould have acted d iffe ren tly  i f  
we had thought differently* This act of Repentance i s  no 
real foundation for sn argument of rea l Freedom because i t  
assîmes what i t  ought to  prove. wan i s ,  by hi# very com- 
s ti tu tio n , compelled to seek h is  "Good", ho oaanot w ill h is 
"Bril" or Misery; even in  the most d if f ic u lt  positioos, he 
always w ills the leeeer " a r il" . Animals have tho appear­
ance of Freedom, th a t i s ,  they appear to do «Aat ploases 
them, but no in te llig e n t person would say tha t they were 
capable of an ac t of Free v o lition .
Fourth* Oolline w ill grant no mceeptione to  universal 
Oausation, and he in s is ts  th a t universal Gausatlm i s  
Weoeesazy Causation. The opposite of ^ u sa tio n  i s  Chance, 
and Collins diemiseee with contempt the idea tb a t Jhance 
could be the cause of eocistenoe and behaviour, i t  L ib e r#  
must be based on the absmee of Osusation then i t  must be 
based on Ghsnce, and th is  i s  unthinkable. Reason i s  a  
human perfection. %t would be iaperfectiom to  choose any­
thing without a Reason, and i t  would be unreasonable to 
choose the # i l  ra ther than the Good.
F iftk . OoUixis turns to on erandnation of tho moral Aiaim, 
fo r Freedom* He in s is ts  th a t Pleasure and pain ru le the 
whole conduct ef men. He cannot find msy other basis fo r
fiOTibli#* nmautxùs anJ rtmishaents ore b u il t  upon th is  
lOeasixfo-Fiiln fomdatlom, and th is  im the o n #  w  1» «hi gh 
joan can be educated in  an apprecdation of the Good. the 
sole ptxrpoee of PmiaAmmt i& the p revm tiw  of Crime.
!To reasonable society peitd te  Freedom to  do s v l l ,  btrl a l l  
'Uiis does not mean th a t man i s  Free, otherwise i t  would be 
Immoral to punish animals* 7e do not punish people be- 
eaoee they -aere Free to do otherwise than thqy did, but be- 
eanee wh&t they did was iv i l  to  tha po<^ety in  .Mch they 
lived .
a ia th . Collins attempts to  deal with Cod and TTimnw 
FrecAm, he usee the usual argiasents of the C alvinists whleh 
hod been almost exhaustod by Hobbes. Collins has v e #
H t  t ic  to soy about Consoionco. no defLie# IL au the feeling 
of self-epprovali and in s is ts  tha t i t  bo educated by 
C7q>orlenco«
%© above an a lysis oT the system o f Detotrainista. by Collins 
had a considerable e ffe c t  upon the D e lstlc  posi&Xoa «d ii^  
he GUpi^orted. %>llins g iv es the ii^^rcsslua tha t ho i s  over- 
oonfidert o f the so lu tio n  he has offered  u,>oa the questioa of 
Pree&xa and !>etenainisn. lîo speaks of t ’ue need oi H U m ill#, 
hut there arc fa r  in d ica tion s in  tho abovu-awition<>;% worts of 
a Careful sttK itio n  to th is  virtue» He lea ves the im pression 
that the whole matter i s  c lear and sjjq ila , and I s  m
dogaetien and ir^ rtiaoco  of im rostigatian momowdat inoom dstent 
w ith a p lea  fo r  fo lora tlcm , nowevsr, C ollin s has given s  
v e #  short btrt Challenging c x p o s ltiw  of a system o f Dstsr- 
minlgm which i s  b u ilt  upon P #uho log icaI grounds rather 
on Theologloel te n e ts . H is treatm ent i s  hurried and ssms- 
iSiat o s v a l i^ i but he has red&ed i% ;ortant p o in ts Wiioh th s  
q u iet and p a t l ^  mind of aassrds w ill pros# home with p#n#- 
t r a t t i ^  in sig h t and ia^^ertofboble lo g ic  • i t  w ill  be seen
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that Home fo iled  to follow up the points wmleed hy 3olllna, 
end M e twentmmt of freedom end üfeoeeei ty  le  leee wlwld* 
Titteerde le  the loglaaX eueoeeeor of Colline, hut he 
to  the etudar of the qooetion e doUbomtioi and proftiBdltgr 
of wMob Colline we# inoopeble beoauee of Me ovor^onfl* 
dent aetlone l i erab
t >r,'rv' '■ ?•'
m t KtmuM . t m m  w  jm m m##» * ë w ## II,#*### mim
a f - i r r * - » ,  ♦ i , « -
celebrated David RUme was one of thoee geegrmpbere of iwv«*a reason who have imegined that they have euffle len tly  dlmpoeed of a l l  eW& qoeetione by getting them euteide the heriaon of human reoeom, a horloon ehleh yet he woe net able to  determine, Hume dwelt in  partiem lar upon the princip le of oaneflCLity, and qnite righ tly  ohaerved th a t i t#  tro th , and mrm the objective v a lid ity  of the ooooept of e ff ic ien t oauae in  general^ ia  baaed an no ineight# th a t ia ,  on no a  p r io ri knomedge# and tha t i t s  ontherlty cannot therefore be ascribed to  i t s  neceaeity# bmt merely to  i t s  general u t i l i ty  in  the course of expm eneoj and to  a ce rta in  at^ jac tive  neceaeity Which i t  thereby acquire## and which he en title#  custom. From the incapacity of our reason to make use of th is  principle in  anr nomer tha t transcends experience# he inferred the n u lli ty  of a l l  pretensiona of reason to  advance bsyond the empirical",
(Kant. X r.V , A.760.)
"Hume was the in te rp re ter of a j^ losophy the f i r s t  p rincip le  of which was th a t a l l  tha t ia  true In our idea# must be traced back to tha t Which is  given to the passive mind# and tha t a l l  merely subjective additions to the fact# presented must be f io titlo u s  and Illu so ry . Hence# When ho had shown tha t in  the Impression# or immediate experience# of the outer and the lamer l i f e  there is  no trace of tha t necessary connexion of antecedent and consequent# i#%i(A is  supposed to  be involved in  the idea of causality# he conceived him* se lf  a t  once en titled  to tre a t such necessity as an i l l s *  gitim ate product of custom# a confusion of subjective association with objective re a lity " ,
(CSaird. Ihe C ritica l Ailosophy Of Kant, V ol.I. Page 130.)
"I sh a ll add# fo r a fu rther confirmation of the foregoir^ theory, tha t as th is  opwation of the mind# by which we in fe r  lik e  effects from lik e  causes# and vice versa# i s  so essen tia l to the luubsistenee of a l l  human creatures# i t  i s  not prfdaable# tha t i t  could be trusted to the fallacious deduotiona of our reason# which is  slow in  i t s  operation#I t  is  more conformable to the ordinary wisdom of nature to secure so necessary an act of the mind# by some in s tin c t or mechanical tendency# Which may be in fa ll ib le  in i t s  cperatioms# may discover i t s e l f  a t the f i r s t  appearance Of l i f e  and thought# and may be independent of a l l  the laboured deductions of the understending",
(BUme, the enquiries# I ,  seo t.6 , P t.a . (46)
"I think perhaps the strongest argument on Hume's side is  to be derived from the character of causal law# in  physics.I t  appears th a t simple rules of the form "A causes B" arenever to  be edmlttod in  science# except as crude suggestion# in  early stages. The causal laws by Which sudi siaq^le rule# are replaced in  well«developed sciences are so complex that no one can suppose them given in  perception; they are all#  obviously# elaborate inferences from the observed course of nature, so fa r  as the physical soienoea are oonoemed# Hume is  in  the rig h t; such propositions as "A can###B" are never to  be accepted, and our inc lina tion  to  accept them is to be explained by the law# of habit and associatien",
(Bussell, History of Western Philosophy. page 636.)
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3h# preeent work i s  qonaexned with the Kemtion Defence of 
Freedom# and there ia  a sense in  Whi<A such a defence is  
intim ately and v i ta l ly  related  to  Hama, For# in  the f u l l  
and f in a l analysis of such a  Defence i t  amst be borne in  
mind tha t i t  was the extreme implications of Hume's empiri­
cism H i i^  smoke len t from h is  dogmatic slumbers. However, 
great centien zrmst be emerclsed not to involve the present 
diacQsaien of Hume in  the in tr ic a te  and far»reaching con­
f l i c t  between aspirieism  and transcendentalism. Adeq^te 
treatment of such a co n flic t would involve another# and 
paAaps acre extended thesis than is  here contemplated. 
Further# th is  conflic t i s  the ornitinulng problem of a l l  
philosophical thought# and the present analyaio of the 
5sntian Defence of Freedom must rew triot i t s  a tten tion  to 
a more lim ited area of thought} nanmly# of Hume's contri­
bution to  aighteenth-century Determinism.
There can be l i t t l e  doubt concerning the fac t th a t Hume's 
unique contribution to  philosophical thought was h is ra th e r 
novel in te rp re ta tion  of the causal se rie s . of course, i t  
can be argued tha t h is  view of causality  was a log ical con­
c l u a i s  of h is extreme i9B$)iriaiam, and th a t the rea lly  novel 
feature of Hume's thought is  th is  extreme mqpiriciam.
There are ample grounds in  Kant's Defence of Freedom to  sup­
port such a contention. However, the main point is  th a t 
i t  i s  Hume's view of causality  which is  the important facto r 
in  Slghteenth-ceotury Oeteminiam# and i t  is  th is  point 
Which oust receive immediate a tten tion , and perhaM the 
followiug points of discussion w ill bring th is  v i ta l  facto r 
in to  oorreot perapeetivo.
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(X) The problem of oausaHty le the oentraX theme of "The 
tsea tiee"  eM "Ihe lEnqoiriee", end i t  is  not eoay to eeXeot 
a  paeeago Which gives Hhme'e point of v ies with e la r ity  and 
eacaetneeo. Perhape the following la  moat su itab le  to the 
purpose in  hand# ITome w rites t'»
*9[t appears that# in  single ins tans es of the operation of bodies# we never oan# by the wtmost sorotlsy# d is- oover aqy thing but one event following another# with­out beine able to  eoqprehend any force or power by whi<A the oauae operates# or .any oom eotlm  between i t  and i t s  supposed effect"
Hudo goes on argue th a t the same absence of positive# 
demonstrative proof of causal power or force io found in  the 
study of the re la tio n  between wjnd and Body# and "the 
a u ^ o rity  of the WiU over ihe faco ltios ia  not a vh it more 
oomprohanalble". Bow# i t  i s  v i ta l  to the pros^st study 
of Hone to  define in  c lear end maact torob what ho ie  argu­
ing# and th is  might be done by saying (a) he is  not deoying 
the actual existence of causality  in  the phy .^ col and mental 
spherea# but (b) he is  saying tM t th is  deposed force or 
power in  causality  oaaoot be proved by aay e ^ r i c a l  or 
metaphysical argux&onts# Further# he grants# what he could 
not |>ostiibly deny, th a t there is  accessio n  in  causality# 
th a t is# the thlz^ called "effect" always folloee the thing 
called  "cause"# but ho in s is ts  tha t i t  i«  quite impoaaible 
to  pustulate a  "necessary" connection between cause mod 
effect# th a t la# l a  the generally accepted mesniig of the 
term "aeoeesMy"# Per iastaace# i a  swawtnfr^g a  supposed 
"causal" object# i t  i s  q ^ te  iapossible "from the f i r s t
appearance of tha t ebjoct" to deduce what i t s  ncoosi^axy effec t(2)aigbt be. Again# a l l  tha t can be said  shout causality  i s  
th a t th is  follows that# but the secret coameotiom Which 
bindb them together i s  inacrutibl#.^^^ This sceptical or 
agnostic a ttitu d e  to  cawsal l ty  was to have fa r-reaA i%  
impiicaticms.
(1) She anquiriee, I .  Sect.?# Pt*2« (#B  ^(a ) " •  " " 7# (ao)
(3 ) *» " " " 7 #  (88)
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mv 6# W# dWwwwv "##ql08is#l"Hsina#d Cfitias 
%s th# asnoltis&oa tha t Rim m a dMySng th* m U S w i  
Of am m ality. ly p iaa l of th is  olaaa m i  Thom# R«£d (171#» 
13B6)# # 0  mot# ooommtn# Somt^
"Of a l l  the pamdema tM a w thof Hii «dvaneed# them  r  T*\: l a  not one m re  ahooking to  the hum# mderetandlngthan th la . m at tWüM my begin to amiat without *STÏ. J& wSïï/S& Sî -
/ '# # #  i t  ia  #i@Mfl#mt that# althoogh iftmsda had oarefnlly  
/  atwdied Bma*a in te rp re ta tio n  of oanaality# he doe# m t
V*(C
a  recent w riter open lAiloaephy night well eoma under the 
tm dem ation  atteved hy m a t. Beeemr# i t  ie  important 
to  obaerwe that# althonah i«%t tin iie a te d  Hme f rm  #1#» 
m dem tanMng open th ia  v i ta l  fact# he did not agree a im  
Jh M  eoneemimg th la  eoeptieal oenoluaion open @a#ality* 
m ia  diaooaaien of iant*# oentributlon to  th ia  matter m a i 
await a  la te r  stage of the prenant dtamnmisn#
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jo in  in  th is  general ahme# end atSBaaderntandihB of h ie
point of view. eOwmda think# th a t meee ie  a  w riter e f
"eormpt** hooks# hat he does not eirgl# out M m  fo r any 4 |
apeoial eritWLem an he did hard hmee. Kant was q aite  y|
eominmd th a t the e r i t ie e  of Hme# on fMa v i ta l  m nter#
had nieaed the rhole pMnt of Me diaansalon, i
"Re (arms) was understood hy none. I t  i s  painful té  see how h is oppdoents aMd. Oswald. Seattle# and a t  l a s t  even Priestley# so en tire ly  miss the point of h is  probleBi# and m ile  they always take that# Whim he doubts of fo r granted# but# on m# other hand# prove M th vehemsnee# and for the most part with g reat petn* ^ laeee or inaolenoe.gmt# m i oh never m tered  in to  h i#S' mlod to doubt o f " , < ^
L:;':''  ^ The error which Kami sought to  earroet s t i l l  persists#  and .
' M
Cl) # e  Active Powers of the mnen nindU asssy 4# 
(8) Frefooe to  the proleigemma of metaphyeies*
Ca) Wmlw âM iho Poreanial Phlleeopéy. Phge 18#,
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(3) Another im portant fa c to r  to  bo noted in  the  Ltudy of 
Hume ie  th a t  m en he come© to  a dlectaaeion of L iberty  and 
Necoetolty be i^oec a  long w% to  juB tify  .nnnt'e a m ly s ls  of 
tho irihoroat wiaknese of h ie  phllouophy, and exproesoe an 
a te> et orthodox in to rp ro ta t io n  of jau B a llty . That i e ,  i f  
euoh on expotiitlon ia  judged by it© use of c o rta ln  c ta te -  
mentB; yet#  beneath tiii© apparent orthodosqr, Hume i e  « t i l l  
try in g  to  hold toge ther a eo ep tio a l in te rp ra ta tlc m  of cauc- 
a li ty #  and a dogmatic view of Determiniem. The follow ing 
anal^'slc w il l  make th ia  p o in t obvious.
(a) Hume# in  "Tho rroatlco" and "’Cho nquirloe" 1© What 
mi^^t bo toriaed a rabid D otenaln iet. Also# ho is  an 
im patient D eteiTiiniat. Ho ©eem wO euro of hi© theai© that 
ho i l  almoet oavalier in  hie troatciont of it© fin or points#  
and of tlio p ossib le  objections o f h is oppoiwit©. Hare# 
thoro i s  l i t t l e  of tho p a tien t probing of Looke# or the 
deliborato and carefu l an alysis of iadwardo. I t  might not 
be ju st to  t  iO whole of h ie  view of such questions to  cay 
that he has the over-confident "rationalism" of do lllne# y e t , 
h is  dogmatism upon th is  matter i s  akin to :0111ns# and i t  la  
doubtful whether Hume saw a l l  the istH cation©  of h is syutam 
of betermlniam. There are clear in d ica tion s of Im i^tlcnce 
as he begins the d iscu ssion  o f lib er ty  and Noaot©lty^antyiie 
ho saysy tcs*  the whole problem It- b a s ica lly  one about words. 
He i s  aware o f the an tiq u ity  of the problem but soy© i t s  
continuance i s  bocod upon verbal ambiguity. However# he 
maI:0G one important concoision to  i t s  d iscu ssion  When he says# 
or rathor ic$)ilas that th is  problem of L iberty and îToco«oity 
ie  not "beyond the reach of human capacity", ( l )  th is  i s  
a po int vAioh w i l l  be discussed by Kant# and thoro i s  l i t t l e  
doubt oonoomixxg Kant's view of the "Antinony" created by any 
"rational" discu ssion  o f Liberty and N ecessity .
(1 ) The in q u irie s#  l .  a e o t. 8 . (62)
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(B) Buœ goes on to  g ive an «neOysls of cscisaX ityt-
"It Is  u n iversa lly  allowed that matter# in  a l l  i t s  operation## ie  actuated by a neceesazy force# and that every natural e ffe c t  i© ©o preo iealy  determined by the energy of it#  cause that no other e ffec t#  in  such partioul^^^ircuiH itanoe## could peeeib ly  have resu lted
This statem ent v&on the causal  eer ie#  1© almost id e n tic a l 
w ith that given in  "The Treatise"# and the main question i s ,  
what i s  Hume try ing to  say in  making such a statement?
I# he g u ilty  o f one of those paradoxe# with which he was 
charged by Reid? That is#  of viewing C ausality in  !:jkoepti- 
oa l manner in  one part of h i# work©# and then assertin g  I t  
dogm atically in  another? On the surface# th ia  appoar# to  
be the case# but i t  i s  important to  observe that# even in  
the above extraot# Hume i s  net going over to  the sid e  of 
orthodoxy in  th is  matter of causal in terp reta tion } for# 
the v ita l term in  the above quotation i s  the term "necessary". 
In other words# Humo has never denied the actual ex isten ce  
or causal power or force# but he hae denied that th is  causal 
force can be demonstrated upon ground© of isopiricism  or 
U etaphysics. fe t#  hi© scep ticism  upon th is  orthodox view  
o f C ausality led  him to  demy any "neoessaxy" cmm ection in  
tho causal ser ies#  and# in  the «hove extract# he appears to  
contradict th is  den ial o f "neeessaxy" connection, ret# 
such a denial i s  only on the surface of the extract# fo r  
Hume goes on to  d efin e in  carefu l terms What he means by 
"necessary". Ctf course# Hume i s  not p erfec tly  c lear  in  h is  
handling of th is  conception of Causation. For instance# he 
argues that i f  no two causal events were sicd la r  to  each 
other# i t  would be im possib le to arr ive a t any idea of 
H soesfiity. A ll tha t oould be sa id  about events would be 
that they suooeeded each other# not tha t they "produced" 
each other# and the re la tio n  of cause and e ffe c t would be 
u tter ly  "unknown" to  mankind, m m  "Inference" would be a t
(1) The Bnqniries# I ,  g e o t,8 , (64)
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«a end# and the on ly ovenuoe to  knowledge would bo momoxy 
and the senee#. A ll th is  sem e very màh. lik e  tho axgu* 
oent Ilurao used to  demy orthodox view o f Jmmation# yet# 
in  th is partieulm r section# ho mod th ie  mrgoxamt to  in d i-  
oeto that ©odh on arguBaont ie  opposed to  h i# om view .
"Our idea# therefore# of neceea ity end eau iatioei ar iaee  en tire ly  from the uniform ity eheervehlo in  the opera- tiw m  of aeture# Where o im llar objects are aonstantly  Qonjoined togetaer# and the mind ia  determ ined by cue- tea  to  in fe r  one from the eppearenoe oft the othiwP*These two etreumstanoes fora .th e  Whole of tha t neoessity#  which we ascr ibe to  m a tter" .'* /
Therefore# according to  Hume in  th is  section# the id ea o f
a ecees ity  has two ro o ts . (a) The observed "unifcomity"
in  naturel (b) The "Infermaco" o f tho mind from one thing
to  another# Or# as ho says# "Conjuncticm and Inference".
This conception o f B eoessity  a d ^ t be termed "jaqpiriaal
necessity"# Which Amt condemns as self-con tradictory*
"If we accept h is  conclusions# than a l l  that we c a ll  metsp#wmics i s  a mere de lusion  whereby we fancy our­se lv es to  haws ra tion a l i n s i s t  in to  what# in  actu al fo o t , i s  borrowed so le ly  from esq^erienoe* and under the in fluence of custom has taken the illu so r y  semhlance of n e c e ss ity . I f  he had amvisaged our problas in  a l l  i t s  u n iv ersa lity , he would never have been g u ilty  o f th is  statem m t# so destru ctive o f a l l  pure philosophy."
(2)
However# tho main problem before th is  present appra isal o f 
Humo i s  not the fundamental basis o f N ecessity# but the  
a m ly s ie  o f h is  exp osition  of Liberty and N ecessity as these  
terms stand rela ted  to  h is  view o f Determinism. Therefore# 
th is  argument between Kant and Hume can be pr<H>er3y se t  
aside# and i t  I s  enough fo r  the pros mat purpose that Hums 
be lieved  in  the "actuality" o f Causation# and gave reasons 
fo r  a sim ilar  b e lie f  in  N eoossi^ . further eoqposition of 
h is  system  o f Deterndnism w i l l  in d ica te  that th is  ^ esticm  
o f "universality" was not altogether absent from h is  mind.
(1 ) The inq uir ies#  I .  S ect«8. (64)
(S) lU r . V. B.ao*
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(C) Humo hats argued that there is  "uniform ity" obeervable 
In im ture, and he goes on to ac^ that tiiia  samo uniform ity 
i s  oheoxvabXe in  the conduct of persona, *#ere there no 
uniform ity in  human actlona «». •••  i t  wore i!qpoe©ibIe to  
ooIXeot any general obeervatlona conoem ing mankind#"(l)
Yet# th is  argument for uniform ity in  human ooaaduct must not 
be earn ed  to an extrema# say© Hume; although he had pre­
v iously  made a most extreme statem ent idien he sa id  tha t 
"the same motivea always produce the same action s" . Yet# 
the main point o f h is  argument i s  that persons do behave 
in  a manner which i s  capable of c la sa if  iaatlcQ  and g én éra li­
sa tio n . Hums fe e ls  th a t th is  argument i s  strengthened by 
s ^ in g  that msdioal Bcienoe# Boonomio© and P o lit ic s  are a l l  
erected upon th is  a b ility  to make gen eralisa tion s about the 
behaviour of mankind. Yet# h is  real purpose in  thi© main 
argument 1© fa r  more ifiportant# I t  i s s -
"ISmxb i t  appears# not only that the conjunction between m otives and vol untary action s i s  as regular and uot- fo m  as that between the cause and e ffe c t  la  may part o f nature# but a lso  that th is  ragular conjunction has be<m u n iversa lly  aWmowOLedged among mankind# and has never been tho subject o f dispute# e ith er  In phileeophgr er  common M fe" . (2) '
Bow# a t th is  point i t  i s  v ita l to  s tr e ss  the unique con tr i­
bution mode by Hume to D eterm tnistic thought. From a 
su p e rfic ia l po in t of view# h is  ay&teo of Determinism runs 
along the usual lin e s  made c lear  fey SObbes# Locke and C e llin a . 
In  fact# he i s  le s s  d eta iled  than these w riters# and g iv es  
the ia%>resslon tha t he has m issed out whole areas o f th e ir  
arguments. However# thi© judgment upon Hixse must be bal­
anced by g iv in g adequate a ttr it io n  to the new and important 
d irec tion  he gave to  the problem of Determinism} which i s  
the new# and# what he thinks# a more convincing way of 
demonstrating the concept of Sooea©lty.
(1) m e m quiriea# I .  S e c t.8 . (6 6 ).(2 ) " " " " 8 .  (6 9 ).
'^ ' " m  # # W  # 0 A » ,  * t  * #  * *  M m ' w w w * #  9 # W A W # m  W *  W  ' -
I
4» V*« rnsàm th# lM»t wad m at off#otiv# u## #f h is  vatZuur mmaik
g -  im m pm ^ u m  # r uaimUon. or» t#  put m # ms# i n  #
r-< '-.l& f' • 9#»hPhr### # f h is  #%ammt$ i t  wW&t h# sa id  that
,vA- «HB«mA« Mk# # 1.1# ##Wby»lo«Kl fwaSsttwi ctf DeteMWmm
. Jttagw Upoi' «h. lMMV*«taU«i t f  a  19W p u ^ i. ■ ■ ' ' ' -i t  ha# iMMBr # # % h t th a t th is  oonsspt of ommtiim wm #l#ar
"f* aW # # # # ,  . wm has# a w W  tm  a  "m###s#a%y* #@m##tim
-'%- •■ ^  aaft iff# e t*  In  fact# t h #  hss# mmwtm th a t  t l w  
; ' ###M dis##sa "aaoaality"# th a t is# as sob# foroe o r powaar «i
 ^ in  th a t oh jsst Which t h #  tsam d #&#### as# th# arseuXt «f 
% saSh sansaHty in  th a t thing t h #  tsm sd  Wtfmtrn
 ^; # i s  sssm p tian  has hem ###t#d Int#  a  wstaphyaleai âeetxin##
'' aixi i t  has ohtainad a l l  the isreetig# a f  an indiaputahi# fast»
mstaghyMeal deetsin# has hW a l l  th# wm&mt # f '3'
iaveatigatien# ami # a s  # #  d m io  has h e # #  # s *  
y ÿ  " '^ # 1 # # . # * $  says mm## tM a saaaaptien i s  v lth oa t th e
s l i # t# # t  smwmt m  aotnai i  n# net d e #  #a%. ' Îî; V' # # r e  is  # thing as Oaesality WMah #§>#rat#s in  aatw # 
and in  ami# hut % #» ûmtr that th### is  Mnpla# elea# and 
damanatnshl# *^ p*#ef" #f aneh a  eansalily* in  fact# I  #####% 
# a t  th### as# W y te# msthsds eharehy mWh Qmwality can 
h# assmmi# cam i s  ewtam of seeing an# thing fanetdn#
; . anetimr# an# the  e#m# la  # #  m fwens# of tWm mUA a t  sm n
0: m m m om sim  # ... . ." $ h i#  ewmsnien# there fw o . # i# h  e#fg a l in  th# mind# th is  mmtwmxy tran sitio n  a€ the :^l SI  ^ sm Shsatien from one ohjeet to i t s  usual attm daat# f;^ i s  W# ssntim m t e r is^reaaioa from Whioh #e fen#4' V s  the idea of pee## or asoessaxy 8#nn#iocf# (1/
. hhe# say# San## I f  th is  Indiapntahla fa s t  i s  granted ( th a t
i ^  hae# m  d ireo t i # i # t  iam  the aeeeesasy eem ao tiw  o f
(^am# and affeo t) Detemdnism is  <mnfirsmd#• » -
the usual oaneeption of Causation must h# put wide# i t
^ ' r f  ,; had too amy m o lv e d  problem lying w ithin i t s  erh it#
fV - esse#
(1) m# ##*#»«#* X. ( » }
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For i t  invo lved the idea o f a God # 1 0  ia  the
"cause" #  everything (1) and th ie  "aesunptlon" ha© had# 
a t  leoLt# two p a in fu l coneeqctencee upon ph llo tqphioal thought, 
(a) Tho "known" tends to  be explalned by the üBkacmcu (b ) Cod 
has frequen tly been involved ia  a a ter ia l things* Theae# 
sad a host o f sim ila r  problem© can be solved i f  thinkers 
w i l l  only see the sbeurdity o f the old aonoeption o f 
Causation, end adopt the laoro reasonable explanation th a t 
we knew nothing of Causation but by eus tom and in f  erenow.
This i s  the only type o f  "Bseessity" eonoeivable to  the mind 
o f  nan# m d th erefore, Determinism t& beyond dispute# be­
m use i t  i s  the mind i t s e l f  «Màh "ereates" for I t s e l f  the  
very idea o f N eoocsity. Um begin a t the wroqg end o f th e  
in v estig a tio n  of B eeesetty When they begin by try ing to  
eaandne such abstract doctrine th e fa e u lt ie s  o f the eoWl, 
Let them be more reasonable and sta r t  w ith nature# and # e r e  
they w ill  fin d  th a t they oam ot fox» may idea of Causation 
sad N eow «ity exoopt "that e f  a oonstaat oonjuotion o f ob­
jecta# and subsequent Inference o f  th e mind from one to  
a n o t h e r " , T h e  fa ls e  and grotmdlee© id ea o f C ausality  
hoe hindered e%r p ossib le  so lu tio n  o f Liberty- and N eoossity ***
"But as lm% as we xnehly suppose# tha t we hevw some further idea of nooese ity  and causation In  the apeza- tio n  of SBKtexsml bbjeots# a t the asms time# tha t we can fin d  nothing farth er in  the voluntary action s o f  #ss mimd# there i s  no p e e s ib llity  o f bringing the  question  to  any d e ter a a a te  Iseue# w hile we proceed Upon so erroneous a e opposition# "%*)
I t  i s  in  "The Treatise" rather than "The anquiriee" th a t Rase
bxings out th is  point best# that i&# as i t  stand# rela ted
to  Deternrf.niam.
(1) The m quirias# I .  seo t,7 . (56).(a) " " « " 8. C7B).(3) " " ft n
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"I do not osoribe to tho w ill tha t u n in te lllg lh lo  nocafiBity* WULoh Is  ©uppossd to  l i e  In n a tter |  tu t  X esoribc to n a tter, that in te l l ig ib le  q u a lity , c a ll  i t  neoosa ity or n o t. wtiioh the most rigorous orth odox  does or must allow  to  belong to  the w i l l ,  I  ^bmge, th erefore, nothing In the received system s, with re­gard to  the M i l ,  but only w ith regard to m aterial objoo ts" . (*)
ta  other words, our id ea  of Noceeeitj' and Cantatioa a r ise s  
en tire ly  from tho uniformity- observable in  the operations 
of nature, there sim ilar  objects are constan tly  conjoined  
together and the mind b d ru  detem ined by cue tew to  in fe r  
tho one from the appearance of the other, These two c ir -  
OUBtstances alone form the sAole of the idea o f "Necessity" 
idilch wo ascribe to phenomena.
(D) Tho r ig id  lim ita tio n s o f the present thesi© prevent 
further discussion  of the im p lications of Hume's view of 
b e lie f  in  the concept of Causation* However, i t  i s  Impor­
tan t to obsorvQ that both anf'; Sdward© g ive ample ev i­
dence of tho profound e ffe c t of î t e o 's  d iscu ssion  o f tho sub­
je c t , In  "The Treatise" Humo oomes very near an tlo ipa ting  
JJdmrde' d iscu ssion  o f "Philosophical" Reooscity when he soys;
"Thus though causation bo a ohilOkorAical re la tio n , m ixqplying contiguity , suecessionV hno constant con­ju n ction , y e t , * 't is  only so far as i t  1© a natural* re la tio n , and produces an union among our Idems, wmt we are an le^ ^  reason upon i t ,  and draw any inference  from it" ,
Later, i t  w ill be noted that Bdwardc riae to  draw oorta in , 
carefu l im p llea ti on© from h is doctrine of "philosophical"  
Recm&slty, ih e important fea ture o f vAlch i s  the absence 
o f some power or fo rce , or compulsion inherent in  such a 
type of R ooeseity, There can be l i t t l e  doubt that Hume's 
discu ssion s upon the causal procès© had great Inf Xuonoe upon 
Bdwards, although there are no in d ica tion s o f such an in ­
fluence from the pen o f Ddwards. Y et, the important thi%
(1) Ihe T rea tise, Bk,a. P t ,3 . s e o t .2 .(2 ) ” " « 1 . « S . *» 6 .
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a t th is  stage of the d isou seisa  o f Determinism i s  to  
areuputer the vexy n ove l, but a m  the le e s  ix^ ortsn t in te r -  
p re tstion  given hy iSam to  Determinism. Home hsH evee in  
Detenala£si& because o f many reaeons, Ixit h is  bseio mrga- 
iMnt l ie s  in  h is  p eeu lisr  In terpretation  o f daosation#
8%@ mind i s  determ ined by custom end inference to p ostu la te  
the causal process, bu t, and thl© i s  v ita lly  1 important# by 
the term %dad", mrne most cer ta in ly  does not mean the  
"reason" as oasmMdy aooepted* He argues in  fa c t fo r  the 
very opposite <xt Eeaoon being the "ground" for tho idea o f  
N eoesiity* i^ffioaey, ageaor, poser, ener^  are a l l  s y m y -  
sous term s, thereforo , they oam ot be Used to  define sa A  
o ilier . In  fa c t , G Snsali^  i s  not capable o f a real d « r in i- 
t ie n  because i t  i s  an "Impression", i t  i s ,  as Base so o ften  
rep ea ts, "Felt" rather than perceived by the Mnd. Reason 
can have very l i t t l e ,  or nothing to  do M th th is  "impression" 
o f d a u sa lity . F ir s t , beesuse Reason can never g ive  r is e  
to  an "original" idea. Geeend, Reason, apart from e x p e ii-  
SDce, can n ev ^  g iv e  r is e  to the conclusion that a cause, sv  
productive q u a lity , i s  "absolute noaossaxy" to  every beginniami 
o f e@dL©tenoe,
Hume i s  far from c le a r , mû perhaps not always con sisten t im 
h is  deduction o f th is  idea o f seoeaa ity , but cme o f M # mala 
argm w ts i t  ferasd in  the fo llow ing sssmsr* The idem of 
H eeeesity a r ises from some *%spression". Y et, there i s  a s  
im pression aeaveyed to  our sm ses lA ioh can g ive  r is e  to  
such sn id ea . Therefore, i t  m et be derived from sens 
"Impreesiim" àhich i s  the produet of r e fle c tio n . However, 
thore i s  no p o s s ib ility  o f such an "internal" im pression 
ar isin g  so re ly  ty  r e fle c t io n , but i t  can a r ise  from th a t 
"propaoMty" of tho mind, lA ich i s  produced lay "oustom", sad  
tfbloh enablos the mind to pass from one tM i^  to another* 
Thereforo, Hume concludesi-
"  : . v : '
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(H) I t  oott he mrgued that tho DetermWam o f Hume la  
grounded upon h ie  particu lar interprétait ion  o f 3m m allty, 
and that th la , in  turn, ie  W i lt  upon hie esctreee /3apix4aiam. 
However, the important fa c t ia  that Hume hae drawn from 
impirloiam the lo g ic a l inference# and iqp lica tim w  wh5.<Ri 
were m isaed by hoc ko and o o llin e , and Ihereforo, In  th ia  
amme, hia ayetm  o f Doterminiem i s  superior to , and pexhspa 
caoro con sisten t than their*s* A ll th ie  might be argued a# 
ju stify in g  the im patience w ith which he opens the disouaaion  
of Liberty «%) N ecessity . Hume g ives the fo llow ing argu­
ment Why p^raoae re jec t Determinism#
mm s t i l l  en terta in  tho Idea tha t they can ponotrato fa r th e r  
in to  the powers of nature, and perceive a "necessary" re ­
la tio n  between Oause and a ffec t. I f  only they would accept 
hie in te rp re ta tion  of the causal process, and put the righ t 
smenlng on the term "Necessity" th e ir  d if f ic u lt ie s  would be 
a t  on end. Cwastant union and mmtal inference are the 
only ground# #f a  b e lie f in  Neoeesity.
Of course, persons are apt to  argw  th a t they emmet always 
discern a ccmnsctlmi between bheir motives and th e ir  actions# 
Purther, they w ill p e rs is t in  the cmtigmted notion tha t 
there %au©t be a v i ta l  difference between Causality in  nature 
and the causality  which i s  caused by thought and intelligence# 
Here, Ruswr ha© attempted to make c lear h is position beyond 
may thadow of aubiguity. of course, there i s  a difference 
between m aterial things end rd a tio o s  of tho mind, but th is  
difference is  not the importent thing# Doth re la tions ere 
neccsoary, but the term "necessary" i s  the eoxsa in  bc%i in ­
stances, and, a f te r  a l l ,  i t  only means observable ©ucoe#sion 
and habitual inference* Why read in to  ©u<Wi a term a l l  the
absurd metapfeysical meanings given fey former pbilosoiAical 
systems?
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In a foo t-n ote in  "The ^mquirlee", Hum repeat© an argu­
ment t&iioh ne had used in  T reatise". Persons object 
to Lho doctrine o£ Determ ini am because they have some vague 
idea that rea l iib er ty  oone lets in  some type of 'In d iffer - 
enoe". a# argues that the neceaeity o f an ac tion  ie  not 
rea lly  a qu ality  in  the thii% or agent, but coneibte In  
"the doterm iaation oi h ie thought to in fe r  i t s  existenoe 
from com  preceedlng objects" . Bov, i f  the «kind does not 
proceed in  ta le  "neceaeary^* manner, then looeoneee freet 
th is  type of inherent neaeeslty  «met be no idling more or lea s  
than Jhance*
Hume adm ite th a t  th e r e  i e  a " fe e l in g "  of l i b e r t y  in  th ia
sense, tlm t 1©, pemoiu> fee l trmt they can pass a t  w ill from
one idea to onoUier. Yet, th is  fee©ing Is  allowed to
develop Into on erroneous idea of Lberty # âc h  consists in
the lolloping statement#-
»*i« fe s i  tha t our actions ore subject to our w ill on most eccosions, and imagine we fee l that the w ill I ts e l f  i© subject to nathingf because when by a denial of I t  we are provoked to tzy, we fee l tha t i t  moves easily every way, and produoes an image of i t r e l f  even on that s id e , on which i t  did mot settle*"CD
This feeling of Indiifei-ence is  purely imaginary, and is  the 
re su lt of laqperiect in trospection conoeming motives end 
actions. An im partial "spectator" con commonly in fe r  our 
aciiofiS from our motives# men When th is  ie  not ixkseible, 
Hume would argue (and h«re he ie  joinW by Kant as fa r  as 
the empirical character of a person i© oonoemed) — "were 
ho perfectly  acquainted with every oircumstancc of our 
s itua tion  and teaper, and tne most secret springs of our 
c(*upleaion and disposition^ he would be able to do so* (2)
(1) The Treatise* Bk#2* Pt#3# se c t. 2#
(2) " " « " « » H «* see also&• r# V# A»650*
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<4) Hcnid is  QonvinoOd th a t’DBhooiogy" has had a consider- 
ahio infXuenoe XLpcxn the opposition of DeterodLalaci* mm 
think tha t rea l morality i© in  danger I f  they agreo to  ©uoh 
"necessary" p rincip les. Yet, Hume #JLnke that only Deter- 
minlem gives rea l meaning fo r re lig ion  end sm rallty .
"'Yis iwpoaeihle. e itheu t the neoeseary oomwlon of oaaee and effec t In hmem actions* th a t puniehmsnt could be i n A i c t #  ecapatlble v i’im jn s tiee  and moral equity."
Further, actions, fey th e ir  very nature, are temporary and 
p u s h in g  i f  thmy do ac t proceed from some aaame in the 
(Aarecter and dlcpositicai of the person perfoxMng such 
actlmm. "'T ie ixAy upon the principles of neceetity , 
th a t a person acquiree emrlt or demerit from his actions". 
Before eonoludlng h is  espo&ition of DetmrnlMem, Hume M il 
again turn to th is  question of ae lig ien  as re la ted  to  
Beeessity, but i t  1© enough to observe here that he cam 
find no vorth-mbile argument in the Whole of h is knowledge 
of Religion fo r concluding th a t h is type of Determindsm 
stands opposed to morel values. Warn he# an additional 
end very in te resting  argument fo r Determinism whm he says 
th a t "Bipentance" i s  a olemr instance th a t motives are of 
primary im ortene# in  m orality.
aw ever, Hume does not develep ^ i s  idea of "R^>entawe", 
and i t  would be s t i l l  more in te resting  to discovor how such 
a s ta te  of Bepentamoe could be inaugurated in  such a close- 
f i t t in g  system of Determinism as he advocates. For, in  
sp ite  of the ra ther "estpirical" doctrine of morals aceem- 
penying h is  system of Determinism, there are indications of 
a  deeper Mew of hunwn v irtu e  and failure# Hume speaks of 
swM things as "iniquity  end in fid e lity "  and "pernicious 
rnmmims" which pervert hmaaa sdnd# and emWhict* He i s  not
(1) The T re a tise . fik.2. p t .d .  s e c t .2 .
altogether uneyzpathetlo to the Kantian view of humn oflo- 
duot When be w rites:*
sen dispute tha t a mind, which supports a pezpetaal seren ity  and dheerfalneee, a  noble d ignity  and wndswited s p i r i t ,  a tender affeotlon  and good»silX to  a l l  areend# se i t  has more enjoyment within i t s e l f ,  i s  also  a  more animating and rejo leing  speotaele than i f  dejected with melanohely, tormented wid% amdLety, i r r i ta te d  hy r a g e , , . ,  or sunk in to  the meet abject baseness end degemeraoy."'*/
Further, he in s is ts  th a t tho mem, Who has lo s t the capacity 
to rebel against pernicious maWlms of a e lf  « in te re s t, and 
fee ls  no reluctance fo r thoughts ef v illa in y  and baseness, 
has lo s t a ocoaiderable motive for rea l virtue* m  other 
words, Hume had, in  hi© prnMplea of morality, the seeds of 
a doctrine of "radical ev il" , but i t  was le f t  wRdevWloped, 
and therefore, he does not rea lly  face th ie  great problem of 
hmoan repentance and regeneration*
Theee obaervatl^me upon the Determinism of Humo lead to  the 
general c ritic ism  of h it  system which might be sta ted  in  tJie 
fo llosing te rn s. Bums gives the impression tha t he has 
fastened upon one is^o rtan t aspect of Detexiatnlsm, Which i s  
h is ra ther novel in te rp re ta tion  of Causation and necessity} 
and th a t he has neglected, or treated  Whole areas of Deter* 
minis t ic  doctrine with ©oiaowhat isp a tim t superficiality*
Bis special contributioa upon Causation end necessity is  of 
v i ta l  importance to a l l  form© of Determinism, hut he leaves 
h is readers with the d is t in c t impression th a t even th is  con­
trib u tio n  might have bew  subject to great modification i f  
oMy he had surveyed the whole f ie ld  of Deterministic doc­
tr in e  with g reater core and profundity. For instance, there 
appear to  be, a t le a s t, two aspects of Determinism which 
Hume troated with ra ther scant a tten tion , which, i f  viewed 
mere seriously , might have led to  modification of h is cen tral 
theme.
(1) the enquiries, I .  gect.9* (886)
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Fimmt. h is Mew of 3mnoe as i t  stands re la ted  to  Deteratniea* 
The above Oi©ousel(m of Hubs'© in te rp re ta tion  of Jau©ation 
gives aqple extraots of what he said  upon th is  important 
suhjeot* However, in  order to bring the whole m attw  into 
fooos again, the following is  inporten t:-
"% say. i t  has been shewn, in  trea ting  M the under­standing, tha t there is  no oomioKion of cause end e ffec t, such as W 8  supposed to  be, Which is  dUscoversble otherwise than by experienee, amd of which we can pre­tend to  have any security  by the simple consideration e f  the Mkieots. A ll beings in  the universe, considered i a  theaselves, appear en tire ly  loose and independent e f eeeh oth«v* I t  i s  only ty  experience we lescn th e ir  influence and connexion} and t ^  influence we WghtAto extend bmyond expérience"» vl)
Bow, th is  i s  the in te rp re ta tion  of Gensation Which Hume 
advocates throughout the whole exposition of his «yttem of 
Determinism, and, as already indicated, i t  i s  a  centribntion 
which is  of great importance. In  fairness to  Hnae, i t  
Bust be said  th a t he works a t  th is  theme with rea l s k i l l  and 
consistm cy, and he gives h is system of Betezmlnisa a  very 
valuMdLe place in  the th o u ^ t of the Mghteeoth Gmtury by 
the sk ilfu l app licatiau  of th is  central doctrine. However, 
there appears to  be one g reat weakness in  h is  chain of argu­
ment, and th a t i s  h is discussion of Ghoaoe. In  order to  
make th is  point c lea r, i t  most be rmssdbered tha t any system 
ef Deteroinies i s  b u ilt  upon a b e lie f  in  Causation. Bant 
sees th is  tru th  in  his discussion of the Third Antinoay, and 
indeed i t  i s  self-evident# How, Hume is  the onlv w rite r  in  
the history  of Oeterm islstia thought Who attempts to  erect 
a firm and r ig id  system of Determinism upon a "precarious" 
in te rp re ta tion  of the causal se ries . In  the above ex trac t, 
he puts h is point of view c learly . Apart from actual experi­
ence of the causal s e r ie s , the human mind has no rig h t toft '/in fer comeotion, le a s t of a l l ,  aecessaxy coanecticm of 
cause and effeo t. fu rth e r, the human mind must not think
(1) The T reatise. Bk»3. P t.l»  fieo t.l.
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Of extending th is  Supposed" oonnsotlon beyond actuel ex­
perience* mew, the alacat inevitable log ical reeu lt of 
th ie  eci^ticlaet or agnoeticiem cctxcomlng Oaueality ie  th a t, 
beyond a l l  actual experience, " a ll  being) in  the uoiveree, 
conaidered in  theneelvea, appear en tire ly  looeo and inde­
pendent of eech o ther". In  other worde, no etatenxmt ie 
poeeible concerning Oaneation beyond experience, and i t  
eeema th a t Hume earn th ia log ical aequenoe, but refused to  
submit to it*
Of courae, as already s ta ted , Hune did not deny in  any 
positive terms the "actuality" of the causal se rie s , but 
he did in s is t  tha t knowledge at such causal se ries is  lim ited 
to  actiml experience, and, even in  th ie experience there 
i s  no kuch thing as "necessary" connection except the type 
of "necessity" iw osed w on the causal se ries by the mind 
Which i s  ewerieuoing the causal se rie s . Hbe, the obvious 
deduction from such a doctrine is  th a t, beyond actual ex­
perience of the causal s e r ie s , no b e lie f , no conclusion, 
end not even a guas© is  perm issible. That i s ,  a l l  might 
be chaos, or Ohanoe or order, but no opinion upon such a  
subject is  a t  a l l  possible. This seem© to  be tho log ical 
re su lt of such a view of Oaueatien as i s  held by Hume*
However, he w ill have nothing to  do with such a  deduct!on, 
and repudiates the "possib ility" ef Ghanoe in  the strongest 
possible terns* In  "The Treatise", be la  most enphatio 
upon th is  point* Ghanoc is  excluded by constant ccnjimoticn* 
I t  is  the negation of Cause. There is  no middle course 
between Chance and Necessity. All these points are labour­
ed in  the above work, but i t  is  ©ignificant that when he 
comes to "The m quiries", Hume says very l i t t l e  about Chance* 
However, there is  one thing he says in  both "The Treatise" 
mod "The m qu iries" , and th is  1 s t-
"The wàXmepf Who take thing© aoooediog to their f ir s t  appeeraoee# attribu te  the uaaertainty of erente to euoh an nmoerteWgr in  the oeoeee a# make# the la tte r  often f a il  of their umial inflnm oe, ^onA  thmr meet Mth no ImpedinmM in  their operatloii. le t  phlleeo- phere, oheerving th a t, alaoet mrwy pert of natare# there ie  eentelneil a vast variety ef aprih#  end prin* eipXee, mhW% are hid , ky reaeon of th e ir mionteneee or remoteneee# find# that i t  ie  a t leee t poeeihle the oontrarie%r or evenie my not prooeed from soy eon- timemaar in  the eanee, hot from the eeoret Operation of oontrary eeneoe From the Oheervauen ofeeveral parallM  inotenoee, ohiloeopher# form a martm that the oonmemiom between e l l  oemeoe and effeot# ie  eqooUy neoeeeary, and U&at i t s  sewing emoerteim^ in  eome iaetanae# prqpeede from the eeoret wpoeitlcn of oontrary wiee#"tCl)
Therefore, fo r Hume, Cfumoe hae no eadstonoe, and, what ie  
more iw o rto n t, Ohanoe hae no meaning, and ie  inoapahle of 
beeoodng #  "posaUdLe" omaoept of the human mind, and th ie  
"Impeaetbilitar" of Ohanoe hold# good fo r omperienoe, and 
th a t # io h  la  "bsyond" experienoe. Xn other worde, Eume'e 
undweme ia  governed three^w ot by oouee and e ffeo t, and 
"neoeeeity'', in  it#  f u l l  and f in a l aoalyai©, I# an obdeetlve 
and unlverea3| eonowt# Therefore, there are  grounds fo r  
thinking th a t, had Home earn a l l  the inplloatiooe of h ie 
teaohlng oonoemtng Ohanoe, he might have been ooopelled to 
modify hi# teaahing upon Oensation and Heoeaaity*
Of OQurae, i t  adght be argued tha t Huma's disouaeion of Ghanoe 
i#  lim ited to ^ la t  p a rt o f emietenoe which ie  aoM ally ex- 
pealenoed} and h is  re la tin g  of Ohnnoe and Probability could 
be need to support aoidi am araumast. Yet, the operative 
dauee  ia  the above ex tzw t ie  that the seeming unoorteinky 
pwooeeda "from the ©eoret oppoeitiom of oontrary oaueee".
Xn o#@w word#, Hume ia  no t, on th is  poin t, epeaking of actual 
eaperienoe, bsoauea ^  admit© th a t the ©ooret w poeition of 
eootrary canees must be acd# ted  as a fac t to ru le out the 
emietenoe e r  p eee ib ility  of chance even in  th a t aphere a t 
Cauaatien Mdch ie  bey mad th a t whicRi le  actually  experionoed*
(X) The m q a iriea , z# #eot*8* («7).6ee aleo "The T reatiae", Bk.X. P t.3 . sec t#18#
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# u # w ,  in  ihe ^potions É ilfae t rnmmmiMi @ 9#w iw , 
a # #  im i i te d  th a t i t  ma only experienoe #%loh provided 
a%  groundefbr a^ewing "influonee end oememim" in  the 
eftUaal sérioB, end th a t #W& "inflnm ee end oemexien" m # t 
never be extended to  eaqplein Geneation #id%  might H e be- 
yend ee taa l eaperienoe* Yet, hie dieen^eleai a i dbenee re - 
veal# the fee t th a t be i© nee prepared te  aeeert tbe t Ohanoe 
i e  inpeeaible, b e e m e  ebat ie  meetly aeoribed to  Gbanee ie  
notMme mere or leea tban the meeoret" opP06itiw of oentraay 
maneee* In  other worde, i f  the oontrary oawwe are e e w e |.. 
then, by the tW  fe e t of thMr being ew ret, they do mot 
onme within the o rb it of th a t which is  actually  «aporleneed, 
end Bma appear# to  be deaying Me #wn etmtement fey in o ie t-  
ing # m  extending the influenoe end ommeaiem of the oauenl 
eerioa beywd espOrieaee*
Hope ie  perfec tly  emare Wkt hi# eyetem of Detensinism doea 
met l i e  tee eeeurely upon the prew rious foundation o f M e 
hovel in terovetetion  of Camaation, bu t, with commeedW# 
eM ll$  he makes a  good job of keeping the whole structu re  
M tM n erne reaeemahle meaaure o f alignment. iHMver, h# 
meee th a t i f  he aupeaippoaea w en aneh a  e truc tu re  the wa# 
ee rta in  end watering weight ai dbence, the whole structure 
of DeterMniem w ill eollapae in  ruine. He rig h tly  Obepme 
th a t there cam be no oonpreniae with chance. That there 
own be no addMe eeurae betw en iw eee ity  and chance, go, 
he demie# the eai©temce of Chaneo, and, th a t i#  more v i ta l ,  
h e  deMmt the  ^amia### of chance mot only in  t h #  wM6k i#  
actually  eaperienced, but in  the whole course of aaturw, 
#iW% lie #  baycnd a l l  eaperiamee# fb ia ia  ^  weak l i r h  
in  hi# iqretem of DotpaMniem, and i t  sdght prove that.
:
rnapiriciem can never be a  baei# for DetexmialeBh
L-
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Stnrnil I Ms vis# of #od in  rslatiG n to hi# gystsm of Ssttor- 
mlM#m. In  fa im s# s to Hums, mush of the following c r i t i -  
cigm i# i^pHoable to  Locke and coHin# as w all a# to  HttMf 
and i t  oonaigtg of th e ir  d isinclination  to  take the oono#t 
of God aeriowsly in te  th e ir  ayetews of Determinlam. Look# 
has an exalted idea of ^ e  pereen and power of G#d, hot be 
mskee l i t t l e  use of thie concept In hi© ewpositicn ef Deter* 
«iniam# Gelling i s  a  l i t t l e  were ceoglstent in  th a t he 
snhee i t  quite d e a r  a t the beginning of h is  sw positiw  th a t 
he imisndm ssyiz% l i t t l e  e r  nothing about the "thedegigel" 
greuads er inp licatiena of Determlnigm. Hcdbs mkge no 
endk l in i tg t io a  in  h is expositie n t end he eaters upon a  dig- 
gwbeicn ef Thedegy in  re la tio n  to  Determinisn# However, 
he deeg not proceed vary fa r in  sndi a  dieeusolon, and oloeee 
i t  with expregsim# of rather doubtful modwty. the sisp le  
fa c t eppeggra to  be tha t LoMe, Gelling and Hwee have bean 
ecneahat over#%elmed by the impressive evidence available 
in  mgdLMeigm fe r  th e ir  visu» of Determinism tha t they did 
mot fe e l the need fo r say additional mipport from thee- 
log ical gewrcest This statement attempts the fa ire s t  
possib le ewplanaticn of th e ir  "neglect" of the support of 
"thcQlogieal" Determinism, a support of which Hobbes was 
meat happy end wise to  ava il Mmself» Yet, with e l l  rea­
sonable attempts a t  ju s tic e  fo r these erpositiong ef 
" ib y eh o lo g i^ "  PeterMnigm, i t  is  f e l t  th a t Hume had ra ther 
a s in is te r  motive in  net preesix% forward with the acknow­
ledged jbcplieatieas of h is system of Deterednism, amd nmst, 
thcréTore, to a degree, be exempted from th is  excuse afforded 
to Leek# and colHaa#
(1) There am be l i t t l e  doubt th a t Hume desired to be kncm 
as a  rea l believer in  ggd. His theologieal expreasio:#, 
thomah amrked by a s tr in g  tendency to  rationalism , oma be 
e laesifled  as D eistie i f  not Theistie*
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"The idea of God, as meaning an in f in ite ly  in te ll ig e n t, Mae and good Being, arieee from refleo tlng  m  the operatione of our oen mind, and augmenting M thent_. lim it, those q u a litie s  of goodaeas and wisdemf. ID
Bow, th is  is  the view of God which Rume aaintM ne th roug^u t 
h is wo A s . (2) Therefore, # a tev o r modifl cations Rmae f e l t  
neoosaaxy to make in  Christian dqgmatios, th is  b e lie f in  
God rmeained unaltered.
(2) I t  is  eignifioant also  tha t Hume takes oonsiderahle 
time and ears to refu te  tho "theologieal " isplieatlom s 
of the i^etem of Determinism expounded by spinosa. In  a  
very rea l smase, i t  wa© Spinoma, and he alone of "secular" 
thinfters, sAo took the idea of God seriously with reference 
to  th e ir  systems of Determinism* Rune terias spinosa an 
"Atheist", and declares tha t "his system loads inevitably  to 
a  i^teiB  of Atheism" Of course, i t  might be argued
that Hume was dm^endent upon Beyle for h is in te rp re ta tio n  
of qpinosa^^^. Yet, Rume is  too careful a thinker to  take 
h is convictions second-hand, and his opposition to Qpinoma 
carries re a l , personal conviction. Tho obvious fact i s  
th a t Hume had re a l , ra tional grounds fo r  avoiding the 
"theological" iim>lioations of Determinism, and, again, i t  
i s  his LPeeial in te rp re ta tion  of Causation Which he seeks 
to protect*
(2) Htsae'w deals with the "theologloal" impllcaUons of 
Determinism in tho following manner.
P irs^ . he examines the idea of ofod as the so le cause of a l l  
existing th  ngs . . . .  not only as the ultim ate and origixmil 
cause of thing©, "but tho immediate and ©do cause of evosy 
event which appears in  n a t u r e " H e r e ,  he ooaMnee thm
LI) The m iquirles. se c t*2. (14)(8) The Treatise# Appendix*3) " " B k.l. P t.4 . fteot#6*[4) Bee XeqpHBoith. Hume. Page 6D6#(6) The Bnquiries,!. Seat.7. (5W
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gyetom of aDâ and ooaoAnâas th a t thaaa
ié»m  of Oauaalitgr . **rob nature, and aU  croatad being#, 
of every po«ar, in  order to reader th e ir  dopendonoo on the 
Deity atlXX isore eexmlble and Imaediate*, He goee on to 
argue Umt i t  doee not e m it the idea of ood to  oonoeive of 
S tn aa being unable or unwilling to  «'delegate a oe rta la  
degroe of power to  in fe r io r  ereaturea’*, and to  be ever in -  
volvod l a  KoepinG the univeree upon a working baai^. 
deeond. he suggeet# two eey# out of th ie  *'theologioal«* d i l emma#
(a) %ie human roaecm 1# attempting en Impotj^iblo task  « ta i  
ho 60Gke to  penetrate in to  a "fairy** land uhloh ic  beyond 
it#  fbeultiea# "Our lin e  i# too short to fathmi ^uoh 
inmenso alyeees"#
(b) 2ho human mind is  ignorant of hoe bodiea aot upon eadh 
other even in  experlenee, auoh le^e can i t  a t tœ p t tho toak 
of discovering how r«od acts i%)On nature and events# "Ulielr 
feoroe or energy i s  en tire ly  inaompredwnsible",
(4) Later, Bum returns to  th is  thoologloal discussion when 
he observes th a t h is system of Determinism i s  like ly  to  be 
mta-interpreted by h is c r i t ic s  as a system Wbioh believes 
in  "HO oontingeQQy anywhere in  the univorco, no indlfferenoo, 
m  liberty^’ • Purthsr, Ms c r i t ic s  might Wmucge him with 
teaching a rig id  form of Determinism which la  iden tical with 
th a t expounded ty  some theological schools# Bum appears 
most anxious to  escape thii. la t te r  d isige , and takes time to  
examine i t s  implications* He imagines h is  opponent as say# 
iea  th a t. I f  vMiattaxy actions be suhjacted to the same laws 
of neoeesity as the operations of m atter, then i t  must be 
assumed th a t there is  a continued chain of necessary causes, 
pre«-ordained and pre*determined, roo<^biag from tho origimJL 
cause (xP a l l  to every single vM ition of every human creature* 
% is  reference to  a (Aain of Causation i s  an in d irec t re fe r­
ence to  Hobbes who did not h es ita te  to use &uoh bold la%uage*
U ) * »  Maq/Arim, X. Sm «.8. P t.8 . (78)
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Bttme Infère that i f  th is  basic assumption i s  granted, i t
i s  easy to  suggest th a t a i l  rea l human morality i s  a t  m
and God taost be held responsible fo r taxmen oonduot,
good and bad. However, mass is  oonvimed th a t suoh a  lin e
of orgu&iexxt is  gu ilty  of over-eim pllfioatlon, and he a t -
twq^ts to lo t*  a t  i t  in  greater d e ta il .
F irs t ,  i f  hoom actions <msi bo traced by a necessary Chain
to God, what does th is  prowet Does i t  prove th a t a l l  human
aotione are good because they flm» of necessity from the
fount of a l l  Goodnes&t V eil, there are some < ^lm lstio
theologians who find comfort in  such a view of the uni verse.
"tartny pbywical i l l ,  say they, makes an essen tial p a rt of
th is  benevolent system". Yet, Bttae feels th a t the optiadam
of suoh a  view of H fe  is  un justified  in  face of the rea l
fac ts  of huamn ex ist ease. However, even i f  i t  be granted
tha t from the purely "physical" aspect the whole of l i f e
is  indicative of supreme Goodness and Benevolence| there
s t i l l  remains the "OoxWl" aspect# 9m are constituted to
fee l the sootimmt of approbation and blame. some persons
might argue tha t everything is  rig h t with regard to the
*#hole", but again suoh "Moral" optimiam shuts i t s  eyes to
the re a l fac ts  of l i f e .  Right and wrong, lik e  beauty mù
dmronalty, are rooted in  the human mind, and no abstrac t
philosophical system can ignore those d istin c tio n s.
aooohd. how can God be the cause of a l l  human actions without
also being the author of s in  and moral txivpitudc? Rare,
says Hums, i s  a question which "mere natural and unassisted
reason is  very u n fit to  handle" #(D Hume thinks tha t the
task of philosofAy is  fa r  less  am bitieusi-
*%spjEy, i f  she be thence sensible of her tem erity . When Whs p r ie s  in to  these sublime H y ste rics |  and lemvixw# a scene so f o i l  of o b sc u ritie s  and p erp lex ities, return , with su itab le  modesty, to  her true and proper province, the SBBWdnation  of eomimm l i f e ;  where she w ill find d if f ic u ltie s  euoD^ to  employ h«p enquiries, without l Aunchihg in to  so boundless an ocean of doubt, un­certa in ty . and c o n tra d ic tio n ."  '2 )
(1) Bw SaqiitrlM, 1 , « .* .( 2 |  " * « N ft M fl
— #B —
The question i s  Why did Hume make eoy attempt to dlscuaa 
the "theological" ioplicatlone of h±& eyatea of PeteralTiieer? 
WùVf i t  ia  perfectly  otvtoua th a t Me heart mm not in  such 
a diecueaion, and i t  ia  extremely doubtful whether he waa 
qualified  to  dimcuea such implieatione. Further, hla view 
of God bos l i t t l e  to  ju s tify  audh a dlaoussion, and, what 
ia  mdh more importent, h is ey&tea of Determinism does not 
lend i t s e l f  to  the ra is ing  of such questions#
To put the best possible construction upon hia rx>tivea in  
disouseing the theological implications of Detaminism i t  
might bo said  tha t Hume had the following purposes in  view*-
(a) Ho wanted to  make i t  clear beyond any shadow of doubt 
tha t he had not the le a s t in ten tion  of lending support to 
the prevailing dogma of Iheology, tha t i&, tho dogma of 
"?redO£^tinatloa"| end, to a very great degree, Rune was 
quite consistent in  rejecting  the notion tha t h is fyutem 
of DetomixiUBi had arythiog in common with th a t of Theology. 
<b) RSuae wanted to go beyond th is  repudiation, and make i t  
perfectly  c lear th a t empiricism offered the only oonsistent 
and reasonable  view of human existance# He is  quite con* 
Winced th a t th is  ra ther lim ited entry into the realm of 
Theology proves beyond doubt the wisdom of canfinii% a tte n ­
tion  to the examinatiQn of conmon l i f e .  Re i s  not qu ite 
f a ir  lAen he ssyst-
"Tb roeeneile ttm indifference and contingwoy of hiaum actions with prescience: or to  defend mbaolute decrees, end y e t free the Deity frcsc being the author of s in , has oeen found, h ith e rte  to  exceed a l l  the power of pH U e#qplV «r(ir
For most theoiogioal systems of Determinisa believe in
"Receasity" even i s  hosan actions. Bo tM s as i t  may, there
are two observations which can be made concerning Rums and
h is  theological vii
(1) The jaxqMxiea, I .  geot.B. Pt.8# (81)
F i r s t , i t  ie  p e rfe c tly  obvious th a t  îîuao Iuuî s e t  a  very 
lied to d  un iverse  of dltoouroo fo r the d lscueeion  of L iberty  
and ütaoocslty* He has re je c te d  the  wider context of the  
theme apparent i n  ROhhe#, narrowed th e  general % c#rioiem  
o f Looke, and repudiated  th e  "rationaliem " of O oH lm . 
m eee in creasin g  lim ita tio n s  of the  o r b i t  o f disous&ion pro­
v id e  Hume w ith  a  very  t i< ^ , b u t, a t  th e  sooe tim e, e x tra ­
ord inary  system of Determinism. I f  these  l im itin g , major 
prem ises of h is  argusxsit a re  g ran ted , th en , tho re  i s  very 
l i t t l e  wliioh cen bo sa id  in  den ia l o f h i s  conclusions. 
However, in  th e  above e x tr a c t ,  Hume goes on to  th a t  the  
examiiiation of "common l i f e "  w i l l  provide philosophy w ith 
problems enough without "launching in to  &o boundless an 
ocean of doubt, u n c e rta in ty , and co n tra d ie tio n " . This I s  
m doubtedly tru e , but th e  main point i e ,  oan any of these  
" d i f f ic u l t ie s "  w ith in  the  bounds o f common l i f e  be consider­
ed adequately , or s e t t le d  f in a l ly  by an appeal to  th e  da ta  
av a ilab le  in  common l i f e ?  M already  remarked, Hume w i l l  
have nothing to  do vdLth Chanco as a  p o ss ib le  exp lanation  o f  
common l i f e .
" I t  i s  u n iv e rsa lly  allowed th a t  no th i g  eatists w ithout
Chance i s  indeed a  d i f f ic u l ty  which i t  found in  common l i f e ,  
hut irumo knows th a t  dhanoe ik  a  d i f f ic u l ty  which extends 
beyond OGSsaon l i f e ,  and ;*ilo&ophy %auet t r y  and say some­
th ing  about th i s  ex tension . Hume has n o t h o s ita to d  i n  sqyi%% 
something dogmatic about Chance in  i t s  r e la t io n  to  common 
l i f e  and the u ltim ate  b a s is  of a l l  ex is ten o e . Y et, having 
secured h is  system of D ^tom ixslm  by a  d en ia l of Ohanoo, he 
cannot, w ith any show of lo g io , deny th e  r ig h t  o f philosopÊy 
to  attem pt to f i l l  th e  vacmm e x is tin g  beyond experionoe w ith  
some more p o s it iv e  content than the  absence of Chance, o r
(1) a .  m çpA xtrn . Bmet.8, P t . l .  (78)
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1, /   ^ # #  füM S d#  #  # W  ùnly
/ % M thin me realm of «kperieneei and, @# mrnt htm
ao <mjectiv# validity# Rterd» ie  quite right when he 
.^1 "Thee# mioge e l i i  W ordered by e*W H 8# Th%r w ill 
either be diepoeed ty  wieêm, or they w ill be diepoeed hy 
dWmoe^ # eal #me edMt# # e t  there earn be no oeopie*  ^
Mlee between a view of l i f e  based open (Aaooe end m vie# e# |  
Mfe based w m  Reeeeeity. Tberefeee, mme*e etteept to 
ereot a ri# id  syetm  of Detexniiiin open the feW atiem# of  ^
matmm mpirielem end ^LObjeotive* Seeeeeity provide# 
laeolim u m ffiw ltle##  I
ieftOB .^ me idea of @ed, la  any diaooeelea of Liberty aod 
ieeeiilty»  eooetee many m& fsMpeemioa problems# wmm 
hm Meoueeed some of these preblem, end a  ewmrol eorvigr 
of me Tbeologieal ieplieaticme i f  oetem iaiea provide# # 
fttst « ra y  of sueh ;nreblens« xadeed i t  W dd be "happy* 
fo r Bhilasepby I f  ém  eouM justifiab ly  tom  emmy from thi# 
bmmdioBs ooeeo of d o # t, m # # taia ty  emd oootrsdietioa, «ad 
return to the foots of oomsoo life . Yet, to  ask th is of 
pMlosopby is  es ismeesible «« to «sS of "Phyeios" that i t  
owRines i t s  stady to the e a r# , m i avoid the beemdlesB 
'##eem of IbtarateU m r spaeo, end, «# m et rm ssra, the 
M ffioulty is  even greats* them mare spate. (S) %t |e  f iÿ  
th is  omese, mà simila r  reasw e, that IMSt re-opems # 0  
problem #  Ubeely mad #eo##ity witbim a fa r mem emteoslvm^ 
'oeatemt thorn permitted ty  Reas# Be igperes the bom- 
dariem w  horimms artified a lly  oreated by Berne# mA set# 
the problem in  i ts  ege#old emiremmemt of thooghi by etatdhg 
that he tmmod# Mnhimg together oed, Freedom ow xmnortoU^
« 0  the th r a  major preMens of mstophyei#* the very loaert 
thioh earn he said m>noeraing suA a pospose is  that i t  i s  
bMng tm e to  the #ell#eet«blished terms of referme# eb#
t i )  m  yveedom Of the v ili#
(2) K* V* f t  Xhtxe. B.17#
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m #  i# iMudi «Mrs loyal to the method of philoeephy i a  th i  
hendlins of th is  problem then m *e. Further, eoeh ea  ee- 
teaeioB of the wdveree of dioOeiaree indieetee th a t Seat
geaeped i a  a  f a r  profmaader eaamer them Inee the re e l■ ■ / f ■.fetmdatioae oad ia p lim tim #  of DeteraiMea#
Whether Kent doee keep fa ith  with a l l  the faetore ianAved
i a  th is  more «steneive eoatact #f t h m # t ,  tha t i#^ me eeeh
a  eozstoKt etendp re la ted  to  the pxohlea e f  Liberty add
Reoeeeity, reasla# te  be eeMrtned i a  la te r  eeotioae of the
preeeat diaeweiea# iryhew, S ait t e ^  Berne very eerienely,
end he oerta ia ly  declined may easy way out of the problem#
n t  we aeesyt hie (Raw^e) eeneluaieas, then a l l  th a t we well meWhyeio# ie  a mere delueion Whereby we feney ooreelvee to  have ra tie a e l ineight in to  what, in  ao fie l fa c t, ie  borrowed sorely from mprntimrnom em mûm 4 Rte i itflBenee of ^  one tom has taken the ilim o ry  eeWh:: of neoeeeity"# hUnee
# i e  ie  the gyemteet tr ib u te  which eon he paid to Ewme## 
ddeooeeioB of l ib e rty  emd Reweee ity ,  and, perhape, i t e  
gremieet msÊmmmXim% ' '
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"There are few names of the eighteenth-ewtuxy Rhicâi hove obtained imoh oelehvity as th a t of jeasthea Sftmrde. C ritic# end htetoxiane down to  our tm  dayhave preleed in  diRtyseaRla terms the leg ioal vigour end the oonetruotive power# of a w riter Whom they hold to  be the g reatest aetept^eieiaa imeriea he# yet pmdnsed. Who knows, Rwy here asked thamsolve## to  what height# th is  ewigmal geaiias eigh t have risen# i f ,  inetead hf being bom in  a  half#eavage country* fa r  .............................  - md eM em e, he had
. Ç 4
from the trad itions of ghilsaophySpeared ra ther in  oor old world# and there received the root impulse of the modem world. FeidiapB he would have taken a  idace between Lelbni# end Kant asxsm # e  founders of immortal gystem , instead e f  the worn he has l e f t  reducing i t s e l f  to a  mmimo and barbarous theology, whifl* astonishes our reason and outrages our h ea rt, the object Of a t  one# our horror and admiration."
0 #M8«m ifftm, qi»U i ttm  "A*of xwaigi** . 0 # a th lo # " ,, V ,4 . m .  e . 1 ^ 0  m . )
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Tokaihah gWAnne (XToa-aTeel
Jonathan adaarda wae born In  1703 a t Windsor on tho banks 
of tho connootloutf How laagland, and ho died In 1768. He 
eerved as a Minister of Religion from 1787 u n til  h is death, 
and his statue and influence in  the lim ited sphere of Nee 
T^ l i tn d  can be said to be sim ilar to tha t of John Wesley in  
B rita in , except th a t Bdvords was by fa r the greater theo­
logian. Xn 1736, he published a work — "HOrratire of 
Surprising Jossers ions" — which may be said to bo an 
an ticipation  of W illis* James' "Varieties of Religious 
Experience", and Which had an M fect upon the promotion of 
the Bfangelical Revival in  England, adwards wrote exten­
sively  on a wide range of theoiogioal subjects. Bis works 
on the "Religious Affections", "Original Sin" and "God's 
Last Bod in  Creation" are of a very high quality  and won 
Hj”  considerable fame. His e th ica l tre a tis e  on — "The 
Hature of Virtue" — indicates a profound gra*p of moral 
doctrine and is  worthy to  be ranked with Francis Hutcheson's 
work on — "An Inquiry In to  the Original of Our ideas of 
Beauty end Virtue". However, his rea l fame rests  upon his 
work on the Freedom of tho w ill, the oor root t i t l e  of which 
i s  — "A careful  and s t r i c t  Inquiry in to  the modern prevail­
ing actions of tha t Freedom of the w ill %Aiioh is  supposed to  
be essen tia l to moral agency# v irtu e  and y iee , reward and 
mmis;went i .p%#e# andMemefL.
acme attempt must be made to account for the neglect of 
Edwards during the la s t  two hundred years. This neglect 
cannot be explained by suggeoting th a t Edwards has made an 
in sign ifican t contribution to philosophical thought.
I » L * a" »'/f  ^ '• 18 * 4,
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thmm om  be l i t t l e  doubt th a t h it  thmdo upon "the Freedem 
M the ViU" ie  the meet i i ^ r t e n t  eCRtxibutim e r a  m e#
#  th a t BUbjeet. r a t h e r ,  me eyetem ef DetemWam elnee 
hie day has been able to  i g r a e  hi# work, and there oan be 
l i t t l e  doubt # a t  Freedom and Reoeeaity are e t i l l  r a y  
in^ortan t ieeoee in  modem philoeeoby. Ferltape the  folio*' 
ihg point# may maggee^ # re a e ra b le  emplamation to  the nag- 
loo t of the eentxibation made by adwor#*
KKmat# A h..m rn W k !R t.m M m ' «•urge# lyoa i^nak# of the 
meoiogy ef BdwarO# ## ‘"#bblim# and baabaron# * h i#  
tm  reaeen and outrage# our heart". m ere i#  «ft #l,amapt>
, Of tru th  in  a n #  a etatam m t. mdeard# mad# « v alian t 
e ffo rt to  keep hi# m ilo#t#dleal eontributioa free from 
ora-«n<di Theologieal dagmatiem, and, in  hi# Preface to 
M&e Preedom of the w ill" , he #ay#t- .
; *1 «%W*kr iiM0aiK  * àmmAqaa» on g ia . l t f '. .  ^
m a wggr MM «>« 8w  iW fB l<  «W 8#%#mW#m «T CiOvia «m&.
adaerd# w ill not de«d»t the v a lid ity  e f  auoh # atatesmnt*
R tm r a ,  i t  r a  inev itab le  m a t nimarde ahould be regarded
a# the greatest Calvinist ainee m e Beforsntion, and hi#
fheologleal work# bear ont suoh « deeoription. th e  ninm-
te#%m-eentury mm m r a y  etroag rernw tim  to  CalvWam,
and ram rda undoubtedly suffered an eoUpee in  th ie  roratiomei
B|# outetanding eemxm — "gimer# in  the Hand# e f an amyqr
Gad*, has been quoted with eonsidevable horror by modem
# r a # t #  of the C hristian meligion, Tbare i s  l i t t l e  doubt
th a t i t  i s  erne ef the most te r r ib le  atteranee# e r a  mad#
from a  C hristiaa pulpit# but i t  i s  «ften forgotten  th a t
eeneluded th is  eermm wim these word##-
"ROW God stand# ready t#  p ity  you; th is  Is  the day of merqy, you may ery now with aeme encouragement #f obtaining mereys , Christ has thrown m e door of merqy wide open and i s  crying wim a  loud voie# topoor s in n e r#  as# awful i t  i« to be l e f t  bcMnda t  suoh a # y ?"
2^V'iVV-
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ÜDweveri there oan be no doubt about the general horror with 
^hleh the Theology of Bdmrde was regarded. Hie cold, 
p l t l le w  logic Xli*ed to  a majeetlo yIcw of God*e moverei^ 
power brought a c h i l l  to the etouteet heart, and mn were 
glad to turn away to a more benevolent and kindly view of 
the workinge of Providenee, With the rejeotiom of th ie  
Theology want the re jec tion  of the greater part of hie work 
end th ie eocounte in  eeme way for the negleet of hie con­
tribu tion  to  philoeo£dilaal thought.
SSfilEftf the Id terary  aeaeon. aflworde ie  one of the meet 
painful w riters in  l i te ra tu re . Rle thesis on — "The Free­
dom ef the Will" — i s  one of the most d if f ie u lt  works in  
fh ilo ec# y .
one of his most ardnnt admirers end devoted d isc ip les puts 
the li te ra ry  aM lity  ef Edwards in  those words#-
"Tho ety le of Jonathan Boards is# in  general# peahsps the most repulsive whlsh even metaphysios ever sssmned . . . . . . .  Probably there never was » man whs was socharacterised by suoh a wide range e f in te l le e t  and imoh a narrow rmage of language . . .  . . .  without bound­less e laeU oity  and buoyancy of thought, h is  works# so fearfu lly  laden with redamdaneee of lampage, would long since have am* lik e  lead In the m i# w  waters of oblivioa". W
has the power of holding a thought in  pure abstrae- 
tis tti and refin ing i t  u n til  the ovdinaty adnd begins to  re e l 
and stagger under the s tra in  of th is ra r if ie d  in te lle c tu a l 
atmosphere. Then, he marches forward to  another position  
without the s lig h te s t regard to  syntax or making clear h is  
universe of discourse. ,?or instance, i t  i s  very d if f ic u lt  
to ke#> up with adwards in  the following typical expressicn 
on the Freedom of the Will s-
"And i f  vo litions are properly the effects of th e ir  motives# then they are necessarily conneotod with th e ir  motives; every effec t and event being# as was proved before, neoes&arily connected with tha t WhiSh i s  the proper ground and reason of i t s  ex istm ce.
(1) An %eay on Jonathan adwards by Henry Rodgers.
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Thus I t  is  manifest tha t vo litio n  i s  neeessary# and is  not ttm  any se lf  "determining poser in  the w ill; the v o lit ie n , shioh i s  earned by previous motive and Sauoemsnti i s  met esmsSd by the w ill exereising a seveeeisn power ever its e lf#  to detemiae# eawse and eso ite  vo litions in  i t s e l f .  This i s  not oeasistent with the w il l 's  se tind  in  a s ta te  of Indifferenoe and eqwiliheâmm# to determine i t s e l f  te  a preferense; for the Way in  whi Sh motives operate, i s  by btsseing the w ill  and giving i t  a^qewtaan inolim atlon or prepon* deration one way", d )
suoh involved argimmtt# joined to ..m suspicion that Edwards 
was making way fo r h is "barbarous" Theology to  triui#% did 
not oonatitute any rea l a ttra c tio n  fo r h is writings# and 
time they lo s t th e ir  hold upon mm's minds.
Thjsd. %ïm M sto rie  heæOB. I t  may not be too fancifu l to  
suggest th a t in  ccwisideration of these important issues in  
Philosophy sud& as Idberty and leaessity  there is  a kind e f 
eyolie msvemmt. There seems to be grounds fo r holding 
tha t the human mind views these questions with approval or 
disapproval aooording to the p articu lar se t of oiroumstances 
Which may be present a t  any particu lar time in  h isto ry .
The smcient philosophy was prepared to  hold these questions 
together witheut making may attempt to  be too enphatie upon 
Idbeofty or Weoessity Further, there are indioatione th a t 
the f i r s t  four oenturios of oh ristian ity  did not witnose any 
marked emphasis on e ith er side. With the coming of Augustine, 
there was an introduction of a Detersdniam which moulded the 
philosophy and theology for the next nine hundred years.
Of course# there were revolts and oppositions against the 
p o e itim  of Augustine during th is  period, but# on the whole# 
the period was largely  Deterministio in  oot-look. The 
ecsdng of Aomas Aquinas, with a revival of the A risto tlian  
view-foiAt# inaugurated a  decided reaction against Detorminiaaa# 
and th is  continued to the simteenth-eentury when Luther and 
Calvin# la te r  helped by spinoma# created a reaction in  favour 
of Deterodnima. This reaction continued u n til  the close of
(1) The Freedsm of the w ill. Part a. sec t.lo .
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the oightoenth-centuiyi when a movement led by Kant, sue- 
ooeded In putting conelderablo ecphasls uixm Liberty. 
Jenatiian Bdwarde lived a t tho end of tho Determlniet period 
of thought* He gathore into hlmeelf a l l  tha t was rl<* and 
f ru i t fu l  in  the history  of DetesBdniam, and présenta the 
ease for Deterndnlem with a s k i l l  td i i^  ie  superior to  
Augustine, Lather# Calvin or even Qplnoaa# but i t  ie  to  
l i t t l e  purpose. The pendulum of man’s In te llec tu a l in te r ­
es t Is  swinging hack to FreedSB# md the word, of iidward# 
holds l i t t l e  a ttra c tio n  fo r minds # ie h  hsvo had oonturles 
of Deteroinistio philosophy. This may be a reasonable 
explanation of the neglect with i^ o h  h is great work on 
vo litio n  has been trea ted . In  any case# the neglect cannot 
be explained in  terms which suggest th a t Edwards' treatment 
of the subject i s  antiquated and obsolete. Ample evidence 
w ill bo produced in  the course of th is exposition of the 
system of Deterolnism of Edwards which wHl indicate that 
such a oystom i s  capablo of ohall«%ing tho most modem 
theories on the Freedom of the w ill. I t  may bo tha t the 
cyclic movemmit in  p h ll0 6 O£*y w ill return to an appreciation 
of the Deterministic V ies-poiat. I f  th ie  happent# there 
can be l i t t l e  doUbt th a t Edwards w ill  arrive  a t  the s ta tu s  
of fame r^ich he dCGerves,
<1) Tho Nature of the W ill.
Edwards it, of the opinion tha t considerable oonfu&lon has 
taken place in  ditcusslcna ooncemlng Liberty and Necessity 
because there has been an absence of a clear and simple 
underütandin-) of what the Will rea lly  i s t  and ho a tte rp ts  
to  remsQ/ th is  obscurity by saying th a t the Will ik nothing 
more or lo ss  than that faculty  or p rincip le  of tho mind by 
which i t  chooses somethin;^. Therefore, an aot of the w ill
i s  siiqply an aot of Choice. m  the ëurfaco th l t  is  slzqple
and d irec t, but i t  Ic Important to vmwibot th a t Edwards i s  
here in s is tin g  m^on something which i s  calculated to have
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ra ty  fa r  reoohlne liifluenoe upon his ^ o le  (wq^Okitlon of 
Detonninifim. F ir s t ,  i t  ie  jlo a r that isdwords w ill have 
no desire to  draw a sharp lino of domaroation between the 
Will and the mind. That i s ,  he is  no advooate of i# a t 
might be termed a "faculty" peyehology. Tho Will ie  a 
principle or aepect of the mind, or b e tte r  s t i l l ,  i t  ie  
th a t by Which the mind chooses something. second, Edward# 
ie concerned with the Freedom of the nan rather than with 
the Freedom of the W ill. I t  i s  here th a t ho h ea rtily  
agrees with Locke that a^y discussion of Liberty end 
Necessity must stand related  to the whole personality and 
net to What is  a supposed faoulV* He w ill have much mere 
to say about th is  fa c t a t  a la te r  period, but his defin ition  
of Will is  made with th l t  point clearly  In view. Third, 
i t  is  obvious th a t the above defin ition  of Will i s  intended 
to make i t  d if f ic u lt  i f  not impossible for ax^ of hi# oppon­
ent# to argue th a t tho Will can choose it&, own v o litio n s.
This ic a v i ta l  link  in  the exposition of Determinism by 
Edwards, tait i t  i s  fa r  too important to be discussed a t  th is  
early stage.
Edwards now passes on to discuss Whether there is  a negative 
as well as a positive as^pect to the ac t of willing* He 
observes th a t i t  i&> often said th a t the #111 chooses or 
"refuses’*, but he ix>ints out tha t even th is  apparent nega­
tiv e  ac t of Will is  actually  "positive" . . .  "for in  every ac t 
of w ill whatsoever, the mind chooses one thin^ & rather than 
another". The point of su<A an insistance Is that
Edwards wiwhes to etree# th a t every ac t of the vjill i s  
voluntary. That i*., the Willing subject is  personal, posi­
tiv e , and therefore (ghoioe is  a voluntary act of tho re a l s e lf ,  
such prellaimxy observations are necessary booause dwards, 
in  his OKpOLitian of Beternlxxisa, makes frequact reference 
to the metaphor of a  "chain"; and his exposition i s  in  i t s e l f
(1) VTMdMi Of t&o «111, pfcrt 1 . Boot.l.
J
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a oarofuXly aonstraoted chain of arguments. I t  is  on ly a# 
oaroful a tten tio n  i s  g ir a i  to the lin k s in  th is  chain that 
i t  ti. possib la  to appreoiato the and foroo o f hi#
GXpOLltiOB#
Roving forged the above«montioned lin k s , i^viards k lip s in  
another lin k  Which i s  h igh ly  important to h is  i>oint of view . 
Re axarsine# Locke's d is tin c tio n  between "proferring" and 
choosing, and i s  fa r from sa t is f ie d  «1th W ake's find ing  
u:x>n th is important p o in t. Locke appears to think that 
tho act of v o lit io n  i s  best exprossed by the term "pre­
ferr in g" , hat Looko h e sita te s  about making th is  id e n tic a l 
\d th  Jholco bocauso ho thiif^:# tha t a man could prefer f ly ­
ing to  walking but cannot « i l l  much an a o t. However, 
Edwards tlil/iij# there i s  confusion h ers, end in s is t#  that 
"preforoncQ" 1# Jhoice because & man i s  alwoy;, uoncemod 
about tho next and immediate object of the w ill. Of 
courso, man can have a remote preferoncG to f ly ,  but each 
idea# or id ea ls have vary l i t t l e  to  do with actu al "wilH%" 
33«ardfi eayo i-
"Ths th in s n cx tlj chosen or preferrod when a mm w ill#  to walk, i# f  not h is  b d n s removed to such a place  «hare he would b e, but euch m  exertion  and motion of h is leg# and fe e t  e tc* , in  order to  do l t " ( l )
This seems a sm all matter to  d isp u te, but acW ally i t  i s  
v ita lly  important to  the chain of Determinism expounded ty  
Edwards* He is  keen upon gettix% thit. matter se t t le d  be­
cause, F ir s t , such an argument in d irec tly  strengthen# h is  
in sistan ce upon V o lition  being a p o s itiv e  ac t of O ioioe; 
Second, because he «ants to  make the important p o ist tha t 
a l l  w illin g  i s  d irected  to  "extomal" a c tion . la te r , he 
« ü l  argue for a real kind of Liberty in  hi& Determinism, 
and th iij  lib e r ty  «111 fin d  i t i .  basis in  "external" a c tio n . 
Or, as he puts i t  a t th is  early c te g e t-4
(1) Freedom of the W ill. Part 1. 1.
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"Thus, an ac t of tho w ill 1# ooBMBgily #xpr*#t#d lay i t s  pleasing a  mn to do thus ancl thus; and a  men doing a t he vU li., and doing aa ho pleaeea, are the eame thing in  oomcxm epeeOhr#
Having corrected Locke upon th ia  tuppoaed difference between 
preferring and ohooeing, Edward# paasee on to  cm aider a 
e t i l l  more important confusion which he has detected in  
Loeke'e dlLCueaion of the w ill.
Locke had waid "that the w ill ie  perfectly  diatixaguiched 
from desire", but he bad said other thing# ta%iCh modlfl ed 
th ia  rather dogmatic dlstinoticm  between the Will and Desire. 
However, there is  su ffic ien t cudbiguity In Locke's handling 
of th is  point to ju s tify  Edwards drawing a tten tion  to i t .  
Edwards makes a statement In reply to Locke's hesitan t des­
crip tion  of Will and Desire Which appears to go to the 
other extreme#-
"A man never, in  any in.ftance, willsf anything contrary ^ ^ s ^ g ^ s i r e s ,  or desires anything centrai^ to h is
In te r , EAeards w ill go to considerable trouble to ju s tify
th is  statement, sn-l i t  w ill become clear tha t he is  not
msking a point by mere dogmatism. However, here sod now,
i t  is  eaoQgh to  point out th a t he i s  using the term "desire"
in  the sense of effective preference, or baslo desire .
Perhaps i t  i s  only ju s t to  Biwards to allow him to  s ta te
th is  p a rticu lar point in  h is own words#-
" 0 0  th a t in  every a c t, or going forth  of the w ill, there i s  some pr«pondération of the mind o r in c lln s tian  one way ra ther than another; and the soidL had rather have or do one thing than another, or than not to have or do th a t th ing, end that there, Where there is  absolutely no preferring or choosing, but a porfset continuing equilibrium, there is  no v o litlo a ."  («I
Edwards had no in ten tion  of saying tha t there woe never an 
instance when a desire  might not clash with the W ill, but 
h is point is  that such a desire never really  Is&ues in
(1 ) The Freedom of the W ill. Part 1« 1 ,S # * m # " " X #
" " 1.
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effective prtferenee* I t  i t  often vo&ue end flee tin g , and 
generally has reference to some remote end with wliioh the 
immediate action (xT the w ill ie not concerned. The aot <»P 
the w ill ie  alw*ur& the aot of the real se lf  expressed in  
some preference for that particu lar aot a t  tha t particu lar 
time. Of course, there are many instances where the mind 
acts a f te r  a period of co n flic t, and th is  ie  an experience 
nthioh Edwards i s  w illing to examine in  the lig h t of the facts 
which are availab le, hut, vdxatever clash of desires might be 
il lu s tra te d , Edwards In s is ts  that when the w ill ac ts , i t  
acts from a certa in  preponderation of the s e lf .  In  other 
words, man never does one thing and intends another, tha t i s ,  
as an ac t of the Will. His basic and rea l desires a l l  
find expression in  the ac t of V olition. In  other words, 
he always does what rea lly  and fin a lly  "pleases" him.
Before concluding th is  lim ited discussion on the nature of 
the W ill, i t  i s  important to observe how Edwards views the 
Will as rela ted  to the Dbderstending. In an e a rlie r  work,
he makes the following points#-
(a) God has endued the soul with two principal facu ltie#  
Wiich are Perception and what might be termed "Affection".
(b) Perception is  termed the tW erstanding w hi^ diseem s 
and judges things in  a speculative sonse.
(o) The other principal faculty  is  Affection or Inclination , 
th a t i s ,  lik ing  or d islik in g , pleased or displeased, approv­
ing or rejecting*
(d) I t  is  here, in  Inclination , that the M il is  rea lly
centred, or as S dw a^ saysi*
"The w ill mci the affections of the sou l, are not two facu ltiesI the affections are not essen tia lly  d is tin c t from the w ill, nor do they d iffe r  from the mere actings of the w ill and in c lin a tim  . . . .  . .  In  some sense, the
1
affection of the soul d iffe rs  nothing a t  a l l  from the w ill and the inc lina tion , and the w ill never is  in  woy exercise fu rther than i t  is  affected".!*)
(1) A Treatise concerning Religious Affections. P t . l .  S e o t.l .
IJ
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He w ill OT'ke these pointe oleerer in  h i t  dieouseion ef 
m e tiw tiw  ef the M il ,  hot i t  obvious th a t he vleee 
the Htaderctanding as not having the prinoipal part in  any 
partiofslar aot of foM tiaa . I t  would be m ijnet to  h ie 
analyeie to eonolnde th a t he agreed with Howte th a t Reaeon 
wee the slave of the passions; y e t, h is  frequent referenoe 
to "Test#" in  the above men tioned work has strong a f f in it ie s  
with Hume. Whether th is  id en tifica tio n  of the M il with 
the Inclination  is  f a ta l  to h is system eam ot be deoidod a t  
th is  early stags of the disoussion#
I t  must be borne in  mind th a t adwards i s  a R ationalist of a  
vary high order, and fu rth e r, he is  attempting to describe 
how the Will operates in  empirical man, and aot how i t  
"ougM" to  w era te  in  ideal m n . Again, th is  m l ^  be 
considered a  f a ta l  defect in  h is  system, but before any ewSh 
conclueion i s  reached i t  must be observed th a t Edwards has a 
remedy for a sp irica l man. In  other words, he Is  not only a 
psycholQigist, he i s  a Christian teaoher. Re i s  not com­
p le te ly  oblivious to  the t>ught" in  htann l i f e ,  but he 
thinks i t  i s  necessary to examine how people behave before 
entering upon a discussion of how t h ^  "eu ^ t*  to  behave.
(a) %  af the WLU
adwards sees that one of the prino pal problems of any d is­
cussion of Liberty and mwesMty is  the question — "What 
Determines the M ilt"  This question must be raised even by 
the advoc tee of freedom Wio in s is t  that tho wfill determines 
i t s e l f ,  Wf as i s  sometimes termed the self-determ ination of 
the Will. Before attempting a roply to  th is  kind of Deter­
mination, adwards t r ie s  to secure a measure of agreemnmt 
upon the question of Determination in  i t s e l f ,  and suggests 
th a t i t  might be dMined as "causing th a t the ac t of the w ill 
or Choice should be thus, and not otherwise"# This appears 
to  be a  reasonable defin ition  of Determination, and Edward#
ttiCB i t  to indiemte th a t, whatever the kind of Determination 
In sisted  upon, the fa s t  of eause ernmmot be Ignored. There 
must be a cause why the act of the Will or a»olce is  ^ u s ,  
and not otherM se, He also points out tha t those who in ­
s i s t  upon the self-detenainatlon of the Will are in s is tin g  
th a t the w ill is  both tho d e tem iw r and the detorttiiMd, 
th a t i s ,  in  a sente, i t  iw both Cause and E ffect. adwards 
does not mark th ie  fa s t fo r special c ritic ism , but i t  i s  
perfectly  obvious what he has in  mind. such In te rp re ta tim s 
of human Freedom are granting to  the Will the action and 
power which rea lly  belemg to  the man , and such an in te r ­
p re ta tion  of the Will cuts rig h t across the dictum of adwards 
th a t a l l  discussion of Liberty and Neaessity r a t  be ora- 
oemed with the man, and not with a  property of the man* 
However, adwards reserves to a la te r  period the fu l l  impli­
cations of th is  argnsent, and plunges in to  the heart of the 
e c n flis t by sayingi-
"Zt i s  n%at motive which, as i t  ctends in  the view of the mind, i s  the strongest, that determines the w ill ." ( l)
In  th is  sentence i t  eentained a host of problem , but i t  i s  
q ^ te  inpossible to say anything decisive on masy e f those 
problems u n til  Edwards has had opportunity of making clear 
h is  point ef view. However, i t  is  important to observe th a t 
when adwards uses tAe ghromo — "in  the view ef the mind" — 
he is  using the term "mind" in  a very lim ited sense. He 
certain ly  does not mean "mind" to  be taken as meani% "reason" 
or understanding. Yet, he i s  not excluding the aspect of 
Reason from the term, ra ther he is  thinkir^ ef the whole of 
Perception and Bsotien as cw tained in  the term "Soul".
Be th is  as i t  may, the v ita l  point in  the above ex tract i s  
the understanding of what Mwards means by r a  te rn  motive"; 
and here he is  not lacking in  o la rity# -
TTT The yreedon of the W ill. P t.l*  Sect.8#
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"Sy motive, I  mean tho whole of tha t move#, emeitee,ev invite# the mind to  v o litio n , W&ether tha t be erne thing eingly, or memy thing# oonjm etly. may partioo- 1er thing# may ooim r and unite th e ir  strength to indnoe the mind; and When i t  ia  eo, a l l  together a ro , a# i t  were, erne eemplem motive. And whom I  apeak of the atrangeat ao tlva , X have respect to  the strength of the %Aole that operates to induce a p articu lar aot of v o litio n ..,"^ * )
A relevant question is  whether Edwards should have used the 
term "motive" to  describe th is  actuating of tho M il . O u#t 
he not to have used the term "inclination" rather than "Motive"V 
Is there not a roal d istinc tion  between a "psychological" 
motive and a natu ral "want" o r Inclina tion . A natural want 
ex ists for a l l  non-ratimaal créatures, and oan be the basis 
of a peychologioal motive l a  man, but tho essen tia l d if fe r-  
once ie  tha t motive is  a "perceived" want. I t  le "an ond 
Which a self-conscious sW)ject presents to i t s e l f ,  and vtxtdh. 
i t  s tr iv es  and tmods to rea lise" ,
Edwards would agree tha t the mind must be "aware" of the 
motive, for he w ritsa t-
'Vhatever i s  a motive, in  th is  sense, must be something Vhich is  extant in  the view e r  the appreohenslon of tho understanding, or pereeiving feeultar. Nothl% can indsee or In v ite  the mad to w ill or ac t anything, any fu rther than i t  i s  perceived, or i s  some may or other in  the mind's view". vSl
ROW, i t  is  perfectly  obvious tha t Edward# is  anxious tha t 
tho team "Motive" sh a ll  include tha t kind of in te lleo tu a l 
recognition whiWh has been emphasised as marking off a motive 
from a mere natural "want". Yet, the important point i s ,  
ocn adwards have the best of both worlds, and oan he have the 
argument both way#? That i s ,  can he have tho "impulsive" 
and the "rational" elements in  Motive Which h is system appear# 
to demand? I# there Luch a thing as a ra tiona l InpulaW?
Again, these qusLtions e  m ot be decided within the lim ited 
survey of the exposition now available. However, Edward#
(1) The Freedom of the W ill. P t . l .  s e c t,8 . (2-) " " " " " " 1 .  " 2 .
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does make a rea l ottocpt to  oomo to grips with tho pA^ems 
inherent in  h is view of motivation and the mind. He ie  
oaroful to explain the re la tio n  of motive and the mind when 
he writes a-
" I t appears from these thing# th a t in  some sense ^ e  w ill
e r apprehensioa^.and not laerely What is  o^LXed reason or judgment"#
Edwards follows op th is  extract by in s is tin g  tha t I f  t'lle  
d ic ta te  of the Hnderstoadino means tdiat "reawn declares to  
be bOfet", then, i t  is  not true to say th a t tho \9 lll always 
follows the la s t  d ic ta te  of the understanding. Further, 
he makes i t  perfectly  clenr th a t Reason has a real part to  
play in  motivating the w ill ,  but i t  mu&t be given i t s  proper 
place and influence. I t  may be one element in  the co#)Cund 
influence which moves and induces the w ill to  action; and 
there the matter lai&t re s t  fo r the time being «ixlle the d ie- 
cussion follows the main ot argument.
With some idea of mtxaX adwards now means by the term "Mind", 
i t  i s  to be observed that he argues that Motive and mxuS 
are cuttmlly su ited  to e a ^  other. That i s ,  there appears 
to be an inherent tendency in  Motive to influenco mind, and 
he caU s suoh a tendoney the strength of the Motive. Row, 
p rio r to a l l  Rbtivee, there ex ists a s ta te  of Mind which 
a d ^ t  be termed a vicm of the "apparent" Good. Ddwards is  
most anxious tha t the adjective "apparent" sh a ll be appro- 
elated . Tho view of the jRind ie  not the Good, ceaplete, 
f in a l or tru e , but i t  i s  the apparent Good; that i t ,  the 
Good viewed in  a lim ited, re s tr ic te d , end perhsyps even 
perverted sense. He c^^nnot gaant th a t sü ^ lrica l man seeks 
the Good in the f u l l  and complete meadng of tha t term; 
ra th e r, he tookL what seems to him tho go o d , th e r e fo r e ,  h is
(1 ) The Freedom of the w ill,  F t , l ,  sect41*
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mkaSk i s  pursuing the "apparent"Good. Further, because of 
th ie inherent tendonoy in mind, eertain  motives w ill have 
core influence than others in  swaying the mind to  any par- 
tie u la r  oeuree of aotion. in  fa c t, Mwarde in s is ts  tha t 
"the Will always i t  ae the g reatest apparent good is " .
Again, the fu ll  lc%)lloatlons of euoh a statement oaanot be 
dealt with a t th is  point, but i t  is  obvious tha t Edwards i s  
leaving no place f w  freedom between the Motive and the will* 
The argument of Edwards proceeds to the idon tlfloation  of 
the apparent Good with the "agreeable" —  "To appoar good 
to the mind, as 1 «se the phrase, i s  the same as to appear 
agreeable, or seem pleasing to the m ind".(l) Further, th is  
teem agreeable includes the removal or avoiding of "ev il" . 
Hero, of course, the term "evil" mat bo accepted in  a very 
limited sense — uneasiness, displeasing, and disagreeable* 
adwards goes on to say that hla main concern a t thib timo ti.
the d irec t and immediate objects of the W ill. Re is  quite 
aware tha t the mind oan look ahead and frame for i t s e l f  
certain  remote acts of the w ill, tha t i s ,  what i t  intends to 
do in  the fu tu re , but these intentions must be viewed in  the 
lig h t e f actual happenings and must mat be confused with 
rea l acts of the Will. I t  may be tha t a fu ture, or remote 
benefit oan be brought before the mind with su<8i force tha t 
i t  issues in  an immediate aot of the W ill, bu t, soy# Bdwards, 
th is  is  due to  the fac t tha t the future benefit appoaxm a t  
the present time the meet "agreeable" to the mind, and there­
fore some immediate pleasure is  put aside for a future benefit 
or pleasure*
Edwards now proceeds to  make ex p lic it one of the iip o rtan t 
points of h is argmsent for Detemlnisra. Hero are h is wordsi-
(1 ) The Freedom of the w ill. P t.l#  6eot#3#
-  86 -
"I have rather olioeen to express nyself ^os*  tha t the w ill always is  as tho greatest apparent good, or as what appears ooet sgreeablo than to say tha t the w ill i s  determined by the greatest apparent good, or by what seems msst agreeable, booause an appearing most agreeable or pleasing to  the mind, and the m ad 's  preferring and <Aooaina, ,##em hardly to be properly and porfootly d is tin o t" .!* )
The language is  ta c tfu lly  ohoson, and the point made with 
studied ease, but these tilings oomot cloud the v i ta l  im­
portance of the link  inserted  by ladwards. In  other words, 
he is  in sis tin g  tha t there oan be no "gap" between reoog- 
n itien  of the agreeable and the aot of w ill. In  hi^ oen 
words, ' the voluntary action Whi<8i is  the immediate een- 
sequeaoo and f ru i t  of the mind's vo lition  and ehoioe, i s  
determined by that which appears most agreeable". I t  is  
true that he has used the word "ehoioe", but th is  tesia i s  
not used in  the oomcionly aooepted meaning. In  fa c t ,  there 
appeors to be very l i t t l e  "deliberate" Choioe in  thik so t 
of W ill. The mind finds tha t which is  most agreesble, end 
then ^ e  Will acts immediateXy. Of course, adwards would 
argue tha t "Choice" rea lly  i s  tha t which is  most agreeable 
to the mind, bu t, with mind already constituted to follow 
the greatest apparent Good, the meaning of the tom  choice 
in  suoh a re la tio n  of action  and reaction must be given a 
d iffe ren t meaning than is  oonaonly assumed.
In  th is  term "agreeable to the mind", adwards f e d s  tha t he 
has a oonprehensivc conotpt Which covers a l l  possible avenues 
of motivation* He o ^ ta ia ly  means by tho term the view of 
"happiness" in  tho generally aooepted sense, and i t  i s  of 
in te re s t to  observe how for JSont would agree with adwards 
tha t the empirical man is  influenced by suoh a concept#
When Kant i s  detoriblng hoi>pines#, he w rites#-
(1 ) The Preed«a of tho W ill, P t.l#  Sect*8.
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1# the sa tisfao tion  of a l l  om daalras, Ivaly* in  rw peot of th e ir  manifoldnaas.intoaaivoly. in  roapoot of th e ir  degree, and^ro -i«3B ivo ly |in  recpect of th d lr  duration." v l i
Bhiarde would agree with th ie  deeorlptioa to a very g reat 
degree, ta it, whcm Kent goes on to  oontraet the law of Bappi- 
no## with the law of Morality, there would be ground# for a 
sharp difference of opinion. This i s  another v i ta l  factor 
in  the present discussion of the Kantian Defenoe of Freedom, 
but there is  not enough evidence available to make any use­
fu l  oosment of th is  i£^>ortaat m atter. However, Edwards 
is  convinced that the term — "agreeable to  the mind" - -  
C0V03W a greater area of meaning than that afforded by the 
term "Happiness", th a t i s ,  in  usual in te rp re ta tio n . He 
thinks tha t his tens oovere every possible ground ot motiva­
tion  available to the human personality, and he would argue 
tha t even the Moral Law comes within th a t whi<A is  most 
agre«%d)le to  the mind. This point is  not put fo rth  ^s the 
essen tial teaching of adtaards, but i t  i s  f e l t  tha t the s ta te ­
ment is  a reasonable inference from the following eactraot#-
"Xt i s  most agreeable to  ëome mm to  follow th e ir  reason, and to  others to  follow th e ir  appetites; to . V some mm i t  is  most agreeable to dci^ a vicious in ­clination  than to g ra tify  i t ,  others i t  su its  best to g ra tify  the v ile s t  appetites *•••••• In  these respects,and many others #iioh might be mentioned, d iffe ren t things w ill be most agreeable to  d iffe ren t pert^ons ; and not .only so , but to the same per&one a t d iffe ren t time#".(«;
Further, and th is  is  vexy is^ortan t for the oppmwnts of 
Edwards appear to argue th a t no rea l progress i s  possible 
under such a system, he indicates tha t education, eecatqple, 
custom and natural endowment o i l  play th e ir  part in  making 
UP the sum of what is  agreeable to the Hind. Again, Mwards 
would agree th a t , even a f te r  a great relig ious experience, 
euch as Conversion, the same law operates in  man, e x c ^ t
(1) K. r .  V. A.80Ô.
(2) She FreodOB of the WIU. P t . l .  Soot.2.
IIt'.
#  88 #
:$*#$'i# * *# b 0  MM 'MM W M M 'M  «M M M , M t 1$ ##
| t i l l  th a t Which i#  r a t  agrwhhl# to tsm adnd vAioh g#v#m# 
hi# w iiiing r a  doing#
«)) #w «  mnrnattr to  M# * W .
Xn n 6ons#$ the doctrine of Neoeaeity ie  the eentrel eonoept 
Of th# B e tra d a W  of à r a # » ;  tW pofrà#  h# g i f #  o r a  
etdeeohle ear# to  i t s  sta tm sn t#  #e eheerves thettho tenoi 
J M r a i t y i  l # r a t h t l | ty» x r a o lo t ih i l i ty ,  e tc . ,  have hem 
r a d  in  a  r a m #  r a t  la  hi^^üÿ ra4w dlo iai to  the dlaeuasiea 
#f raed m #  md unless sea* ra sm a b le  meaning i s  g ir a i  to  :%
" ' p r a h  terms, m  p eeg ras  earn he possible. Be begins ttd#
\  V teok e f o la r if  ie a tie tt by s # in g  th a t f w  a th i%  to  be
i r s - r , .  ' ; A  . ’ ' . . V ; . ,r a e e r a r  eW iy  ra n g  that i t  is  r a t  i t  is  r a  e a r a t  be 
o ra rw ise . Bowera, he eaplains th a t th is  is  a  r a t  im#
" pepfeet defiM tiem of r a r a i t y  beeaese i t  uses terms cuSh t 'l  
' se "emmet"  without epplain ing them, iherefewe, r a r a #  ^
. r a r a  th a t r a  problem i s  aéSh deeper than mere verbal 
d éfin itieme. z t  i s  erne whioh m te rs  into the very e t r a t r a  
- Of temam thought* Xn ether  words, he must get behind the . 
te rn s , end view # e  matter from the point of vie# of rawgbt^L'M 
i t s e l f  .  '
I t  Is  ewstemary i a  aU  # s O # s i r a  r a n t  8 e b # s ity  to  aeme#
: r a t  i t  i s  a  "re la tive" teem, r a t  i s ,  eeomOB peupla end
aU ke teed to  think ef a ra th in g  existing end s t a r a  -i- 
ing ever againet th is  tame Beeeesity* Therefore, the term
#
, i .
i e e e s s i^  i s  eeneelved ef i a  t e r #  ef oppeeitlom or even 
aee#A#ien. B eu # sity  i s  something v b i#  everoora the will,
sad fu r use i t  to be something qu ite  d iffe ren t from what i t  
in tended to be. Bow, miis view of Beeessity r e s a l#  in  a
- ofw # d  Mfforemt meaning being given to the term — "Znpeeai'
bmiy"* For th is  term "Zmcmesibility" i s ,  in  i t s  origimal 
' Bdowtngf a "rela tive" term. I t  always mes# being thus 
because i t  oaanot be otherwise, i t  alaays sWggeste some
ferye or eonpwlsi# # ie h  ra ie i#  #  eehpels# Tbmrefore,^
. . .  . in 3r ;. *
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iStk9 itfiQla âébata about Uborty mol Baooa& l^ty becomoa boggW 
down in  an assbigulty o f tm'sm w b l#  mkaa aoXution q|oit« 
unthinkable*
When theee term* are ueed with r ferm oe to  tho W ill of mm, 
then, the oonfueion l e  m d leee and deeaetatiz^* For in -  
stance, vAen the term Beoeeeity le  w ed with regard to human 
beinge, i t  i e  a t  <mee euppoeed that certa in  thlnge w i l l  be 
regardleea of any <^H>oeition from audh human beinge. The 
whole y ic ^ r e  preeeated to  human thought la  perverted be- I
oauee i t  1« oaeumed that when a thing le  maid to be Beoeeeargr j
i t  Btanda over ega inat aoms p o e lt iv e , personal dee ir e  to  be 
othendeo than What ie  oonoelved ae Beoeaeaxy* I t  pre- 
eupposea tha t the very term Booeaeaxy muet be "relative*  
and oppoeed to  Voluntary, that i e ,  i t  con have no moaning or  |
eadetenoe other than that i t  atanda oppoeed to  a e ta te  of 
a ffa ire  or mind that would be d ifferen t from that which ie  
eoneeived in  the team Beoeaaary#
"Thinga are aaid to bo what muet be, or neoow ar ily  are, aa to  ua, When they are, or w i l l  be, th cu ^  wo aeblre  or endeavour the contrary, or txy to  yrevont or remove th e ir  eacietencei hut such oppoeltion of oura alwoya e ith er  oonaiata in ,  or im p liea, oppoeltion of our w illa"»(1)
When thia p icture o f Bsoeaaity la  preaw ted to  the hucm  
Mind, i t  i& quite eeay to c lip  in to  the further aacnmption 
that a thing ia  Weoeaaory '^ When we cannot help i t ,  l e t  ua 
do what we will"* Ihua, tho whole cwmoept o f Heoeacity b e-  
cornea involved in  i t a  "relative* moeming, and aocn oeaae# to  
hove any meaning unleaa that meaning involvea acne aoppoeed, 
p o e ltiv e  and pcwaonal cppoe itioa to  i ta  auppoaed force or 
compulaicn. Mdwasda believea that thiL chain of grouadleui 
oaamptlona can eaa ily  lead in  oonfuaing a doctrine o f  
Beceaelty with a doctrine of Tataliam, tm à  a m  ro&ult in  a  
great deal of noneenae being w r itten even about moral queeticma* 
fo r  inatanee, en auoh on erroneous view of RoccadLty i t  i s
CD She freedom of the w ill, P t« l, sect*#*
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poaaible to ooy th a t a man could not h d p  being vlrtuoue or 
Tlcloua a t  tha t p a rticu lar time When be prefer^ v irtu e  or 
vlcoi and tbarofore Beoaeeity over "Whelm# hie re a l choloo 
and smleeo him difformat from What be oig^t have been ajU 
tboug# there le  c lea r evidmoe th a t he (Aoee a t th a t partieu - 
Xar time to bo vbat he wee. In  other word#, a  men cboee 
v ir tu e  or vice beoaueo he woe under seme eompolelon whloh 
euperiqrxmed i t s e l f  upon b is apparent Choice and in  re a l 
oi^meitiQa to  ble supposed intended Choioe* 
ahssrds w ill re tu rn  to th is  p r^ e m  la te r  end give i t  more 
a tten tion , but i t  i& menti mod bare to isd iea te  i te  absurd 
coaseqoenoes*
Ibe only way out of th is  hopeless oonfus^lon In  tb s difiouseion 
of Liberty and Veoessity i s  to begin with as o lesr and s lsp le  
a meaning of Beoessity as 1# possible. Therefore, Bdeards 
decides to  c a l l  hi# view of Beoessity by tho term "Meta­
physical or Itdlosophical necessity** • By th is  he means 
nothing more e r le ss  than "Certsizity**, and be does not mean 
certain ty  of knowledge, but ra ther the certa in ty  which i s  in  
things themselves# Be examines some defin itions of "msta- 
pbysical** Meeessity, and finds them insde^pmte boconse they 
do not explain Msoassity us the thing rea lly  i s  la  i t s e l f ,  
but m thsr uses team  to explain Vhidk demand eiqzlamtlon in  
themselves# His own view Of *%etapbysical* Heoeselty i s  
s e t fo rth  a s :-
, c ^ . .*Mdllos<@hlcal necessity i s  rea lly  nothing le ss  than the f u l l  end fixed ocanection betwem the things sian lilsA  by the subject and predioate of a propositicsi, Which affirms aomething to  be true* . (1)
Rbw, says iddwards, "MetophyLlool" Bocosuity can be said to  
ex ist When i t  I s  la id  down th a t b d n g , in  i t s  f u l l  and f in a l 
meaning, ex ists and ex ists  e ternally . The Mind cannot
f t  *•>conceive of being in  £*ensral having no existence, ne ither can
(1 ) The Freedom of the W ill* P t*i*  Boot###
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i t  think of ahealnte and urtLvereal "nothing* os axiatonti 
fo r th is  is  a gros# oontradletioii within thought# Thorofor#,«/ ifunivwoal# p ositive , general being i s  a  nsoessaxy oonsept 
of the human Rind# Further, ones God i s  sa id  to ex is t, i t  
i s  impossible to  separate suoh exlstsnoe from in fin ity  or 
eternity* #o, i t  Is quite inpossible to  say or think tha t 
two and two do not make ftm r, or that a l l  s tra ig h t l ln w  
dxwm from a aentre of a e lro le  to the oireumfersnee are  not 
equal* Again# some things are said  to be neoossary beeaase 
they are  p a s t, th a t i s ,  th e ir  exlstense i s  a  matter of faot* 
Further, some things are  said to be neoessaxy oonaeming the 
fu ture and th is  most be used in  a oonsequontial manning, th a t 
i s ,  these things w ill eome to peas in  the future beeaase 
th e ir  eawses or roots are  already in  sxistense# Bowever, 
these fu ture things are  not nooessary in  th e ir  oun rig h t but 
only neoossary beeaase they are dependent upon p rio r causes 
or conditions. BSsards also aives a tten tio n  to p articu la r 
and general "Hstapbysical* le c e ss ity , but th is  i s  only by 
way of I llu s tra tin g  the cen tral thesae, and need not be re­
viewed in  detail#  She v i ta l  point in  a l l  th is  discuw&iom 
i s  tha t "Metaphysical* flfeosssity does e x is t, and fu rth e r, i t s  
existonoe does not involve any compulsicui in  the generally 
accented asatiing of th a t terns#
In  other words, "Metapbysioal* lecess ity  i s  an "Absolate* 
term. I t s  essen tia l meani% i#t not depoodent upon say other 
term, and i t  ce rta in ly  does not stand "related* to seme 
supposed opposition from ^ s  Will of men. Further, i t  i s  
worthy of note th a t adwnrds, having given tk ls  positive , 
absolute connotation to the term necessity , i s  now qu ite  w ill­
ing to l i f t  the terns "Impossibility" to  a  now mad d iffe ren t 
level of in teri^etation# He ia  w illing to  define th is  tern# 
as "negative" le cess ity , and thik is  important ft»  h is  fu rther 
development ef h is  sy&tem of Determinism# Later, he w ill
-  98 -
drive home the inpllcations of thio eonoept of "negative" 
neeeesity# and i t  w ill become oleor # y  ho was w illing to 
give a  new in te rp re ta tio n  to "Impoeelbili^r" %
Here and now, i t  ie  Irportant to observe the meaning he gives 
to tho term "(^optioamay# Bis f a l l  teaoMng upon th is  term 
suggests i t  eon bo used in  many d iffe ren t ways, (a) I t  oan 
moon something oomos to pass by Ohame or aocidsnt.
(b) I t  oan mean something oomiqg to pass When i t s  causes are 
not dUeesned* (o) I t  oan mean soeiethiQg coming to pass 
lUildCz was not foreseen or counted upon* (d) i t  osn mean 
something coming to  pass without any previtma ground or 
Reason for i t s  existmaoe.
The interprotatiom ; of the eonoept "Oontingozxt" as contained 
in  (a) and (d) are important for the exposition of P eter- 
ndnisp by Bdwardsf fo r , i t  i s  perfectly  c lear from his 
w ritings th a t he always thinks of somothiz^ being Contingent 
as being due to Chance* In  fa o t, he Id en tifies  the word 
"Contingent" with "Chanoe". the interpretati<m  of contingent 
In (d) is  important because i t  i s  here th a t adwards makes 
h is g reatest a ttack  upon idiat he thinks to be fa lse  theories 
of human Freedom*
Having made ^%is remark upon OontingenBy, Rdwards again turns 
h is  a tten tion  to a  more detailed dibcusmion of **lletai>byalcal" 
ROoossity^^^t smd he thinks i t  w ill a s s is t h is exposition of 
th is  oono#t i f  he divides i t  in to  two aspects — One, Morel 
gsoassity* and Two, Bhtural Heoessity* He i s  not ooemitted 
to th is  division In  any absolute sense, but he fee ls  such a 
division w ill a s s is t tho task of in te rp re ta tio n  of h is  aen tra l 
ooncept, th a t i s  "Metaphysical" Becostlty, How "Moral" 
Mioossity is  used in  mazy ways* (a) I t  can mean moral ob li­
gation, that i s ,  a man being under the bonds of duty and 
consoienoe from Whi«A he oaaaot be dis^io3%ed#
(1 ) The Freedom of the >^ill* P t*l*  sect.4*
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Anot!ior oooïilng or I llu s tra tio n  of Moral Hooofcsity 1& (b) 
tha t appfiTcaat conncotioii of things which la  tho ground of 
norol ovldmco# Hore, Hùmxô» I t  thinking of the ssinuL 
argumente fo r  God etc* , and he observes tha t such evidonae 
can amount only to probability  and not to Infaillib le oer- 
tolzity ^ c h  is  tho resu lt o r oomequenoe of "Absolute" 
Becofisity# Rioee ins tone ee of "Moral" necessity are neither 
accourted or rejected by Mimufde. Re merely etatos tha t 
those are  way# in  which the term bo# been used* Hoeevor, 
his oen use of the tom  i s  confined to a  very rig id  and 
lim ited connotation, and is  put in  theee vordei-
moral meoeesity i s  meant that neoeaeity of ocnmeotion
comneotlen woiah there ia in  oaay oaees b e ^ e n  theee,and such certa in  volltian# and action#".
Dpon tho firs t: glonao a t  th is  d éfin iti<m of "Moral" Racessity, 
thorc 1b a feeling tha t : dwords ie using the term in  a manner 
quite foreign to It^  rea l meaning, and that he would have 
served tho cause of tzuth b e tte r i f  he had used the above 
extract to define "PeycZiologlcal" Recessity". That Ik , 
tho te rn  "Moral" appears to be given a meaning which ie  quite 
d iffe r  ont from acy conceivable association with moral values* 
On the eurfnoQ, i t  would appear tha t -îdwcrdfi ought to  have 
kept tho term "Moral" Rocostity for that t ta to  ".Than a man 
is  \m^ QT tho bond# of duty and oonsoiooce from whloh he d is­
charged. Yet, i t  w ill booome clear in  the cubiequent #c- 
position of his system of Dcterrdnisjn that KhTcrds is  quite 
ready to give the neocGtary weight to th is  type of in te r ­
p reta tion  of "moral” M ecessi^, and that h is  rather novel 
defin ition  is  of real value because inclinations and motives 
are given rea l moral worth* That i t ,  h is  ©yttom of Deter­
minism i s  not a system of Fatalism, nor Is i t  a system of
(1 ) The Freedem of the w ill#  P t.l#  sect*4*
r ' . - ' -  ■ «
"f <
i
. . '  1 >  i " ?  ■'‘ ■ "  * * *  "  '  V , ,  .  ;;
; " ^ r .  " V -  ' . .. v - -
-r timoim* Mmktittf # i @ k  w m *  *  w « #  A *  m #  « w m u i *  « r
I ' Wmn Mbwty# m thsr, BWard# ia mmammtA with givi% m
wm maning to W)^%y$ and tWrafor# a na# imarpeatatim 
of roal Morality, «Kt, im til h# baa bad ow)»rtmity to a*- 
pmmd tbaaa omoapta, i t  would bo unjoat to obarga bi# with 
failing to glvo a roaamabla dafWtimak of maooamity#
% "natural" Boooaalty, Bdaarda appoafo to mm% a ll tba#
Bbioh ia # #  oopoalta «r "moml" moooaaKtar.(^ ) fat# agaia
groat oar@ ia aaadod to guard agaiaat mmMimplifioation of 
thia Iz^ortaht poiiit»
I t  ie ai^Jfioant that eoa# of tba lllisetratlcm  #ad by 
Bdmrda In tbia partioulaar eaation mdar diecuamiaa aa# 
similar to tbomo uaOd to illm tra ta  "WatagbyaiaWL" ## 
abaoluto Raoaa&ity. Furth<a*# i t  *aat ba bom# in otad that 
b# boa mod# i t  parfootlar oloar that "batmpal" Maoaa&ity ie  
only a aub-divieioa of %otapbyaioal" Mooaaeity# Tberafoea# 
##dW# tho boat dafW tim a of "meal" Haaoa&ity end 
4mWPal" MOoaaelty ia that #bi<di atataa that the forma# is  
:''a#amaaad nllh mamX deuaaa and the lattes with natural Oamaa# 
That ia , for the time being# and witb the olaas taadera|aadl#B 
that #w tern "moral" ia beWg uaod in  a eomaobat novel nemar* 
awards omfima this preewWn by oeying that meeeal" 
###eeeity my be #a msolute aa #&t%m*l"#ooessity# % tbd#
#  mams mat # t# o  my be joined U  an aotioo of the « ill 
by a "aura omâ perfeot oomeotiozf* aa mat oonoetved of la 
Oonaa and mffOot in  the natmal mrld# me mabee this s t i l l  
move mpbatie by eeyli^ that tW oeaoept of meeeeaity Is not 
modified by m# tame omneeted. me «mite that the## I# a 
diatiziotioa or diffevoaoe in the omooy# oomeoted# that is , 
a motive Is different from a mare "natural" Oatme# but the 
$#o«tsnt point is that this diffevenee is not great enoe# 
to affect the kind of oomnaotlon, ahiob In identim l in  a l l  !
> (1) aw  F tm m  #e w u .  rw «* M e t.* .
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casea. HoceBsltyj in  I t t  alaeoluta connotatlcm, "la only 
the fu ll and fixed connoctlon between the thiqg© klgaifled 
by the subject and predicate of a proposition". I t  matter# 
not thingk are oontoined In the eobject and predicate, 
the only thiqa vôilch matters Ik the fu l l  and fixed oomectioiu 
l3Qwarde eeee tha t thlc explanation In  I t t a l f  le  not enough; 
he mufit eay aomctMng about the thlnge connected, and the 
most i%)ortant concept of euoh thii%e le the ccjncopt of 
"Choloe". In fao t, he la  roady to admit tha t i t  ie  "Choiae" 
which makoa neoeeeecry tho division of "aetaphyelaal" Heoeaalty 
into "moral" and "natural" Roceaalty. However, he has a l­
ready made I t  quite clear in  hik previous reooAa an Moti­
vation th a t the term "dholoe" must be need in  a  vosy guarded 
oenae. Here, he hinte that "Choice", while d lffe ien t from 
mere "natural" Cause, ie  often brought about by natural 
causee* of oouree, moat people frill to trace tho rea l 
ooucee of th e ir  Choloo, and ore inclined "to cignify the 
manner of the event by another name".
However, the tern  "Choice" rea lly  aeoms to introduce a new 
princip le of motion and ac tion , d ifferen t from the Oktab- 
li&hod law and order of things. I t  seems to Interpose and 
in terrup t and a l te r  the chain of "natural" events. All th is  
i s  for üsdwards the commonly acoepted point of view, but he 
is  convinced that "Choice" Is  as necessary as any other Cause 
within the o rb it of "metafA^sioal" Recessity. However, 
the time has not yet eome for a f u l l  and f in a l statem m t 
upon the nature of Jhoioe. adwords has something important 
to say about another matter which stands intim ately re la ted  
to Choico, and thiu is  "Moral Inability"* Raw, i t  w s t  be 
observed that ho has defined "Impossibility" os the negative 
aspect of "metaphysical" Recessity, az&d the term "Moral 
Inab ility "  carries with i t  a l l  the ifm^lioatiook of th is  in te r ­
p reta tion  of "Im possibility". I f  th is  i s  not k ^ t  in  mind,
■ n
f , . .  -i ;•- 'W  ?À,'.f «  '.  '.,1  « \  '. ■ ' ' '* " v ’ ■ ■ " '-• -  ^ "■■" ' ’ ■ ' '■ ’"  -’i - - ' ^ ‘' '  ' y  ? ’/ ‘. - ^ ÿ - - ~  - C b :
W m  Ê# #  m # #  #  # % :# # %  # #  WWW m  : * W l : . : W ^ t y
aff «lit qC plmee iat the present Wain #f srgasm t#
A sarefo l d is tin e tle n  ase t be msd# between "naturel" «ad
"aersl” in ab â lity . «Mn # wm ie  «nder "astttral** n a sb U itr
i t  ie  quite  e leer tb a t hé esnaot de s  psrtim slar t hi ng #1-
Wflttggi h# m i# t "# 1 1 " te  do it#  th a t le ,  m  "ex trinsie" .
(bmee prevents #&e «ffeet «S Me v o litio n , and th is  extx im i#
Gene# earn be im eome pbysioel or evw  n m ta l defect# # # »
ever# the ease ie  q e ite  d iffe ren t with "meml" im b i l i ty .
I t  ie  not s iweetMng e s trin s io  t#  the w ill which new preveeie
notion, but isemriMne " ih t # # i e " ,  ##, ÜM # e  w w ü e t
admmdsft- .
"Moral ib s b ili ty  W neieti ##.*.# elW #r In the wmt e# ^ in e lien tlen , #  the  strength of n eontmry inelinntlen#t - e r  the went of s tA ic ie n t motives in  view to indue# .•
.  y >  « Ï .  s s j î â ' i a i r u  « ? i S S s ^ < » “ .
’ , i  V Sbwl m n b llity  sen be seen in  th a t quality  of # a ra e te r  " 
wbieh finds i t s e l f  qu ite  "bauble" to  enemit se ts  of vie#, 
end eleo in  th a t type of oham eter,j bWng e v il ,  esm et per* 
fe m  nets #  v irtu # , a # e n t  deal of hab itual wickedness 
m y make i t  quite iepoeeibie fo r n men to  ebon# hMinees# 
bSsurds ie  n o t. In  W a  eectlim , empeunding the doctrine ef 
to ta l  depravity# Be i s  s W ly  seyibg MmH n perecn'e habite J% 
and eharacter m ed itio a  Choiee» f fe ith ^  is  he saying th a t ^  
erne bad not suet forever deeid# the ebaraeter of the person 
e# aetins* l i e  purpose i s  eloar and simple* 1# dSLlree 
to  MM# i t  V##y c lea r # s t  Ghoic#, mlthou# i t  M ^ t  %^#ar 
to  in te rru p t and a l t e r  natural events, ia  not eomethhea th a t 
arisee out Of nothing# or #eeemda f rm  the iMiy, i t  i s  in ti*  
mate% re la ted  to  the eharaoter of the person aWking the 
' Ghoiee# Further, a  careful dl«tln@tlon m&t be made betwesm 
:mMMural" SWi "####1" In a b ili ty , fhe woïd "Im btutiy* i s
'
• -1
!
t
(1) B #  FreSdem Of the Will# Pt#l# eeet#4.
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to  co v er a  im jltltu d o  o f alae. %f ::5dwar(îa had sa id  
out bluntlj^ that a wtciiod aoa was "unabla" to  (Aoose the  
Good, Qony would have charged him with Fatallam, or would 
have doQlnrad the man g u iltlees  beoause he was '^unable" to  
do or w i l l  d ifferen t from what W woe doing. That I s ,  the 
mora term "Inab ility" would bo uead in  it*  "natural” meaning 
ÜM roenXtina trm  ench phyeleal or mental d e fe c t , or pro- 
von ted  by some "extrlm lc" Caueo. ndwarde w i l l  not allow 
euoh confoeion to  hold oonoesmins the "acte of the w ill" .
»»Xt*  oamot he tru ly  emld, eooordlng to the ordinary m e of lai^m gSf th a t « mdioicm  non, l e t  him he neve# #o maliciowe, eennot hold hie head from eto ik log , en th a t he ie  met ohle to she# hie meieWhw himdmme# or tha t o d r it i ta r^  l e t  hie oppwlite he meyer go etr(w%, oaie» not iceep l6e ohP from hie ncrath"» (*)
That ic ,  thee# v io l one acte oazmot be exoueed ty  mere "aatatol" 
In a b ility . "A man ham a thing in  hie power, i f  he has i t  
in  hie Qhoiee". Therefore, although many mote of Choice 
m y mrlee from "natural" Oamee, f in a lly  and fundamentally. 
Choice im a moral fact* I t  ham te  do with imoliimtiom, 
notive, charaoter and personal end poaltiTo willing# This 
ie  the ju s tif ic a tio n  of the ra ther novel in te rp re ta tio n  given 
by Bdwarda of "moral" msoeeslty#
jadwarda would agree th a t **willlng" was rea lly  doing — "Ohom 
onoo ho has w illed , the thing is  performed, mod nothing ole# 
remains to be done". Therefore, whom an aot of v l l l  ia  not 
done, the question of "Inab ility” ought not to  be raised  aa 
an eaouae. For, the thing wanting is  not being ablf# but 
a  hoim M llin g ,
Of course, a l l  th lk  xm^  appear as begging the moat v i ta l  
Quoetion, but i t  ie  only being ju s t to  Edwards to say th a t, 
up to  th is present stage of hie arpoeitlon, he has not hesi­
ta ted  to  see as many points of view as possible, and to face 
the d if f ic u lt ie s  a t  Ihey a r ise . The jo s tif io a tio n  of h is  
«ystem must await fu rther analysis#
(1) 9m m tdm  ot tb. #111. pta. #wt.#.
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(4)
8 0  fo r, MSwordo ha# boon omoomod with pvoMag that Mio Will 
i# dotofniaod# Be hoe Amo th is  by ofgMns that the w ill 
ie  that aepeot or prlaeipie of tho Mmd whibh ehooeeo*
Farthov, that dboloo ia  that prapenderatiag inflnenoo of tho 
Mtnfl| or that effective proforenee ef the siad «hLeh hao a 
vioo of the Good ahiOh ie t ermed that bhieh ie asvooablo» 
Again# metivo ie  «hat eauo## eomethia# to  appear meet agroo* 
Ohio# end thie oenotlttftoe «ffoeUvo proforenee ehieh ia  
a  oceMinatlen of affeotiea end «ndoretenaina# and thorofor# 
tho R ill is  doteralnea by the Mine*# vioo of «hat ie agroo* 
able# In  fao t, the O il! ie  ae the opparwxt Oood, end thoro 
ie mo gap, o r, ae he aeya, vaaanby, betooea  tho aot ef tho 
Ming dooWing upon «hat i# agreeablo and tho Oooieiaa of 
the « i l l  to aot on «hat ik agyeeahio# AeenWmg that he hoe 
mag# out a eaae fo r MMs type of botoaMgagea, the next v ita l 
qttoeticn ie ,  hov goea eiwh a aysten ef Dotorcgniam atanâ 
related to reeegniaod naaal valnoa?
Mgoarde ie  perfootly emare that the eupreem charge hroa ^  
agaimet a l l  foraa of ootemlaiem ia that they deetrey real 
Merality# go, he nehe# a eenaidewahlo effo rt to  jca tify  
hie ayaten of BoteaHlagen on greumda ef Moaelity# She 
preoent «apoaittoa ef th la  attoept « i l l  involve jeiniag to* 
gather argameata idlieh adaarda hae le f t eoatterod thrmaM*g«t 
hie eyetem of HotetntMiam, toot i t  ie  the Only nothad Vhorety 
a  eeapreheneivo picter# of hie attempt ia  poaaitolo#
Be luegina thie taah ef relating Deteredmlaa to Merality by 
atplng that there ia  enly one onmmaa omee vioo of Freedom 
pogeih le, and that ie  the oao Vhieh aafeca Mhorby "a power, 
epportonityi adamtago, that may erne hae to do aa ho pleaoei^ 
Or, i f  i t  «U1 «nit tho porpoae bettor, ie  willing to do* 
fine Idhwty in  megativo term  aa "Ida being fro# from
(1) «ho Freoden o f the «Ul« p t l# goot.g.
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hindrance or Impodlomt In the way of doing, or oenduoting, 
i a  any respect, as he wills"# The very opposite of Llhertgr, 
end th is  is  important, is  a person's being hindered or wACTable to een#w«e as he iaill% or being neoo&sitated to do 
otherwise thajv he wills*
All th is  appears very c lear, and quite convincing; and i t  
i s  obvious tha t Edwards is  not saying anything whloh eon* 
f l i c t s  with his previous exposition of Determinism#
He strengthens th is  argument fo r  such Freedom toy in s is tin g  
upon h is previous argument th a t such Freedom i s  oonoexned 
with the person and not with the mere will* I t  i s  only 
th a t which possesses a Will «hich cam be free  or otherwise*
I t  i s  not the W ill, but the agent who has a w ill tha t the 
disouseian must cenoem# the W ill le  simply m property 
or a ttr ib u te  of man, and i t  i s  the whole nan «ho is  the 
doer, or the active agent* There a re , a t  le a s t ,  two things
wh oh can destroy Freedom# these are constra in t, that i s ,  
a person being compelled or noose s i  ta ted  doing something 
Whloh be does not w ill to do; and R estrain t, that i s ,  a 
person being held back or hindered from doing ohat he w ills  
to  do# Wow, says Edwards, there i s  a vezy grave error in  
the minds of ce rta in  person^ Who disousk Liberty and Wecessity, 
and th a t is  the mrrov of thinking th a t doing what one w ills  
is  not a  su ffic ien t «mplanation of Freedcm. They imegine 
th a t i t  i s  th e ir  task to trace  out the causes wby people will* 
In  other worAe, they are not sa tis f ie d  with Choice as a 
decislcn of the Kind, but try  to  find out the orig inal Gauss 
&f such ca&oioe.
Edwards Is no opponent of what s igh t be termed psychological 
investigation , but he warns against I t s  dangers, tha t i s ,  as 
an argwmmt fo r re a l Freedom* The main thing is  'Uzat the 
pereomi w ills , and, when he w ills , does what he thinks agree­
able to  h is mind. In  other words, he does What he pleases, 
and th a t ought to be enough evidence of Freedom#
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"Let the person oosae by h is v o litio n  or dholee hov he w ill , y e t, i f  he i s  able, and there i s  nothing in  the VRy to hinder hie pureuing and eoceeuting hi# w ill, the man is  fu lly  and perfeotly  f re e , aooording to the primary and ooraaoa notion of freedom^
This is  a very importmit statem m t, and i t  w ill be in te r ­
esting to Observe how ;Amrda works out i t s  fu ll  and f in a l 
implication#*
Here end now, i t  must be observed tha t Edvard# thinks tha t
there are only three main arguments vhioh oan be directed
against h is  system* They are (a) th a t the Will hae a power
of determining i t s e l f ,  (b) th a t the Will ie  Zndifferent in
the act ù£ V olition, and (o) that the freedom of the . / i l l
ie  b u ilt  m)on the dontingenoy of the will* He w ill examine
these point# of view i a  tu rn , but the present exposition
of hi# system mmt keep to  the main lin e  of argument.
Tn order to  keep to  the main argument of Determinism and
Morality i t  w ill be nooessary to  put aside, for the time
being, the rep lies of mhrnrd# to What he think# aremrroneou#
tdems of hmmin Freedom, end take up tho main orgomant whidh
oomee m<ùx la te r  in  hlk e3Qx)altion* Here, he comes to  grlM
with the problem by quoting one of hie oppensnt# as seying#-
"If  a l l  human action# are aeeeasaxy, v lr tn e  and vice must be empty names; we being capable of nothim  th a t i s  blamevorMzy, or deserveth praie#; for who oan blame a person fo r doing only iMiat he could not help, or judge th a t he A ess^eth ^poise only fo r what he could net avoid"* v2l
Mow, in  fairness to  mhrnrd#, th is  c ritic ism , on the surface, 
ie  a parody of Ihe iqrstem of Determinism which he ha© so fa r  
eapounded* He would h ea rtily  agree tha t v irtu e  and vice 
are mqpty name# i f  a person i s  neocseltated in  action# wbiab 
he could not help or avoid* #o fa r ,  he has r^zudiated such 
neae^sary action# a# consistent only with Fatalism, which 
he ha# condmOMd. However, in  equal fairness to  h is oppcm- 
ent, i t  must be boms in  mind that the above charge is
(1) me Freedom of the will* Ft*l# dect.d*(2) " « rt « 9 " a ,  " l é
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l e v e l l e d  a g a in s t  th e  f u l l  and f i n a l  in^^ licatiüru i o f  th e  
la lv iM fc it ic  sy ttom  cooiaonly u n d ers to o d , and th e r e  i s  no 
doubt t î ia t  odwardû le a v e s  h im se lf  open to  ©uch a  oharge whan 
ho hae o o q p le te ly  expounded h i s  systam . Y e t ,  th e  instijortant 
th in g  li> th a t  üîv^a-^de I s  \ ' î î l l ln g  to  argue th a t  h ie  eystom  
o f  ‘J c to r td n ie n , even  w lt li a l l  i t t  im p l ic a t io n s ,  i s  th o  o n ly  
sy© ton \ i i ic h  raicci r e a l  s e n s e  o f  a l l  tho f a c t s  tzhicA a re  
a v a i l a b le .  ï isr th o r , i t  jJUüt n o t be fo r g o t t e n  th a t  h ie  
opponent i s  a " m e o lo g lq a l"  c r i t i c ,  and i t  w i l l  bo n e c e e sa z y  
f o r  -iîdwards to  r e p ly  t o  th ia  charge i n  terras which a re  
p a r t ly  p h ilo sO iiA lca l and t h e o lo g i c a l .  There 1© am^Jle e v i ­
dence in  tho w r i t in g s  o f  M wards t iia t  ho would p r e fe r  to  
avo id  th e o lo g i c a l  argum ents lA en  discuL L lng human ihroedora, 
but hiw s t a t u s  as a lo a d in g  exponent o f  ilieo lo g y  ccxqpolled  
him to  Uuie n o t ic e  o f th o se  tlioo lo: l e a l  lia. l i  c a t  io n s .  
T h oreforo , dwards b eg in s  h ie  r e p ly  to t h i s  charge by a  
ro fer en co  t o  th e o lo g y . Ho s e o s  th a t  th e  p iv o t  o f  th e  argu­
ment turn© w o n  th e  supposed "rwai-moral" n a tu re  o f  n o co ssa ry  
act© o f  th o  W i l l .  H is  opioonont, and ho 1^ . r o p r o ^ c n ta t iv e  
o f  a  g ro a t  s c h o o l o i th o u g h t, cannot c o n c e iv e  o f IJLborty and 
îTocce©ity œ  e x i s t in g  w ith in  th e  sarao o r b i t  of th o u g h t.
I n  tho  mind o f M s  opponent, th e  v e r y  term "Hocc, sary" i s  
tho  l o g i c a l  o p p o s ito  o f  '‘L ib o r V ” , and ho roads in t o  tho  
terra, " îîocoseary", a l l  th e  f a t a l i s t i c  i n  p l ic a t io n s  commonly 
a s s o c ia te d  w ith  th a t  term . T h erefo re , th e  f i r s t  ta sk  b e fo r e  
i3dtoards i s  t o  c o r r e c t  t h i s  l o o t e  u se o f  th e  term ‘N ecessary" , 
and th e  fo l lo w in g  divisions o f th e  main argument might n o t be  
w ith ou t p r o f i t .
(1 )  I t  iL argued t l ia t  H ocQ Stlty am! l i b e r t y  ore In com p a tib le  
tonm s, and t lia t  i f  v ir tu e  ami v i c e  aro  n o o o tea ry , th en , th ey  
ce a so  to  be o f  any r e a l  m oan ing, and becojiw ei.p ty  nam es, 
Edwards docX iaes to  withdraw h is  sta tem en t th a t  tho  act© o f  
th o  iV ill a re  "nooocsary" a c t s ,  and ho has g iv en  a c ^ le  ovldozioo  
to  j u s t i f y  i l l s  p o in t  o f  v ie w  u/)on t h i s  liqportan t m a tte r .
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However, ho ha© to convinoo h is  opponent of tho justlfiom - 
tion  q£ th is  point of vlaw, and tho task  w i l l  bo fa r  from 
easy. Bo, BAwords b% lns by trying to  prove tha t beoauso 
an aot of w ill 1© neoossary, i t  doss not follow th a t i t  is  
non-morml, Take fo r instanoo, he sayt to hi© "thoologloal" 
opi>onmt, our view of God. We aonosive Him os a Being of 
a l l  possible v ir tu e , in  fao t, #s view Him as a Being who 
posa ess os in  psrfeotion and purity  a l l  the v irtu es . BOw, 
says Edvards, i t  i s  obvious that God oouXd not be othervlse 
than He i s .  He kaovs no s in . In  fa o t, v* Qcaaaot oonoolvv 
i t  "possible" for God to  commit an aot of s in . Further,
Hi© acts of perfect ^111 flow neoossarlly fzom HI© perfect 
charoctor. Therefore, e l l  God'© aot© are "neoossary", and 
they are al©o oxa%)Ios of perfsot v ir tu e . How con i t  be 
argued that the term "neoessazy" tM Inconsistent with 
Morality? Further, mould h is "thoologiaal" opponent dare 
to say th a t God vas not perfectly  Free? Yet, a» fo r as ve 
know, God's perfect Freedom is  not inconsistent u lth  the 
perfect Necessity of Hi© eoa^iot. He ohargos hi© c r i t io  
with inoensistemcy, and worse#-
"ViMtmi.i when ascribed to  him (God), i s  but an em%)ty MW#, and he i s  deserMng of no aoaBMndati<m or pndMmt heoause he i& nader necessity , he ooitiot avoid being holy and good^ae he is# therefore no thanks tomim for i t " .  (*)
sorely , h is  o r itlo  m ill net deacQr that God's moral acts are 
good in  themselves, and tha t he i s  tru ly  a  "Moral" agent. 
Yet, they com et conçoive e f  thio perfect goodnos© and moral 
worth ot!ier than being necessary, Hov then con they say 
th a t Recessity 1© perfectly  Inoonslgtm t with morality and 
Liberty?
This "theological" argument for his system of Deterninisa, 
althouf^h outside Uie main ©tream of h is  exi)0©ition, and used 
sparingly, must be given it© f u l l  v^aue as i t  affected h is
(i) Iho FrMdoD of th. wm. Pt.3. s.ot.1.
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system. There le  ooneiderable grounds fo r as©uxalng th a t 
I t  wee th ie  perfect blending in  God of M orally , Liberty 
ana Reoesslty vhioh oom titu ted  Me p a rticu la r leaning to 
Determinism. The "sovereignty" of God aXvaye sKorolsed a 
great influence over exponente of Calvinism but with Edvards 
i t  vas more than a mere In te llec tu a l iofluenoe, i t  vae a 
great myetioal esperienoe. In  fao t, the knowledge of th is  
groat tru th  ew  be said to have come upon him ae a type of 
Conversion. He records th a t he had been b ro u ^ t up UPon 
the doctrine of God's "sovereignty", but tha t such a doc­
tr in e  had not meant much to him. However, there come a 
time when i t  buret upon him with a l l  i t s  Ineffable glory#*
"The appearanoe of everything was a ltered ; there seemed to  be, as i t  were, calm, sweet cast or appearance of divine glory, in  alstost ev e ry th in . God's excellenoy, hie wisdoa, a is  p u rity , and love, seemed to appear in  everything Absolute sovereignty ia what Ilove to  ascribe to  Qod".
These things have been nentioned because i t  ie  li%»ortant to 
have in  mind the fao t tha t Peterminiam for dwards is  not 
merely a philosophical in terp reta tion  of l i f e  and conduct*
I t  is  a groat uy©tical experience. Further, that hie 
system of Determlniem d iffe rs  from Robbee, Locke, Collins 
and Hume In that i t  i s  more than what might be termed 
"Psychological" Determinism* I t  i s  a eyttem of Determinism 
which oombines Psychology and Theology as they have never 
been combined before or ©ince his d#^. Therefore, although 
Edwards would much rather argue Determinism from itspeycho- 
logioal point of view, he does not discuss i t s  theological 
implication© with lack of conviotion or sk ill*
(2) Edwards now turns to  another problem inherent in  Liberty 
and Necessity, that i s ,  as presented by h is opponent* I t  
is  the question of being able to perform God's commandments 
i f  human beings have not the Power, A bility or Will to  do them,
(1) The Memoir# of Jonathan ECwards. Ch.l*(See also The Freedom of the will* Ft *4. Sect.?*
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AWm, the rea l #éW ,m  1# #W # »l#d f  tom v ifir ly  the « m #
of # #  aritidU n* iftwar^ r# # o t#  th« « o r# m
M&ey atMOBoufily maintain that i t  «ouXA he W jm t t o  God to  require aMQrWiing of ue beyond our present power, t mod to lU ty  to  p ^ o x » | and alee hold, th a t we are now unable to  perfora perfect obedience ••*••»"
Again, th ie  le  a  theologioal objection, and, in  falm ees to  ^
to» c n t io e  ef E&»arde, i t  i s  directed agatoet the f u l l  ami |
f in a l  topUQatiotm ef cm lvinietle neteredniem. B eeem , 
ndmarde know» perfectly  w ell th a t he hae got to meet th ie  
eritieim » of h ie eyetto  a t  eeme period e f i t#  eupeaitien, ee, 
he deeidee to  take i t  a t  th ie  po in t, end nee i t  ae a  peg 
upon mhieh he oan tomg a  fu rther eeetimo ùi h ie  eRposlticeu 
toefefore, he attempt# to  reply to th ie  eeccnd major oritiolem  
/ to  toe folloeing term##- ,
<A) "toe w ill i te e l f  I and not cedy th œ e aoUone which are
toe effect# ef toe w ill ,  ie  toe proper to je c t ef precept ear
I  eemmead"# to i#  ia  a  wexy important etatem eat, and edmerd#
- ie  amtioue to put i t  in  toe moat careful t#pme, eo he re -
1 peat# i t  with dee emfhaeis upon to# « i l l  heihg the eeato# o f
hretto pereoneliMr#*
"for i t  i s  toe eoul oïdÿ to a t I# properly end d irec tly  U the eUhject Of preeopte and oomaandei t!mt only being Capable of receiving or perceiving oomwade"* W
iieard#  hae two porpcaee in  tdew in  mahing the above oh##M 
initient ( i )  to  wiehee to  emphaeiee and emofixn the pre-
i '
Viou# etatemont tha t freedom, mod sdto i t ,  m orality, bdemg
v  o  ?
t e  the ana med n e t emrely to  toe w ill of man# ( i i )  Be 
witoee to  examine th i#  question of morality «Mch ha# been 
raieed ae a  peeeible objection to hi# ^etm o of oeterminiem* 
«hat doe# h ie cppcawnt nwm by morality? u n ti l  there can 
be aome general agreemen t upm What ie  rea l m orality, i t  t#  
f u t i le  to  condemn hie eyetem ae immoral or aonWMwal*
v"!
U r  A . ftwOMi M «M ViU* M .3. ##*%.#,
'  : ' ,7 : ’<r.',-
iaeiete upon hmvig# eon# clear id ia  a i  f
! . toe eeaene# ef m r a l l ^ ,  #W he hegiaa bgr eaying to a t a H
ccmmmda eoneesnlau e th iea l btoaviour moet be aââreaæd ta
X:: ' ':: '-"tr
k f  ^  I  the WiU| and to toe «111 m  he ha# dafimee i t  aa heia# 
that aapeet o r prinelple ef toe Mind by to i to  toe met
„ ow e#  ie  «We* '
k (M) me#, thmre i#  only eoa toeral" reao tim  to the eftwind 
to i to  ie  eeeeatia lly  m e a l, and tha t reae tien  ie  "Obedietiee", 
and Obedience ha# no rea l meemlng emeept tha t I t  i#  the  
"e#mittlz% and y ielding ^  the w ill of one to  the M il  M 
enothmr". m i#  défin i t ie n  ef Obediepee i# nete*wortoy, fo r , 
r  M il  oonetitute a  problem e f any th inker, eato a# Kent,
: / k "  ' # o  i#  tenpted to  th ito  th a t man, himeelf, give# himeelf
the %##, Bowever, that i# not the Immediate prtolem, ratW#. 
i t  i#  to  #e# the f u l l  im plitotiene of toe d ic tm  M ndward# 
«  thi# point of « ill*
^ ' Beal mexality, toen, eenoem# toe « i l l ,  ana toe correct
a ttitu d e  to  the moral lam 1# Obedience# Later, mdwwpd#,
. w ill enamine toe eabetitu tae men often put forth  in  plae# 
of thi# cardinal ,  deoieiwe a c t  of Obedienoe# Bare, he 
. jP««oue# toe qoeetion ^  morality end toe « i l l  to  toe point ^ . ’i ï"” ^ «here he ecmc# in to  a large meaeure of agreement with Khnti- .
" 8 0  th a t i t  i# manifeet, the w ill i te e l f  may be required, % % and toe being of a  good w ill ie  toe meet proper, d ire c t,immediate ewhject of ccaammd for other- ,  thing# can be required ne otherwiee than ae,toey depemdkvk"'" . upcm, and are the fru it#  o f , a good w ill"*vl;
, ;mamerd# i# eoaeimeed tha t hi# opponent i#  #M ity of th i to h ^  
'--I' of no ra lity  a# a  eerie# of «Lght aeti(m## Be id , however,
- Sttm wllna to  #ay tha t rea l mmeality eonaiat# In a  e ta te  eC 
y - Win* I t  matter# met how many action# a men might perfomm, 
toe rea l onto of the «hole m atter centre# in  the qwaiiV o f 
toe Will from «hidh they flew. Beeauae, although the Law
r-
Kt' A6»f.
— ! »  " " « I '  n u l l  I ■ ■ I . . . . . . . ■ ■ I l l  " " « I  m  < j n » * n i « m i .    " n * w » » i ,  m e   m l *  i l l U i . *  ' i n  i m i — A i i S i i
p ' , (1) Ae IwmiB 4# tfc* *au.
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le  0 0 3 0 emed with rigîit conduotf i t s  oocoaand^in tho primary 
iastanoo^l© not oûâroo&où to tho ‘act#" of tlio Will, but 
to tho Will itf io lf  • How, tho primary and only eth ical re ­
action of tho Will to the cQODumd ie übodionoo, and Obedlonce 
i# not fundamentally Mnoerned with righ t aot©, but with the 
"submitting and yielding" of tho v;ill I te e lf  to another.
In  other words, i t  ie not a new eorloe of aot# of the Will 
to i oh i© required, but a now quality of Will, a new a ttitu d e  
of w ill, In  fac t a Hew H ill,
(C) Edward# confirm# th is  teaching Upon the Good Will by 
another statement toich come# very near to tho basic teato - 
Ing of !0Lnt#
"If the w ill fu lly  coBo^zlie#, and the proposed effect dee# not prove, acoordlm to  the law# of nature, to be oonnected with hi© v o litio n , the man 1# perfectlyexouBod   I f .  therefore, there 1# a fu l l  com-pllanoe of the w ill, the person has done h is d u t y . . . *  (X)
Again, Edward# 1# rather isg>ationt with those too argue that 
a man might have a very great desire to cooply with the 
command, amounting to a good in ten tion , or even to to a t might 
be termed hie "better" se lf ;  and yet f a i l  becau©o of hma^ 
f r a i l i ty .  He cannot to le ra te  thie idea of a divided s e lf . 
From h is point of view, a "split-per© ow lity" 1# an is&- 
posslblo concept. The man will# the a c t , or he does not 
w ill the a c t, and tX*e idea th a t  a man can w ill one ac t, rmrt 
de&ixo another i s  completely foreign to  hi# gystem.
Much la te r  in  h is exposition of Determinism, Edwards w ill 
have to  deal vdth the problem of "Hecessltatod Holiness", 
but thi© i s  a V ry d iffe ren t problem from the one be is  now 
conoemod with answering toich is  "Hecee^ary Goodness". So 
f a r ,  hi© system ha^ argued that acts of the J i l l  are nooessary, 
and he ha# extended tliii. type of Necosslty to cover even good 
acts of the J i l l  in  God and man, and ho ha© tried  to indicate
(1 ) The Freedom of the w il l .  P t.8 . sect.4 .
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th a t, In ôuoh Instances, there i s  no real oontradiction  
between Heoesfclty and Itorality. In fa c t ,  real B^orality 
I t  alwoyc Necoetary Morality. How, he bring© forth  another 
argument to confirm h ie  poe ltlon . Lot i t  be assumed, he 
Gays, that a men's actions have no real linkage w ith h is  
real charaoter* That, i e ,  that they aro ju st ac tion s, and 
are to be judged as ©uoh for their moral worth. Does th is  
interpréta tion  of Morality make any real sense? Ho arguest-
"Or i f  there be no previous d isp o siticn  at a l l ,  e ither  hehitnal or oocaeiOQal, that determines the a o t , then i t  i s  not choice that determines i t ;  i t  ie  therefore a contingenoe, that happens to « sen , ar is in g  fromnothing In  him* and therefore omnot make hime ith er  the b etter  or worse, any more than a tree i s  better than otiier tree©, because i t  oftener bapi>ens to be l i t  upon by a swan or nightingalo" •
In other words, the lo g ic a l opposite of tho term "nocoe&azy” 
i s  Qontingoht, and th ie  applies to  acts of the will In the 
realm of morality as w ell as in  Psychology* ‘bccept that 
in  n o ra lity , contingent acts are fa ta l to  real moral worth*
The second point which Mwards has in  mind when in s is t in g  
upon the Good w ill as the only /^ooelblo foundation for  
Morality i s  the fa c t  that he wishes to confirm h is doctrine 
of human In a b ility . He has already mode oloar that "moral" 
In a b ility  must be sharply distinguished from "natural" In­
a b i l i ty . Row, he wants to  make clear hi© toaoliing upon 
"moral" In a b ility  in  an even more eniAatic manner, and he 
usee th is  concept of the Good Will as the basis for thi^. task* 
The Oocmand i s  addressed to the W ill, and the ^111 ie  the 
men, and the only real moral reaction to the jasuasnd i s  
Obedience. I f  tills  obedience i s  given, i t  matters not how 
natural ovents ^hall hinder the e ffe c ts  of th is  Obedienoe; 
the man has done h is  duty, and that i s  rea l liOrolity#
He gives considerable care to the analysis of "Sincerity", 
as that term i s  used by mout poople, and he rinds that i t
(1 ) The Freedom of the w ill. Pt*3* Sect.7.
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le  often u©o6 s» »om& eort of eubetltuto for righ t W illing.
Ho d sa ld o s  that aoro cincority  cannot bo tormod a v irtu e , 
booau©e a can can be tlm oroly  "Bvil", and ho th lm e I t  1» 
dangcroue to use i t  aa a eubetltuto fo r re a l , positive acte 
of the «fill. The Good Will ia the only thing which rea lly  
an tto re i-
"And, therefore, however einoere and re a l , and however great a pereon'm endeavours a re , yea, though they should be to the utmost of h is a b il i ty , ujuess the M il  whloh they proceed from be tru ly  good and virtuous, they oan oe o t  d o  av a il, influence, or weight, to am purpose whatsoever, in  a  moral sense or respeot#"
He is  a t one with Xhnt^8) toen he in s is ts  "that nothing ean 
oounter-baianoe ev il but good".
(D) Itow, a l l  th is  ine istem e upon a Good w ill as the founda­
tio n  of real Horality is  no mere side-issue with Edwards, 
and i t  is  not an Intrusion of pious p latitudes Into h is  
system of Determinism. Bather, i t  i s  one of the pivotal 
and oruolal points of tha t system, fo r , without th is  founda­
tio n  of re a l Morality, he would be untole to drive home two 
very l&^ortant points of h is Deteroiniem#
The f i r s t  point has already been notieed In  the objeottea 
of h is opponmot, tha t 1©, that real v irtu e  i s  inconsistent 
with Necessity. Edwards has already replied tha t i f  th is  
argument is  applied to God, then God must be conceived of 
poseeesi% no rea l Morality. He now turn© the argument as 
i t  stands related  to man and argues that even in  man morality 
and Recesbity are not imoempatible terms.
He has already argued tha t persans can become so Good or 
Bvil th a t, in  a very rea l sense, the opposite so ts to th e ir  
"determined** disposition oan be viewed ae alnoct ia^posslble# 
Here, he proceed© to say tha t a man is  much more virtuous 
toen he acts from fixed principles than to<m he sots in  some 
random manner #-
 ... ..  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . ..  I I » . — « . ■ ■ . i . w . i M i i ,  I l l i n . i l i i . M i i M i  I I .  ,  « . . . . . . . . . . . .     .
(1) The Freedom of the W ill. Pt.3« Sect.8 .
(8) Religion. Sect «85»
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"If there be an approach to a moral neceeelty in  a man*# exertion of good act# ef w ill, they being the «xereiBe of a etrong propeneity to good, and a very powerful love to v ir tu e , i t  1© #e fa r  from being the d ic ta te  of oommon aeneo, tha t he is  looe virtuous, and the lees to be esteemed, loved and praised, tli t  i t  is  a^eeab le  to the natu ra l notion© of a l l  mankind, th ' t  he is  much the botter man, worthy of g reater ro©poct, and higher cjomraendatlon."
In  other words, i f  a mun'b rea l character is  good, find his 
action# flow from hie good character, he i© botter than a man 
to 0 6 0  acte have l i t t l e  or no re la tion  to his character. 
However, ©uppoio txiat tho n/111 does not obey the command, 
what then? I t  i© hare, a t th is  poin t, that Edwards faces 
one of the most ooiqplioated probloms of the v ll l .  Later, 
i t  w ill bo seen that Hartmann use© thi*. point to expomd 
hi© doctrine of the "Antlnoi^ of the Ought"* Further, th is  
point now brought into focus may well prove to bo the water­
shed between tho sy©terns of Edwards and KOnt. However, be 
those things as they may, tho io^jortant matter is  to d is­
cover what itdwards teaches upon thi© fa c t . Hi© central 
argument is  tliat i f  tho Will does not compl;/ with the Jommand 
i t  1© bocause tho VKiU is  already in  possession of an In­
clina tion , an effective preference which is  in  d irec t oppo­
s it io n  to the command. Tlils previous a ttitu d e  of the Mind, 
th is  effective opposition to the jocmund is  the vciy essence 
of human "moral" In a b ili ty .
"I say, the w il l 's  opposition in  thi© act to a thing proposed or commanded, or it© fa ilin g  of ooinplinnoe, Implies a moral in ab ility  to  do that thing"
The Command is  not addressed to  a w ill empty of some content, 
fo r i t  is  addressed to a i>er©on, and not to a property* A 
person oan only be termed a person in  that he has a disposition, 
and a Will capable of making tha t d isposition effective.
I t  is  uselesL to argue th a t, vdth one part of a man's R ill ,  
he wants to obey the Command, and n ith  the other, he unfortun-
(1) The Freedom of tlie W ill. F t.4* geot.4.(2) *• " " " " " 3. " 4.
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até ly  v io la tes the commond. sato a  mixture of w illing 
makes nonsense of effootive preforenoo, and i s  a parody on 
Morality. A man ic always behind the aots of the v i l l ,  and, 
for th is  reason, he is  responsible.
At th is  p o in t, i t  is  only f a i r  to  say th a t Edwards is  oon-
vinoed that the human h ea rt, soul, mind or d isposition  i s ,
by i t s  very nature, opposed to the command, and, d iffe ren t
from Rant, he i s  not thinking only of man's sensuous nature,
but of the to o ls  of man's personality#
Ind ireo tly , he attempts to  prove th ie by saying tha t tho
conmsMd is  always addressed to the « i l l  in  an a tt to p t to
"bind" i t  to  one tid e .
"For the end of lass  i s  to  bind to  one side ; and the end M sonnands is  to tu rn  the w ill one way, and therefore they are  of.no use unies© they turn or bias the w ill th a t way".
The Win ha© a "edntent" p rio r to the ocxmaand, end the "osn- 
ten t" is  contrary to the command, otherwise, there would be 
no real need fo r the Command.
Bdwards now attempts to  strengthen th is  pivotal point by 
taking UP another objection made by his opponent. The 
objection i s  tha t according to  the tenets of Determinism 
Moral In ab ility  consists in  mm being quite unable to  f u l f i l  
the Oommand. Here, the upponent sees a v i ta l  contradiotian 
in  such a system, on me ©ids, stands God and toe cmmmd, 
on toe other stands man with hi© "Moral" In a b ili ty . I t  
appears th a t God is  asking something which i s  to ta lly  and 
eonpletély beyond the powers of the person to whom the Jommsnd 
is  addressed* I s  th is  ju s t)  I s  th is  re a l Morality in  GodT^S  ^
In  the examination of th is  problem, Edwards i s  perfee tly  
aware tha t there l ie s  a much deeper problem than ha i s  a t  
th is  time prepared to face . I t  is  the problem e f  Predestina­
tion and Election, but Awards i s  ooarlnoed th a t the time has
(1) She Freedom of the W ill. Pt.3# Sect .4.
(2) «• * • • * » " "  8# " 8.
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not oorao In hi» expcmltion of Detorminiun to deal vzith th is  
ooQpXieated le tue) so, he takes th# objootion from i t s  
rather ©uperfloiol point of view.
He says th a t what h is opponent is  rea lly  ©aylng aiaousts to 
thi*., tha t God oust never a t  any time command anything but 
tha t to ich  i s  within tho o rb it of man's normal Ability*
ROW, i f  th is  were tame, there would be a oompleto end to 
Cowaanda of any s o r t , fo r , the Command must never be U nited 
by what i s ,  that i s ,  by the "actual"*
"Rush a s ta te ,  or ao t, of the w ill may bo roquired by Qensnnd as does not already « d s t .  For i f  tha t v o liticn  only may be eooswmded to  bewhUh already i s ,  there could oe ae use of precept, command# in  a l l  . cases would be perfectly  vain ana Impertinent"*
When Rdwards say© th a t the command must not consult more 
human A bility, he is  saying something toich agrees with the 
central teaching of Khnt*^^^ However ,  as already ind i­
cated, there i s  a ouch deeper problem in  th is que©tian of 
human A bility thm  ^ ha© yet been raised by Edwards, and i t  
must be faced in  the CKix)©ition of the Kantian Dofenoe of 
Freedom* Yet, i t  in perfectly  clear from the evidence 
already available in  th is  exposition of Determlniam advo­
cated by ah^ords that he has made out a very reasonable case 
for h is  system, and i t  cannot bo dismieeed in  the rather
dogmatic terms assumed by h is opponents#
The proceeding exposition of the Determinism of Jonathan 
Edwards contains many of the crucial elemsnte of h is system, 
but there i s  s t i l l  a considerable area of that system to  be 
discussed* As already s ta ted , i t  is  dwards too roally  
sums up a l l  the arguments and implication© of Doteradnlsm,
both in  I tc  Psychological and Theological aspects; and
therefore i t  i s  against the background of h is  system of 
thou^^t th a t the Kantian Defence of Freedom takes on a now
(1) Iho Freedom of the w ill. Pt«3« 8ect*4«
(8) X* p . V. 134, 141, 180, 159, 197, 2 U , 214.
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slgnlfioanoe. I t  would be possible to proceed with the 
exposition of the Determinism of Bftvards as already outlined, 
but th is  mlHht lead to needless rep e titio n  of the arguments 
available in  tha t system# Therefore, i t  appears more sa t­
isfac to ry  to permit Rant to ©tate h is  Defence of Freedom 
against the lim ited background of Determinism now avail­
able, and to introduce further arguments from the system of 
Edwards as they become necessary by Rant's treatment of 
Freedom# ab already sta ted , Sdwards thought there were 
only three explanations Of Freedom possible other than tha t 
offered by hie system* They were (a) th a t Freedom, consists 
la  a ë e lf 'determining power in  the « i l l ;  (b) th a t Freedom 
consists in  the Indifference of the « i l l ;  (e) tha t Freedom 
belongs to tha t which i s  Oontlngent, as that term stands 
opposed to Necessity# These arguments fo r  Freedom w ill 
a rise  In the discussion of the Kantian Defence of Freedom, 
and therefore need not be sta ted  here. However, in  addition 
to these supposed erroneous ideas of Freedom, i t  w ill be re­
quired to discuss Freedom as i t  stands re la ted  to  Moral E vil, 
and, fu rth e r, as i t  stands rela ted  to the Being of God. 
Therefore, i t  is  proposed to discuss the Kantian Defence of 
Freedom as i t  stands re la ted  to (1) Causation; (2) In d iffe r­
ence; (3) Motive; (4) Moral Bvil, and (5) the Idea of god, 
and i t  i s  f e l t  tha t the f u l l  force of Determinism as ex­
pounded by Bdwards w ill become clear in  such a discussicm. 
However, before proceeding to th is  ta sk , some attempt must 
be mode to discuss certa in  preliminary d if f ic u ltie s  in  the 
Khntian Defence of Freedom. These d if f ic u lt ie s  concern 
Kant's in te rp re ta tion  of the act of v o litio n , and h is  seeming 
fa ilu re  to give any clear decisive account of idiat the "ViU" 
rea lly  i s .  I t  i s  to  th is  task th a t the discussion now turns.
(1 ) The Freedom of the W ill. P t .l. s e c t.i.
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y o litio a . Freedom and Cassation
w oerta in  «cactly vib t^ Kant mean# by % ili is  a moet p#rpl«Kl% problem. Anoqg the mmwroua faoultle# in to  lAiob ^ e  critleeX  piiiloe^by b&e analysed our mental ao tiv ity , th is  baa eometlmee an independent position , though a t other times, i t  i s  almset# i f  not lAoHy, iden tified  with reason. Perhape. in  general, reason night be defined as the faoulty of prinoiples or ideas* praotioal reason as the faculty  that determines the m ill ly  these principles or ideas: and m ill as the f&eulty ofas tin s  aooording to th#m. But though there is  abundant grom» for such a d is tin s tion , the e^dence % ainet i t  i s  not le ss  OMVinsing#*
(J.G* Sohuzman. Kantian B th los. Pago BO)
**Hhe in te ll ig ib le  morld is  the morld as Will* the sensible morld is  the morld as Idea (V o rs i^ lu ^ }  | the former is  re la ted  to the la t te r  as th in g ^ n « ltse lf  to phensmena; in  other mords, i t  is  the thiim-&a*dtsslf, and lie s  a t the basis of the eense«morld| fienoo i t  is  Independent of the l a t t e r ,  vhlle  th is  is  dependent upon i t .  But ju s t as the sensible morld i s  re la ted  to the in te ll ig ib le , so our faculty of haomledge must be related to the m ill, o r , mhat i s  the same thing, our thsoretioal to our p rao tica l reason: the la t te r  i s  independent of the former* %&Lle the former i s  dependent upon the la t te r .  Heremitn i s  that re la tio n  determined mhioh Bhnt sa iled  the *Prima@y of Praotioal Reason*'. He earn himself obliged to hold the rea lity  and causality  of thlngs*in^thomselves, and to iden tify  the l a t t e r ,  as in te ll ig ib le  causality , with freedom or pure m ill, and thus to teach the primacy of praotioal reason.In  other mords, the true or rea l princip le of the morld i s ,  according to Bant, not knomi% reason, but m ill*,
(KUno Fischer, A jr ltiq u e  of Kant. Page 38)
*Khnt rig h tly  o a llt a tten tion  to the fact tha t a l l  psycho­logical Or p rac tica l teaching mith regard to freedom must remain v&luolose, unless i t  be shsmn tha t freedom as Luoh is  not inooepaticlo mith the mechanical lam already recog­nised as an a p r io ri condition sxperionoe. The d is­tin c tio n  drawn by him betmeen In te ll ig ib le  and aqpirioal character has been much misunderstood* and roquires careful statement — —— .The morld of stperience must be fo r in ­telligence a system of things causal 1 y oomsoted ——— .But the very fac t tha t tho conception of cause onables us to  think eaoh separate event as part of a united system, points out the lim it of that conception, !9e tmaaoi subject the mhole of esperienes to the lam of natural causation, and are led inevitably tomards the notion of something be­yond the phenomena of sense*.
(H. Adamson. The Philosophy of Kant. Pages 94 a  96)
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In QommonoiQg an exposltlMi of the Kantian Defonce of Proo- 
dom, there oust a preliminary taek of attempting to d ie- 
cover wîiat Kant mean# by the term Will, Kant, from a super­
f ic ia l  point of view, eeem& to  make his Defenco of Freedom 
unduly complicated hy using the term w ill in  an extensive 
and varied manner out of a l l  pr%>ortlon to the real needs 
of exposition. For instance, he speatce of a '*Holy* d i l l ,  
a "Rational" Will, a "Good* w ill, a "Pure" w ill, an "2&eo~ 
tive" W ill, and even a "Brute" w ill. All these terms are 
intended to stand fo r seme roal end abiding tru th  about 
"Willing", and the study of such terme is  made ovon moro 
d if f io u lt because there are occasions upon Which Kant i s  
not consistent In his use of euch terme. Further, the 
general teaching of Kant is  th a t the w ill is  the very core 
of porLcmal id en tity , and th is  appears to suggest that 3:ant 
is  fa ilin g  to see the wood because of the nuxm)er of trees; 
and, what is  much more serious, Kant appears to be breaking 
up the citadel of rreodom into a number of vague and scattered  
outposts. Perhaps the following questions w ill indicate 
the d if f ic u ltie s  inherent in  discovering wliat Blent means 
by the term *%ill"#
(1) Does Kant intend his readers to iden tify  the "Holy" Will 
with the "Pure" w ill? (2) I s  the "Pure" w ill the same as 
the 'National" Will? (3) Is  the "Good" to  be iden tified  
with the "Elective" Will? (4) Is  the"Roly" Will rea lly  
froe in  the same sonto as the "Good" will? (5) Is  the 
"Good" Will iden tica l with the "Moral Law", or i t  mers 
"awareness" of the "Moral Law"? (6 ) Can the "Good" Will 
ever become "Holy"?
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'WÜL # # #  # # e tic# #  ÊMWA# # #  4%#j%ri/Q%dLtJL#i* «moNf# ib#l 
faosd bsfwrs omdog to  g#lp# with tho Shntiaii Befmo# of 
vrosdom# Psrhsm & vesy liadtod survey of fiant's tm felA I^
Of Voli#ma3L iwroeeo o ü  w W  b# tho >oot way to &ttox#t to 
s ta te ,  i f  not to solve, Bant’c rathor eemplioated doooript# 
ioaw bi the to m  "w ill" .
<1) One of Kant's e a r l ie s t  doooriptiom of Will i# fo ip i r 
t e  the follewtes t#m a#-
"avorythins in  nature wmrk# aoeordim to  tewo* te # o n o l hoinga alone have the faoulty of m tim  aooording to  the aoRoeptloa of t e r n ,  th a t i s ,  aooording to  prinoip laa, i . e .  teve a w iU ".”
te n t goes on to  aey two vwy tepw tan t things# (a) the  #111
te  hut another term fo r the "tvaotioal" Beaoon| (h> The
Will ia  "teed" only when i t  ##oa#e th a t teiW& meaoon, ted#-
pendent of i na l inatio n , reoogaloe» a# p ra o tiW ly  neoeesary#
In  other tom e, the n ^ ll ia  "p rw tiea l"  Beasen in  action#
and is  oood in  th a t i t  ia  deteraalaed by meteem# tew, th is
p a rt of the e teee ition  of f i l l  ia  s tra ig h t and elear# The
?@eed" Will i s  id m tif ie d  with the "Pure" w ill , in  th a t
adttena wMdi are te jeo tiv e iy  neeeasary are also auhjaotively
neoeatemy*^^^ Bewevfr, this ia not ju s t wtm^ t te# t deairea
to  otevey by the term "Good" w ill, and he aeao tha t he m e t
# d i f y  hi# d teorip tien  #r the "teed" w ill by aayi%  tha t now
he i s  dasoriWlng the "Absolutely* Good w ill ,  o r, in  te n t 's  i
t e n #  — "teo tlteroiytay good te l l "  — end which or# Paten
tran sla tes  as the w ill good through and through.
In  o te te  words# te n t 's  a rp n m t appears to he th a t, i f  season
ia fa il lh ly  detertenes the f l U ,  the Will i s  perfectly  teod#
th a t is# teed in  a  "thorep#" quality# or ahsolutely Good;
hw% tho  Will te  man i s  not always deterteumd by teason# thsro**'
f#p# the  f i l l  o f mn# though i t  m at be tmrmed "Practical"
iè
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RSMKm because i t  Is  oepable of ssting  aaesrding te  th s  
eeneeptioa ef la s s , ia  impearfeetly Good, and net good through 
and Ihroute* This i s  a  very oomplioated say fo r te n t to 
take, and i t  would appear tha t h is  argument woWld have gained 
fores end c la r ity  i f  he had iden tified  the Rationally d e t e r ­
mined Will with the Pure f i l l#  as he does la te r  o n ,( l)  and 
l e f t  the Good Will to be dteiaed as the w ill "aWbjeet" to  
mwral laws hut not neooeeiteto# by moral laws. This lim ited 
glance a t  sa n t'e  in i t i a l  attempt to  define the \? ill in d i-  
sa tes how he ooo^lioates h is expoaition by attempting to  
eresd too mooh deetrime in to  too few words.
The teeve deeoription of w ill imdioates Kant's ewphaeis wpon 
the Rational features of the vo litio n a l proses#* Will can 
have no rea l meaning or purpose unless i t  a s ts  upm% primal* 
p ie s , and euoh primelples eam et be obtained unless w ill i s  
intim ately related  to  Reason* rurther# Kant re la tes  
hatiomality to  morality by making an aoticn soepletely deter* 
minod by Roasem to  be absolutely (lood.
mow, te a t  prooeede to  develop answer atipeot of the V olitiw m l
prooese by looking a t  w ill from another pein t of view.
"The Will i s  a  hind of oansality belonging to  liv ing  bein#o in  so fa r as they are rational# and freedom would be the p em rty  of sueh eaueality  tha t i t  earn bo off ieiemt A .independently on foreign sausos deter* miaing it" .(* >  , ^ w
This i s  an important aentribution to  the^volitional prooees
in  that i t  re la tes  causality  and lib e rty  to ths w iH .
Further, here are the roots of Autemooy and Traneoeodental
haw* Wet, th is  desoteptiwi of Will has oerta in  biddem'Jwtrdangers* I t  %po#$^teat might be termed a morally defined 
quality  of Freedom* men have a Will in  so fa r  as they are 
ra tio n a l beings# and Freedom is  imdepmdenee of fo rtegs 
eauses* tend says th a t th is  is  the "negativw** aspeet of
(1) see Gd. 88, and K#p.?. 1%# 
(8) @d# 79*
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FrcodoK, b u t i t  1& f a r  more th a n  th l i ; ,  i t  ib  tho  non<*f&or&l 
as p o e t o f Freedom.
The g r e a te r  p a r t  of t e n t *6 toaohifig  upon Froedom e o n fc i.te  
o f  tho  ci%)h&sis th r.t on ly  as  a  man i s  r o m l  i& ho f r e e ,  b u t 
somctiL'iOfi no h o s l ta to s  to  make euoh a n  e e e e r t lo n  th e  founda­
t io n  o f  ÎÛC ooi%)lete o jip o e itio n  of Freedom. IjEitor, Kant 
eays 'a  f ro o  w i l l  and a w i l l  s u b je c t  to  m oral lan e  a r e  one 
and th e  sam e". However, th e  key-word hero  i s  " s u b je c t" ,
and t e n t  u ses  th e  German word " u a te r"  n o t ^%iaoh", and th e r e ­
f o r e  le a v e s  th e  whole p o s i t io n  a s  b e fo re . I t  i s  "aw areness" 
o f ,  r a th e r  th a n  su b m iss io n  t o ,  m oral la w s. T h is m igh t seem 
a  c n n l l  m a t te r ,  b u t i n  th e  p ro ceed in g  d iL C usslon  o f  th e  
K an tian  Defenco o f Freedom I t  w i l l  become c l e a r  t h a t  Kant 
has l e f t  th e  way open to  c o n s id e ra b le  m lb u n d erü tan d ii^ ;, i f  
n o t r e a l  w eakening o f h is  e x p o t l t io n  of Freedom . However, 
h e re  and now, i t  i s  p o s s ib le  on ly  to  draw a t t e n t i o n  to  t h i s  
f a c t ,  and p a ss  on to  o th e r  a s p e c ts  o f h ii. to a c  xLng up o n  W ill .
( a ) Iho  R a tio n a l v i l l  sewrn to  be a n o th e r  terra  f o r  th o  Pure 
W ill, and can  be i d e n t i f i e d  w ith  th e  te rm , th o  " P r a c t ic a l"  
icason* Kant co n ce iv es  of i t  a s  th e  o r ig i n a l  endowment o f  
a l l  normal p e r s o n s , and i t s  a u th o r i ty  rem ains und im in lshed  
i n  s p i t e  o f  i t s  b e in g  opposed and d e fe a te d  by I n c l in a t io n ,  
l u r t l i o r ,  i t  i s  i t ire  Reason i n  I t s  p r a o t io a l  a s p o o t ,  and a l ­
though i t  canno t be used a s  an  in s tru m e n t to  f u r th e r  "know­
le d g e"  o f th e  noumenal w o rld , i t  does g lv sb  c le a r  a m  c e r t a i n  
" th in k a b i l i ty "  o f th a t  w o rld , and i s  tho  fo u n d a tio n  of th e  
m oral and r a t i o n r 1 n a tu re  o f man#
(B) The Good W ill e^ p cars  to  bo a n o th e r te rm  f o r  th e  e le c t iv e  
w i l l .  I t  b e lo n g s to  th e  w orld  of u n d e r ta n d in g ,  b u t i t s  
r o o ts  a l^ o  belong  to  th o  w orld  o f s e n s i b i l i t y .  I t  ap p ea rs  
to  be tho  o r u c ia l  p o in t  o f what m i ^ t  be term ed humaz: Proedom*
(1) Od. 80.
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I t  ifi th e  b a t t le -g ro u n d  o f thexnumeaaJL and phenomenal fo ro e e . 
I t  "knows" th e  o a teg o rio & l ii%4P e ra t lv e  o f  th e  R a tio n a l W ill ,  
and i t  "knows" th e  s p r in g s  o f I n c l in a t io n .  t e n t  i s  n e v e r 
p e r f e c t ly  e l e a r  w hether th e  e l e c t i v e  W ill b e g in s  w ith  Freedom 
o r  ends w ith  i t .  That i t ,  he  g iv e s  no p r e c i s e  g u id an ce  a s  
to  W hether th e  i^ e o t iv e  W ill s t a r t s  o f f  w ith  th e  a b i l i t y  to  
tu r n  e i t h e r  to  th e  Good o r th e  a v il*  ( th e  Freedom o f  I n d i f ­
fe re n c e )  o r W hether th e  iS lec tlv o  W ill i s  b ia s s e d  i n  fa v o u r  
o f  th e  Good o r  o f th e  S v i l .  However, th e s e  a r e  m a tte r s  
w hich o u b t r e c e iv e  a t t e n t i o n  from  th e  fo llo w in g  d is c u s s io n  
o f  th o  K antian  D efence o f  Freedom , and c&imot be r a i s e d  h e re  
i n  any p r t e i t a b l e  manner#
(C) The Holy W ill m igh t be  i d e n t i f i e d  w ith  th e  R a t io n a l  o r  
Pure W ill ,  b u t i t  i s  b e t t e r  to  keep i t ,  a s  t e n t  a p p ea rs  to  
d o , a s  e x p re ss in g  th e  N i l l  o f GOd. As a lr e a d y  s t a t e d ,  t e a t  
h in t s  a t  an  « a d le s s  p ro c e ss  o f  human e f f o r t  i n  th e  c u l t i v a ­
t i o n  o f th e  Good W il l ,  b u t  he does n o t s t a t e  i n  any c l e a r  
manner t h a t  th e  Good w i l l  e v e r  becomes th e  R oly W ill*  I t  
m igh t be  t h a t  th e  Holy W ill has t h i s  s p e c ia l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i o  
t h a t  i t  has n e v e r known th e  o p p o s it io n  o r th e  v ic to r y  o f 
In o liz ia tio tn  over i t s  e x p re s s io n , which can n o t be s a id  o f  th e  
Good W ill .
fix
(X) t e n t ' s  second c o n tr ib u t io n  to o th s  n a tu re  o f  V o l i t io n
c o n s is t s  i n  h i s  In s ls tm o co  th a t  Freedom i s  n o t  law leeg n es# .
"A lthough freedom  i s  n o t a  p ro p e r ty  o f th e  w i l l  depend­in g  on p h y s ic a l  law s: y e t  i t  i s  n o t f o r  t h a t  re a so n  law less#  on th e  c o n t r a r y ,  i t  m ust be  a  c a u s a l i ty  a c t in g  a c c o rd in g  to  im m utable la w s , b u t  o f a  p e c u l i a r .k in d ,  o th e rw ise  a  f r e e  w i l l  would be an W ss u rd ity " . '^ ^
The fo llo w in g  comments in d ic a te  th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  c o r r e c t
in t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f su ch  a  p a s s a g e .
(A) When t e n t  say s  t h a t  Freedom i s  a  C a u s a li ty  a c t in g  acco rd ­
in g  to  im m utable la w s , i t  i s  easy  to  assume th a t  t e n t  i s
(1 ) Oci. 79.
« lia  -
«akiiqt another indication of the inevitable linkage of Fi 
den end M ût R ationality vhleh, by i t s  own inherent nature 
and mode of operatiom, moot eome within the o rb it of law. 
f e t ,  there i# the ooaoealed problem raieed by adwarde in  hi# 
doctrine of "pbllceephieal" Veoeeeity which must be borne in  
mind* Imter, i t  w ill be obeeryed that Kent i s  Inclined to 
look upon the ac t of Freedom, or self-determ inatl <m, an
ac t whioh ie  epontaneome, orig inal and self-earned. ab
already obeerved, aftwarde o&taiot conceive of a human being 
anything else than a oontingent being and therefore within 
the o rb it of phileeophieal Beoeesity* That i e ,  he would 
charge Kant, In the above ewtraot, with being gu ilty  e f  gyoe# 
contradictien in  th a t he ineleted upon Freedom coming wltMn 
the realm of law, and than denying tha t i t  is  subject to  the 
very essence of law idiich is  cause uid effect* Further, he 
would in s is t  that only God can be ow>able of self-causation  
in  the manner Kant is  expounding such a  concept. adwards 
would regard Kant's admission of free w ill as operating under 
a system of "iswmitable" lams as conclusive of h is argument, 
and the insistence tha t such "imnutable lams were of a 
"peculiar" kind, he would regard as evasive i f  not begging 
of the whole question under discussion* Kant's exposition 
of ths a  p r io r i nature of cause and effect^^^mould be used 
by Hdwards to expound the nature of philosophical Receaeity 
to  expose Kant's inoonslsteat attoapt to postulate a 
se lf-causality  of a ecntingent being ûiose only grasp ef the 
a p rio ri ooosists in  postulating for su<di a cono^ t tlslver- 
s a li ty  and Reoessity*^*^
However, the main point here and now i& to observe that Kant 
repudiates a lawless Freedom, or a Freedom based upon Chance*
(1) K. p. V* B*ld# a*1C9*
(8) K* p* V* B*4*
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(B) I n  th e  above e x t r a c t ,  Kant h in t s  t h a t  Preedwa c(m & l^ts 
i n  two p o in t s .  F i r s t ,  t h a t  i t  i s  " e f f i c i e n t "  C au sa lity *  
Beoond, t h a t  I t  in d ic a te s  i t s  e f f ic ie n c y  i n  t h a t  a c t s  In d e -  
pexulenÉ^of f o r e ig n  c a u se s . B oth th e s e  a s p e c ts  o f  ?reodc#m 
w i l l  bo re p o a te d  by Kant i n  a l l  a s p e c ts  o f  h is  e x p o s i t io n ,  
and la igh t bo summed op a s  ssy ln g  th a t  freedom  i s  synsnymoas 
w ith  S e lf - d e te rm in a t io n .
(3 )  3ÊW Problem  o f T ran ecen d en ta l and m oral Freedom i n  K an t. 
D r. P k ton  r a i s e s  th e  v e ry  i n t e r e s t i n g  q u e s t io n  «A ether R a n t 's  
K th ios was b ased  on  h i s  m etaphysics  o r  nA ether h is  m etap h y sics  
w ere based  on h i#  b th i e s .^ l ^  D r, P a to n  su g g es ts  t h a t , i n  
s p i t e  o f  o c c a s io n a l l a p s e s ,  t e n t ' s  m etagA yaics a r e  b ased  on 
h i s  E th ics#  and t h i s  m ight w e ll p rove  to  be t r u e ,  b u t th s  
q u e s t io n  c o n s t i tu te s  a  fwoblem In  hit» d is c u s s io n  o f  human 
rreedom  w hich i s  w erthy  o f  a t t e n t i o n ,
ih e  problem  i s  im p o r ta n t n o t o n ly  because  o f i t s  im p lic a t io n s  
f o r  Freedom, b u t  beoaswe a o A ig u ity  upon t h i s  p o in t  m ight wsll 
weaken th e  «Aole m oral s t r u c t u r e  so  c a r e f u l ly  e re c te d  by K an t. 
I t  i s  custom ary  to  assume t h a t  th e  r e a l  and p iv o ta l  t e a t i im  
Defence o f Freedom c e n tr e s  I n  th e  M oral Law, and th e re  i s  a  
c o n s id e ra b le  body o f d o c t r in e  i n  K sat to  conclude  th a t  su ch  
an  assu m p tio n  i s  c o r r e c t  and f i n a l .  T e t ,  i t  can ao t be dsm ied 
t h a t  th e re  i& a n o th e r  a s p e c t  o f  t e n t ' s  D efence o f  Freeds# 
w hich 1# o f  g re a t  Im p o rtan ce , and w hich must re c e iv e  i t s  due 
em phasis.
PerhN^s th o  fo llow in^j a n a ly s is  w i l l  make th e  d o p th  o f  th e  
problem  c lo a r .
( a) Kant a p p ea rs  to  have th e  p e c u l i a r  and u n fo r tu n a te  b a td t  
o f d i l i g e n t l y ,  and even p a in f u l ly ,  d is c o v e r in g  a  co n cep t w hich , 
a cc o rd in g  to  th e  m easure o f  la b o u r  Izxvolved, ought to  hmv# 
im p re ss iv e  worth# th e n  i t  i t  r e le g a te d  to  a  sW bord itetS
(1 ) The C at^o rio a l lsg)eratlve. Page 855.
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position out of a l l  proportion to  i t s  coot of dloooiwy oad 
iiAorent worth. te n t 's  imropontant passion fo r tho "orA i*  
tectonic" sppsaranoe of tru th  might be a  possible explsna* 
tion  for th is  tendenoy. 31s urge to "sohsmatioo" olm ento 
of Reality i s  most eonendablsf but th is  very tid iness of 
Ms cdnd soi^timee becomes & snare. His thesis tha t there 
i s  tru th  in  organic unity i& righ t only as long as he per* 
fidtc the facts of Reality to express th e ir  d is tin c tiv e  and 
Inherent worth and not to be out dosn to f i t  into a system 
shidh might be impressive as a structure of thought but 
which borders upon the grotesque when l i t t l e  or no a tten tia#  
i s  paid to üuoh d is tin c tiv e  and Indopsmdmt worth. This 
objection to te n t 's  handling of ooaoepts w ill beoone more 
clear in  the following dit^ousslon, bu t, here amd now, i t  
fi&ist be reg istered , and perhaps made valid  under the above 
t i t l e ,
(B) te  the Preface to  the Second sd ition  of The (hritlou# 
of Pure Reason, te n t makes i t  quite clear th a t he Intends 
to keep fa i th  with h is promise to reconsider, i f  not rooem* 
s tru c t the whole basis of metaphyLioal thought, and, as 
already indioated, Freedom is a orucial element in  LUsh 
thought* He begins vUOh a disou&sion by a d istin c tio n  i a  
terms «Aioh is  important. Be argues tha t there i s  a dim* 
tin c tlc a  between "knowing" freedom, and "thinking" Pr##dsm,(l) 
and i t  is  obvious ^ la t the Whole of te n t 's  e ffo rt in  the 
above work i s  given over to proving tha t Freedem is  "thinkable" 
and not "knowable"• An adequate discussion of such terms 
would involve an entry into the ten tian  theexy of Knowledge 
vMch is  beyond the capacity of the present e ffo rt, T et, 
i t  mi^iht be observed that a lim ited appraisal of te n t 's  doe- 
tr in e  ot phencmemon and the th ii^-dnH ltself does not enscuM^e
(1) S. r, V. B, xmxr.
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the W # that th# "knowable" is  #%# m s  WWA# tWA th# >. |
. \  ':|"W nksbls". At le a s t ,  from om point ofwtsify th#  "think* C
sW s" sppssw# to  have more psmaaems «M re a l ity  than th s  
"knosahle"* HSsever, the nU a issue is  not aentredl i n  th s  
esses question of Kantian epistennlegy hut in , Shat n i j^ t  he 
termed h is  "astsphysisal" D of#es o£ nmeSSBi M S  begins
I
hy asm dng  th a t Morality présupposés freedom, t a t  he argses I'-■ith a t i t  i s  not enough to  iaCeop yrsedem from sueh a  h ss is .
For, i f  me eaaoot "think" Freedom as w ell as in fe r  i t ,  them 
th is  moral infmrinse i s  in  danger. He argues th a t morality 
does mot require th a t ws sh a ll he able to understand Fresdem, 
hut in ly  th a t th ihkah lF h ty^oald  not eontradiet i t s e l f  .(D  
fhds i s  a  w y  modest end iSiKdi Kant s e t  fa r  him self, and 
there saa he l i t t l e  dotat tha t he intm Sed keeping w ithla 
the U üdts of th i b modest p lan. However, prehlems, pestm- 
la to s  and eemoepts have a  strange isqr of greming ooder the 
d iligm st eeneentration ef samt, and th is  "th inkahiiity" ef 
'Freodma is  no emesption. Planned as a  hmttreee to  the main 
e trtto ture, th is  "trsmsoeodental" jMfeaee of Fresdem aesemed 
proportions Whioh makes i t  d if f ic u lt  to  d istinguish i t  from 
the main s tru o tu re , and there is  no detibt about te n t 's  fas* 
e iaation  with h is  seareh and re a l sa tis fao tio n  with h is die* 
eoveey# Right to the very end e f Ms difeoussion of svesden, 
th is  tr a nseemdemW, aspeot exereisee a  pomerful influemoe 
upon h is  thought#
(C) I t  i s  d i f f i e a l t , i f  not impossible, to  disoover how mttWh 
of the struoture of the le e  MstN^Aysies existed in  the mind 
#f Kant when he oemmsnoed h is  weta, crritiqne of Purq 
Sgggg#. Tet, i t  is  perfeotly  elear tha t there was, a t  learnt, 
WHS great aspeot ef th is  struoture quite evident from the 
tadW ing# %#s aspeot i s  the "spontaneity" of mind*
(1) X# r# f# B#XX3DU ,  ^ ^
^  ..■ . . . r . - .  . - . . . ■  " v  - ,  ■* . ■ . ‘ ' . '  '.' w  -  ':: ■
The feUodUig ex tract Im lmp#rW»t$ oeourrlng ee i t  does a t
•■ .t t a  early etagee of tM e g rea t mSL, «Mating to the
• t M h k e b l U t y "  O f i d e a e #
"If  the reeee tlv ity  of our m W , i t s  power of rooelvlng resw M oStstiSSn®  go fa r  ae i t  ie  in  any uiee affeotoA,
^ 4  i#  te  ta  en titled  em m ibillty , t e e n ^  mind'e powM of
r V
; producing repreem tatione from its e lf*  the spottteaeityof knowledge should be called  the uadermtwmüg The faeu lty  ****** which enablss to  th lak  the.qbjeot o f sensible in tu itio n  i s  the u n d e rs t2 # % " . (* )
la te r ,  te a t considers th is  spoatameity e f mimd wader the
te rm  of AMxrdhmsion, asproduotiom and Recegadtloo#(9) end
s t i l l  l a te r ,  he re la te s  th is  spoataneity to  i t s  h i# sS $
eategory wMoh he tease "tr&nsoendental synthesis of iaag laa
g tim " .(^ )
She purpose of the above refer mess i s  to  iad iea te  the poosihXe 
aodro# of tenths tramsomdental Dsfsme of Freedom# %t i#  
stW Ltted th a t hMe, in  th is  c ru c ia l smd cen tra l concept e f  
te n t 's  laitaphysles, th a t the roots ef th is  other view e f 
yreedom are  to he found* 2f th is  submission i s  ju s t if ie d , 
i t  becomes quite c lear shy ten t was haunted by th is  meta» \ 
pbysipal hefmc# of r rwedsm, end ucy i t  hs#mus e # e  than n  ' 
mere bu ttress to  h is  moral inferense ef r r esdsm# The above 
argumsmt i s  strengteened by the fa c t th a t, Men ten t i e  d ie -  
enceiag the Third Antinomy, he lin te  te ls  spmatanelty of mdnd 
te  tee  rreedms ef the will#
"the transcendental idea stands only fo r the eheMutespentMioity of an aeticei ***-— # But since the power e f spontaneously beginning a  series in  time is  teerSSy proved (though not m dw steod) —  and so te  a ttm *  .lu te  to  teeff^Gubstances a  power acting from freedom"* W
- jtee  shove extract i s  made with the f u l l  knowledge te a t  i t  ie
te ây  erne sepeet ef the Third Antimeey, hut i t  i s  te n t 's
bepjtiye argumeitt fo r  Freedom, exiA expresses tee  link### e f
epomtsmeity of mind and Fresdem of w ill* e f  M orse, in  th is
K # , ' particular section, tent indioatee the Inability Of met&*
X* r# 7# A*51#X# r# V# A.97*X* r# V# 0#151#X# r# ▼* i#tee# 4/:
' \  t*ti i V &
mm#% te ofimmo »Wg tM# path, wt the wm 
point i s  the linkage ef thaee tee oone^te i a  hie ergemmt# 
(B) rnmever, i t  ie  i a  the aieeueeioa e f  "tee AntiacHy e f 
Pure meaeen" th a t te n t strengthen» and deepen# th ie  liakege, 
and eeewk# w en aa «■mlyeia ef traneaendeatal Freetem te ieh  
tends to  eacaeed the nedeet end he had ee t before Wmejf*
He beglna hy obeex*viag th a t there are two typ"# of d w ea lity  
eeaW tehl## m e fwem te ta re  and the ether from feeedem* 
franeeendental, or ceemologioal Freedem he# the follmmiag 
M araeterie tiee . I t  ie  capable ef hegiming a  s ta te  epm* 
taneoasly. I t  does not eeme w der the lam of Oaneality oh* 
eereablo in  teture* I t  dee» not need to  be eteetem tiated 
by te tu re , and i t  eam et be determined by w y givea # # e r i*  
enee# tee  fo llen iag  ex tract iadioatee the d e^ e e  te  Whieh 
ten t has permitted trw #om dental preddem te  emeed mere 
"thiiWcabillty".
"Bet einoe in  th ie  # y  no abeelute to ta l i ty  ef een* dltione determining cmmeel re la tio n  can be obtained, t  reason ereatee for i t s e l f  the idea of a «pontamity. , te la h  can begin to ac t of i t s e l f ,  without reqM '^^^' to  be d e te rc^ed  to  aetion by an anteeedent oaose In  - aooordanoo with the lam of oansality".
te n t,  then goes on to eey something which reveals how ante
he has eseeeded M s orig inal pwpose, and wMoh, i f  take» a t
i t s  face yalne, would abate the foundations e f  the nsral
Struoture be seemed m  asmlom to  stren g th s»
should especiaily  be n o te d  th a t  the p rac tica l eon» sept ef Freedom is  based <m tMe traneoeodental idea# an d  te a t  in  the l a t tw  lie© th o  rëcX  o f ^ thed if f ie a l ty  by White the gaesUon.qf tee  p o ssib ility  #f freedom has always been beset" «79)
te e  Who!» eeotext ef the above extract i s  M # ly  important
to  the analyste of Transoendental Freedom, and i t  reveals
how ten t las permitted tM e conctet to  ovwteelm the lim its
White ho set fo r  i t s  Meoussion. i t  i s  tru e  th a t he eloses
the diseuseim  with tee  aesuranoe th a t he has mot imtemde#
X. r* ?* A#633. .X. r* y . A .(^ ,  ' ' - . 'Vt;
.V .: ,
m//'
■ i'
0» p90m the m a tt»  e f  rntewem, tmt tM# nodsety of #m* 
pression must not be allowed to  bXlnd the m sder to  the reM  
VSlhs ten t puts open mote sn ssgossnt* Further, although 
Rent brings in  h is moral deetrine in to  the abwve dlsotwslen 
i t  i s  flsde subordinate end oentributory to  h is other ew- 
position  of Freedom. Again, he appears to give the iwprems 
ion te a t  h is diOhotoneoe deeeripticn of noumenal Md phnamme* 
n a l is  essen tia l ont only to  h is  dsotrins of wransoeodental 
Freedom,U) but aleo to  M m l Freedom*
(s) The g reat influm oe ef te le  eonesptlon of Traaseendental 
Freeden overflows from "The Qritioue of Pure Reason" Into 
t e n t 's  isthieal works. Bis f i r s t  and perh«#s primary idea 
of Fresdem in  these works i s  te a t i t  is  a  quality  of dausality  
White is  "independent* of foreign s e n s e s . t e n t  dteoribes 
th ie  type s f  Freeden os "negative", but i t  i s  d if f ie u lt  to  
peroelve hew euoh a  Freedom can be negative in  the re a l mean­
ing #f th a t temm. Here again, te n t sppesr# to be wader- 
estimatiug the re a l value of the ossswpt, m nsosudontal 
Freodon* tewevor, he modifies th is  wnder#estimatiW When 
Ms ssys th a t a  ra tio n a l bMo^ Samot ac t exoept under the 
Idea  Of Freedom#
"Bow % esy every beiag th a t eannot ac t oscoept under the idea of freedom is  ju s t fo r th a t reason in  a  p rao tioal point of view rea lly  fre e , th a t is  to say, aH  la ss  white are Inseparably oonmsoted with f re m m  the mssm fores fo r him an i f  h is w ill had been
3 *
shows to be free  in  i t s e l f  ky a  proof theore tioa llyQoaolttsive" *X5r
Iteis I s  an argument borrowed from fraaeeendemtal Freedom, 
and indleates how te a t  was divided in  mind sn tee ^ es tiem  
of teeo re tiea l #md moral Freedom. Further, M es temt finds 
h iw e lf  in  d if f io u ltiM  upon the re la tio n  ef aed to  hussm 
Freedom, he does not take refuge in  moral freedom as standing 
efem egatest Sivlne power, but reso rts  to  th is  hmwnti% idea  
of Transoendeutal Freedom:-
a  & . - S Î :3> Od* 8I«
A#d9d#96,
o  u s * . -  %:
"lu  point of f a c t ,  i f  & m&n'e ao tim # ## belonging tel'V*’
P ê rT
3 A '\3,
hi# modifioatiooe in  time were not merMy « eâ ifiea ti« a i of him m  Mpeexanoe.^but a# a thing in  i te o lf ,  freeâb» eeuld not he saved"* d /
Of eouume, there a re  tiewe Men Kant uses with re e l fores
Î
the augment s f  msval Fveedem as against M vins Authority, 
t a t  the impsrtamt thing im th a t in  sp ite  ef a l l  Kant's re ­
peated aseuremee th a t the Traneeendeatal idea s f  Fresdsm i#  
p  mere ide^ , hs hsqps #n using i t  wihmssver  he finds himself 
in  rea l d iffiou lty*
pâm f a s t  is  M early sem  M m  Kant ie  om fronted with one
ef the m e t d if f io u lt  problems ef hi# espseition  of f r e sdem#
Be i s  disonaeiqg what might he texmsd a  hind e f "psyoholonieal"
PetûMnism* Ms ##alynis ef th ie  type of netersdnism i s
sowBd, but whsoa t a  oomes to  mahe a positive reply t s  th is
seosiderable objeotien t s  preedsm, he t akes refuge in  Trans-
seodm tal sreedom end not in  moral Free###
Spsshiag Sf tee  error s f  tho%%ht involved in  a  diw oseiq#
of in te rn a l and external Freedom, Kant says*-
"This may im ly  psyoholo^eal Freedom, ( i f  we Choose to  amply th ie  term to  a merely in tm oal chain of ideas in  tee mind), but i t  Involves physical neoeseity# and therefore leaves no room fo r transeamdental f  te ioh  must be ooaeeived ae i n l l ^ i a d ^ W m  empdrieal* and, eoaseqoently* on nature generalV t Whether i t  ie  let object of toe in te rn a l sense oomsidsred in  time only, o r ef the external in  time and spaoe* Mthowt th ie freedom (in  the la t te r  and true sense)Whioh alone i s  praetle&l a  p r io ri..n o  moral law a ta  mS moral imputation a re  possible", tn ;
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As already oboervcd, Kant's emaiyeis Of th is  ^ e  Of Deter- 
minism I s  meet valuable, but the question a r ise s , tey  Md 
he reply to i t  in  terms Tsantatedw tal FreedaoEt Of ssmsse , 
i t  s i # t  be argued th a t , in  th is  p articu la r om tex t, K#m% 
Identified  Tramseendm ta l  fstooôm M th Moral Fresdss, Md the 
M ole d ifficu lty  can be cleared up by a  oorreotioo Of terms# 
f e t ,  the d if f ic u lty  is  dsegmr than th is  propMsd so lu tic# , 
becaoee &ant here in s is ts  th a t te teou t th is  comept o f i r m s -
(1) X# p# V# r a #(2) X#p# T# JS8#
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oeridentfiJL preeaom no 'Moral Law" le  p o ss ib le . fhorofore, 
jo iifu o lo a  o f  tertie  i .  r a l t e  out &# a  pOBLlblo o x p la n a t lo a .  
Furtîàor, ho i e  eay in ^  eoiaotiUng in  tho above o x tr a a t  w h ite  
u o n i' l lc te  w ith  o th e r  e a c t io n s  o f M s to a c iiln ^  upon t2fo Moral
Law aaO Pruodom,
por instance, e a r l ie r , ho w r itos»-
"Hmco tl%o obj active r e a l ity  of tho moral lew osomot be proved by any deduction by any e ffo r ts  of theo­r e t ic a l rea^oA, teother speculatlvo or o^irie&JUly exp or ted , end therefore, evon i f  #e renounoed I ts  apodiotio oarta in ty, i t  cmMLh not be moved a p oster ior i by esperioooe, ena yet i t  i£ firedy  cotab iished of i t s e l f  \  ^1'
A ll th ie  la  i n  k eep in g  w ith  . f m t ' s  rep ea ted  in s i s t e n c e  th a t 
tho  frw m cen d en tn l id e a  o f  Preedoia la  a mere id e a  whose ob­
j e c t i v e  R e a l i ty  i e  d o u b tfu l ; and t iia t  know n o th in g  
o f tiio  s u p e r s e n s ib le  m iaop t x^eodom th rou ^ i th e  l^oral 
L a ter , he can i’in a s  t h i s
"This duty i s  founded on wmothing that ii> indwd  quite independent o f those suppositions, and i s  o f  i t s e l f  apodietioally  oerta in , namely the moral lam, and so far i t  needs no further support by the<xp#$ieel views W
fills "rational" ground for  ^^ reedom i s  further eqph&sised by
t e n t  when he e t ^ s -
"Ifow I ec^ r every boing that oam ot act except under the idea o f freedom i^ juwt for  that roai^oa ia  a prao tioal point of view rea lly  free
Butler uses th is  same a r g u m e n t a n d  there can be l i t t l e  
doubt about i t s  rea l value as a ra tional argument for Free­
dom; bnt i t  i s  only an argument white belongs to  acaem  
la ther than to laorallty. I t  loads d irec t ly  to the viMoue 
c i r o lo  which ten t c lear ly  seas a s : -
k# P* V* 163.04. 90.K. p . V. 194.K. p . V. 889.04. 81.‘tba AwOogy of RaIl«;lon. Ch.8
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"2a tee order of e ff io lea t o*m##s wo assmao oarsolvo# f«#e# l a  order tlia t ia  te# ord#r oC #nd# w# my o#a* •«tv# oorsolveo as *uX>4#ot to morhl Ism s wad w# •ftenm rd# ooaooivo omoXV#» a# iratbjoot t# tee## lo rn , taobBoe we have a ttrib u ted  to oareelve# freetem of will#"(1)
Kant i t  baaated by th is  problem. He make#, a t  le a s t, two 
major attempt# to solve i t .  (a) %r taking refuge in  tee 
poetolatioa th a t man muet be viewed from two d iffe ren t a#- 
peot#^®'; (b) lEtr trying to  explain the re la tio n  of "ra ti#
eeeeodi" t# "ra tio  oogne#e#Bdi"«(H) Yet, the problem i#  
fa r  greater than theeo explanations, and w ill be indioated 
in  the following dlecueaion of Freedom. On the way to  th i#  
v io l ou# e ire le , Kant make# an attempt to subordiaate the 
ra tiona l to  the moral native fo r Freedom by uaing an argu­
ment for the Freedom of the Will te loh  might be termed bote 
Rational and Moral#-
"To eonsider oureeXve# eui free  in  aetion and yet a#M bjeet to ce rta in  lam#, #o a# to  find a  worte «imply in  our mm pereon te ich  can eompen&ate u# for the , leas of everything th a t give# worth to our oondition".(4)
Thi# idea of "wortheldp" w ill be used by Kmt tine  a f te r
time, but he never^ give# i t  it#  required e#(ph##l# beoauee
he fee ls  i t  ie  identioal with the argument "Why we tab# an
in te re s t in  the moral law", which he think# ia  ineolWble#
Yet, the argument# can be separated, end there are time# teen
Kent make# each a  decieicn end build# hie defence on freed##
Upon purely Moral ground#.(8)
The term# @elf*#orth and self-detezm ination appear te  meen 
tee  #ame thing# Yet, in  a very rea l eenae they stead fo r 
two d iffe ren t line# of argument fo r Freedom, gelf-worth i#  
a moral valuation, end self-determ ination i# a  ra tiona l 
valuation# of eouree, i t  can be argued th a t the Moral and 
the Rational are so blended in  tee teateing of Kant that he
(1) (2d« 83#(8) dd. 86#(3) X# p# V# 107.(4) dd# 88#(6) 86# 84# 88# 88# 71. K# p . V# 184# 815#
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uses th o  ouo In p la o o  o f  the o th e r . ïh i s  î -  cruo to  a very 
-r o a t  Q x^cnt, but th e r e  mu^ t^ bo ca iofuX  l im it e .t ie n s  to th i#  
i d o n t i i i c a t i o n .  A fter  a l l ,  th e  doou t i l l  s\,w3de apart 
drom, i i  n o t opposed t o ,  moro I n t e l i l j o n o o ,  oeJm half-con tro l 
or J u lib oraU on i^ '" ' and itent aPi^eare to  j iv o  prim acy to  th e  
tOuc' W ill over even  ioaoon when he üliat t^io ta sk  of
teaooa i s  to  produce c- o i i i  t e ia n  i a  Good i n  it6CJlf#C2) 
dliQso two argum ente o i e  i l f -d o to c m iiia t iu n  a n . S e l f -worth are 
p u t by /diTit in  the io liO Y fing
( a )  à olf-C O te r m in â t!% . 'hen wo to y  wo aro f r o o ,  we 
tr a n s fe r  ourcelvao by th i^  vo ry  a s t o r t io i i  to  tho vx>rld o f
undorwtiuiühü " ( Reason). In tho act of this iironeforenoo,
\i-j a s s o r t  o u 4  u u tonocy , and t h i s  autonomy in v o lv e s  t e r a l i t y ,  
out whi.3 Z k r a llty  In v o lv e s  an Im para tivo bocaueo , a lth o u g h  
wc iiavo, by an a c t  o f  d ea een , tr a n e fe r r e d  o u rso lv ee  to  th e  
w orld of Q ad er^ tand iry , we s t i l l  b elon g  to  tlw w orld of 6en#e# 
However, th e  w orld o f  llodoR standing oo n tn in s th o  foum da tlca  
o f  th e  w orld o f  L onso, ana oonaaquan tly  o f  i t s  law s & !##, 
and a co o r d in g ly  g iv e s  th e  law  to  ay  w i l l  w hich i s  th e  law 
o f i'reedom. (^)
(b) delf-worth. -Xvory reaeon&blo boiiig viho rrwios any rea l 
use of ills  "Heason", even an immoral use (loiuiismato v l l lM n ) ,  
se ts  before himself oerta in  Idoais of conduct; and theeo 
vary id ea ls are iüpoee lb le in  the absence of a dowlro to  
poseoco them. Yet, by the strength of h is  actual passloH# 
lie does not possees theeo id ea l# . Hie Will only a v ^ u e  
'%ieli ' ,  but even th is  wish proyoe that ho can transfer him­
s e l f  in  thought, a t le a s t ,  to the v/orld of Underotending.
Me Imaglno# a t^ p^e of conduct possib le  to  him wliich ha# worth 
in  i t s e l f  not mere advantago to hie in c lin a t io n s . Thu#, ho
Qd. 12* Od* 16*(o) 6d. 88.
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aseerto hi# rea l Freadom, the Reality of & Good W ill, aad 
the authority of the moral l#*w. In  other words, hi# Freedom 
i# founded upon the O u ^ t.d ^ ToThis problem ha# been raieed in  th is  introduction 0Ê sa a t'e  
Oefenoe of freedom because Kent is  conscious of the vioioo# 
e lre le  in  white his own argument# fo r freedom and Morality 
hawQ involved him. Yet, i t  Mpear# th a t the o lro le  was
of his own making* Be is  haunted by the b e lie f  th a t he em#
estab lish  Freedom upm a foundation independent of Morality.
He speaks of the "spontaneity of Reason" (3); of the isheren t 
Causality of Heason^^^, and he gives the impression, a# 
already noted, th a t these factor# constitu te rransoendental 
Freedom white make# the acral Law possible. This eqph«#i# 
i s  tru ly  unfortunate, and, i f  i t  is  allowed to predominate, 
weskene h is Defence of Freedom as that Freedom stands con­
fronted with Determinism. Transcendental Freedom i s  a  
valuable i^upport fo r Hoval" Freedom, but i f  i t  i s  placed 
Upon an equal footing with Moral Freedom, i t  might prove f a ta l  
to the Kantian Defence of Freedom, and a l l  the endless raml- 
fioatiM * of noumenal and jteMomsBal might not save i t  from 
complete ooUm#w.
I t  i# believed tha t Kant saw th is  c learly , a t  le a s t .  In  one 
se c tim  of his exposition. ^ 6) Here, a t  l a s t ,  he cones to  
grips with the problem already diucussed. He ask# the 
question, "Row is  the oceiü douanes fa of the moral law possible? 
and ocnolndeet-
"2t 1# morality that f i r s t  discovers to  us the netiom of freedom. ———— He jW gee, therefore, that he can d# a  ce rta in  thing because he is  oansdoos that he ousta, and he recognise# th a t he 1# free  — a fac t which but for the moral law he would never have known". (5)
dd. 89.CM# 83.Qd. 88.X. P# V. 174. K. p . V. U l#
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tCUe problem ha# been raieed a t thifa stage of the Kantian 
Defence of freedom beoauee I t  ie  a major problem of Kantian 
in terp reta tion . Some thinker# have aaeuiaed that Kant taught 
the fundamental thing in  a l l  exlatence was "Pure" ;Vlll, end, 
beoauee th is  th in g -in -ite e lf  1# "Pure" w ill, i t  1# therefore 
"fr##". m  other word#, the Oaaaality of the th in g -in « it- 
s e lf  Is "Freeden^ Cauoality, and exist# in  i t s e l f  unrelated 
to a l l  "Btoral" considerations. as already s ta ted , Kant 
seys that "freedom m at be postulated as a property of the 
w ill of every ra tiona l creature". This could mean th a t 
Freedom is  established upon grounds other than the moral, and 
belongs to  man as an inherent righ t or a ttr ib u te  of h is 
noummal nature. Here, there i s  no apparent moral oonditlon# 
of Freedom, end the catégorisai imperative ha# faded into 
the background of the Jauoality of tho th ing -in« itse lf • I t  
i s  th is  view of Freedom which seems to have oospelled Kant 
to have divided emlstenee in to  in te llig ib le  and phenomenal, 
and which mmay in terpreter#  of Kmt term "metaphysical" 
wrg^pings of Freedom, and destructive of h is real contribu­
tion  to the fundamental meaning and purpose of tha t term#
Any dogmatism upon th is  major point of in terp reta tion  would 
be out of place in such an exposition of Kant as the present 
work contemplate# • However, the guidance of Stmo Fiseher 
flight be taken a t th is  stage a# a possible escape from com­
p le te  Qontradictlen in  the teateing^6m t upcm Freedom. He 
think# th a t Kant taught tha t the end of a l l  w illing is  "purity" 
of w illing, and that th is  purity  of w illing oenstitute# the 
rea l foundation of the p o ssib ility  of a "soral" world. Row, 
without t t a  existence of the "sense" world, there would be 
no sensoos antive# or appetite# operating in  mm. Therefore, 
there would be no p o ss ib ility  of "will" obtaining any moral 
meaning. However, the law# of the "sensible" world a re , by 
th e ir  very constitu tion , subordinate to the law# of Freedom,
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althonn^ thoy  n e  n o t  m  t h i s  f a c t   ^U8pen<l@d or a n n u lle d ,  
w ithout a l l  th e se  f  i  ftorg  l.n th e  "eerw'îble'» ^ r 3 d ,  th e  
"freedon" of the In te l l ig ib le  rorld would be an abstraction , 
w ith ou t nnj/ rea l, moral value. Therefore, fo r  Kant, "pure" 
Froodoia i s  tho bas le  of something mdh moro valuable, that 
i e ,  "î^oral" freedom, and th is %m#t bo won upon tho b a t t le -  
f ie ld  l i f e  ’This important matter must roooii/e attemtion 
at a la ter  stage#
(4) ihc uiatur© a ia operation of Causation. 
iOant'e ooaoeption of causality  i& one o f the most Important 
contribution# of the J r it io o l  fhllosogd^r, m û  i t  i s  isp o ss ih le  
to grasp in  any adequate manner h is Oed'enoe of Freedom with­
out jiving a tten tion  to th is  most v ita l  aspect of h is  system  
of thought# Yet, for the purpose in  hand, i t  i s  not essen­
t i a l  to attempt to trace the evolution of h is  conception of 
Jou sc lity , or even to expound, in  any exhaustive manner, th ie  
Kantian concept. The main purpose of the present d iscussion  
i s  to attempt to  rela te  Kent*# handling of th is  eonoopt to 
jâ'i^hteenth-century Determinism, and to  examine whether he 
has contributed any durable cclu tion to tho problem of Free­
dom and H ocesslty. I t  would be in teresting  and i%%^ )ortant to  
difccu&s fwant'6 re la tion  to Hume oa th is  ixaportm t eonoopt.
For thoro om  be l i t t l e  doubt about Kant being roused from 
hie. dOjjfmtic slumber by Hume'e ehallenging ex >ositioa o f  
JausM ity; and It i& in terestin g  to ind ica te  hov Kant was 
influtmccd Hume and how he d iffered from him ui>on th is  
crucial concept. These m atters, however, have been handled 
in  a m at ooEpetent manaer alroady by most ^orlous student# 
o f Kant, and Dr. O a irdd), m â  Dr, S u i n g t o  mention only 
two such fctiKlonts, appear to have covered th l i  f ie ld  of en­
quiry, %e important fa c t  ie  that both Kant ma Hozae be­
lie v ed  In the ac tu a lity  of the c .m a l procoi l  . I t  i s  true
(1) The C r itica l A ilcsop h y . 2 Vole#
(2) Kant's Treatment o f Causality*
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tha t Hume olouded euoh a  belief by a kOmWiat scep tical d ie- 
cueeion upon the actual "proof" of the causal procédé. Yet, 
as already Indicated, Hume b u ilt hie eystem of œtermlMem 
upon a rea l b e lie f la  Caueatloa. Doubts upon th ie foot were 
never f e l t  by Kent æ  the following extract indicateej-
"Ihe question ie not whether the conception of eaueation ie  M ght, useful I and, re la tiv e ly  to the whole oo#%ltion of nature, indiepeneable; fo r of th ie  Hume never har­boured a aoubt; but tee ther i t  i#  thought of a  p rio ri reason, and in  th is  manner has in tem al u t i l i ty ,  teiOh is  not lim ited to objects of exporimoo merely; on th is  subject Hume wanted information, and, as he himself t e l l s . a l w a y s  k«pt his mind optoi fo r in ­struction ,"  \1)
In the examination of the contribution of .mthony oolUne to 
the Determinism of the idLghteenth-centusy, i t  was observed 
th a t, in  sp ite  of the nûMur over-eonfidonoe of Colline in  
h is  ra tio n a lis tic  solution of the problem o£ Liberty and 
Necessity, he did expound a lystem of Determinism whioh was 
to have far-reaching results* In  h is  work "a Fhilosophioal 
Inquiry oonceming lib e rty  and Necessity" (1717), he sta ted  
that tho whole question of Liberty and Necessity could be 
se ttle d  in  a f in a l manner i f  a l l  eoholars involved In the de­
bate would answer in  a olear manner two important qiamtiane. 
Those qucfatione were (1) Does man come w ithin the universal 
system of Causation? (11) I f  so, om man, a t any point, 
break throu^;h th is  universal system of Causation?
I t  is  not too high a  tr ib u te  to pay to Collins to say tha t 
a l l  the exponents of Dete minism in  the Bighteent.i-century 
would have agreed that he had put h is finger <m the very nerve 
ocntre of Liberty and Necessity by asking these two questions* 
To confirm such a statement i t  ie  necessary only to quote 
short extracts from sdwards and Hume#
"So th a t i t  Ifc Indeed as repugnant to  reason to  supposs tliat on aot of the w ill should come into existence with­out a cause, as to tuppeee the human soul or thewhole universe should come into existence w ithw t a cause,
(1) Bio Prolegomena to Metaphysio®, (Preface)
(2) The Freedom of tlio Will. Port 2 . S ect,3,
"00 m â t N #  idW#* thftt a# the M i get bêtitekt iH iv # #  and QoâXom ta# the »#mm eweWwy, a* t ta t  in  # y  natural epera tlm »; #e I t s  Inriuonee m  the m âomtm  -  Im  ie  alae the earn, la  deterKlalag u« .to in fe r  the’ , 4'.'.'..-%! estietem e e f  «ne from that e f anether."Cl)
r -
# # #  e^tfw t# W leat#  hW <%lllz# m# te  ate t ta
\ above # e e t i w e ,  m d J ,$ .  M ill, an eapewmt o f tm iem dxdm
:'^fe: te  om e reem t #ate$ e m f lrm  t ta  i# o r ta a o e  of. each queteienct
'• '% o question whether the law of eau ea lity  oppUca ia■'- '■• " the same e tr le t  em se to  hum#  aotloae a s to  othertemomcna, ie  the celebrated ooatroverear eonoemlag the freedom of the w i l l ,  te ie h  from a t le a s t  m f a r  bate @e the time of Pelaglue, tae d iv id e d ^ th  te#■ piiilosophioal m û  the rÆ gîou c world. ' CRT
Q û llins, Bdnarde m d Am# are ia  eo#%)l#to ogreommt ( i )  th a t-
mm doe# w e e  witMm the m iver#a l eyetem o f 3au#@ti#c$ <11 )
tha t i t  i e  quite im poieib le fo r  mm, a t m y poin t, to  hrete
throOte te le  m iv erca l forctem o f caacatiOtt* IMref o r t , te# ^
.Kontim. Defenoe of Freedom mn&t a t t« © t  an omwer to  teem#' , ' f_'t a )  oruc ial mmeertimm# an# the foUomteg m alyk ie  of te n t '#  t
-r
- f
l i  ' K ; .position might be tteem m# netting fo r te  the oentra i fe a tta P ’- kC- f ' ■• '■ ', Of h ie  toaOhlBg upma thi# important faubjeot.
V'V Zn b is  '(TPitiquo of $%re R#m##n«, tea t emtel# # t e  & te te f te  
of te a t  he term# "The mtlaomy of Fure B # ta o n .\
The whole point in  teaminîng th i#  "ooefltet" w ite te  pur#
, \rSl^ ' reaeon i e ,  in  the word# o f te s t# »  *%ot fo r  the purpo## o f
: û m ip m  ^  fm te #  of m # or other # id e , t a t  o f iw c s t ig te in g
‘ whothoi tee  object of oontrovermy is  not perhaps a demcptev#
%' 'r. appoarame which emte va in ly  str ive#  to  g r a s p . "(9) , ; V
: Of h it  i llm tr o t io R e  o f  the Antinomy of ftcmm#, ÈB t e l#
question o f f reedom mû Cfansallty, and i e  termed the «telrd" d
I t  i e  here, in  te e  « A n tith e tic *  aspeot of the
Antinooy, that ten t aive# c le a r  evldenoe o f  h is  grasp o f the
- ©etermlnletio tataept of Ctasatlon. the following point# |
k. , , ta® up Kant's onalysi#  of tei#  eenoept »» that i®, g# %#
the Setermini&t# would pmt it*
j& |r  (1) te e  Treatise. 3k.2* Part 3* fasot*!»v <8) A 8yt'ten of Ingle. Bk.O* Ch.2# < . - . .K. r .  V. w m .  .
■ - " 5 / .
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(A) Freedom of w ill U  Ineonoelvable beoauee evexythlng, 
inoluding the Will of mm, ie eubjeet to  the lam  of Ceueam 
ticfif whioh ie  another name for the lam  of native.
(B) even i f  i t  meumd th a t there is  what might be termed 
a "trm#oendentel" quality  of Freedom, tha t i c ,  a  Freedom 
whioh oamot beoem e ta je e t to the lame of natu re , but a  
Freedom ehioh ha# a  power ef epontm eity and origination, 
euOh en aeem vtien doe# not eolve the mtSnooy*
(0) A "troneeendental" Freedom appears to  ralee more d i f f i -  
oultles then i t  eon aelwe. to  peetulate th i#  spontaneity 
or e rig ina tien  of an absolute "eaose* eons# very near to  
begging the whole questicai involved In Freedom and Causation. 
For the human mind cannot oonoeive of the ooncept û  Csmsa» 
Tion sKoopt under the teroL of antecedent and consequent, 
ted here i t  i s  being assumed th a t "traasoendental* Freedom 
has a  consequent without an antecedent. Further, i t  i s  
claimed th a t «transcendental** Freedom ope ra t ee within rea l 
las# of a special type of Causality. Tet, how can i t  be 
termed Causality, special or otherwise, i f  i t s  systms lack# 
one of tho essen tial terns?
(0) I f  «transeendental« Freedom is  in sis ted  upon, i t  must 
be a  type ef Freedom white work# aeoturding to  law», end the 
only knowledge white we tave of stste lam» Is  found la  expert- 
eaoe. Therefore, «transeendental" Freedom present# two 
horn# of a dilemma. Ci) I f  i t  be ae©umed th a t «transeea- 
dental" Freedom work# according to lam, even a highM type 
of lam, I t  most grant tha t the only knowledge of sudi law 
Is  found In  experttece, and therefore causation governs th is  
higher qualilqr e f  Freedom. Therefore, the problem ha# not 
been solved, hut <mly pressed fu rther back, ( i t )  I f  i t  be 
assumed th a t "tresieeendental" Freedom is  governed by lam 
quite d lffe rm t from that found In experience, then, **trans- 
cendtetal" Freedom stands opposed to the only concept of lam
available to  ths human mind, and must be defined in ters»  of
-  135 -
"lawless" Freedom, Whioh le ju&t onother term for "ChancS"' 
vJau&ality, and th is  1# a f l a t  contradiction In te rm .
(B) lAron I f  th is  dilemma can be i»olved,"tranfacondantal" 
Freodsm le  s t i l l  outside the real world of httoan cotperlenoe 
and cannot be given in  any possible perception. F inally , 
what kind of systematic and unified vlow of tho unlvomss i s  
posettlc  when a part of tho world Is  sta ted  to  bo povemsd 
by natural lorn and a part by a type of Causality which i s  
d ifferen t from natural law, and even stands opposed to 
ncitural lam, and white can be defined In  no other terms than 
a "lowlees" Freedom of Causality?
This very lim ited maalysis ef Kent's an te the tleal argumant 
of the Third Antinomy Is  valuable for ,  a t le a s t, the follow­
ing reason# *-
F ir s t , i t  ooBfizms a  previous statement upon Kant's careful 
and profound insigh t Into the gravit of the ehallm ge of 
Determinism, ten t was convinced tha t Determinism contained 
a possible explsnation  of man and the world. I t  was not 
based upon superfic ia l prejudice, or theological blindness, 
or even ex^plrlcal soeptlcism. I t  went much deeper than a l l  
those, and divided. I f  not antagonised Reason i t s e l f .  ihe 
Determinism of the dghteenth^oentury never put I ts  case fo r 
the concept of Oensallty quite as clearly  as Is done by Kant 
In the Third ABtinosy, but I t  Implied a l l  th a t r.ant has said 
under th is  t i t l e ,  and Kant has not exaggerated any of these 
logical im plieatlons•
Seoaad. the Third Antinomy indicates why Kant never entered 
upm a "refutation" of Determinism. Deteimlnlam ttood rooted 
in  pore Heason I t s e l f .  i^teroLnlsa was motapbyslcolly 
ju s tif ia b le , In that i t  poseossod as much ra tio n a lity  fo r I t s  
system ae could be u tte red  against I t .  Kant saw, with re­
markable c la r ity  of judgment, that "Pure" Reason oould not 
u tte r  a doolslve verdict upon the r iv a l elalme of Detorolnisa 
and Freedom; fo r each posses&ed so inherent "rationale" fo r
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the uyetem i t  ccme true ted. However, th is  did not meam the 
QoXlapee of aot«q2iyeioe ae u tte r ly  Incapable of offering 
guidenoe upon th ie  queetion, t a t  i t  did mean a careful lim ita - 
tion  of the ephore and operation of oetaphywical thought, 
Dotersiniem preeemted mere nationalism with an Antinceqr# 
therefore another way would have to be eo u # t In  obtaining 
a  eolutlon of lib e rty  and Heoeeeity*
Third. Kant's analysis in  the Third Antinomy reveals m other 
scMWiotlOR which stands re la ted  to hie Defence of Freedom.
I t  ie  that Freedoa, though Imeapable of national proof, i s  
also incatable e f  being over-thromn by argmeents ef Reason# 
Bei% an esmentlal part of the Antinomy of Pure aeason, i t  
shares the prestige of inherent ra tio n a lity , and cannot be 
dlsislsLed as a figment of the Ineginatlon, so fa r as mstm- 
p taslea l thought is  Involved, Freedom must always be con­
sidered as «pofaslble*, and capable of supplying a reasonable 
in te rp ré tâ t!on of l i f e  and thoutet* la te r  Kant puts th is  
oonvlotlm  in  the following terme i-
"Whfl^rvsr 1 hear tha t a  w riter of rea l a ld lity  has demonstrated away the freedom of tho humsm w ill ,I  am eager to  read the booh, Already, beforehaving opened i t ,  I  am perfectly  certa in  that he has not ju s tif ie d  any one of h is upeeiflc claims; net be­cause X believe th a t I  am in  possession of conclusive proofs of these ImpSftant propositi oms. t a t  because the transctedental c ritique  has eompi^tely ecnvinoedme th a t, as raison i s  incsaopetent to  arrive  a t affirma­tiv e  aseerticms In th ie  f ie ld ,  i t  i s  equally w ab le , indeed even le ss  able, to  establish  mas noÿoA ‘ elusion in  regard to these questions#"!*)
The above extract i s  valuable because I t  simm np an important 
aspect of Kent's speculative Defence of Freedom* Viewed 
against the Impressive background of Deterministic thought 
i t  does net seem to be of very great algnifloanee. Yet, i t  
marks a  very rea l advance In the oonoeptien of Freedom.
Of course, i t s  claims are lim ited, t a t  th is  does tS #  meam tha t 
a careful snalysls ef a l l  the implications of the Third 
Antinoiy c a lls  a  very decisive holt to the amrch of a bold
(1) K. r .  V . A.76S#
'fftiU ■ '"/ \ a . y
' ' #  '# # 1 # #  mtmWWWm. Ht W # " % t t m m  # m # #  # #  ' 
ataruotuvt t f  D#t#r«W#%lt thdtghtf Imt b# k n ttt  h# i t  t l t a t»   ^
log üià grtmWl fo t tb t  tw t^ o a  ^  t a  aittxm tiiR» t iv e t t tv i  
or gfttëom. H# t to l la t#  %o oharg# DttominiBm tilth  i r r t t iW k  
ality#  ba t h t  goTitt $ht oapmmto of tW& a ty o tm  ^  I tv t l  _ 
a  ohajfga ogalatt hi# «ocpooitioa t f  Fapt ogt m.
BemèffêTf Sm%^ » « o it mpoa thio kpooulatlvo DoTmot of Trtodiü 
i#  f a i  fm » <mpléUtd hgr tho t w e i t i o a  of ttm miUtMaUmX^ 
ttpoe t of tho # i r d  MUnoagr. ## p ietoet tormaé nith  a  
1 . «OINI g o ta litg  ititiyolo  of th# "fh tti##  t f  W #  ttoUoa» ondf
: i a  tp ito  t r  tab igo lty  #f tap««#*ioa, i t  l£. r ^ t  tha t he ha#
a#Ê#g «oiaht to  th ië  paitiolsiav asptot of hie Deftaot o t  
Fietâoa* 2h # e  m^lMgmmt of hie "Thttie» on tho fk M  
mmm tù havm th# foXIoiriag a iae t^  ( i)  S t 
I* V «ont# to hoop th le  ptrUoniopr oepoot #  m o O ia  ittthlii thor V #poQuXaii«o tphoio; ( i l )  Eo «aata to  io$e%vo fo r  a la te r  
g  r,:r ‘ lü ih  c%iti<#)0 of P iao tim l aoaooo) tho major argomoot# 
y- fo r  m  oapœ itlon @f ProoOom# ( i i i )  Eo «ante to  hoop hi# 
arguaont fo r  noo<hni opon grooaO «hiWt ho thinks i#  ooamea 
to  Freodoa aaO Dotominiam. # fo rtm a to ly *  h# eaooooOo £& 
aaao o t the## aim # sad the looWLt i*  a  very involved ooga* 
a m t « h i^ i  tahm  oo a  mol«»dooo strengthen hi# #oa#Ml 
position# hat ohioh# i f  taken in  detail# is  rook, m  tho
% mlargoment of h is  positive a rg w n t  fo r frootom# K## # ah #
en mttmpt to give a  no# Interprotatiim  of oausatlon# and$^_ 
to  as&iet sneÊK a  n#« intorprota&ion# he IW ss tho dio« 
ooosien r i th  a  referonoo to  h is  f indna ent a l  dootrino of 
"tho tM n8 * in ^ ts o lf " . fhorofore# to  ondersteM Sent*#
handling of the problen under disoossion# i t  r i l l  he n o o # s# y  
to  vie# Causation nod tho " th in g ^ d n ^ itL e lfin  isolation#
^ olthoagK in  Kant»# m W  and toa#im n th#y are intim ately ^ 
relatods. '"
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(1) îho gqooojit o f CauLAtiw.
By m tu ro l Causation Kant mean# the coenootion of one sta te  
vilth another in  tho world of phmomena# and ho le  emphatic 
that BOoh Causation i s  in f le x ib le  and m ivereal#
*' fh le  la #  le  a law of the understanding» fro* which no departure can be perm itted# and from which no appear* ance may be exempted." d )
Thle le  a type of etatem ent eiiiah is  fotmd In a l l  fozm  of 
Determlniem# but i t  would be incorrect to aosume that Kent 
la  saying the exact thing meant by the etered n ia ta. The 
operative word in  the above ex tract la  "Appeamnoe"# and Ita  
Inclusion  Indioatee Kant*# carefu l hab it of lim itin g  the 
range of h ie  d a fin ltio n e . He haa a sp ec ia l meaning fo r  the 
t&m  "Appearanee”# and th ia  aavea h i. d e fin itio n  of oauaatioa 
from granting any v ita l po int to  the n eten d n ia te . further#  
i t  ind ioa tee how deep ly Kant haa Involved hla oonoept of 
Jaueation with the concept of ''the Thlng**in<«itself'’• Kant
fee l#  there la  a aerloua defect in  the gen erally  aooepted 
view of Causation, A e  usual In terpreta tion  of causation 
p reaw ts no real "totality** of the causal sa r ia s. I t  haa
no rea l beginni ng# and can have no rea l end and purpose.
The human aeatsen can never rest .a t l .f le d  by a mere end less 
Lorles# for i t  comes from xxMd&ere# and# therefore# ends no­
where. Kent Is qu ite cenvimoed that human Reason cannot 
fin d  t ills  a sa tisfa c to ry  explanation of the causal process, 
and in fers that# «ÿiite apart from the problem of L iberty and 
Hecewsity# Heason must p ostu la te  a "spentaneous** cause to  
give real meaning to  the causal process:*
"Reason crea tes fo r  i t s e l f  the idea of a spontaneity  whl(^ can begin to  act o f i t s e l f  # w ithout roquirlng to  be determ inea to  action  by m  antecedmot cause in  accordance w ith the law of w u sa llty . "
(1) K, r .  V. A. 648.
(2) K. r . V, A. 683.
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In judging o f the toundneoL of K;uit*e argument ux>on th le  
particu lar point# i t  le  important to have In la&nd what Kant 
I t  txying to  do. Hlü mole porpo&e appears to be to Ind l- 
cato a "speculativo’* need, Inherent in  "Pare" aeason# for  
going beyond the oaosal eer ier for an or ig in a l canoe whlOh 
cannot be f  o%md w ltidn the natural oonmal prooomm i t s e l f .
He i s  QMwinoed of the need o f what he terms th is  "oaus# 
noummon" hut he is  carefu l not to allow  dogmatism upon 
th is  :)oimt to  exceed the needs of the case. Later# i t  w ill  
be neoessary to  ask what the Dotenatniwts think o f such an 
argummt# but here and now# i t  might be observed# that Kant 
i s  in ser tin g  the very th in  end of a wedge whloh# with a 
strange Iremy# though i t  night succeed in  s p lit t in g  the rook 
o f deterednist thought# a lso  rende in  twain the cosmlo un ity  
in  whloh Kant seemed so deep ly in terested . (^) However# 
th is  problem i s  too ooqp lleated for ^uch am early stage of 
Kant*s Defenee of i reedos.
He has another argument whloh i s  rooted In th is  p articu lar  
section  but vixldi is  not clven the care which i t  deserves.
In fact#  i t  is  found scattered throughout the whole o f Tho 
ontiQ oe of Pure aeasm . but i s  never pressed home with the 
required emphasis. I t  i s  an argument which tW&ee the b a ttle  
Tt}ÿxt in to  the centre of the D etem inist camp# and i f  r ig h tly  
used oould have been a source of real embarras so eat to  the 
over*confidemt C o llin s. Kant everywhere im p lies# but no«* 
where s ta te s  in  an eoeplicit monmer# that Determinism i s  
founded upon Empiricism#
I f  K m t't argument were paraphrased i t  would appear as fo llow er  
"The D eteram itts make a considerable t ir  about the ccnoeiTt 
o f Causation. This i s  quite aoderstandablo because w ithout 
i t  their whole structure would f a l l  in to ru in s. %ey in ­
s i s t  that the cmieal se r ie s  be oonceived as *univexsaland
(1) £• p . V. USé
(2) K. r . V. A#686«
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and in f le x ib le * . Zhoy w ill  peradt of no pOL^lble oxceptlen  
in  luo mttxre and operation# !%#y demand that a l l  l i f e  and 
thought bo bffOQi^t within i t s  orb it and influanoe# I do net 
(A allenge the Im p lications of th e ir  major premise# but I deny 
that they have# upon the grounds of jj^apirioism, a r igh t to  
ooh a conoept* For i t  i s  u tter ly  and com pletely iim ^ esib le  
for  i3qplrioal thought to  evolve or deduce such a concept am 
un iversal and in f le x ib le  causality# tn iv o rsa l and In fle x ib le  
Ccttuolity i&ioh# by i t s  very terms# i s  an A P riori concept# 
does not and oennot belong to  the sphere of .% ir ic a l thou ^ t#  
I t  i s  a  complete absurdity in  mdh a context# and Hun^  m e 
p erfec tly  ccnJLstent When he sa id  that he could find  no A 
Priori foundations for cau sa lity  in  h is em pirical world o f  
thought. Therefore# i f  the Determ inict# dare to  be log ica l#  
they w ill find  them selves upon the hom t of a hopeless 
dilemma, (a) I f  they deny un iversal and in fle x ib le  C ausality  
th eir  côiolo system of Dotemsinism i s  .h a tter* ); (b) I f  they 
in s is t  upcm un iversal and infleoc ib le c a u sa li^  am a founder 
tion  for th e ir  system# they assit go outside the ^ q p irlesl 
sphere o f bought fo r  a reasonable postu la tion  of th is  A 
P riori concept# They cannot have the argument both ways# 
and whichever way they choose they have ind ica ted  tha t 
saqplrical" Detem inism  does not present a oo tsslitent and 
in te l l ig ib le  view of humnn l i f e  and thought#
Thus Kant would have argued th is  partiealar Defence of Free­
dom# or# to  put the case in  h is  mm words*-
"If we thouÿ&t to  escape these toilsom e enqu iries by ssyin g that expert eoce continually  presen ts sxmsples o f tU #  reg sla r ity  smeng appearenees and so affords ebuadent opportunity o f abstraetiue the consent o f  cause# and a t the same tisw  e f  vex lfy tn  the ob jective  v a lid ity  e f  eueh a concept# we should be overlooking the fa s t  that the oons<q?t o f cause asm never a r ise  in  th is  UGsmer# I t  sn st e ith er  be grounded com p letely a  p r io r i in  the understanding# or xmn*t W en tire ly  g iven  UP as a mere phantom e f the b r a i n * " vD
(1) K. r# V. A#91*
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ïh le  action  o f Xant*e axgunant fo r  Frcadom from tho concept 
of dauvality would have rea l value ag iin et the bold and 
flip p an t "twychological" Dotemintem of jo l l in s , but I t  would 
have le e s  value aga inst z^ dwardt# if^ards was deeply an- 
debted to the m p lr lc lu a  o f Locke# and h ie DetomlBlam mi^ht 
a lso  he termed "Feyoholeglaal" to  a lim ited  degree# However, 
upon th ia concept of jauaallty# Bdwarda never f e l t  i.a tla fied  
with the Eimp&rlcal p o s itio n , and declared that the "<wneept 
#  oaw talllaf *M «w lamted In th# hw en n lad tjy 0@g". In  
Other words I Edwards escapes the home of the d ilw a a  beeonee 
h is "Psychological" Determinism is  mimed with "Theological" 
p r in c ip le s . ^igolnst BUme# the above argument e f Kisit wcmld 
have l i t t l e  or no value because Hume had alrem%r agreed with 
such an argimont# and was probably the f ir s t  peracn to  mpply 
Kent w ith the m aterials fo r  such an argument#
At th is  stage of the Kantian exposition  of : roedom# I t  i s  
nocofesary to pause In the exam ination of tho oonoept of 
JaUwatlon# and turn a tten tion  to  one of the most complicated 
concepts o f the c r it ic a l Philosophy# However# la ter#  a 
return must be made to further discussion  of Causation as 
viewed by kant# because he never rea lly  g ives up the ..tru&;lo 
to  oxtract from th is  concept a meaning Which w i l l  g ive  a 
foundation for h is  system  of ifreedom# a ra tion ale for  h is  
view of the uhiverse# and on argument which w ill  prove that 
the neten& iniste have misunderstood th is  o<mtral feature of 
th e ir  system#
(2) m# Oapcept of
On the face o f it#  i t  appears im pertinent to attoopt to d is­
cuss the concept of the th in g-in m itse lf"  under the lim ita ­
tion s of a subW&eading# For Kant d lecussee th le  concept 
throughout 'The C ritique of Pure Reason"» said the an a ly tls  
overflows in to  h is subsequent works. Yet# i t  hoe to  be d is -
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Quseed in th is  particu lar context bocauc© Kant Introduce© i t  
as an iii^^ortant element In his "transcendental ' Defence of 
vreodom, and although the following eunwary is  brief# even 
to the point of over-eiaplifioation of a l l  tho factors in ­
volved in  such a concept# i t  may serve to  provide a very 
lim ited background to  the present analysis of the Kantian 
Defence of Freedom.
There ie  l i t t l e  doubt tha t Kant considered the doctrine of 
"the th in g -ln * itse lf " to be essential to the whole of the 
C ritica l Philosophy• His d istinction  between irhenomona 
and "thlnge-in-theiabelves" pervades cver^rthl%: he write# qpon 
tho basic probloms of metaphysics# and he always turns to 
th is  doctrine as the way of escape from a l l  tho dllenaaw which 
a rise  fro* the discussion of God# Immortality and Freedom.
I t  is  d if f ic u lt to  find many passages in Kant which put forth  
the doctrine of "the th in g * in -ltse lf " in  a clear md condee 
manner. Perhaps the following extract w ill serve the im­
mediate purpose
"axtem al objects (bodies)# however# are mere (^pearanoee# and are therefore nothing but a species of my repre­sentations# the objects of which are eonothing only through these representations. Apart from t»em they are nothing. Thus external things ex ist as I  myself| end both# indeed# upon the immedlato witness of ay s e lf -  consoieosness. The only difference 1© th^at the repre­sentation of myself# as the thinking subject# belongs to inner sense only# idiilo the representations whlœ mark extended beings belong also to  outer usnse#" (1 )
Kant in s is ts  that i f  there wore no things In thec^olvos# but 
only a consciousness of phenomena# then, a l l  thou^’h t would 
be a dxearn. I t  may be a harmonious dream# but I t  would be 
invalid because I t  would be purely subjective* There can be 
l i t t l e  doubt that Kant mad# many inconsistent statements tgxm 
things 1 ■ themselves. In  many places# he declares tha t they 
ore unknown and unknowable. Yet# there are# at least# four 
positive s ta tem en ts  which can be found in  h is  analysis of
( 1 )  K. r .  V . A .3 7 1 *
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the aouosnal* (a) They are the ^uhatonoe of a l l  aeo sih llity ; 
(b ) Thay aro the uiroct oouee of phmosana; (c) They are 
basic# mû causal to a l l  experienced ^ezma icne. 
bpace and 'Hm are not "things -in-the^eelvee " ; rather the 
" th in g -in -itse lf " Is outside space and Time# yet i t  le  the 
ultimate basis of a l l  husum "e3q>erienee" which i#  w ithin 
space and Time. WThe **thing-in-lteelf** does not cone within 
the causal eeriee ef humanly conceived Jaueallty# yet i t  has 
a Jaueality a l l  i t s  own iidiich v ita l ly  affect© the caueal 
i.orie# operating in  human experience. Therefore# i t  ie  not 
juct to Kent’s teaching upw th is  cen tral concept to  ooa  ^
oeive of i t  ae completely aeparated from ;Aenomena# Time and 
space# and oocismi human'eacperienee" • Yet# there ie l i t t l e  
doubt that Kant gave ample grotnde for such a mlemderetand- 
Ing. Further# he create© the la^^roeeicn that the "thing^da- 
i ts e lf "  la  fmdamentally amre comparable to  A lll than to  Idea. 
'£he world ef scn e ib illty  eecms to be productive of Idea# hot 
the world of the nouaenal eeem© to have no eeeence or porpoee 
otxier than that of «rill. Therefore# w ill ie  fundamental to 
a l l  Kant’e eyetem. I t  eeeml to be prio r to  Idea# and e l l  
th is  ie  confirmed by KZmt’e laelstenee upon the "primacy" of 
tho P ractical Reaeon, Yet# even i f  th is  oonoluoieo le  in ­
evitable# Kant «avee hla eyatem from the icplioatione tha t 
i t  ie  an mipoaition of "wi 11-force", For hie w ill la  alwaye 
eaaentlally  moral# and ia always purified  from the grow 
and aenauoua#
The puriwae of th le ausaary la to provide the background 
against ?^ich Kant ia trying to find am were to two qu@ tiema. 
First#  what ia the rea l nature of the causal seriee? Second# 
can Freedom exiat alemgalde of thia eauaal aeriee? In other 
word## can i t  be ©aid th a t a l l  changea in the world a rise  
either from nature or from Freedom? I f  the objecta of experi­
ence are "thinga-in-thecm olvea "# then# Freedom ia  u tte r ly
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lW )aslble because the concept of Preedcm would bo within 
the caueal sorleo and would be subordinate to  nature. This 
i t  the cardinal error of a l l  DeterialiilBte. They aeeuae that 
objocte of ex p er ien ce  are « thlnge-in-theaeelvee " # tha t there 
ie n oth in g  behind# beneath and beycmd mere eoneib illty .
Human "experience" thus bocomee a closed c irc u it . Nature le  
the complete imd adequate oauae of a l l  events. # and new be­
ginnings# or fepontoneoue origination are impoeelble. Kont 
eeoB very clearly  that a former method of defending the Free­
dom paid the price of lib e rty  by mofbing a hopoleae broach in  
Jausality . This is  an impoesiblo situation# for i t  make# 
Liberty m  aspect of Chance# lawless and chaotic. The 
Dotenalnists are right in  th e ir  demand xhat Jausolity be 
miver&al and inflexible# but i t  not poseiole that Liberty 
and Hecoesity can ex ist aide by side?
'Admitting th a t in  the whole series of events there ie  nothing out natu ral neceesity# is  i t  yet possible to re ; curd one and the same event æ  being in  one asjpeet merely an effeot of nature# and in  another aspect an effect duo to freedom or i t  there between these two kinds of causality  a d irect oontradiction?"(*)
When iCant asks tWs question about man# ho on roasonablc 
grounds. fiaoreeo# when he in s is ts  that a l l  "tîiings"Oi)orate 
according to law# but man "act#" accordin: to his "conception" 
of lam. There can be no doubt about the v a lid ity  of such a  
d iv ic ln i lin e  between man and the re s t of tho universe. I t  
is  oas^ CO lino  fa u lt vdUi Kant’s division of tho  noumenal and 
tho phenomenal# th e  in to llig ib le  and th e  seneoou&. Yet# 
there can be l i t  tie  doubt concerning Kant’s valuable reminder 
that a being who i s  cot-obl© of acting according; to Principles 
is in  a very  different cat. gory from something in  Which lav  
operates without any perception.
'jJlio .KJtorminists wero never very suocesoful in roviding s  
oatii;factory explanation of :ojuion or Itodarstandii^ in  th e ir
(1) K. r .  V. A .643.
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% conviction they were xliolt
«hole ap.;oal was made to  the reasonable In l i f e  end thought# 
but they never succeeded in  treating  the fac t of :ea#m Itt 
any re a l is tic  manner. For instance# E\xm attw%;to to  tny 
th a t auason ie  the slave of the paeelone# butt hie whole «yetem 
of thought itf a refu ta tion  of such a statement# and# as Kant 
cleverly remarks,# Home ie a "dleposelonate" w riter in  p iill- 
osophy, jBdwards does not attempt to hide h is unbotsidsd 
admiration for eason# but# in  h is discussion of liotivatlon# 
be oomot make up Ms Mnd what part Is  played by Reason in  
tho choice of Motives, Kant is  making a rea l e ffo rt to 
give Reason an adequate place in bis system. Yet# he 
created many d if f ic u ltie s  for himself by granting to the 
DotenCUkists that t  :e causal series control not only things 
but man himself os a  "phenomenon",
A very lim ited analysis of Font’s exposition of lauso lity  can 
be said to  re su lt in the following observations:-
(1) There are two kinds of Causality, cne Is  observed in  
Nature and sight be said to consist of nece:^&ary suooeseisn. 2) 
The other has i t s  roots In  the nowwoal and might be termed 
dynamical Causality. I t  ie  iB ^ rta n t to observe that 2:ant 
was more emphatic than Hume in  h is analysis of natural or 
eoplrlcal Causation. Kant in sisted  upon 'Necessary" suooossloa# 
TMs eltt&ent of Necessity i s  not a re su lt of mere a&Loeiatlon# 
habit or inference. I t  i s  a law of the understanding which 
Is  Izspoeed upon the mmifold phenomena# tlms givi%  unity# 
and providing the only rea l basis fo r human "«xperlenas", 
However# Kant would grant to Hume that such "natural" Causality 
does not imply some hidden force. Rather# he is  inclined 
to reserve for the noumenal s#%ere the operation at cuch a
(1) K. r ,  V. A,745*
(2) m ing. Sant’s Treatment of Causality. p ,10S«
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dynaiaic in te rp reta tion  of Jautation. An attor;ç>t ha© bom 
made in recent JiLCuasion© upon thle difforozieo of view upon 
the nature of i^onooimnl and noumenal CaUi-ation to render 
the whole matter more cniay of In tsrp ro ta tlon  by reserving 
the term "Caueatim" to mere cuoeeesion, md to uee the term 
"Causality" fo r the dynando phase of the operation* There 
lb  £X30h to be said  fo r suoh a d ie tin o tim  in  terme more so 
in  any attempt to in te rp re t Ksnt’s teaohina upon th is  sWkjeot. 
However I Kant makes no such d istinction  in the terms# but I t  
i s  obvious tha t hiü e ffo rt to distinguish two types of 
Causality or Causation c a lls  for some so rt of distinction# as 
suggested above. Â&e very idea of two kinds of causality 
or causation appears to be re^iugnant to the concept of a 
unified world# but i f  there is  one single coui^al process 
which has two aspects or phases# then# tho idea Ik not in ­
capable of being "thought"# although# in  3:sntian terndnology# 
i t  may be incapable of being "Imown". There oon be l i t t l e  
doubt that Kant meant "Oausallty"# tha t ic# oroativo# dynacdo 
saosal process to be applied to the "thlngk-in-theoselvs#, "
This aspect of hi© teaching on th is  subject ra ises very s e r i­
ous d ifflou ltlee#  and appear» to ju s tify  Schopenhauer’s view 
tha t Kant taught nothing smre or le ss  than tho universe was 
fundaincntally "Will" or sow "Will-foroe"•
I f  JCsnt had s t r ic t ly  reserved th is  dynamio jauso lity  for 
Reason olcme# he might have saved his exponents considerable 
embarrassment# but# in  view oi' his careful and continuous in ­
s i s t  onoe upon the d lstiiw tlon  between the nowaonal and phens»» 
enal spheres# i t  la  d if f ic u lt  to see how such an ssegcmBHk 
could liove been worked out in  any consistent £xmner*
(2 ) Tlic ompivicul s e lf  seem» to belong to the sphere of 
natural lousatlon. ( l)  This sounds very slc$)le u n til an atteopt 
is  JBCdo to obtain from Idmt those aspects of the se lf  which
(1) K. r ,  V,
.  ' ^  1#? # ' %
it- ,
ii
are te  be dam n ified  m# "*%%irleal"$ I f  the pbyel<ml l e  
regarded m  "eepirieeX"# end the mental as %G%menal"# eW&
# d iv isio n  la  g td ity  o f m  w er-e lm p liflo a tlo n  W hi^ ie  ifeiBr* 
Where repudiated % Kmt. For# aeoordfng to  h is  d eo tttae i 
the m ental, fh a t is#  tho mmdefstmdlng" @e d lstlnaul^hed I
fro#  "pure" Reason# eoame wlthha the sphere o f the "eaplrieal"# 
fefh ap i # »  lü e t d lv le ie #  of ^  too epheree i s  e#pre##ed by 
eayihg m at the %o a# % #bjeet" beX oi^  to  tho nmmtmX 
ephere# md th e %o a# ^objeef* beleoge to  the phmnommei J
ephme# but m m  here the «sp eeitor e f  Kent i s  not e##m veey  
sa fe  ground. For the "%o as subj set" appears to  W ee vesy  
l i t t l e  p o s itiv e  w m tm t I f  the foU w im g # W a # t ie  t#  he 
vewLved as v ita l to the rjxattm  doctriM »* A:"?#
t >' : I
"If ^  ♦nowwm » m  m m  a thing so  i w  as i t  i s  n et m  eb jeet of our sen sib le  in tu ition #  «ad so abstract from our mode of in tu itin g  it#  th is  i s  a neuaaaon in  the n ega tive sense of the term. Bet I f  ## understand by I t  w  object of a nen-#@nsible InW itlon# #e t h e r ^  p r e sw e e e  a sp ee la l no#» e f In tuition# namely# the  in t< d leo tea l| w n #  i s  not that «hioh #e posses©# and o f Whloh we em not eeqprehsnd even the p o s s ib ility .%hls iM | 4  be in  the positive sem e of m# - 4gtons." W
i‘t
}:#mt la te r  says th is  n&vmmon la  a  merely lim iting eeneept# 
the f#@ tien e f # 1 #  i s  tn  ew # # e  p retm tlene ef eensl* 
M lity# and therofw e only ef a m #atlve w ployam t, s t i l l#  
W  W m W n# i t  i s  no w ee W m t lw  of Whe Wnd# mad th a t i t  
must be eensidered as bei%  bmmd with se n s ib ili ty . 
#etMng oan be affirmed ^  i t  as #  i t s  positive oharaote# 
sK d#t that I t  lim its  sen sib ility .^^ )
À3X thU  doss mot thro# vesy sueh lig h t upon the nature of 
the e sp ir le a l self# but i f  i t  I s  to  be assw sd th a t When the 
self#  as indicated above# I s  iso la ted  and sWb* 
traoted from the to ta l  s e l f ,  the residue o m stltu te s  the  
*em#rloal« se lf  ; them# the "empirloal" s e lf  most OSftSWy 
oovors a vast mtm of oonseiouaness.
<1) m. r .  V. B.307. . • , ^
(*) K , V. K-;.w
0-1*^,.
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Therefore# when Kant s ta te s  tha t the "qmgdrieal" s e lf  la  
(governed by natural oaumatlm# he appeare to bo tha t
the Whole area of the ob jective  ©elf 1# determlnW in  every 
d eta il by natural lam a tlon  which le  un iversal md l3^1e% ihl#§ 
and tha t on ly the "ttttoonn" s e l f  1© capable of creative#  
o r ig in a l and diytsmio C ausality. im already stated# sehepm * 
Ymxm fcwtenW  upon th is  aspect of Ksnt’o teaohtag to  in ­
vo lve Kant In an e#*e#ltlon  of sheer "W lll-force" # and evm  
i f  Bmh an in terp reta tion  ^  now enal C ausality Is  rejected  
as to ta lly  im o m iA tm t w ith the major ;>ortion of Kant’ s 
doctrine# the problem of th is  noummal C ausality I s  fa*  frem 
sa t 1 ©factory.
I t  i s  of In terest to  observe that adwm li deals u lth  a  
p o s itio n  s la ila r  to Kant’s when he 1# expounding h is system  
of Dstersinim k. He quotes one ox h is opponcnte as saying  
tùa» w f  iwW e  9 t  M tiT . oatKre «*9 hayo ihq egriag# 
o f M itloo ulta to  aa4 oaa detœrmlna themeolwm. (1)"
Of sour se# £ant never puts h is p osition  in  much tern»# but 
nhm  a l l  the terms he uses have been cleared of ambigoity 
and w tG physlcal wropgdngs# th is  i s  p rec ise ly  what !Caat I s
freedom# on the other hand# in  i t s  ooem ological meaning# i  taadermtand the power of beginning a s ta te  epontaneeuely# iuch e a w a lity  «111 not# therefore#i t s e l f  stand under another cause d a tcr isln ^ ; I t  la  time# as required by the lam of neâure," w
TMs appears to be notîîing more or lo s t  than on aseertlcn  
that mm ha© an ac tive  nature, end that he car iloe  the spring  
of action  w ithin h im self v;hlch can deterolne h im  e l f ,
îîdward® r e p l i  o© to  t h is  I n te r p r a ta t ic n  o f  FroedoB I n  th e  
f  01 lowinp mozmer : -
(1) th e  Freedem of the W ill, F t ,2 . s e c t©4,
(2) K, r. V. A.633,
W W ' ,  . .  ,.
' : ;  -  .  . ' v W /  '
A»«*‘ * W k  Matodb M# VfpcmmA WA i t  ia  W t#  ©a# ' ' '"" *
^Maibla t t  MMk #  «n " W tw  feat* i##m ra or ia  «qr»
thing without g m m t^  $m t such « for## eeomtitut## #m# 
kind #  csoi»atl«i. Th# v#z^ fac t th a t i t  I#  m  "a ttlv t*  /  
for## to  m  «xp tio lt ©tatoM it of i t s  Wwmmt CmmaHty# 
t%at i t  oouoe# isi not iwpovtontf mâ %Wr# i t  Amotion# i#  
mot i# o r tm t .  The very fac t th a t#  i#  am "active" foma# 
iadioat## i ta  cmnaality» Bm## doaXarea Bénard©# i t  la  Im  
poaaihi# t#  poatulat# am "aative" fore# a# Camaality nithamt 
grmti%% th a t i t  ewaaa withim th# o rb it of the ow aol aerie# , 
amé #u#h a  ©erie# mmt aSwiqni involve tne eeeential e iemaata# 
thee# ar# amteoantatt and oenaequent. In other no r##  # 
oame i # l l e #  am effeot# and ia  i t s e l f  a  re su lt of some p rio r 
gva### reject#  the idea th a t nay omne #am ha#Km
to  emiat of i t s e l f  * So adadts that i t  i s  quite impeasibl# 
to  tm m  the #0 0 % oamaee of a l l  «ffèota# hot he ia e is t#  th a t 
thw e amnt be m m  "eemeo" Why the e ffec t i s  nhat i t  i#  and 
not smeatMsg quite different*  Therefore# he Ohargee hi# 
oppcmant M th  tah i%  r^hag# in  w  "mcnmed" ammo# while Id# 
Whole syetam of Causation deanodi a  sure and o b l a t e  link### 
Of the camaal eerie## W ear#  #aye th a t i f  i t  i#  one# 
^fsmtod # a t  m  Emommed" came earn eniet# then# the tWLe 
iysteem tie thought of mam i s  in  mün#» Anything em  hi^pan# 
and ^  Wnd of mam and the  universe are in  ooaplet# eearu- 
WLw, mû order# system and are m p lè te ly  unthlakehle* 
In an m eeM m ttm  of the Third Antinoay# i t  mm ohecrved 
th a t Kant treated  such am ar^m m t with respect# and declared 
i t  to  he the hasia of a conflic t In  itm oa^ fet# he In­
s is te d  th a t th is via# W Cmmation had# a t  least# am# serlen# 
defect* I t  l e f t  the h a m  mind #i#% m  an#### f m a i  
sorios th idh  went baedc sad forward to  in fin itude* Bdmsrd#
■I
:A
ha# m  W #  adsgivm #* fo r  him the camcal se r ie s  were 
l#M #*nted by dod and M il  he amd#d by #d#  and: th is  i s  m
added reasam fo r  h is  hcterwdnim#*
'T' »•
.-k— ■ÿ*
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’Whom ve speak of cause and e ffec t, oatoeedent and ooneequent. fundamental and dependent, detersdning and determined# in  the f i r s t  Being, w o ie  s e lf -  ex isten t, independent, of perfect end absolute slwplio- Ity and im w tab llity , and the f i r s t  < ^ee of a l l  things I doubtless there must he less propriety in eudh represm tatione, than when we ©peak of derived dependmt heinge, # 1 0  are eompounded, ^  liab le  to  perpetual su tatlon end eueeession#" vD
Therefore, Bdwsrde cannot agree with Kant th a t the generally 
aooepted v ies of causation confronts the human mind with a 
dilemaa, and he sees no reason to postulate a "spentcneity" 
of cause in man to  escape from the dilemma presented in  the 
causal series in  nature* Wwards would be prepared to 
aooept the division of Reality and Appearwoo, of Bmmsna 
and Fhenommia, but he would include the whole of mm as 
appearance and phenomenon because he i s  a  "dependent" being 
by the very act of h is creation and the nature of h is f in i te  
constitution#
Later, i t  w ill be observed tha t idwards carries the conflic t 
into the arena of th is  supposed "absolute" humm Freedom by 
declaring th a t @od alone has Freedom in  th is  absolute sense, 
because God alone has rea l Morality. dod himself is  Deter- 
mined, but i t  i s  Doterminatioa by Bis own se lf- le g is la ted  
Moral Law. I t  is  d if f ic u lt  to  see how Kant can answer th is  
type of Moral Determination Mich i s  so sim ilar to h is  own.
I^eocnd. BOwards is  most anxious to  understand th is  postu­
la ted  ac tive , freedom-foree, in  man, and he presses h is  oppeci- 
ent to say whether ©uoh a freedom-force has bean termed "sdtive^ 
beoause of tho manifestation© of a c tiv ity , o r Whether there 
is  some resident "dormant" ac tiv ity  in  men regardless of i t s  
manifestations. In other words, is  there some "re&crvoir" 
of th is  "freedom#foroe" waiting to be turned on at the needed 
occasions, or does the occasion of Freedom create i t s  own 
activ ity? Edwards i s  sure tha t whatever reply i s  given to
(1 ) The Freedom of the W iH . F t.4 . sect.? .
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euoh on InvottigatIon such a reply w ill rovoal tho abeurdlty 
of fciuch a poctulatod active nature in mm* l or tho very 
idea of "dormant" a c tiv ity  ie  a oontrodiotion in terras, 
iXctlvlty ik active or i t  1^  non-existent* Further, a dor- 
mmt freedom-force would be without moral value* I f  the 
oocaelon fo r "freedom-willing" create© i t s  own power, uOh 
a power, which was onco non-exlstm t, oannot begin to oxict 
without a "cause", mâ th is  involves h is  opponent in  saying 
that X reedoc and i t s  inherent force are factors wltliin the 
o rb it of the causal so rlos, Wiich is  a l l  that idwarde de­
mande of Reason for oonfirnntion of hie system of Determinism.
Third* Edwards would argue th a t the postulation ef an active , 
freedoi -force in  man has l i t t l e  or nothing to do with the 
essen tia l Freedom of the w ill, fo r i t  postulates sush a force 
external to tho v illl.
Edwards attempt© to s ta te  h is case by saying that the very 
osoonce of Freedom consists in  "choice", and "choice" is  
acting according to  the preference of the adnd* Freedom of 
w ill consists in  doing k^haX is  "agreeable" to the mind.
I t  does not mean al#%^ acting Ir^Rüse, or even on what 
might bo termed "inclination"* Doing what i s  agreeable to 
the mind my be doing one’s duty, or i t  may mean following 
one’s inclinations fo r p le a ture* Huoh w ill depend upon the
char actor of the person making the particu lar choice, but i t  
is  th is  act of Jholce which constitu tes the reedom of the W ill, 
Once the ohoioe is  made there is  an end to : reedoa, because 
tho a c t, good or ev il, is  now determined by the choice* 
Therefore, to speiJt of an active "froedom-force" in  man oon- 
v(%w no meaning to iMuards. For r e a l  nativ ity  begins mA 
ends in  particu lar operations of the n i l !  througgi Jhoioe, and 
there lo always a ground, or a cause th e  i i l l  chooses one
lin e  of oonduQt ratW r than luiotlier* A permnont freedom-
fores in  man waiting to bo turned on by the R ill utxm p articu la r
_J
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o o cas lo n s  I s  m th ln k a b le  aocordiizg to  Edwards* For i t  
pootuXatOB on  a lre a d y  caatssfaoturod & tore o f F roedoa w hich h a s  
no r e a l  m oral v a lu e .  Even i f  ho w ere t o  g r a n t  th e  e m le tm o e  
o f ©uch a  v i t a l  F ree d e o -fo ro e  r e s id e n t  i n  man, ho oomnot 
exeop t o r  exclude  i t s  o p e ra t io n  from  th e  lam  o f  o a u c a tlo a , 
b ecause  to  ’t a p ’ t h i s  a lre a d y  e x le to n t  r e s e r v o i r  o f  a c t i v i t y  
th e  R i l l  would have t o  be moved by scuae ground o r  c a u s e , mod 
t h i s  a g a in  in v o lv e s  th e  W ill  i n  th e  c a u s a l m e r iw . % e  
e x is te n c e  o f ’% heer" w i l i - f o r o e  I n  mm i s  no r e a l  argum ent 
f o r  ead^ tenoe  o f  r e a l  "Freedom" i n  n an .
The Whole p o in t  o f  th e  above d is o u s s io n  i s  to  a tte m p t to  
u n d e rs ta n d  th e  d i f f e r e n t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  p u t upon d a o sn tie n  
by Kant and th e  D e to rm in is ts . Both ap p ea r to  s a y  th a t  th e  
c a u sa l p ro c e ss  i s  u n iv e r s a l  and i n f l e x i b l e ,  b u t Kant r e ­
s t r i c t s  su ch  c a u s a tio n  to  es% )irica l mm and th e  w orld  o f 
phenomena* Be i n s i s t s  upon suoh a  l i m i t a t i o n .
"m d  c o n se q u e n tly , s in c e  n a tu r a l  n a G o m e lty  i s  to  be met w ith  o n ly  in  th e  s e n s ib le  w o rld , th ik  a c t iv e  b e in g  must i n  h ie  a c t io n e  be in d ep en d en t o f ,  and f r e e  from  a l l  su ch  n e c e s s i ty .  Ho a c t io n  begime i n  thi©  a c t iv e  b e in g  i t s e l f  I b u t we may y e t  q u i te  c o r r e c t ly  s a y  t h a t  #&e a c t i v e  b e in g  o f  ^ i t s e l f  beg in s  i t s  e f f e c t s  i n  th e  s e n s ib le  w orld*" CD
The above e x t r a c t  from  Kant in d ic a te s  t h a t  th e  rev iew  o f  th e  
argum ents used  by Edwards a g a in s t  th e  p o s s ib le  e x is te n c e  o f  
a  "freed<N s-foroe" i n  man i s  n o t  b e a tin g  th e  a i r  a s  f a r  a s  
th e  K an tian  Defence o f  Freedom i s  oonoem ed. The im p o rtan t 
p a r t  of # e  above e x t r a c t  I s ,  how ever, th e  re fe re n c e  to  
" n a tu ra l  n e c e s s i ty " * Kant soys I f  " n a tu ra l  neoes© ity  " were 
th e  on ly  c a u s a l i ty  to  be met w ith  i n  th e  w o rld , th e n  Freedom 
would bo im i^ossib le*  CS) H ere , i t  i s  im p o rtan t to  o b se rv e  
t h a t  Edwards f u l l y  a g re e s  w ith  Kant* B deards had  bema oharged  
w ith  making man a  mere au tom aton , and hand ing  him o v e r to  th e  
law s of N a t u r a l  n e o e e s i ty " .  Edwards repud ia te©  uch  a ^large 
and 8aysi<*
(1 )K. r* V* A.641#
(8 ) E .r . V. A*684*
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" I t  le  Indeed a plain d ic ta te  of ooamon senae, that natural neee©city 1© wholly Inconsistent with ju s t prolee or blame . . . .  There le  no vice, fa u lt ,  or moral ev il a t o i l  In the effeot done, nor are they lAo are ttas» neoeaaitated. In any Mae worthy to be punished, hated, or in tho loaat diereepocted, on tha t aeoount#"(D
m  other vorde, i f  there i t  nothiz^ else In the world but
"natural ' Heceaaity, then x roedom is  l%x>esiblo and moral
judgments are iapeasib le. These statemanta by Kant and
Edwards w e important not only because of the agreement tdiioh
they reg ister upon one of the oentral conoopte of th e ir  con-
fllotin»^: eyctesk, bnt because of the manner in  which they seek
a way of oeoape from involving man in  mere "natlNkUl" Beoeesity.
The method of Kant i s  by an appeal to noumeoa and phsnoaeoa.
Every object has an In te l l i r ib le  and a sensuous aspect, and
N atural" Necessity has reference only to the ^eaomsnol and
the sensuous. The nouasnal and the in te llig ib le  aspects
ix>£s6 ss a Aiueality a l l  th e ir  oen. I t  i& Freedom Xiusallty,
and is  d ifferen t from "natural" Causation in  that i t  i s
original and is  wcaimcd. All th is  i s  completely repugnant
to  Edvards. uhile giving due «eight to the ra tiona l or
sp ir itu a l aspect of man, he ie  on^zle to ccxicoive of an
"uncaused" cause. Hl^ reason fo r th is  is  that he believes
tha t D ecessity" governs both God and men. There are too
types of '9eoossitar". One might be termed "Natural", md the
other They are the same in  th a t they both possess
the essen tia l features antooedent and conséquent* Yet,
they are d iffe ren t in  th a t "natural" Hoces^lty possesses force,
cow ilsion , and is  i r r e s is t ib le .  "Philo©ophioal" Necessity,
however, must never be regarded as force or compulsion* I t
i s  siqply the logical re la tion  of eubjoot and predicate.
Perhaps i t  is  be tter to  allow Edwards to put h it  case in  h is
own words I-
(1) Tho Freedom of tho i l l .  P t.4* Sect.3.
— 164 —
"Philoeosiileal 1« rea lly  nothing cl## thanthe fu l l  and fixed coxmectien between the thli%# «to­n if ied  by the etxbjeot and predicate of a p ro p œ itio i, which affirme eemethlng to  be t« je*"U )
"fhiloeophieal" Booessity oooee in to  operation in  the very 
law# of thought. For Inetance, i t  1# u tte r ly  iapo##ible for 
the hnmn mind to dmoy the exletenee of being in  or
to  poeVolate uodvereal and aheolute "nothing". Further, each 
Heeoeeity operates in  the statement# th a t two and two make 
four, or that a l l  righ t line# drawn from the centre of a e irc l#  
to the circumference are equal. He refers to  vdzat he terms 
a quality  of Neceeeity in  doing one’# duty, and also to what 
Kmt term# the hypothetical imperative, or what RdwardS term# 
the "ceneeqoential" Heceeelty* 8 e ia s le ts  tha t these as­
pects of "jiAiloe^&ical" Necessity cannot be said  to be 
" ir ré s is tib le " , that i s ,  in  the general use of th a t term.
Xn a eense they do qoœ>el assmat, but i t  i# a very d iffe ren t 
meaning from tha^ found in  "natural" Necessity. "Philosophical" 
Necessity operates in  a universal end an inflrndble manner, 
but i t  does not exempt man from moral responsib ility , fo r i t  
does not v io la te  moral standard#. This quality  of "philo- 
eophloûl" Necessity is  the highest omoept in»ich i s  available 
to human Hessen. I t  is  from suoh a quality  of Necessity 
tha t the human mind in fe rs . (1) Moral Neceseltyi (2) Natural 
Necessity. Moral Necessity might be sold to  operate "When
md^^m eio^e» # iCh h@ c ^ ^ t  % 
discharged from." (B) Natural Necessity is  tha t discem ibl# 
and obvious course of events in  %Alch the v i ta l  feature of 
Choice is  absent.
I t  1© th is  mspram ccmoept of "philosophical" Nocosslty in ­
herent in  the very texture of Mud and thought which moke# i t  
quite i% ^ # ib le  fo r Edwards to  grant the existence of any
The Freedom o f the R il l .  Pt. 1 . 6«ot«3.2 )  " • « » If Pt. 1* sect .4.
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quality  of ^auuality which hae i t s  root© l:i vdsat Kant has 
teriaed "an o rig inal ac t, ©uch can \sy i t s e l f  bring about 
m at did not ex ist before".(D
At th is  point of the dikcussion, two postions press forward 
fo r oensideratioA. F ir s t ,  did Kant maintain the concept of 
"philosophical" Necoeaity? soocnd, hae Kant boon ablo to re -  
oonoile such a oonoept with his views upon nouaonal and 
jjAensBsnal  Causality?
f i r s t , in  reply to tho former question there con be l i t t l e
doubt that the whole of the c r i t ic a l  Philosophy is  oonoemed
with the exposition and vindication of such a  oonoept, o r,
in  Kontifin language — the p o ssib ility  of A P rio ri synthetic
propositions* The foUoaing ex tract indioatee the depth
of Fhnt'e in te re s t in  such a eonoiqzt:*f
"In the synthesis of appeoranees the loanifold of repre­sentations i s  always suooessive. Now no object i s  hereby represented, since through th is  succession. Which is  common to a l l  apprehensions# nothing i s  distif%Msbed from enythlng e lse . But Immediately I  perceive o r assume th a t in  th is  suoceesicn there i s  a  re la tion  to the preoeding s ta te ,  from whloh the representsticn fsllowe in  conformity with a  ru le . I represent cometbing as an event, as something that nappeos
"From th is  there re su lts  a  twofold consequence* in  the f i r s t  place, I  cannot reverse the se rie s , placing tha t vAich happens prior to  th a t upon vhich i t  follows*And, secondly, i f  the sta te  %Alch precedes i s  posited ,th is  determinate event follows inevitably  and neoe<.©arily«*<2)
In  the above quotation tliore i s  a kind of "philo©ophioal** 
Hecofikity with \diioh Edwards would agree, but i t  would be 
hasty and inaccurate to as&ums that Kant and ;3dDards are say­
ing emsotly the same thing* Kant would in s i s t ,  and Edwards 
would probably ai:ree that such a concept is  an \ P riori con­
cept and vTunot be evolved cut o f, or doducod i rom the merely 
oB^xirical* Eduards and K^ vit would both %roo that ©uch a  
ccnoopt constituted tlic voxy form and material of a l l  think­
ing , but, here, th e ir  agreement ^ould end, and th is brings
(1) K* r .  V, A.664.
(2) K. r* V. A. 198*
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the dieoueeion to tho ©eoond question.
Gooond* hae liant boon able to roooncllo euch a ccmoopt with 
hie view upon phonooenal Jaueality? On tho ©urface, I t  would 
appear that Kant held a dootrlne of "philo©ophioal” NoceSklty 
and then went on to ropudlato i t  hie view# upon noumanal 
Oaueality* Yet, such a o r itic ie a  would be leee thm  ju s t 
to the i>o«iticsi taken up hy Kant. For he ic  caroful to  ex­
plain  the grounds for b e lief in  suoh a oonoopt whlcA might 
be tem ed "philo&<%)hiaal * Neoessity, md his oonsietenoy 
upon ttiis subject i s  oomuendable#
Tho following extract indicates Kant*© partioulor in te rp re ta ­
tion of the oonoept under discussion -
" It therefore follows that the c rite rio n  of necessity l ie s  sdMy in  the law of possible exx>ericnce, the law that everything Which happens Hi determined a p rio ri through i t s  oouoe In the (fie ld  of) appsarsAce# We thu© mow the necessity only ef those effec ts in  nature the oauees of which are given to us, and the character of necessity in  exietcmce extends no further than 'Uie f ie ld  of ->osslble experience, and even in  th is f ie ld  i s  not applicable to the existence of things as eubstanoee, since substances can never be viewed as e% )irical e ffec ts .# . . . . . .  Necessity conoema only the re la tions of appea»# anoes In  ceaf om lty  with the d^nsMoal law of causality  and the p o ssib ility  grounded upon i t  df inferring  a  p rio ri from a given existence (a cause) to  another exittence.(the s f fe c t) .W
Therefore, Kant*6 reply to Edwards concomLig the concept of 
"philoeopiiioal" Necessity might be paraphrased m follows t -  
'»! agree with the argument th a t the concept of philosophical 
Necessity atands rooted la  the very texture of human thought. 
Purthor, I agree i t  1© not a product of more eni>iriciem.
For, by Ite  very nature and operation, i t  ie  A P rio ri. How­
ever, i t s  value and use a© a m8 t%)hy&lcal concept must be 
clearly  defined. From such a concept i t  is  quite impossible 
to in fe r that there is  a noces&ary existence of God or the 
universe, and i t  1© oqually ixA>os£iblo to say concomlng God 
and rational beings tha t they are involved in  ©uch a Jlecosdlty*
(1 ) K. r .  V. H. 280.
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This ie  due to the fac t th a t, although the formal element In  
the oonoept ie  tru ly  A P rio ri, the m aterial olement le  
empirical, Xm other words, we woMd never be able to oon- 
firm  tudh a oonoept i f  i t  were not for the Neoeseity which 
ie  observed in  the empirical or the phenomenal. Yht, 
th le  observable Hecoeelty oennot provide adequate ground fo r 
inferring  tha t the whole of tho uni verse of being i s  governed 
by tho some quality  of Necessity. For instance, #e know 
nothing of what things are in  themselves «e comoot, there­
fo re , apply the law of Necessity to things in  thensolves. 
Necessity, a© fa r  as we know, is  the law Miioh governs 
phenomana, because i t  Is In phenomena th a t we f i r s t  become 
aoore of i t s  0 x1  ^tenoe and operation. I t  i© true tha t the 
oonoept of Neoeseity gives unity and system to the universe 
we know, and tha t i t  i s  a fundamontol concept in  the r^osel- 
b i l i ty  of a l l  human thought and emperimoe; but any extmselon 
of th is  concept to the re a lity  behind a l l  phsnomaoa i s  f u t i le  
and quite u n ju stifiab le . **
Is  th is  roply made by Sant a reply which can bo accepted as 
valid  against the argument of Edwards fo r the "universality** 
of "philosophical" H e c e s s i^  I t  is  feared tha t i t  i© quits 
lot^oseible to  give Kent the b e tte r of the argument upon th is  
important aspect of the discussion of lib e rty  and Necessity. 
There are two principal reasons fo r suOh a deoisian. These 
hwo already been hinted a t ,  but, fo r the purposes of c la r ity , 
they w ill be repeated.
Fire;^. Kant has given considerable prestige to h is srgummst 
fo r Freedom by denying to Empiricism the lawful possession 
of such a  term as "universal and in flex ib le  causation"* He 
has claimed that such a term catnot axiam from a purely 
empirioal point of view. I t  i s  "A Priori" in  orig in  and 
izplicatlom . His insistence upon th is  point ie  found in  a l l
(1) Qd. 90.
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aspects of ble system, and another Instanoe of his teaching 
upon th is  suhjeot w ill not be out of places-
"Bqpirloal universality  is  only an arb itrary  extmsion of a v a lid ity  holding in  most oases to one which holds in  a l l  When, on the other hand# s t r ic t  uni-VO rea lity  i s  essen tial to  a judgment, th is  indicates a special source of knowledge, namely, a facu lty  of a  p rio ri knowledge, Necessity and s t r i c t  universality  are thus sure c r i te r ia  of a  p rio ri knowledge, and in ­separable from one mother#"!*)
th is  is  a type of "phllosophieal" Necessity M i oh has bwn 
used by Edwards to deny the p o ss ib ility  of an "tlocsused" 
cause in  nature and in  man. the question i s  whether Kant 
i s  ju s tif ie d  in  giving so anch i%)ortance to the term "m l-  
v e rsa lity "# md then deliberately  emptying i t  o£ real asming 
by saying M at i t  has application only to  "the f ie ld  of 
eppearmoes"? I t  is  i#josgible to enter in to  a l l  the aspects 
of th is  fundamental problem of Kantian in te rp reta tion , and, 
a t the risk  of sonm amomt of dogmstlam, i t  must be sta ted  
that Kant has not given s  durable reply to Deterzdnius upm 
th is  particu lar aspect of i t s  system» I t  does not seon 
enou^^ to say that the concept of "Necessity" cannot a rise  
from the Empirical, and th m  say that th is  same concept must 
apply only to the a^xlrioal. I t  does not seem mough to  say 
tha t Necessity, such as i s  sta ted  in  the above ex trac t, i s  
applicable only to the f ie ld  of «cperienoe, because i t  seems 
to demsnd that i t  sha ll govern every "possible** experience of 
every ra tiona l being*
esQoa^* Kant mkm I t  abundantly e iear in  a l l  h is  exposition 
of Freedom th a t i t  i s  i s ^ s s lb le  to conceive of a "lawless" 
Freedom, The negative aspect of such Freedom is  tha t i t  i s  
independent or empirical eonditione, but the ix»sitive aspect 
i s  tha t i t  f u l f i l s  the demands of the Moral Law, such a lav  
may be"tremscendental", or i t  may be conceived as the prodwt
(1 ) K» r# ?# B,4,
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of the r>r»Qtlcal Reason, end be seXf-iepoeed* However, the'iFIjqportunt point i s  th a t/ie  Lav, and the question i s  whether 
i t  I s  possible to oonceiwe a£ any hlad of law without eons 
eel wing of Neoestlty os involves in  the very concept ef Lvv7 
I t  i s  not enough to  say that the nouaenal Is  olsnSsS In  com­
p le te  mystery, and th a t the hnmm mind i s  lim ites to the realm 
of the phanoBMnal. Kant say# these th ings, but he also 
gives expression to an opposite point of vie#. I t  is  no 
ommvor to the above question to say tha t the concept e f  
Necessity belong only to  the phsnommmal, fo r Kant has aXvmây 
sta ted  tha t the phenemvsnl by i t s e l f  eon give no valid  ground 
fo r the oonoept of Neeessity.
Nloolas BerOÿasv has seen thi© problem involved in  Freedom
and lent, and i s  obviously d issa tis fied  with the —wisr in
whidh Kant has l e f t  the problem# Berdyaev takes a plunge
which i s  the logioal opposite of a Lawful" Freedom by sayingi-
"Freedom is  rooted in  nothing, in  baselessness, in  non-being . . . Freedom i s  without fom datipn; i t  i s  not determined by being nor hem ef it#** W
This is  in  f l a t  opposition to  a l l  th a t Kant taught upon Freedom, 
but i t  has the merit of being logical in  tha t i t  sees tha t a  
Freedom M IM  works according to lams, even laws of i t s  own 
mahingf cannot escape the net of some measure ef Neeessity.
Kent in s is ta  upon a  "Lawful" Freedom. He attempts to  say 
tha t suoh Freedom operates upon a  d iffe ren t level from that 
of mere 'natu ral" Necessity. Further, tha t I t  has a spon­
taneous power of causality . i l l  th is  can be granted, bu t, 
as long os Kant in s is ts  upon Freedom being subject to law, he
oaBnet deny th a t, even in  Freedom, there oust be oomsUnd of hasNeoQoeity suoh as/been indicated by Edwards. to  oonfomd 
th is  with mere ply©leal or xntural Necessity i s  to beg the 
whole of the arguments advanesd by R^dvords.
(1 ) slavery and Freedom, page TO#
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Is  thle the fu l l  md f in a l verdiet %>cn Kant’e Defence of 
Freedom o© that Defmoe etand© related  to  caueatlon? Hoe 
Kant fa iled  oeepletely in  hie a tteep t to give an adequate 
reply to  DeterMnlem? That ie ,  ae that reply atande re la ted  
to Causation, and ae that reply ie  directed against the 
"Theelogiaal" Oeterndniea euM ae that expomded hy I9dvardg7 
Prom the foot# Mddh are available in  the preeeedlng die- 
eueeien, thl© would appear to  be the oaee. To make clear 
beyond any reaeonable ©hndow of doubt tha t th is  ia  the ease, 
a brief ©oHKirgr of the aagwasnt w ill not be out of plaoe*
(A) Kant *6 f i r e t  argument for Freedom in  thiw p articu la r 
eeetlen^^  ^ i e  tha t the very nature of the eauaal proeeee de­
mands that every effee t must hare a oauee, and th a t th is  oauee 
must in  i t s e l f  be an effect of eoma ether eauae. New, eayw 
Kant, th ic  invelvee the Reason in  a hepelees task of going 
book through an endless ohain of eaneee and e ffec ts , and 
never coming to the end of tho chain# Therefore, Reason 
create# fo r i t s e l f  the idea of a spontaneity Which can act 
of i t s e l f  without requiring to be detemined to action by 
on anteoedemt cause In aocordanee with the law of Causali^# 
This argument i«>peare to Kant to be unan©worahle, not so nooh 
as a :>o©ltive factor in Freedom, but ae a refu tation  of the 
argument by the De termini ©ts that natural Causation cm  ex­
p la in  everythin# This argument ie  of real value, but 
against Edwards' position i t  is  useless. por Edwards would 
h ea rtily  agree with Kant in  exploding "natural" Determinism, 
because such a destruction would moke more clear the worth ef 
his "theological" Determinism. There is  no sndlest chain 
of Causation fo r Edwards. The causal se ries begin end w ill 
end in  God; and therefw o, Kant's postulation of a "spon­
taneity  which begins to act of I ts e lf"  i s  only another 
for dod.
(1 ) Dee K. r .  V. Â.532 to
•T-.fi" r  I #  . '  \  • •^- 9 s ^  % ■
. W w '  r
Kant is  p«rfeoUy flowre ef the tXxmÿêi^oi nheoXogiee&** 
position , mod takes a great Seal e f  ease, in  a  la te r  s e e tim , 
te  provide w  answer. I t  ie  W eesib le  to  t e l  MM th is  
re i4 y a t Mi© stase# W t i t  i s  m o « #  to  amy tha t hardly m y 
th e # s # te  Of the present dgy t e l d  grant the im lid ity  #f 
th# reply offered by Kant#
m tefore# an VA» f ira t argmaat# meat ia  fw  f t e  te te te g #  
<$) 9te se e te  aigB»te te d  by t e t  is  his wellessm # #  
vieiw  of eaieteass into xmssanal and phmenmal# yreedam, 
in this seas# ie a p&m "trw aom tetal" idea, Vhioh, $m Me 
f irs t plaoe, oontains nothing borrowed from experimoe, md 
# i # ,  seoendly# refers to an ehjeet Mat emast he deter- |  
fldnsd Or given in mperimoe# naosM t e  hem said a l- 4 
t te y  to indioat# that this division ef eaistmes Into 
netmmal md phsnenmal  is  an ementlai part of the teaming 
#f te d , hat i ts  vales as m  srpm nt for r r s e te  vests te n  |  
the mrnma^Um that eMstmee can he divided in this mnnev# 
iA; Hardly my aerious md synpathetio ©tudmt of im t would
WMV$ *—  * divlstff) w U tt by %mt. or* WW flilzdet i t  R 
is  a  tolmatde theory t e n  oarefully smmdsd by stesqem # 
M # # t#  hr# sm s P is te r  thânhs Mot i t  invelves th m te
in a hopeless oontmdiotim. Peteps Dr# im lsm  might
he quoted as putting the xigot emphasis wpm a t e  m  argmmt*#
"SO far as I see, the doetrln# of trsnsemdmMl f res­t e  has hem no gain in my way. m  Mnt holds i t ,  the omoept of the horn tmamm  as a souse of phsmsmmm, and t t e  too of the same phenomma that me smussd by >. natural soaditims, is  neither thtnkable nm even son-' L siatm t with his &m fundamsdal notions#"
#e this as i t  my# the M ite # s# e te  #  a imsmel md phs- 
nommai would he sss^ted by mterds m & feasihle esplma# 
t t e  ef the d ite lm  ef mistmse into t e r i t  md m iter, and 
Whish he would aooept in its  hrood outline as a refutatim  ef
(1) the Oritieal ÎMlseepî^# Vol#8.
(g ) 1  WLtique e f  Kmt# Fag# !##«
(3) m n t , His u t û  and m ette# » ,. Fag# ddo#
^  U 2  ^
«SmtuaroX** Determtnl&m eaqpoimded by co lH w , Kam# m â Hum# 
a»mveT} a# already indicated, Edward» would view Kant»» 
*aakoe*a&lan#eG* of the nouraonol ae a c lear indication that 
hie argaaent had very r ig id  lim ltatione, m& m incom lfttent 
with Kant»c view that man mm a ••cauee noumsncn**. Becauee, 
according to  Kant's own mtatement^ "oaneallty" can bo ooo* 
ooivad only in  th a t ophoro which 1 » capable of «cpXanation# 
The fa llacy  of a t t iw tln g  to explain the icnown the unhaoun 
mm too WGll-tnown to Edworde to  allow KmX too mwh c red it 
fo r Ite  uee# Purtber# the poetulation of Jaueality , whether 
in  the noumeool or phenomemal, om be done mily upcm the 
aeeun^tlon that such Ckumality Involve# cauee m6 effect#
#\n UDoaueed cane# mi^^t bo postulated In apeaking about @ed, 
but having once poetulated it*  i t  cannot be postulated a 
second time in men; for tZion i t  loses I ts  ^mrpose in  being 
postulated of (3oc. Kant seem, to want the argument both 
ways #(1 )
<C) Kant's th ird  argument fo r Freedom in  the gectiom under 
dlsoussion i s  based upon the two preceodi%^ argiuriinte* and 
le  exproeeed in  these tosmet«
'fhero i s  in  man a pm?cr of self«"detcrminati m , inde* , . pottdently of any coercion through seoeuouo liB^ulses'*#vâ/
This Is  what Kant terms i reo&m in  the "practical ' sense* but 
he provokes a great deal of uncertainty in  hli^ reader by 
amserti% that "practical" yreodom is  based on the "traasoeti* 
dental" idea. This problem has already received attention# 
The main point is  tha t Kant claims for man a immr of se lf*  
déterminât ion regardless of sensuous impulses* This i s  an 
Impressive claim, and one which is  f la t ly  opixjsea to the 
Determinism of Edwards# Can i t  be said  that Kant has sub* 
s tan tia ted  ^uch a claim? The former arguments upon imich i t  
rested have been &ily weighed and found wanting# Is  there
(I )  K. p . V. aea. s .  r .  v . a .89B,
(8) K. X .  V. A.8M.
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anything in  the ahoy# argument which can he allowed in  i t e  
own right?
The trouble rea lly  s ta r ts  When Kmt hegina to mtplaln the 
above argusMBtty and th is  explanation occupiea the greater 
p art of "%» Oritioue of the Praatioal Heaeon". therefore y 
only a very l i a i  ted and pexhape dogmatic statement eeei be 
made hore, hut the following might he enough to indleate i t s  
inherent weakness.
What does Kant msw by th is "powor" in  man fo r «elf*deter* 
idnatlon? the obvious miMor is  the "fill*». However* i# a t 
does Kant mean by the tom"Will"9 His works abound in  terms 
such as the "Good" Will* the "Rational" Will* the "Pure" w ill, 
tho**Froo« Willy and the "KleaUve" will# the d if f ic u lty  of 
understanding Kant*s Gonoeption of the vo litional process i s  
not helped by the fac t th a t he always g lv ^  the impression 
that "Will" i s  the very core of persoaality . Therefore* the 
reader obtains the impression that the s e lf  i s  d istribn ted  
over a wide range of personal en titles#  For i t  is  obvious 
that* although tho "Bational" Will n l ^ t  be Iden tified  with 
the "Pure" Will* the "Qood" Will i s  something d ifferen t from 
these* and i t  i s  not eaay to  conclude that the "Good" Will 
and the "Elective" Will are always one and the same* S till*  
when a l l  these d iff ic u ltie s  hssve been solved* the reader has 
to make room for the "Bad" Will among hi& en tities»
However* in  the section under dlseuesion, Kant Is ^peaking 
of the "Elective" f i l l  (fillkuhr)*  and th is  is  veay helpful 
to the understanding of h is  point of view. For la  a la te r  
analysis of th is  some term* Kant puts fo rth  the following 
explanation*" (1) Xhe"Blectivo" Will seem to be another term 
for the Appetitive" faculty , and th is  faculty  i s  doim or 
jj^rbeayina as we p lease . (g> The "Elective" w ill can be 
determined by Pure Reason, then* i t  i s  teaased % e e "  M ectiv# 
Will* (3) The "Elective Will can be affected by Impulse* but 
not determine^ by tWm^ (4) Freedom of the "Bleotive" w ill i s
I*  1 6 4  -
i t s  indspesdsnes of detorszinatien by impulse (negative), md 
(po. tiv e ) i t#  dstsrminatiOG by Pure Reason# (l)  Yliat i s ,  the 
"Ebral" la» of Pure Tieason. All Ih ls mdgbt bo highly ow»*> 
p licated , bet i t  essen tial te the mderstanding of Kant's 
point of view# TM critlotcm  of ^dwarac would be in  the 
followl%% te m it»  (1) Kant le unable to msJ» up h is «lad upon 
tho rea l centre of per&cnallty "Will"* Ho has eempli"" 
eated the discussion of Freedom by breaking %) the ^ i l l  in to  
various e n ti t ie s ,  mà th is  Is  dtee to his eontos^it of psyeho- 
log ical investigations (2 ) The "H ective" W ill i s  affeote|d 
by sensuous I t ^ l s e a ,  therefore, i f  language is  to have any 
meaning a t a l l ,  the "TSlective" t i l l  am ho "influeased" by 
sensuous impulses# To say that i t  can be determined only 
by Puro Reason i t  to beg the whole question of the Freedom 
of the Will# This is  but a new version of the old erro r 
th a t the determination of tho i.iH  come# from the lo s t d ic ta te  
of the imderetanding. From a peyohologlaal ;X»int of view* 
th is in ii#oso ib l3 , bcoauec the actions of nan aro re a l aotiena, 
and they are not aii’saye good and ra tio n a lj (3) I f  the "alee- 
tlvo" Will i s  only ■‘Free" i t  is  determined by Pure Reason, 
then, there is  no rea l ^roimd fo r Kant SiWaking about a  "Bad" 
w ill, becaxme Praise end Blosw must re s t upon a real "Choice" 
between Qood and Evil* and the **Elcctive" w ill, in  sp ite  of 
i t s  name, E%)pears to  have no Luch choice* (4) Bosldes a l l  
th is ,  whiShever way Kant moves he cannot evade or ignore the 
problem created by the ^'Indifference" of the w ill, by 
the postulation of an "i-üLective" Will between iea#cn end sc tio a , 
he hue opmed himself to a hcpelesL ailomma in  th is  directive» 
Much more eould be sold in  critic ism  of Kant»o point of view, 
but euoh critic ism  must await a la te r  disuussim# Hnough has 
boon said to Indicate tha t Kant's position i s  fa r  from strong* 
Yet, Hiere i s  another argument, in  the section m éer ooasiderm-
(1 ) M* d# 6* IB*
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tl<m, which must receive a tten tio n , and I t  l e  mterto&ate 
that Kant d id  not make th lt  argument primary and ftedam ental 
to hit, )Oültlon, I t  1» tho "BOral" argument for Freedom» 
Lator, i t  w i l l  be neooeeary to dluouss Font's QxtmëtVÊ^ aigÊ^  
lamta for aoral Freedom. Here, i t  must bo said , im a ra ther 
âü ^ ^ tîo  manner, that only the Moral ar im ent fo r  Freedom 
saves San t's Defemoe of Freedom from co&pleta oo llap ee. I t  
i s  put In these worflei-
"But although we believe that the ration Is  Sam d eter-
gard ruAsem as a eauee th a t Irreepeotlve of aU  theoîmvo^oentloned «qplrioal eendltim e oould ham deter­mined, and ought to  have determined, the agent to  acto th om ise."
IIOTO i s  th o  vory  c i t a d e l  o f  r e a l  Freedom amd r o o l a o r a l ity #
This iü the fo r tress aiEizmt which a l l  tho assa u lts o f P eter- 
ndnlsQ beat in  va in . Edaards w ill use the vvoapan# o f orig­
in a l ü in , a eo ess ita ted  :% llnest, M vlne 'leoxee, and prepm - 
derating tendmioy, but thay oaonot r ea lly  cancel out th is  
v ita l a sser tlw i. Kant i s  not always lo y a l to  th is great fa s t .  
At tim es, ho i s  oonvlnoed that he can buHd^anral"FreeAsm 
upon the f  ow datlon of "trsnsoendeatal ' rreedem —  "WLthoat 
th is  ( tromi cendental ) freedom # lc h  alone la  p ra c tica l a  
p r io r i, no moral lam and no moral im putation arc p o ss ib le .
Yet, h is rea l ea^ tosis li. directed  to the norol Toum^atics* 
of Freedom, and I t  i s  here that he i s  g iv in g the only reply 
p ossib le  to "natural" or "theological" Dcterminiom» I t  1# 
when tant nakee th lo  moral fac t the bed-rock of h is temetrfng 
that he can turn to the task of buttress 1%  h is work by #, 
d lscucoion on ca u sa lity , or postu la ting the noumenal and the 
phemwaenal, or matUjig d istin c tio n s w ith in  tlw v o litien a l pro- 
ooss. A ll those aro ju s t if ie d  as p ostu la tio n s, and as attempts 
to account fo r  the primary fa c t of moral ju d # w t. when want
(1 ) X. r .  V» A.«6 6 .
(2) K. p. V.
-  1## #
la  a t Ma beat, th is  la  abat he and I t  le  beowee
be eaya tb la  tb a t b is DefeoM «T Freedom baa oontinuiag value* 
TMs approach te  Kamt'a bmdling of V olition, Freedom mà 
Oaueation la  oomfeatedly fa r  from adequate, but i t  doee liw 
diomte eeme of the major problem# vbieb are ibkmrent in  any 
eeriou# dicotuitioa of Mberty mad beoeesity. puttbev, i t  
appear# to ju s t ify  tbe ctatement tha t Kant widereteod the 
depth of the ohallenge offered by Dete»aUii«m to any erpooltien 
of Freedom# Again, the preeeeftlmg e # e # i t im  of the Kantian 
Pefenoe of Freedom 1# but a  vezy lim ited aeeeunt o f Vhat Kant 
baa to  oay upon ouch a matter* end oaro must be taken to eb- 
eerve vhat Kent be# in  adnd in , adwt adgbt be tam ed, tM e 
"epeoulative" aspect of b i t  Defenoe of Freedom. There are, 
a t  loee t, two hasty verdict# ebieb moot be avoided in  mumming 
UP What Kant aa mo fa r  aooompli^bed. FI r e t ,  I t  would be 
unrime to  diaaiee tbi# metapbymieal aepeet of Freedem am quite 
immoeeeeary to any Defenoe of Freedom, more so, to Kant'e 
&m Defenoe# eeoond, i t  would be umeiee to aemume th a t Bmt 
ha# euffared a major defeat in  M# Defence of Freedom beoauee 
of hi# in a b ili ty  to r id  ble oonoeptlcn# of w ill, Freedom and 
Cwmaticn from ambiguity mA unoertminty. Kmt ba# a very 
c lear and lim ited objective in  view m be arnvee for th ia  
"metapbyeioal" oonteart of Freedom. Re uagrer-
"The reader ehould be careful to observe that in  what he# bema «aid our Intentiem ha# m t been to  eetabUeb the re a l ity  of freedom a# one of the facu lties  WMoh eonta&a theeaW # of the i^pearamoe# of our eeneible world**..*#I t  has not even been our in tention to prove the pemmi- M&ÜK of freedom, *##., what we hove alone bean iSüti to aSamf and what wa have been ooneemed to  ehow# ie  thmt th is  antinomy rest# on a beer illumion, and tha t aaneallty  through freedom is  a t leoet not incoi#atib le with nature."-  (8 )
In  a vary rool eexu e^ i t  oan be «aid th a t the whole o f "the 
^ it io u e  of Pure iieoeco" i«  an attempt to  ehow that Freedom 
1# not Inco&patlble w ith nature* and on ly a bold and bigoted
i
U ) <M. 18. 16. 87. at.
K . p .  V . M O . 1 6 8 . 1 6 4 . 8 0 1 . 2 1 6 . 8 8 5 .
( 8 )  K . X ,  V . A .S 0 8 .
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Determlnist could say th a t Kant had fa ile d  In such a tack* 
In  other words, I f  Kant's auoceas, so f a r ,  i s  s t r ic t ly  
lim ited, i t  is  because doHberatoly he sets himself a lim i­
ted objective* l e t ,  i f  he has succeeded in  th is  very lim i­
ted  task, he has succeeded in  what he most doeired to dei— 
"the removal of the objections of those who pretend to have 
seen deeper into the nature of thinge, and thereupon boldly 
declare Freedom impomilblo*'*^^^
( I )  Qd. 06.
m a  kahtxàb tM Fm œ  o? wvmrsM
j  n K t  T M n F i v i s
% e # ^  md the Xn^fferew# of tim  wg*"
i
" I t  is  a rad ical mistake to  regard a person 'l mrm fu l­filment of value as morality. From th is  mistake spring a host of fzmdamontal e rro rs . The greate&.t aonfoarmlty to  values would be precisely %diere there was the le a s t freedom, namely idiere there was eomplete determination by the w ino ip le . And precisely in  tha t case there would be le a s t morality. Only on the part of a free  being, a being who, when oonfrcxited by the value could do otherwl&e, ic  conformity to value morcmty . # * # » # # # # * *
"The w ill i s  not as i t  cm ^t to be, a t le a s t never ce#~ p le td y  so. Nere a l l  vdULticn determined by the t t s ^ t ,  mm would be perfec t, and the ao tu a lisa tim  of the moral claim would be behind him instead of in  fron t of him. Precisely because th is  is  not so, th is  ac tu a lity , the positive ex iitm ce  of the ought, i s  a problem fo r him."
(H artam m » R th ic s .  vol.3 . P ag es, 106 m d  1 8 4 .;
"This t,uspending of v o litio n , i f  there be prcpm^Xy any such thing, i s  I ts e l f  an act of v o litio n . I f  the nUid determinee to suspend i t s  a c t, i t  determlnee i t  volan- ta r i ly t  i t  chooses, on some consideration, to suspend i t .  And thi^a ^M ce  or deteradnation is  an ac t of the will* and indeed i t  i s  ..qppeeed to  be to in  the very hypothesis* fo r i t  i s  kuppoeed tha t the lib e rty  of the w ill consist# in  i t s  power to do th i  ,  end ^ a t  i t s  doing i t  is  the very thing wherein the wU.1 exercises i t s  lib e rty . But how can the w ill exercise l ib e r ty  in  i t ,  i f  i t  oe not an act of the w ill?  The lib e rty  of the w ill i s  not exercised in  mythlng but what tho w ill ^>ee."
(Jonathan Edwards, The Freedom of the w ill. Part 2.seo t.7 . )
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Thm "Xnâiffereaae" of the #111 1# one of the oost oruolal 
problem# in  any dlLoueelm of lib e rty  and Beoeeelty, The 
expounte of OcterssLnlem have no hesita tion  in  deolarlng th a t 
a l l  the argument* fo r the Freedom of the #111, #hioh etand 
opposed to th e ir  &y«.tem, are argument* ehloh are based upon 
tbe <^tndifferenoe "of the W ill, m  other morde, they contend 
th a t the logical oppeeite of a "neeeeeary" ac t of the <¥111 
ie  the "indifferent" met of the W ill. That i s ,  i f  the w ill 
ic  not "determined" to  action by eome oaueet, then, i t*  action 
ie  "ind ifferen t" , mû ixmtead of exproi^eing Freedom of the 
agent, i t  etande rooted in  "un*freedom", ehloh ie  motiveleee, 
pnrpo*elo*e Indifference. Pexhap* th i#  term "indlfferenee" 
of the Will i* not the most fo rtm ate  term idiidi oould be 
Qhoeen to erpreee the oontention of the Detem lniet#. What 
they have in  mind i*  «one kind ef "neutrality" ehioh ie  
aappoeed to ex iet in  the ..e lf, mod in  the Will p rio r to #om# 
deeieive ac t of the W ill. For them, the w ill i&^ moved to  
action in  a neeeosary mmner, that i« , i t  follow* the pre­
vailing  preference the mind. They cannot conceive of 
"freedom" betmean the preference of the Mad and the ac t of 
Volition. Farther, they argue th a t a l l  oppoeing theoriee 
of the Freedom of the Will demand bWh a pauee in  whidi the 
Will can come to  i t e  oma decision ooncertxlng the ac t which 
ie  to be performed. The DetersdLniete in s is t  th a t a l l  em- 
planatlom; of the self-determ ination of the Will ere beeioally  
rooted in  th is  idea of the "indifference" or ^neutrality" of 
the W ill as i t  stand* over against the motive of the persoc, 
md the attract!venee* or otherwiee of the act to  be performed^ 
A* alr@a% sta ted , Wcke was deeply in terested  in  th is  type 
of Freedom of tho W ill, and he argued that i t  was the highest
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quWLity ot Freedom to  suspend deoielon u n til a l l  the factor# 
Involved In *udh a deelcion had been weighed and dheoked by 
the 'Wind". At a  f i r s t  glanee, th is  explanation of Freedem 
by Looke appear* reasoned»!#, but a DeteraiDietf tttoh a#
Edward# I find# i t  feUaalou# and to ta lly  opposed to hi* ayeten 
of Detoradniem, and hi# argument# agoinat wU^ "deliberated" 
eelf#deteradn#tlon of ^  w ill are inpreeeive#
%n order to give Bdmerd# an cHiiportunity of etating  hi# oaee, 
i t  B d ^ t be helpful to  quote an eartraet from one ef hie 
eppQMnte vhleh he takes time to eeairtne in  hi# work "the 
^^eeaem of # e  w ill". The opponent i s  an advooate of the 
Freedom of the W ill, and he# put dom in  oereful tem^ what 
he msdos by *ueh a stateemit» Hors ore h is  words#-
"that there are many instm ee# wherein the w ill is  determined neither by pweeon t emeaeimee# ner by the g reatest apparent good, ner by the la s t  d io ta te  ef w e emderstaadiagt n er by anything ^ se «  but merely by i t e e l f ,  a# a  «wvereimo ew#determlmmg power of # a  *ouli mad th a t the tou l doe# not w ill thi# or th a t aetion, in  some oaees, by may other influaooe but beosnse i t  will»"
how, th is  i s  a statssmnt whleh i#  a  wmry bald expression of 
what is  tensed "Belf-dstexwlnation" of the w ill , and, in  
i t s  present form, might not oemmend i t s e l f  to  many advooates 
of the Freedom of the win* f b t ,  fwmdamantally, i t  em» 
preeeee an argoment fo r vo litional Freedom wbdoh i s  wide­
spread, and, with seme minor modtfioations, sigh t he so ld  to  
inolude Kant's view of Freedom* Here, however ,  i t  is  
nseessamy to  say tha t Kant avoids mamy of the crude asse rtim s 
itf the above stateswnt whiob appear to  odvooate "sntiveleas" 
YoUtian, mad a separation of w illing from the in te llee t*  
S t i l l ,  there are mmgy passage# in  Kant which can be taken a# 
teadtlng $hi& " se lf-de terminatiom"of the w ill whloh is  quitef{oblivious to  emtemsl influenoes. The "AUtonoey" of the 
w ill is  one of the beeie emplanatioms in  Kant fo r the Freedomi (1 ) The Freedom of the w ill*  Pt*8# Seot*g«
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of tbe w ill, and tbe following passage le  typloal of audb
tb a t Kent bas to  o#y upon th is  wUbjoot;-
"Autmony of the w ill 1# tb a t property of i t  by wbiob i t  ie  a  l a #  to i t s e l f  (independently on any property of tbe objects ef veütlem )# Tbe principle ^  sstOBMgr tbm  l e t  Always *o to  obsose  tba t the same vAitiem  s h a l l  oospr^Maad the ma%#,ms of oar obolee as a a a iv e r s a l  lev» • • * • • * * *
'I f  tbs w ill seeks: tbe la#  wbiob Is  to  determine i t  jgBgjbBse e lse  tbm  in  tbe f itn ess  of i t#  «mtms to  be w W r s s l  l#ee of i t#  owa f lo ta tio n , ewtequsBtly i f  i t  goes out of I ts e l f  sod seeks th is  1## in  the ebarsmtw of my of i te  objeets, there always resu lts  bst#ronosy*"(l)
Sow, i t  i s  perfectly  obvious th a t soeh e rtrae ts  as the above 
do not teeeb toere" self-detersdnation. They do store, they 
indioato "moral" so lf-determ inatim , and Kant makes th is  
abuadmtly clear in a l l  bl^ i^tbloai work*. "Trms the w ill 
is  not sW)jeet simply to  Ims, but so subject tba t i t  amst be 
MBMNhd as it#«W AlvlaE th s %sp, and «a th le  s « m «  only, 
snWoot to tlM lam."
There are times when JUnt i s  s t i l l  more emphatio open th is
a b ility  ef the T ill to  determine i t s e l f  regardless ef a l l
iaflnenees external to i t .
"got the some sahleat being on the other side consoioas ef himself as a  thing in  Mmself, considers h is egittenee
be gives himse lf through reasons and in  th is  h is emis- tense nothing i s  cnteoedsnt to the determination of h i. w ill, bet eeezy astion , end in  am eral every nodifioaticn ef h is emisteno#, varying sooermiig to  b is  in te rn a l sense, even the whole aeries of his existsnss ss  a  sen- WLble being, i s  in  tbe cen#elos#mes# of his swperseagible SKistenss nothing hot the re su lt , end never to be re ­garded as the deterexining prineip le , of hi# oam hlity— « a n n a * *  (=)
Sdeards would t,eleet as the operative term of the above pass### 
the statement tha t "nothing i s  antscedsat to  the detersdnntion 
of h is w ill" , and would charge Kottt with making the w ill o f 
asm "Indifferent" in  thi# eupream se t of V olition. , Tmrther, 
i t  I s  d if f ic u lt  to see how Kant oould e # o ^  thi* c h a w  e f
(1) od. n .(a) dd. so.(3) K. p . V» 28B.
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"Indifference" he everywhere in S îite  th a t the a iH  am 
"nooanon" IK actually  un-eaneed, th a t 1#, in  the generally 
accepted meonina of OauLality. ^Swarâù vrould not bo im» 
proeeed by the argument of Kamt "that we might define praotloal 
freedom m indepondonoe of the w ill on anything hut the moral 
Xa#«<t(l) 4eoauee Kant has already iae le ted  that man rive# 
hlmeelf thi* moral la e , and I t  i s  eesentiol to  Froodnm th a t 
he should be the "mxthW of th is  moral lam. Later, i t  
w ill bo Lomi th a t th is  aspect of Preedwn in  Kant present# 
very great d iffio u ltie e  fo r the questicm of m n 'e  re la tio n  
to  OOd. Here and now, the dii.oussion muet re s t r ic t  i t s e l f  
to t h i s  question of Uie "indifforense" of the w i l l  as found 
in  i t s  power of sovereign self-determination»
I t  is  important to note th a t Kant expressly repudiates the 
"indifferenoe" rtf the « iH $-
"Freedom of e leetive w ill ,  however, oamot be defined m  the power of ebeeeiug to  met for or against the law (liberté#  ind lfferen tiee  ) as *ome have attempted to  define i t ,  altheugjb the eleotlve w ill a t a  phenonsnon gives lauay « a s i le s  of th is  in  experionoe»" va)
Dr» 13# daird and nr. A.d. Being take th is  passage as o learly  
teaehing Kant's a ttitu d e  upon th is  question of the "ind iffor- 
4mW  of th#
The above evidenee from Kant md hie qm ülfied  in te rp re ters  
ou£^ to  be o ff!oient to s e tt le  th is  question of the "Xn- 
dlfferenoo" of the f i l l  end the teaching of Ksnk. However, 
tho m tte r  1# not qMte a .  simple a# that# I t  mnat be ob­
served th a t, in  the iO)ove peeeege, Kant i s  speaking of the 
"ELeotive" w ill; he mejsm- i t  quite e lear th a t he drone a 
clear d is tin c tio n  between what he te rm  the "Rational" and 
the "Eleotive" W ill, fu rth e r, i t  i s  unfortunate fo r the 
in te rp re ters  of Kant th a t he did not moke th is  dii^tinstion 
muwA clearer e a r l ie r  in  hi* discussion of the Freedom of the w ill
k
(1) m# p. Y# M »(8) m. d. d m tre .  ae.(3) The %Atieel Bhiloimdy# YB&.3» Yskge BK» Kent's Treatment^ef Oansality, fW@e(4) MU d« g» iM m » H «  Feotwete#
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2n the om text of the above pmaage# Kant eaye th a t "W # 
proceed from the"nationaI" W ill; aaacicm from the "Eleotlve" 
Will"# and aacordlng to the teaohiag of Kant, morality oon- 
a le te  in  making «eaciae in to  lam#, th a t ie ,  bringing the 
«^eotive" w ill in to  harmony with the "Rational" vill# At 
th ie  point the diemi*#ion most he oaroful to avoid being loo t 
in  the labyrinth of Kant's rather nmwrott* desoripticms of 
w illing , end attempt to keep to a ree tric ted  path to the heart 
of the ^oblem* I t  i s  perfeotly  obvious th a t Kant means 
the "Rational" Will to  have tha t eemplete power of determina­
tio n  MAiWi 3Mk ards thinks f a l ls  within the oategory of what 
hac hew termed the "Indifferw oe" of the 3 iH . Edwards 
w ill hove something to say shOot th is  «.opposed "Eleotlve" w ill ,  
hat f i r s t  the problem of the "Rational" as expressed in  the 
teaObing of Kent must be «xamined in  the l ig h t of the teaeh­
ing of E##sards on Determinism#
th is  sovereign power of the w ill to determine i t t e l f  i s  
denied by Edwards, in  the f i r s t  instance, whw he say si-
"Zf the w ill determines the w ill , th w  Woioe orders epid determlnee the ohoioe$ and acts of ohMoo are emhjeet to  the deoielon, and follow the owdoot, of other sots of ehoioe* And therefore, i f  the w ill Wtermlnes a l l  i t s  own f rw  se ts , then every free  sot of choice i s  determined by a  preceding act of chMoe, Woo.ing th a t sot* And I f  th a t preceding act of the w ill or choice he also a  free ac t, then, %  these principle*, im tdiis ac t too# the w ill i s  i^ lf -d e te r-  sdnsd, that i s ,  th is ,  in  lime mamor, i s  an act th a t the soul voluntarily  chooser., o r, which is  the sane tWL%, i t  is  an act determined s t i l l  by a  precedingso t of the w ill choosing t h a t #    ^moh hrimgsus d irec tly  to  a  oentram ctlcnt fo r I t  ^opposes an (Wt of the M il  preceding the f i r s t  act in  the whole tra in , d irecting and determining the rest# w  a  free  act Of the w ill, before the f i r s t  free ac t of the w lll# " (l)
Bdwards prefaced th ia  d if f ic u lt  {mmsage by making i t  c lear 
tha t only the men, the #%snt, can make any rea l (Aoioe, md 
therefore when people say they believe in  se lf -determination 
of the w ill, they rea lly  mean seXf-detemdnation of the *elf 
or "soul"* Further, he can *.ee no rea l meaning in  aaagr w illing
(1 ) The Freedom of the W ill# Pt»S# s e o t.l*
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I f  i t  doe* not Involve "oholoo"; so th a t, ohm i t  i s  said  
th a t th  i l l  "M ilt." *onsthing, i t  re a lly  mm» that the 
person "^nooses" soswthimg* Edaards can see no masor-
lag in  th is  act of ehoiee" unless i t  be granted th a t, b#~ 
hi^id the Ohoioe, there i& a cause which make* the choice Miat 
i t  is  and not sonethiz^ else» Therefore, i f  Choice in%plies 
the existem e of an antoecdsnt cause p rio r to  the determina­
tion  of the s e l f ,  or w ill, then the act of tho i l l ,  in  
choosing, cannot be free or cut o ff from i t s  antecedents* 
Therefore, in  a veiy rea l *<mse, .elf-determ ination i s  a 
contradiction in  terms i f  I t  wans an independent, completely 
iso lated  act M the viH , and is  .^upr^o^ ed to be "yelf-caused ' » 
Ac alroauy s ta ted , Kant saw the imi>licatioR£ of th ic  type of 
argument in  hie ditcuwslon of "The Third Antinomy", but he 
in sis ted  upon the " ra tlw a l"  Will as the"daaisality
of the acting being ss b e lay ing  to the  ^uperccn& ib le  world, 
and may consequently be conceived as free»^(l) There is  
very l i t  Lie more th a t can be said cweeinlng tills position 
of Kant, except tha t % would be omsidered a f a ta l  weWmss# 
by id^vardc in the Defence of PrseWm, and even Kant's most 
sympathetic in te rp re te rs  can sgy very l i t t l e  in  i t s  LUpport#(8) 
The supreme d lffieu lty  of Kant's idea of w illing , however, 
doe* not l ie  in  the emistenoe aid operation of tits "Rational" 
W ill. I t  is  true tha t ^Aaarde would decline to accept Kant's
oyguamnt that tho Tntional w ill posses sed the overoign power
of "spontaneity" of action; tha t i  , that i t  was capable ef 
originating an act of w ill out of i t s e l f  without any pca*i- 
b i l i ty  of p rio r causes cer antecedent inflmencSw» ?or iJdmarW, 
the human w ill, in  a l l  i t s  r e l  \tio n ., i* a dependent wiU, 
end only God's w ill comes within the category do cribed by 
Kent* jrrom a l l  the theological end psychological evidwos 
available, BOwards ould declare that Kent's "Rational'' w ill 
is  but a figment of the ime^iamtloa»
(1) K* p . V* 837*
(2 ) Dr. H*J* PatOQ. %3ee Categorical Imperative* Pc«esajfc
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Yot, in  th is  present section which deals with the "ind iffer­
ence** of the Willy the problem a€ the *^atlonal" w ill is  net 
the eopreme ie&ue# The rea l battle-groond l ie s  In  the 
postulation of the "HXectlve" #111, and i t  i s  importent te  
grasp what Kant rea lly  meant hy th is  term. As already noted, 
Kant introduced th ia  d lk tin c tim  rather la te  in to  h is d ie- 
ouscion of the Freedom of the W ill, and theie can ho no doubt 
about the fac t tha t in terp reta tion  of the toaohing of &mt 
would have been easier i f  he had revised hi# ea rlie r ex­
pressions m  w illing in  the lig h t of th is  d ik tln o tim . For 
instance, when Kant say* th a t the task of ^aso n  is  to  pro­
duce a "Good" W i l l y  doee he mean that mason in  tlJLs passage 
ie  to be taken as the " Rational** WiH, and th a t the "Good" 
Will i s  to  mean the "Elective" will?
**For reason recognises the establishment, of a good w ill as i t s  highest p rac tica l d se tin a tim . *
Further, what does ha mean by such a passage as lolloe#?—
"For the w ill stands between i t s  a  p rio ri p rincip le , whitii is  formal, and i t s  a poste rio ri spring, whicn i s  m aterial, as between two roads, sm  m i t  m e t be determined by something, i t  follows th a t i t  emst be determinsd by the formal prineiple of vM itioa When m  action i s  done from duty, in  which case every m aterial princip le has been withdrawn from i t . ” '3)
When Kant uses the term "Will" in  such a  passage, doe* he 
mean the "Elective" W ill, and does tW  "Elective" Will stand 
as i t  were a t the "parting of the ways"? I f  thi* i s  what he 
meant, then, the" 4«ctive"w iU  i@, in  th i*  instance, fa llin g  
within the category of What Bdwards term* tho "Indifference" 
of the w ill. Farther, Kant gives grounds fo r  assuming that 
tho rea l struggle fo r Morality takes place la  tho "Elective" 
Will whoa he goes on to say th a t man "feels l a  himself # 
powerful counterpoise in  h is wants sad inclinations" (3) ; sad,
( 1 )  G d ,  I d .
( 2 )  G d .  2 0 ,
( 3 )  G d .  2 6 .
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than, on the other hand, "the ooooeptioa of the xaoraX ioe, 
exereleee on the human h eart, by of reacon alone . . . . .  
an influenoe eo ouch more powerful than a l l  othor eprlnge." (1) 
Here, i t  would appear tha t the "Rational ' v ;lll ie  to be 
iden tified  with "reason and the moral law on the one aide, 
and mmte and inolinatione on the o ther, with the "Hleotive"
IVill *tandi%% a t the croee-roade between the two in ten d in g  
force#; and th a t the 'Elective" w ill only hecooea the "Good" 
Will m i t  conform* to the Moral Law given by tiie "national"
W ill.
Again, Kant doe# not make the task of in te rp re ta tion  easie r 
by making I t  quite clear in  thi# instance th a t the "î3leotlve" 
Will alone i& free .
"Lows proeeed from the Rational w ill; maxims from the eleotlve w ill. The l a t te r  i# in  men a free elective w ill .  The Rational w ill, whidi i s  directed to nothin# but the law only, oamne t be called e ithar free  or mm fre e , heeanm i t  i s  not direct## to  actions, bat immediately to the le& isla tim  fo r the maMms of a c t io n s . . .« Gonaeqaently i t  is  aheolrrtely necessary, and i s  even '  » w  oonstralnt. I t  i* therdrore^only the tha t cen be called free ."  (8)
E a rlie r, Kant had given a somewhat d ifferen t meaning to 
Freedom when he writes*-
"lew we «sanet peesihly conceive a reason oonsoiottsly recel vim# a  bias from #my other quarter with respect to  i t^  Jttjpwita, fe r themth# wahject would ascribe the determnrntion of i t#  judgpwwit not to  it#  own reason, but to m  impulse. I t  mot regard i t s e l f  a# the author of i t s  prinA ple# Independent on foreign infliteaoes. Ooooequontly as prac tica l reaom or oo the w ill of a ra tiona l being i t  moot regard i t s e l f  as f re e , th a t i s  to  soy, the m i l  ef ouch a being eaonot be - w  w ill of i t s  own eseoept under the idea cf freedom."(9)
m  th is  la t te r  passage, Kant appears to  be speaking of the  
"Rational" v /ill, o r, as he terms i t  "practical" Reaom m ioh 
i s  the author of i t s  p rfncip les, end he give# tho impmssicn 
tha t th is  "Rational" Will csmoot be oonoeived as hawing rea l 
value unless i t  bo oonoeived of as "free*. Whereas, in  the 
former paosage, he says th a t the queLtim of Freedom doe#
a )  Gd. 34.(#) M. d. 0 . m tre .  (d) OMU 81.
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no t omoem thi» "Rational" #111. Fuxthar, the ||NI4 
t r i m  ef *tmm»een»ental# fveactaf ebi<A he# a l r e a #  ham  
disem aedf aeam to prove th a t Kent eenaaived ef re a l ?#### 
dam eodatiiig in  the "Rational" f i l l ,  nenever, there i#  m 
l# # # tm t  peds eim to  whioh eefeweao# has already hem made 
efhiOh might aeo lst in  # e  eolmtian ef tM e d iff icu lty . 
max ia aged# di*oue«ing the "Rational" end the »%leetive# 
W ill md i t  makee the following etatem m t;-
"The m eotlve w il l ,  ehig^ ean he determined by pure rm een i s  called  free elective w ill . That vhloh ladeteradziahle only lay inoliziatioa would he mlmal elective w i l l . . . .« • •  naam eleotlve w ill , m  the eon#,
_3uro* hat i t  am  h# Mned to  aotione ty  the pure w ili. Freedam ofaequired praotiee of reason) not pure determi l o < the elective w ill ie  jUi t^ that Independmoi o r l%deterM natim  m  em eible Impulees tlve  oonoept ef i t .  Tbe peeitive pure reaeen te  be of i t s e l f  p ractica l
) th ie  is  the m e ^  Qone o is :  .tho pomr of.."vl> I
£C, k
pemeage doee throw eome lig h t upon the oenplieated 
(yie^Uon under di^^ceeeim, hu t, imdiweily, i t  raieae a  vmy 
in p m tm t ieeue, and that i&, where doee Kent rea lly  plaee 
"Antmoey" of the w ill? Ie  i t  In  the "RatiooM" w ill or ie  
i t  in  the "Elective" WH17 or le  i t  jo in tly  in  the "natim el* 
md «m eetive" w ill; thmt i e ,  by the "Elective" *111 eemh% 
in to  m uplete ham m y with the Batim el" Will? i f  time» 
gees tim e  can be answered in  a  sa tisfac to ry  m ener, there i e  ' 
hope of a  e e iu t i#  ef the m # jeet m # r  M sonssien. For, 
i t  appear# from the teaching of meat, "Autmofly" i s  but 
m Pther te m  fo r "feredm lity"*
-  i  ■ . ■l*The autoneey M the w ill i s  the to le  principle of a l l  moral low*, end of a l l  A itlee which conform to  them: on the other hand, heteronoay of the else tlv e  w ill not only cannot be the baoie of eb lig a tim , but i s ,  on tho contrary, cppoeed to the DrtnMpIe m ereof, ana to the m o ra li^  of the w ill ."  w
'■I
1
/'If
h# CU 6* K» p . V# In tro , 18# M l.
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How, hot) i t  Kant u s in g  tho tarin " \ii l l"  in  tho f i r s t  in sta n o e?  
I* he fcpoahirXj;, hero o f  tho ' 0 .o a t iv e  ' or tho '’R a tional"  W ill 
as tho 60I 0 p r in c ip le  o f a l l  moral law s? Ho .^oomt. to  bo
c le a r  ro f erenco to  tho " l e c t iv e "  i l l ,  bu t l a t e r  in  
t h i s  «acx L ,eotlon, he appear» to  \« a k en  t h is  in to r p r e ta t lo n  
by o a y ln g i -  " la  th a t  caea  th e  w i l l  doo<- n o t j i v e  i t s e l f  th e  
la w , bu t o n ly  th e  p rece p t  hov; r a t io n a l ly  to  fo l lo w  p a th o­
l o g i c a l  law  but I t s e l f  op.H)sed to  th e p r in c ip le  o f
a  pure p r a c t ic a l  reason " . The g en era l te a c h in g  o f  sa n t  i s  
th a t  th e "R a tional"  w i l l ,  and th a t  alon e i s  cap ab le  o f g iv in g  
i t s e l f  th e  la w , bu t in  t h i s  p a ssa g e , I l f  ho i s  t peak ing o f  
tho " E lec tiv e"  w i l l ) ,  th e  v ery  " E lec tiv e"  v / i l l  seers, cap a b le  
o f  g iv in g  i t s e l f  th o  law . F u r th er , he has j u s t  s : iid  th a t  
th o  "13.e c t lv e "  J i l l  cou ld  be o n ly  " a ffe c ted "  by i# )U lse & ,  
end n o t  "do to  ru ined" by them; b u t h ere  he appears to  gran t  
th a t  tho "ifLootlvo" w i l l  can be su b je c te d  to  H eteronaqy and 
f o l lo w  in  eome " ra tio n a l"  way th e  P a th o lo g ic a l Law, w h ich , 
o f  c o u r se , i s  n o th in ;  more or l e s s  than th e  " la o o t iv e"  v / i l l  
bein^’,  i n  t h is  in s ta n c e  a t  l e a s t ,  determ ined  by In p u leeL . 
However, th e  prlraasy q u e s t io n  i s ,  where does Kant i>laoe th e  
oen tro  of Autonomy? I s  i t  In  tho "R ational" or th o  "?2Leotive" 
W ill?  The above pnseago does n o t  g iv e  any d o o r  gu ldanoe  
f o r  th e  rea so n s £vlready g iv e n . T h ero fore , th e  d is c u s s io n  
mutt s e e k  h e lp  from o th er  a tp e c t s  o f  K an t's  tea ch in g »
In  one o f Sant'a. l a t e r  vjorkt,, " H e ll.r1 on w it  An  th e  l i m i t s  q f  
mere Reason"» i t  i s  q u ite  c l e a r  th a t  he m a in ta in s  t h i s  d i s ­
t in c t io n  between th e  ’R a tica ial"  and th o  " iv lec tivo"  W i l l .  He 
i s  speak ing o f  th e  o r ig in  o f E v i l  i n  humun a c t io n s . He 
s t a t e s  th a t  th e sou rce o f "badnes*" canno t bo p la ced  in  th e  
b m i; . lb i l l ty  and th e  natureJL I n c l in a t io n s  t p r ln  in g  th erefrom  
fo r  two r e a so n s . F i r s t ,  because th o se  very  I n c l in a t io n s  cac  
be th e  ground o f  Good o r  E v i l .  wecond, bojouso Humanity i s  
n o t  to  bo h o ld  r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  th e  e x i .  ta n ce  o f  th e se  i n o l i n -  
t io n s »  They are a  r e a l  ixu 't o f i t *  "na tural"  endowment, and,
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In th e ir  true meaainp* cam ot be said to be Good or E vil, 
hist aoXy tW gromd of Good or E vil. Kant then turn# to  
another mouree Which sigh t he «aid to be the origin of the 
"Bad” prineip le in  man — that i e ,  the very opposite of the 
eeneible qualltiee  in  men, the Rational Eatusra of mw. Gmn 
Bvil be traced to i t e  orig in  here? fient ie  quite es^^hatio 
thmt th is  oamot be the &ouroo of tho Bad jprlnoiple#
"The eouroe of th ie  ev il cannot be planed in  a  ^orntptlen f e f Heaeen Mil oh give# the moral law, jaasSi i f ' Beaeon oeuXd I f#olieh the authority  of tho la# in  i te e l f  and dieeeni t s  obligation; for th is  i s  ahsolutoly ij%)e#eible*” d )
KfiBQt, then gees on to make h is  position even more clear by 
s ta tin g  tha t the "Rational" Will (V ille) oannet be the source 
of ooxTttptien, bootinse being already the souvee of the moral 
la# , i t  i s  the only "spring" of action fo r the "Bleotive"
Will towards the Good# i f  the "Rational" w ill wm Bad, then 
man would not be a sinner, he would bo a  Devil. ta n t ,  now 
goes on to make h is  position oonoemins the "Rational" Will 
and the "Eleotlve" Will more obvious, and h is  teaching sdght 
he smmed wp under the following points*-
(1) He has no doubts about Miat he terms "the existeioe of 
th is  propensity to  ev il in  human nature". There 1# a real 
antagonism between the human w ill sad the moral lew# t e t ,  
the knowledge of th is  antagonism omnot give a  rea l clue to  
i t s  orig in . As fa r  as fiant can seo, thi* antagonism oentree 
in  the »*fr«6 eleotlve Will"» Re has already made i t  quite 
impossible tha t i t  should centre in the "Rational" W ill, there­
fo re , he is  l e f t  no a lternative  but tha t i t  oonoems the 
"Blcotive" Will#
(8) thn , even the worst, does not abandon the moral lav . 
m  fa c t , the moral law "forces i t s e l f  upon him ir re s is t ib ly " , 
and, i f  no other spring opposed th is  moral la# , man would he 
morally Good. That ie ,  he would oake tho maxim of h is
(1 ) m M glon. 30,
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"Elective” J i l l  elodLl’ix to  tho lim of hl& "Rational" J i l l .
(3) Ksmt has already denied th a t the origin  of Evil oaa l i e  
in  mm'e merely "physloal" nature. i t  1* true that th ie  
#en*ib ility  can be tho ground of "spring*" Whidh oan be used 
fo r Evil, but then, on the other hand, th is  ^enelb ility  can 
be used for Good.
(4) Therefore, there are two eouroee or "kprlz%e" of action 
in  man. m e comes from hi* "Rational" W ill, the other from* 
h is sensible Nature, and ihril consists in  allowi% the 
sensible springs to gain the upper hand over the "Rational"; 
that i«.| Evil i s  the subordination of the "Rational" by the 
"Bensible".
"danseqmently a man (even the best) is  bad only by th is , tha t he reverses the moral order of the springs in  adopting th«ea into h is meKims»"(*)
(£) Kant clinches th is  argumont about the "Rational" and the
"l“3.eotlvo" w ill in  a very oonclosive manner, by sayingt-
*Dfow i f  there is  in  human nature a  propensity to th is ,  thm  there i& in  man a  natural propensity to  ev il; m d since th is  propensity i t s e l f  must ultim ately be seuBht in  a free  elective v ill.^and  therefore con be iqputed, i t  is  morally had#" vs)
Here, then, is  a very important instanoe of Kant's teaching 
upm th is  complicatQd question of the "Rational” md the 
"Elective" Will, and i t  throes lig h t on h is previous refer­
ences to th is  subject# such teaching might be summed as 
siqring tha t the "Rational” w ill is  the source of the moral Las, 
and i s  unalterably determined by the Moral Law. In  other 
words, Kant seem to allow no "corruption”, and no p o ss ib ility  
of "conflict" with the "m tional” Will in  re la tion  to  the 
Moral Lew. Cn the other hanti, the "Elective" w ill i s  not 
a t  one with the moral La», yet, at the scvse time, i t  does not 
belong to mere S ensib ility . I t  too, like  tho "Rational” WIU 
must belong to the supersensible, but with th is  Importmt
im ligicn. 40.Beligien. 41. see also 94.
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differenee, the "JSLeetive" w ill om be «ffeotsd by the 
eo tib le , and, i f  the above teaching ie to have any awening, 
can take up into I te e lf  maxima which are ooatrary to the 
h o v^L av , and thus beoome the centre md eouroe of th a t 
Milch i t  E vil, the morally Had.
I t  i s  quite possible th a t the above attexqpt to  disoover What 
Kant rea lly  means by the "Batiemal" and "Eleotlve” Will om  
be Interpreted as merely aoademio and only remotMly re la ted  
to the principal purpose of th ie  section mmi the Kantian 
Defence of Freedoo, th a t i s ,  the "Xadifferetice” of the w ill. 
However, i t  i s  submitted tha t the above d itcuseim  ie  of 
v i ta l  i%;ortemee to Kant's Defence of Freedom, and th is  fo r 
the following reasons*
(1) Bdeards i s  convinced that Deterndnim offers the only 
possible sKplmatioa of the vo litional process in  man#
Further, i t s  conc^ ticn  of Liberty in  human choice consists 
in  allowing man to do what he "pleases", and, in  fairness to  
Edsards, th is  does not mean always doing tha t whiMi is  in  
accord with h is "Sensuous" nature. Doing as he pleases 
might make a criminal of one man, but i t  tigh t make a sa in t 
e f another. I t  a l l  depends upon what i s  the preponderaftlng 
preference in  the sdnd of tha t p a rticu lar men, tha t 1*, his 
view of the apparent Good. Bis use of tho term the "apparent 
Q^ed" i s  quite deliberate , because ridsards is  convinced th a t 
mm is  a "fallen" creature, and i t  is  u tte r ly  i% ;oetible fo r 
him to have a  view of the "real" Good u n til  he lias passed 
through a sp ir itu a l experience known as "Conversion". This 
can be brought about only by the action of tiio s p i r i t  of God 
in  keeping with God's Election. Therefore, en|>irical o r 
f a l lm  man has the lib e rty  of doing as he "pleases", not as 
God pleases, and th is  is  the only Liberty of which he i s  eat»- 
Msle. What he pleases is  already conditioned by what he i s ,  
and, bocanse he does what he pleases, he is  capable of res- 
p cnsib ility  for h is deeds.
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(2) Bdmirdi i s  also fu lly  oominoed th a t acy other quality  
of yvmô€m a ttr ib u t#d to mm assumas th a t mm can bs a if f s sm t 
from Ms om Oharaotsr. That i s ,  such Frssdoa postulats# in  
mm a  quality  sf W ill which i s  unrelated to h is character, 
th a t i s ,  "indiffèrent" to h is  character. Therefore, he 
s ta te s  tha t a l l  opposing theorie# of Freedom are u l t im te ly  
based upon the "Zndiffermoe" of the Will# Wow, i t  has bem 
observed tha t Kent was quite aware of th is  Charge by Deter- 
sdnism, and th a t he e s tte t io a l ly  denied tha t h is view of 
Freedom was ooB%»atible with the "Xnlifferenae" of the Will#
(3) Further, i t  has been observed that JCmt made a careful 
d istine tion  between the "Rational" and the "E lective" Will in  
am# Again, there are times Mien Kant seems to put Freedoa 
in  the "Rational" w ill of mm# That i s ,  Freedom moans the 
fu lfilm m t of the moral Law, Miich la  also a creation e f the
"Rational" W ill. Kant appears, in  certain  places, to  deny 
th a t the Free "SSleotive" W ill can be determined by th a t MiiMi 
i s  in  Imposition to the moral Law* Ke admits that i t  om  be 
affected , but not determined# This seems to  be h is general 
teaching in  moot of h is  Ethical works, and i t  has been aaeumed 
th a t th ie  is  hie basic teaohing upon the w ill .  This asausp- 
tie n  has had certain  results# For Instanoe, Dr* X# Oadxd i s  
quite omviaoed tha t Kent t a u ^ t  a Freedom which was only a 
"me way" Freedom* That i s ,  Freedom in  doing the Good, bat 
not a  Freedom in  doing the xvil#C^) A s t i l l  more isportant 
result# has been th a t Hartmann has oharged fiant with ealttim g 
the Whole of th ie  problem from his view ef human Freedom. (8)
(4) ROW, i t  i s  submitted tha t Kant's doctrine of Radiesl a v il 
I s  a  v ita l  part of h is Ethical system, and I t s  teaching must 
stand rela ted  to  the re s t of h is  work* i f  th is  is  correct, 
then, i t  ie  obvious that K m t's doctrlae upon Radical a v i l
(1) The C ritica l FhiloeojAy# Vol.S# page 8iP«
(3) Xthics# V0l#3. Page 67#
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mtfX be viewed e# a  log ical development of Me th lo o l doe- 
tr in e , and oust influence the general mpacte of Me ccnelu- 
aim # comeming Freedom* Xf the above evidence le  con- 
eidered reaeocably v a lid , Kant meet be held as teaching th a t 
the real Freedom of the Will centred in  the a ttitu d e  and 
action of the "meotive" W ill. When tiii* term "resa Freedom” 
i s  used, i t  simply means "actual” Freedom, of course, i t  
i s  perfectly  true to say th a t lan t was righ t when he sa id  
th a t Freedom consisted in  the if i l l  being independent of any 
foreign causes* However, th is  Is  the "ideal" Freedom, and 
might be compared to  the "Christian” Freedom — ’I f  the sen 
therefore, sh a ll make you f re e , you sh a ll be free  indeed”, ( l)  
Kant might have said with equal s in ce rity , ' I f  the Rational 
Will sh a ll make you f re e , you sh a ll be free indeed,” hut the 
important point ie  how can the "Rational" Will make a man 
freov There are times Mum Kant i s  inclined to view the 
"Ratloml" Will as pressing forward to f u l f i l  i t s e l f  in  sp ite  
of a l l  seneuws opposition.
There i s  an in teresting  pass%e In  Kant Where he, peihape, 
given a rather extreme expression to thi* tendency of the 
"Rational" Will to have i t s  way regardless of the ^ensoous 
nature of man. m  thi* passage, Kant soys I t  is  uttdenioble 
tha t Fure Reason of i t s e l f  alone give# to man the imivershL 
law Which is  the moral Znw* He *peoks of Aeason "incorrup­
tib le  and L elf-constrained " confronting the Will (elective) 
in  may action with the "Pure" i l l*  Further, he argues, be­
cause th is  law i s  universal, i t  is  made the fom al deter­
mining princip le of the W ill, "without regard to subjective 
différences". He mentions tha t th ie "pure" w ill moots oo 
oppoeitien in  a Holy and In fin ite  Being, but in  man i t  meet# 
with wonts sod "physical motives” , a# ÿoes on to say*-
(1 ) The Gospel of a t. John. Ch»8«, v.36*
— XB3 —
"In th e ir  case (men), therefore, the moral I m  ie  «n imperative, Miloh oocmma» oategorioeXly, beoauee the Im# ie  uoeonditioned; the rela tion  ot euch a w i l l  to th ie  law ie  depeadeog# under the name of p a jg gUj n ,  which im llim  a oiatetrain^ to  an action , though only by reason and iteoBJicrEIve lam  ^ and th is  aotion la  called  duty, bojouee an e le c t iv e  w i l l ,  euhieot to pa tho ldpcal a ffe c t!  one (th oo^  not determined by them, and therefore e t i l l  free ) lu ^ llee  a wish that arleee  from subjective causes, and there m y often  be opposed to the puro objective deterfaining p r in c ip le i Mienoe i t  requires the moral constra int of a resistan ce of the prac tical reason, Which ««af-be ca lled  in tern a l, but in to lle o tu o l , compulsion* "vD
Many instimces could be quoted from Kant to support th is  
argument th a t the "Rational" Will takes l i t t l e  or no account 
of tubjoctlvo influencée — "Ronce, i t  cones to pass that 
man a la tm  the possession of a  w ill Miich takes no account 
of anything th a t comes under the head of deeires and in o liaa - 
tien s , mû m  the contrary conceives actiwm as possible to 
him, nay, even as necessary, which can only be done by d is­
regarding a l l  # * lre e  and sensible i n c l i n a t i o n s K a n t  
gpOG on to use the term "Will** in  two d iffe ren t senses in  
oao context.
"Roy, he does not even hold himself responsible for the former or ascribe them to h is proper * e lf, i . e .  h is w ill I ht only asoribe* to h is w ill any indulgence which he might y ie ld  them i f  he allowed them to influence h is maxims to the prejudice of the rational la\w of the will***(3)
Wow, i t  seems d e a r  tha t Kact means by the proper se lf , the 
"Rational” W ill, eUd by the indulgence of h is W ill, the 
"Moctlve" W ill, because i t  is  quite inconsistent w ith the 
whole of Kent's teoohing to conceive of the "Rational” w ill 
as being corrupted, as he soys, to the prejudice of ra tiona l 
lows of h is Will. I t  is  th is  confusion in  terms wMMi 
mismidorstending of fiant upon th is  legx>rtant point so easy.
Yet, in  sp ite  of th is  tendmcy in  fiant to  # # ia s ls e  the 
"primaey** of the "Pm ctioal" Reason or the "Rational” W ill,
(1) E* p. V. 144.
(2) & (3) Gd. 92.
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th ero  I s  an o th er  ^^p eo t of h i*  te a c h in g  w h loh o b ta in s  i t s  
lo g ic a l  âeveloptoent i n  h i s  d o c tr in e  of Radical E v il*  i n  
e t h e r  w o rd s , th e re  I s  i n  K a n t 's  E th ic a l  works a  l a t e n t^  h u t 
v e ry  r e a l  d u a lism  a s  te s t  s s  th e  v o l i t i o n a l  p ro c e s s  i s  co n - 
cezn ad . zrem  one p o in t  of v iew , he ap p ea rs  to  g iv e  p rem ln - 
m o e  and prim acy t o  th e  " R a tio n a l” w i l l ,  w h ich , w ith  a  k in d  
o f  i n t e U o c t u a l  com pulsion  con p re s s  th ro u g h  to  f u x f l lm s d  
re g a rd le s s  o f  th e  sen su o u s  n a tu re  o f  man. s t i l l ,  cm th e  
o th e r  h an d , Kant i s  d eep ly  oonso lons of th e  depth  and r e a l i t y  
o f th e  "h ta d ran e e "  to  th e  m oral lam  o f th e  "R a tio n a l"  will*
I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  he does n o t  g iv e  e l e a r ,  em phatic  g u id an ce  as  
t o  th e  c h a r a c te r  o f  t h i s  h in d ra n c e ; end he  o o r ta in ly  does 
n o t  i d e n t i f y  th e  " la ieo tiv e"  w i l l  w ith  t h i s  sensuous h im d rm ce . 
Y e t, he i s  p e r f e c t ly  aware t h a t  w a n ts , I n c l ia a t ic x ie ,  su b ­
j e c t i v e  maxims m â  s e n s ib le  s p r in g s  o f a c t i o n  a re  n o t  a o c u ra te  
d e s c r ip t io n s  o r M iat he  h a s  i n  mind i n  re o o g n le in g  t h i s  h i a -  
druQoo* Y e t, i t  i s  th m re , and i t  i s  h ig h ly  im p o rtan t t e  h i s  
E th ic a l  system * As a lre a d y  s t a t e d ,  i n  h i s  d o c tr in e  o f  
R ad ica l E v i l ,  heoomes to  g r ip s  w ith  t h i s  a l r e a d y  re o e g h ise d  
h in d ra n c e , and h i s  d e e o r i p t i m  o f  i t  now beoomas p o s i t i v e  mod 
t r u l y  p e r s o n a l .  However, h i s  d o c tr in e  o f  R ad ica l R v il  i s  me 
m ere a f te r - th o u g h t*  B a th e r ,  i t  i e  th e  lo g io a l  s e q u m c e  o f  
th e  l a t e n t  s u b je c t iv e  h in d ra n c e  to  th e  M oral Law WhiOh h o a s ts  
e v e ry th in g  he w ro te  upon E th ics*  P erhaps th e  fo llo w in g  
p o in ts  w i l l  a s s i s t  i n  making c le a r  t h i s  f a c t*
(1 ) <toe o f fiam t's c a r d in a l  coaoepXm  i s  t h a t  o f  th e  "Good"
W ill ,  and he makes i t  p e r f e c t ly  c l e a r  t h a t  a  "Good” w i l l  I s  
a  w i l l  w hich i s  oonscioue o f th e  m oral Law, b u t ,  i n  man, i s  
n o t  i n  o o s p le te  c o n fo rm ity  to  th e  M oral law* i t  i s  u n d e r 
M oral L as, fcut n o t " s u b je c t” to  mcaeal law , t h a t  i s ,  i s  n o t  
f u l l y  and f i n a l l y  d e te rm in ed  by  th e  m oral Law* A "Good" n i l  
f u l l y  s u b je c t  to  th e  m oral L a s , fian t term s " a  co m p le te ly "  Good 
W il l ,  o r a  "Qood" n f i l l  th ro u g h  and th ro m ^ ;  s t i l l  s e r e  o f te n  
a  "Holy" W ill*  How, i t  i s  q u i te  obv ious t h a t  t h i s  "Good* w i l l
«  lafi «
in  imn osnnftt be id e n tifie d  with Kent*, d eeo iip tlon  o f the  
"Rational'' « i l l ;  tjwnPe?## i t  om  mtm en ly  the "S leotlve"  
W ill#
40 already #t#t#d , i t  i#  m for tm a te  tha t i&aot d id  not nake
ea r lier  referenee to  h ie  d ie tln o tio n  o f the "Ratioaal" and
th e "E leotive" d i l l ,  yet* in  the aheeaoe o f eooh m  e e i^
d ie tin o tim *  i t  eeeae tha t i t  ie  in ee ita b le  that i t  m et he
eemimed that Kent neemt the tern  '%eod" w i l l  to  he taken In
the emwe o f being the *^Bleotive* W ill, m  the fellen& ng
entraet* xanl eeame to  make th i#  in ev ita b le
" iw y th S ag  ^  m tm m  noeke neeerdiag to  lane# a e t t e a l  h e m #  alone hen# the f  a o e lV  wf anting m oordine #e
;tie e l reaean# W w n m  in fa llib ly  detemtnae the thm  the aotim e of wiA a helm WUUii eee we##* »6 Ohjeetlfely neeeeenor are eWMeetiwely aeeeeaniy alee# i#e# the m il ie  a feealty to  eheeee only thnt ihiah reaean Wdpendant en lum ination e e o e ^ a #  a# fiwaotieally meedeeeew# i.e#  the good, net i f  veeeen e f ite e lf  de#  not eoffieim m y determine the m il* i f  the la tte r  i t  enmeel alee to  eWWeetiwe oenditicne CearHen* 1er tnpnle#rW hidh da net ale##  oataoide with vm  e ^  leetiwe eenditiq## in  m word# i f  the w ill doe# net Am A ag^ eeand^ aeeead with remon# WWlch i#  eetnday EB <B ae#th aSh) than the aeUene #d l|h  e l^m tiw S t are reoagEued #  neoee&ary are eoWemivezy iinitiiMpit * and the deterwdnation ef «noh a  w ill aeeaamm te  a## jeetiwe 1## le obligati m* that U  to eay* me re iitie  ef the ehleetiwe law# to  a w ill that I# net good I# eeneetwed ae me deterwdnation of the w #lew  a rm ienal hem# by g/gim^gUm ef r eaeem* hot dhWt the^^ w ill free ite  nature àom not of neoeaeity fo ile v # ^ !)
how* i t  i# perfeotly #fvloua that Kant oeuld h a#  made thin 
inportanl and d lffieo lt p##age nueh ainpler if  he had tntve* 
dneed hie la te r d i# tino tim  between the "Rational" end "HLee* 
live" Will; for there ean he l i t t l e  denht that he i#  ueing 
the tern" w ill" in  «neh two diatlnot menlnge. i f  thi* la  
net grmted* then* the ewtraet beeen# alm et iapeesihle to 
intespret# When xm t may# that the "will" la nothing hnt 
"praotioal Beaeon"* Ohviouely he ie u#ing the term "Will"dlf«» 
ferent f#m the weanliyi he giw# i t  # en  he epeak* ef it*  In
(1 ) dd# dd#
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sm* QM not nboxttuglOy Good", m  the former owe* i t  m e t 
be the "m tionel" w ill  trihloh ie  m m t. Ha t #  la tte r*  the 
«aiootl#"#  i f  th i t  in terp reta tion  ie  corxeet* then*
i t  ie  tho '«idLeotlve" i / l l l  #bi(dk ie  mewt eheo £m t eeyei»*
"the w ill U  a  f  aotaty to ohooee t h a t  only m idh roaeiB In* 
dependant oa in o lim tia e  reoognieee am p rao tiee lly  aeowewgr, 
i.e*  the good". Again* i f  th ie  in oerreot* then* i t  i e  the 
"#eo tive" Ë il l  m ioh i^  the real* crucial centre of moral 
action»
Later* he give# another defin ition  of w ill. I t  i e  "a facu lty  
to determine onemalf to action in  aeoordmce with the ooa- 
ceptioa of certa in  lm #"(l)*  wd* « t i l l  la ter*  ae "the w ill 
i e  a  hind of cm ea lity  belonging to liv in g  beings in  so fa r  
w  th(^ are ra tio n a l" . (2) fhe former défini t ie n  appears to 
meem the "Kleotive" s il l*  and tho la tte »  «eeea. to pein t to  
# e  "National" w ill. Be th is  as i t  may* ssaat is  quite  c lear 
tha t the ’TSood" w ill i s  central to h is e th ica l eymtem* md* 
in  nan* i t  i s  soawthing to  be attained* not seeethix^ with 
# ic h  sm  i s  already mdowed.
(2) Another important foot i s  that the"laiectivo" Will ie  the 
"Good" ^111 in  the making. lierai Laos proceed from the 
^ ill*  but moral Lass m e t be aoeepted by the 
"i&Lective" w ill. I t  i s  true th a t there are tine# when Kant 
appo^s to  give the impression that the only task e f  the 
"JSLective" Will iu to  ro e is t the iac lin a tim s*  'Umh* the 
"national" w ill fd lew s through in to  cenplate fclfllm m t*
The foraar procosi. is  termed "negative" irecdoa* aW the latte» 
’positive ' Freedom. Yet* any un^crltioal acceptance of tWLe 
tmdbing i s  lik e ly  to resu lt in  .erioue cm plioatlcm  in  
in te rp re ta tion  of Kant*s e th ica l system, for* he repeats en 
mapÿ occasions* th a t the sAole eg&cnoe of morality consists 
in  the deliberate acceptance of universal and o W # tiv e  Isms
(1) #u ëd.(2) «d. 72.
1 #  •
in  place of "subjeotivo" mmlm. u r, in  h is  om  tew »: —
'Wo Z3:k% |H> able to vdLljlf tha t a  maxim of our action should h# 
a  isoivoraal l£ov*%(l) Kant lo  never weary of repeating UWL
"I do not* l^erefore* need any far«reaching pénétration to dteoezn # a t  I  have to do in  order tha t rs^  w ill nay bo morally good. ln # p eriem ed  in  tho course of the TBcrld* lnet%)ablo of boiiw prepared fo r  a l l  i te  oontiii** genoiet. X only ask sgmeif* Oanet thou also w ill th a t thy maxim should be a universal leov? I f  no t, then i t  must bo rebooted
T h is d o l l  b e r a t e ,  d e c i s iv e  a c t  o f  th e  w i l l  to  faake I t s
Ioonform to  u n iv e r s a l  low  1^ ix% )ortmt a s  in d ic a t in g  th a t the | 
« S la o t iv e ’' W il l had a " p o s it iv e "  ta sk  t o  do i n  M ora lity  qu its  
beyond th o  more r e j e c t io n  o f  in c l in a t io n s  m d  s u b je c t iv e  to »  
f lu c n c s  . I t  i s  th o  " l e c t iv a "  v -I ll whidh hcu. t o  make the 
o s u e ia l  d e c is io n  th a t  i t s  mrorirm h a ll be o b je c t iv e  and u n i­
v e r s a l  I n s te a d  o f  s u b j e c t iv e  and p a r t lc u ln r ;  m d I t  i s  only 
08 t h i s  " p o s it iv e "  a c t io n  i s  m d era to o d  th a t  k^nt’s  efqphosis 
urxm th e  "K lective** # i l l  o sa  b e  f u l l y  a p p r e c ia te d ,
(3) Dr* Paton remarks th a t Kant nearly illu s tra te #
his doctrine of reedom by copies of bc,d mnr-1 a c tlc n .W  
Thiu îr- importent ^or tW  mdoretandixs^ of the real emphasi# 
given by Kant to  the "Tdectivc* #111. Tor, obviously* i t  i s  
quite imx>ssible to  conceive of Kant teochf.T^ that the *Satioii#l" 
Will is  capable of b#d moral acticm. Kant hoe very l i t t l #  
eyr^pathy fo r the '•crook*, md ovtm the "ctmsunmato v illa in " (4) 
i t  viithout excuse fo r fa llin g  to  reform hie conduct. Been 
tho apparently "hopalwit* charactors are l e f t  vjlthout tu fflo -  
le n t @%cus#(^), end ho views with rea l horror the vie# «Nf to* 
einccrlty* (Ô) Those Inctaneea indicate that Kant believed 
th a t tloml 3V11 could not bo defined in  any f in a l by
Gd* 60.Od*Çio J^ogorloal Inperative. Page 813* Gd# 6B*Ke P. V. 231.K* Pm V. 163# See also Belifilen. 43.
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the mùmo th a t eensaoos feelings were too strong to he dealt
with hy the "Bloctive" W ill|(D  md h is  general teaohiag
upon Moral %vll, in  h is ethioaX works, oan be summed In
the following extract I -
"He who has lo s t a t play may be vexed a t himself and h is fo lly ; but tr!h e  is  eonsdtous of having dhea t#  s t  gfiy  (although he has gained thereby) he
law."mmselj^g^ soon as he compares himself with the mi
(4) f in a lly , on th is  importanoe of the "Hleotlwe" W ill in  
moral aotien, i t  is  neo#sary only to quote one soctraot from 
Kant*# analysis of Radical WLl and i t s  iramedyt-
"What man is  or ought to be in  a moral konse he make or most have asde himself. Both must be the effect of h is  free elecHve w ill, otherwise i t  could not be imputed to him, and, consequently, ho would be morally neither good nor bad# When i t  is  said be i s  created good, that can only mean tha t he is  created fo r pood, and the orig inal constitu tion  in  man is  good; but th is  does not yet make the man himself good, but according as he does or does not adopt in to  h is  maxim tho springs which th is  oonstitution contains (whldh must be le f t  altogether to h is  own free choice), he makes h im e lf  become good or bad."v3)
This ought to be su ffic ien t proof that Kant looked to  the 
"Kteotiwe" W ill as the rea l battle-ground fo r Morality, and, 
i f  th is  fa c t i s  grsBXted, i t  has important implioatloBs fo r  
the charge which mtsards makes that a l l  opposing theories of 
Freedom are rea lly  grounded upon the "Indifference" of the Will,
In  any discussion of the "Indifférence" of the w ill i t  i s  
impossible to avoid some discussion of Motivation aad Radimol 
Bvil# Yet, thsko subjects can be trea ted  only in  a  very 
lim ited iffiuiner In the present discussion because Motivation 
and Radical Hvll must be discussed in  g reater d e ta il a t  a  
la te r  stage, tha t i s ,  in  th e ir  re la tio n  to  the concept of 
Freedom, However, i t  Is  quite impossible to keep these factors 
co%#letely outside the present dismmslon, but anything said
, K* P, V. 141#(2) K, p . V» 180#(3) Religion# 80»
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a t  th is  stage most be ten ta tive  and subject to  aodificatlcn*
I f  the abeve-ewmtioned evidenee upon Kant’s troatmsnt of the 
"zjLectlve ' s i l l  is  generally oorreot, then certa in  implica-* 
tions are inev itab le , (%d # e y  sd.ght be sta ted  cnder the 
followica points»
(1) I f  Kant actually  taught th a t the "Bleotiva" Will was 
crucial to  ree l Morality, and possessed within i t s e l f  that 
e leam t of Freedem, nei#tive end positive aspoots, then, the 
e r i t i e i s n  of Hartnam oonceming Kant upon th is  phase of 
Freedom laikt be modified. In  order to ^ee What modification 
i s  required, i t  might be helpful to give some indication 
ebat kind of Freedom Bartmana weuld postulate fo r  the human 
W ill. As already noted, he was oonvinced th a t Kent had 
fa ile d  to see th is  valuable aspect of Freedom which he, Eart- 
mmm, now explains. To a  lim ited degree, Hartmann oenflfsm 
Caird’s critic ism  of Ib n t’s view of Freedom tha t i t  is  a  one­
way theory of Freedom; tha t i&, i t  is  Freedom of the "Rational" 
W ill to express i t# e lf  regardless ef subjective p rincip les, 
fbtrtsuom writeet-»
"Kant was sight in  maintaining tha t the w ill i s  not in  need of being lees d e tm m in ^  but fj£ biMbig more deter­mined than a more naturel ea ti^ . ^^Xii piece of the
^oet Wholly ato the eth ica l p rino ip le , a  tronsfem atien  ef the pxeh-
ftoee# % et deteredned from wi&emt’,  the positive phsuee a t be intredooed ’so mesh the more d ermined fxem th in* . But since inner determiaatima ttcmhee
lem is  here ta c i t ly  eeeumsd# Freedom of the w ill re­fe rs , fceerdine to  m et, exclusively to Ihs autonoey ef Who prinmiple. ms had a o b ta in  rig h t te  be sa tis f ie d  with tM e point of view; fo r him the princip le i s  a i^ o re d  in  the p rac tica l reasw . His m ra l law is  va lid  as leg ie la tiv e  act of roasen. And i t  I f , more­over, the ssms reseom Which demonstrates i t s  fre*>dem in  following ^  moral low. Bet, sgbordinatix^ i t s e l f  to  i t s  own law, i t  is  ac tually  detersdaod by i t s e l f .Homes the autonoey of the principle is  itk  çrm autonomy,"
Vory l i t t l e  oaa be said to  deny that thlL is  a real aspect of 
Kent’s teaching upon the Freedom of the W ill, but i t  i s  # b -  
mitted th a t th is  "autmeomy" of tho ra tiona l prinoiple i». only 
one aspoct of Knot’s discussion of Frsedum#
(1 ) Bthimp, V b l.3 . Fuge 102,
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M already ebeerved, the above evidmee upMi J&ast’e aaalyaie
of the place end fenetlen  of the "elective" *111 is  drmm
from a wide ajtmx of hie dteoueeiom of Freedem, end, i f  th is
##dm eo is  velid , the eqphaeie upon the "Rational" « i l l  «met
be balmeed by the evtdeneo availablo cm the "^leotive" f i l l *
Yet, fo r tho time being, le t  i t  bo aemjueed th a t Eartseem has
given expresttlan to  the only possible toeery of view
of Fveedesu i t  now follows th a t Hartmann m e t attempt a
eeereetion of the Kantian analysis, and th is  he does in  the
folloelng sxtreeti-^
"Bot for the person th is  means th a t he i s  not bound to  the moral daim  of tW  prinoiple* He may greep the trend of the eoemondaent and surrender himself to  i t ,  but he may also not se ise  upsn i t ,  indeed he ssqr em- preesly re je c t i t .  H atum lly in  the l a t te r  ease he i s  determined by other powers, whether these be only natural forsee in  him# in c lin a tio n s, i«%pulee#, in -  k tino ts , e r moral tendeneie# from other sources, whieh prove to  be strengmv# Were h is  w ill ooereed by the ought, i t  would not be a  moral w ill and his decision weuld not be isputed to  him# Be i s  responsible w ly  in  so fa r  as he i s  not eenstm lned, th a t i s ,  only so fa r  as he hue in  face of the prinoiple a  freedom for or g a in s t .  Hanoe i t  fellows th a t freedom s i ta is t s  not only as against natural lam, but also as against the q ^ g ^ a s  a p r in ^ ^ e .  She Ought and the Will do
I t  ie  th is  theory of Freedom whieh Hartmnu te rse  "The
Antinomy e f the ought" th a t he wee i t  to  oorreot Kant’s
view# Be charges Kfictt with not having seen th is  "higher"
idea of vroedsm, of being over-hasty in  h is analyLis of the
problem, and of being "sne-sldsd". Hartmann mmtioos that
the soholattios saw th is  problem when indioatod the fact
th a t man oould "sin" against God#... mrtrnam continues;
"Hottt does not meet the point th a t, wbm faced ter the law, Beaeon Whiqh promulgates the law o%%ht to  hove freedom of desision, th a t therefore, %d%en fas# to face with i t s e l f ,  the p rac tica l reason ought to be free#"(2)
2n the face of such a  passage, i t  is  almost inK^ssidble to 
avoid the eencluslon tha t Hartman hoe not only nUunderstood
;i) athics# vol.3. Page 104. Î2) " " 3. * 102#
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XBôti bot bas imrolvad the oonoept of Freedom It&alf In  hspe- 
I s s s ,  i f  not abk^ord contradiotioai. Surely Kmt ta  rlg#% 
wbaa he in s is t#  tha t the "Rational" W ill, bhioh not only 
prooclgatss, but "oreatss" the losr oamot be a t ooofliet with 
i t s e l f  by posssskiag some supposed "freedom" to  oppose i t s  
ihhsrsot oharaotsr? I t  i s  believed tha t Hartmcan hGL asked 
a  very important question in  the analysis of human i'reeds% 
but tha t the la t te r  e rtrao t i t  m et unfortunate in  i t s  method 
of saqMPessiom.
Hseever, l e t  i t  be assumed that Hartmann i s  oontmading fov a  
Freedom whleh is  re e l , personal and positive as agcdnst mere 
determination by the objective prinoip le , o r ,  as he terms i t ,  
the "Ought” . Is  i t  true that Kant never earn th is  supposed 
"higher” view of Freedom, or tha t "the Kantlmo dootrins of 
Freedmm overwhelmed th is  i_ide of the problem"? Û>) i f  the 
above evidsnee upon the nature and operation of the "liieotive” 
« i l l  i s  e s rree t, them, the aosmer to  such a  questlcn must be 
a  da<^ive negative. Kant cam thi& problem in  a l l  tha t he 
wrote upon Freedom, and the evidence indieates tha t he f e l t  
i t s  imereaslng importanoe, and, u ltim ately, be gives olemr 
récognition to  th is  problem by the d istinc tion  of the "Rational” 
and "Hective" w ill. F inally , h is treatment of Radical Hvil 
leads him to  a position #%1<  ^ is  almost id sn tiea l wito Hart- 
mama. I t  i s  octal t te d  th a t the extract already given on hew 
a  man most make of himself Good or Bad i s  enough to  confirm 
sWh a  statem ent, but the following also adds cenfirmatioQ:-
”%#st any d ifficu lty  should be found in  the expressionidilch| i f  i t  memat (as usual) the eppesite ef the so w ta  of actions from freedom, would be d irec tly  centra- dictory to  the predle&tes SMnSlly good or e v il , i t  i s  to be observed, tha t by the n s w e  of man we mean here only the LUbjective ground of the use of h is  freedsm in  general Ctaidsr (Ajective moral lens) whioh prsoedss every act th a t f a l ls  under the ssnssiw, moerevsr th is  gnmtnd l i e s .Xhls subjective ground, however, oust i t s e l f  again be always an act of freedom (else tha use or Urn abuse WT maa*e e lective w ill In rsLpect of the moral law oould not be imputed to him, nor the good or bad in  him be
(1 ) mthice. Vol.3« Page 100#
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called merci)* Gmeeguwtly, the source of the bed eam et l i e  in  any object th a t determinem the e lective w ill through in d ia a t io n , o r eaay n a tu i^  impulse* but only in  a ru le  th a t the elective w ill mokes fo r i ^ e l f  fo r the use of i t s  freedom, th a t i ^ , In  a masim#”(l)
Sere, Kant ind ica tes, in  more careful terms than Hastsutm, 
the  fac t of freedom against determinatiom by the merely 
% aturcl % He re jec ts  a l l  eoteuses th a t would put the deter- 
mining; principle In the merely subjective ground, nod in ­
s is t s  upon the re a lity  of Freedom even in  the face of evexy 
object th a t would determine the "elective” w ill  through in ­
c lina tion  or natural impulse. Kant demies, in  th is  en tren t, 
th a t man can claim Freedom from xeepomsibility fo r  h is actions 
by taking cover under h is  seasucos % sture”, and in s is ts  
th a t sensuous acts are done b) the Freedom of ^ e  "Elective" 
W ill.
When Kant cooms to  emadne the fac t th a t man i s  a  tidmmr”,
L#d mot always determined by the objective princip le or the 
**Onght'*| he i s  very pninstaidng in  h is  analysis of the ^ n se s  
fo r  th is  tr#m gree#im . m  is  w illing to  admit tha t there 
might be degrees of % in” or Radical avil* F ir s t ,  there i s  
the F ra ili ty  of the hmmm heart or w ill; th a t i s ,  man adopts 
the Good lam la te  the msrim of the "m eotlve" S i l l ,  be t th is  
adoptim  is  weaker then the "inclination” , second, there i s  
the degree of transgression known as "Impurity”* zy th is  
term imct meanL the terwWncy of the human hwurt oar w ill to  
mix i t s  motives in  carxyimg out the d ictate^ of the moral Lam# 
Mm introduose ether «prtng^ to  determine h is  "Elective” Will 
besides those which have th e ir  origin in  the Ism* Third, 
there comas the s t ^ e  or degree of "Perversity”* Kent i s  
qwite w illing  to  caH  th is  s ta te  "oonuptlen” , end i t  ccnslsts 
in  the propensity of the "Elective” « i l l  te  "prefer” s p r i t e  
other thm  those of the low. Thus, the "Elective” «111 re­
verses the moral order, and uses i t e  "Freedom” deliberately  to
(1 ) Religion* 91#
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put i t s  in  place of objective lam. Tble enreful
analytile of why the btmn heart does not f u l f i l  the law 
surely constitu tes an analysis of what Hartmann tonou the 
"iVitiaony of the ot%ht”. In fao t, again Kant is  more care­
fu l mod detailed  than Hartmam in  the onaly is  of "opposition” 
to the 1ms. However, fo r Kant i t  is  more than mere "oppo­
s it io n ” to the lam, i t  is  wickedness, rad ical mx$Ji E vil, 
and transgression of the lam. Psshaps there is  no more 
eiqahatic statement upon human wickedness in  eth ical writings 
than the f  o llov li^  mnde by Kant in  h is description of re­
jection  of the uughts-
"But those sti&y 8%es (sto ics) mistook th e ir  eneay, who i s  ac t to  be sougla in  the natural, and, though undis- cip liaed , St i n  openly displayed and mfllsgtttsedf appe- t i to s  of the sensory; fo r the inward fee Is  m  in v is ib le  occult enssy, InHdng behind the fuCbnshSm Of reason, mad upon tha t accsmnt ju s t so muA the more damgerous end deadly. Drnqr celled  on wisdom to  amfce a wtmad against F olly , which allown i t s e l f  unomares to be in ­veigled ami wonsted by tbs sma^osy, instead of calling  %)cn her to  wage war upon the wicssdns&s of the human h ea rt, wbiWt, by ssnl-de&trsyix^ prinelplevi secretly  . sape and wmdermlnes the moral fo rtresses of the soul."CD
Hartmann wants Freodom agolnst the determination by im tural 
causes. Kant has given i t  to  him. Bartmam wants Freedsn 
against determination of In d ln a tlcn s . Kant has given i t  
to  him. Further, Hartmann wonts : reodom ag in st oetermina- 
tic n  by the objective p rincip le , the ought. Kant has given 
i t  to  him, but he has given more. He has given the resu lts  
of onsh a  Freedom; i t  is  nothing les& than the conoept s f  
Radical B vil.
I f  the preceding discussion of Kant’c view of Freedom has 
succeeded in  clarify ing  the fac t th a t he granted real Freedom 
to  the "Hlectivo” Will as against "Batoro” on tho one hood, 
and as against the "Ought” on the other; i t  has not yet an­
swered la  any sa tisfac to ry  manner the ctaxge which Determinism 
brings j^a ln st Kent’s exposition. as already noted, adwards
(1) Religion. Bk.2. (senple’s Translation)
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would not a l l e w  Ksnt postulate "Presdem” of tho "Ratlasal" 
w ill  In the manner &,mt is  inclined to do. For there cm  
he l i t t l e  doubt th a t Kant never roaiay gave up th ic  view fgt 
Freedom which made the "Rational” Will a  noosuael eauee.
Yet, i t  hardly be doubted, in  view of the above evidence, 
tha t Kont al«o postulated "Preedem” in  the "^Oeotive” w ill.
I t  might be d if f ic u lt ,  i f  not i%>osLible, to  reoonaile ttaee  
two centres of Freedom. Hswever, such a task i s  not Inperm* 
tiv e  fo r the present dl#ouLsion. The fa lie n t ddffioulty  mew 
oonfrenting th is  discussion sf %aDt*s*Defene#”ef Freedom i s ,  
assuming th a t Kant aotually  grsnted Freedom to  the "Bleotive" 
W ill, how ean such a postulation of Freedom have escaped the 
D stercdnlst’s dhasge of teMLng "indifferent'*? The proMen 
Wight be pot in  these terms. I f  the "Eleotive" Will i s  free  
to shoose the Good or the Bad, that i s ,  i f  i t  hae ooaplets 
Liberty to be determined by the objeetive prinoiple or the 
sensuous inc lina tion , then, i t  appears to  stand ecmewhers 
between the objective princip le and the jtaeuoos ia e lin a tio a . 
That i e ,  p rio r  to i t s  actual ccssmitmsnt In £oqy p articu la r act 
of w ill, i t  wppeors to  be poised between two d iffe ren t and 
opposing princip les of action. uf course, cnee i t  has chosen 
a courae of ac tion , i t  i s  committed to thit, p articu lar course, 
and is  "determined"} therefore, décision means ^onas form of 
Determination. Yet, the problem is  th a t, p rio r to  a particu­
la r  deals ion, the W ill, peesessed of i t s  Freedom, appears to  
stand UB-oommitted to  any particu lar course of action , m  
other words, i t  appears to  be "Weutrel" o r , as bjdaards vjould 
say, "XBdlf fereu t" . so th a t, i f  the previous discussion ef 
Kant ’e view <MT Freedom does not succeed in  ccndeanlng the 
"Rational” os g u ilty  of the «âiarge of '«Indifference", the pre­
sent dicous^im  « h t  mcamine the tAarge of "Indifferenoe” m  
i t  stands rela ted  to  the "Elective” will} and i t  ie  against 
th is  "second” aspect of Kant’s theory of Freedom th a t the A arge 
of "Indlfferenoe” appears to besoms impressive#
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I t  hae alreWy be«a noted how Bdear# would have declined 
to permit Kent to  olaim for the "Rational” Will tha t absolute 
spontaneity whioh he postuXates of such a w ill, ana how be 
would have inmieted that tuoh a  Will cane within the category 
of "Indifferenee”# PoAap# the following mctraot indioat«i 
beet how Bdwardo oonoeived the "X&differenoe" of the "Elootive” 
Will. ae ie quoting one of hie opponents tMio aays tha t 
human Freedom oonslets In t-
"Every man hoe power to  a c t, or to refra in  from aotihg, %reeable with, or contrary to , ogy motive that p re se n ts .,# Man hBUi power, and ie ae modb a t lib e rty , to re­jec t the motive tha t does prevail, as he has power, and is  a t  lib e r ty , to re jec t those motives that do not In order to constitute a moral agent, i t  i s  neoessaxy tha t he Wxould have power to  ac t, or to  r e f r a i n  from noting, upon such motives as he peases,"C D
Again, th is  thesis upon human Freedœn is  put in  rather awkward 
terms, and, in  i te  present form, does not express adequately 
the Freodem of the ^Elective” w ill in  i t s  most precise term*. 
However, Hdwards saw th a t, behind the complicated erpre&sion, 
there was a  re a l abjection to  his exposition of Determinism, 
and he takes time to  reply to th is  objection. The argument 
ef h is oppment i s  that Freedom of the Will consists net im 
dting as one please^, but in willing as one pleases. Wdwards 
is  quite ready to admit lib e rty  ef action as the out-come of 
the pleasure of the W ill, but h is opponwfit is  not sa tis f ied  
with th is  kind of lib e rty , and in s is ts  upon Liberty to  choose 
not only how to a c t, but how to wil^. that i s ,  not only to  act 
Uixm Motive, but to choose the motive upon whiaii to ac t.
This complicated question Motivation must be dealt with In  
a la te r  section, but here, i t  most be examined as i t  stands 
related to th is  question of the "Indifference" e f  the w ill.
I f  the torn "motive" is  taken in  i t s  most general ksnse m  an 
In ternal impulse to action, than, the argument of the oppoomt 
of '^ a rd s  is  tha t the yfill can l i f t  i t s e l f  above a l l  in ternal 
impulses to cation, review them in a s ta te  of impartiality, or
(1) The Freedom of the w ill .  P t.2 . Sect.lO .
\-  ODô -
tton-conialtœont, and than fin a lly  decide to accept a particu­
la r  factive aii a course of action. This, ea /t Mvmrde, ie  
u tterl^ ’^ inccmoeivablo, and claeeifiofc wUoh a view of Freedom 
as tho "Indifference" of the î^ ill. TKsmp tho W o rta o t 
question is  does Kant’a Freedom of the "Elective ' Will corxee- 
pcod to th is  Freedom o f  "indlfferm ce"?
K«it does not use the term "Motive" in  a eco&iateat mmmer. 
Sometimes, he gives the impreeeioo tha t he i s  using Motive 
in  opposition to more "Impulee"^^), bu t, a t another tim e, he 
uees m tlve in  a Iocs exact manner* Yet, th is  question
of tho correct use of the term "Motive" is  not v i ta l  to  the 
UDderst<inding of Kant's position o<nceming tho reedom of 
the "JO.ective" 3111. The above-mantioned evidence cppcare 
conclu iVO ao indicating tha t Kant conceived of the **Blective* 
17111 as being able to  choose faotivation hy Inclina tion  or by 
the Objective p rincip le . «hen Kattt is  speak in,g of tho re­
form 0 - a  had aen to  a  oood can, ho says i -
"The only way th is  d ifficu lty  can be not over i^ , that a revolution is  neoeesnsy fo r the mmxtal di^poi^ltim, but a gradual reform fo r the ^ML.lble tempérament, which opposes obstacles to  the former; and bei%% nocQs^eay, most therefore be possible} tha t i s ,  ehm  a  man revoreoe the ultim ate principle of his byumioh he is  a  bad man by a  single immutai^ resolution (and in  eo doing puts on a new man);" w)
Hero, f.ont eonceivee mm as capable of being affected and 
detorcdnod by c ith er Inclinations or the objective princip le , 
the former w i l l  tm km  him bad, the la t te r  w ill make him  good, 
and I t  l e  the "^ec tiv a"  M ill which must moko the choice by 
a "elngle imnotable resmlutlCB". I t  is  in  Kudh m  expression 
of the '«Eleotive" ? /lll, and in  sudb a view of Freedom th a t 
Kant corresponds to the above-mentlaued "Freedom of Xndiffmr- 
onoe", ond Edr \rds would have no hesita tion  i n  putting gush 
a view of reedom In the same category m th a t of hie opponent# 
Without anticipating too much the la te r  diecu. ^loa ef imtlva-
(1) Gd. 36,(8) Gd. au*(3) Religion# 36,
-  1 9 7  -
t ie n  and and ‘Radical J v i l  and . rcecSow, poriiapt. the
objections 01 ..^ordL  ag-iin^t t h i .  ty,-c of i-rocdon can be 
put in  tho follow ing tcr-iic:-
(1) immrds ie  quite unable to  conceive of ta le  vo litional
'*paueo"5 t a ie  s t a t e  o f v o l i t i o n a l  " n e u tr o l ity " ,  betw een two 
d if f e r e n t  and op p osing  I n te r n a l ic p u ls o e  to  a c t io n ,  th a t  i e ,  
unlOw i t  be gru n ted  th a t  such  a c ta t o  l e  a  e ta to  brought 
about by a  p r io r  a c t  of ;111. That tlio  - f i l l ,  th e  eoul, or 
th e  agon t e o n , by an a c t  o f v . l l l ,  stand  bach fr o n  con tandigg  
in t o m a l  iu y u le c e  caul v iew  them ae po.^lL lG  co u rses  o f  
a c t io n ,  'dwardc I s  q u ito  ready to  adm it, but he I n e ie t e  th a t  
t h ie  c m  bo done o n ly  by n  a c t  o f w ill. He coIÎjb th lc, a c t  
o f  f i l l  "Fulpension" o f a c t ic m , but d en ie s  t l ia t  i t  i s  tfue- 
p en s io n  o f  v o l i t i o n .
To s ta to  th is  po in t perhapa more c le a r ly : the advoccilos of
tho freedom of the i l l  who declare  tlia t Jic ,,'111 "Free" 
to  say hoy i t  ..ha ll bo determined r u s t ,  l a  view cf «uoh a  
freedom, p o s tu la te  an Inherent f re e  do::, cf fuc . . i l l  to  tu rn  to  
the  GOLÛ or the v i l ,  th a t I t ,  to  be determined the eenmuou# 
or b-y tho sublime. How, to  ce c.eterm.nod by e i th e r ,  i t  m e t  
be in  c ta to  oi' :-;on-cora;v.itment to e ith e r , tio it i*-, i t  mumt 
be in  a p o e itlo n  to  accept or to re je c t  os i t  -gd llf.
Therefore, in  th is  s t a te  of non-oommitmont, i t  muet be im­
p a r t i a l  or n e u tra l ,  or in d if fè re n t  to  e i th e r ,  u n t i l ,  out of
i t s e l f ,  i t  w illa  to  accept one and re je c t  the o ther coure# of
ac tio n  or determ ination . This s ta te  of in d ec is io n  oonatitu t##  
i t s  re a l Freodom. I t  ie  h e re , in  the  W ill 's  a b i l i ty  to  tu rn
one way or anotiiev, t.ia t re a l yrecdon ic  s ide  to ex ist*
Hartmam puts h is  view of i reedom in  these  term es-
"There must be freedom in  two toncos; not only freedom over agc.inst the regu larity  of nature (tho caueaX nwm  and o ther o n to lo g ica l d e te rm in a tio n s), but ec^uilly there uuet be freedom over against moral prinoiple# and the demands of the Ought - whether over against an im­perative or against the values (the antlncnqr of the Ought). The w ill must have soop# precisely  as regards them# p&k- alplofi by whioh as a m rsX  w ill i t  ought to allow i t s e l f  to be detorm ned#" (1)
(1) athies* Vel.3. pgg#
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Kant hsL already maid:- "What rsan Im or ought to be in  a  
moral monso he must make or must have made himmelf. Both 
rnoftt be the effect of hi& free elective w ill" . (D  I n  other 
wordoy fo r both Freedom eeenm to eonsist in  eoomcious, de­
lib e ra te  deterninatlon Yxy e ith er the Good or the Bad, and 
th ie  i@ nothing more or lose than the poetu latin^^ of a  e ta te  
of Will whioh ie  somewhere between th e  Good and th e  Bad.
Bdeards charges each a view of Freedom with boing inconsis­
ten t with i t s e l f  in  that i t  postulates "Freedom” of a s ta te  
Whicdi i s  in  i t s e l f  a s ta te  h ro o ^ t about by a p rio r act of 
Will. Such a view of Freedom confuses "suspension” action 
with ”eulpension” of V olition. Ednards wants to knw; the 
"purpose ' behind th is  s ta te  of vo litional hesita tion  between 
the Good and the Bad, I f  i t  1» said th a t the purpose” i s  
to  aoice a "Freedom" decic Lon, then, sajs. dwords, %  the veiy  
fac t t2mt th is  t ta te  has a ’purpose" meanc th a t I t  has been 
inaugurated by m  act of w ill, and thlt. "prior act of w ill 
eancols out a l l  ta lk  of Freedom within th a t  supposed s ta te  
of Bollberation.
<2) I f  i t  is  argued by these exponenti of 'reodoa of the Will 
tlia t t3Uoh Freedom oan only aoasiot in  tho a b il i ty  of tho w ill 
to choose hgw i t  sh a ll be determined, rdsards rep lies tha t 
th is  argument ie self-contradictory . For the Will to choose 
how i t  sh a ll be determined means that i t  is  able to choose 
the "motives" by Whicdi i t  sh a ll be detenztlaod. Bow, scya 
ZMbmrds, the advocates of üuch a  view of Freedom osm ot avoid 
finding themselves Involved in  a hopeless dilemma, (a) i f  
they in£ià»t tha t Freedom con&ltts in  a  choice of Motives, then, 
the s ta te  of FreediH in  which th is  choice muat bo made most 
bo a s ta te  in  idiich the "free" Will i&i e::%)ty ol’ notive. %o& 
i s ,  i t  i s  a Ltate of complote "Xndlffereaoe", or "motiveless 
n eu tra lity " . I f  th is  i s  the case, how ie I t  possible tha t
(1 ) Religion# #0.
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a  m t l v e  s h a l l  he choe^x w ith in  a  e t a t e  w hich i c  o o n p le te ly  
erq jty  o f  M otive? <h) I f  i t  i e  a rgued  t h a t  th e  « i l l ,  i n  t h i e  
s t a t e  o f D é l ib é r â t : m  betw een th e  Good end th e  B ad, i e  actuated 
by a  L o lf-d e to rm ln ed  m t i v o ,  th e n ,  eaye Fdm r<L , th e  « i l l ,  
bo lgg  a lre a d y  I n  p o a ee c e io n  o f  a  * )tlv Q , i e  u&ing a  W tiv e  
to  ohoooe a  M otlvo Which i e  a  f l a t  c o n t r a d ic t io n ;  and t h i e  
o x le ta n o e  o f  a  ^ e l f -d e to rm in ed  m t i v e  point©  back  to  a  p r i o r  
a c t  o f viii i n  « « e le c t in g ” th i©  a c t i v e .
Therefore, the ©uppooed s ta te  of ^Freedom" 1© actually  e  
s ta te  of Determination hy a  p rio r act of tho «/ill in  creating 
such a  s ta te , mhwrd© is  quite w illing to a d r it tha t there 
are* occasions in  #iich  a s ta te  of suspension might arise#
mind e r  soul might be confronted with a hoet of p o ss iM li-  
t ie s  of action# This case of suspension concerns net only 
actions of the bedy but jndgaonts of the mind. However, 
th is  s ta te  of suspension is  not a  s ta te  of N eutrality , fo r 
the mind is  d e # ly  involved in  the problems productive of 
such a s ta te . Further, i t  ie  not a s ta te  of Freedom beeaaee 
i t s  very existeoce Is oonditicned by a p rio r ac t of the « i l l  
to  deliberate what ccurse of action to  follow, or t t a t  judg- 
jMBt to deliver. m  other words, the mind, or W ill, sus­
pended action hy a "prior” action, and i t  did thiw because i t  
was possessed by a Motive, Which, in  the system of Zdwards, 
was the prevailing prefercnoe of the mind, or i te  view of 
tho apparent Good. The Will never departs from th is  pre­
vailing preference of the Mnd, but i t  xsight az^^pcod ootiom 
w t i l  th is  prevailing preference of the mind is  c la r if ie d  or 
made deliberate .
(3) EdWords would have a «special word of critic ism  fo r Kant, 
but a l l  the implications of th is  critic ism  oonnet be s ta ted  
u n til  the discussion of yreedea and Radical E v il. However, 
here md now, i t  can be observed th a t Kant tr io s  to  link  a 
free  "Elective” w ill with a  disposition tha t is rad ioally  a v i l .
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Further, h is argaaont for hucuan raformation assupoe iAat out 
of th is  f re e , "jaeotlvo" W ill oan ooae a lâDtivo, or an "obeo- 
lu te  lirjAXtablo résolution" by Which the r a d i c a l l y  bod d is­
position oan p u t on tho now smn ot Morality. A^aln, 2ont 
oddtfi t h a t  I t  wat tho froo "Elootivo” W ill t/hlch warn the 
osmo of the bad d isposition; mâ Edwards would want to  know 
hoc those tXiizigs can hang together. For him, the d isposition, 
o r oharaoter and the w i l l  are jaterehnngeable terms. Bo 
eam ot oonœlve of the w ill standing cmt&ide of the ^zaraote», 
more eo, i f  i t  is  agreed tha t i t  i s  the w ill which imkao the 
oharaotor Good or Bad. Kmt fu rther oonplloatae tho suhjeet 
by in s is tin g  th a t, in  addition to tha iso la tio n  of the free , 
"Elective" W ill, tiiore i s  the unoorruptod "Eational” W ill ,
#& ich, i n  s p i t e  of th e  Radical E v i l ,  o r  e io k e d n e ss  of the 
haman h e a r t ,  r e s a ix ^  im to W w d  by th e  p e rs o n a l and p o s i t i v e  
AVÜ o f  th e  c h a r a e to r  to  which i t  bo long^. The w hole j« eM eB  
o f Toot's vim? o f Freedom i s  f u r t h e r  ccmplioated t y  the m at 
t h a t  he i n e i e t s  t h a t  i t  i e  th e  f r e e ,  " E le c t iv e ” W ill  wbieh 
chooses th o  s u b je c t iv e  ameim as a g a in s t  the o b je c t iv e  prinaip l# .
'Every bad a c t io n ,  When we t o ^ r o  i n t o  i t s  r a t i o n a l  o r i^ L n , m ast be viewed as i f  th é  mon had  f n l l m  in to  I t  d i r e c t l y  from th e  e t a t e  of inr^omoe. For V hatevor suy  have bwen h ik  p re v io u s  M kh& ot, end of \ihatwvu» k in d  th e  n a tu r a l  c au se s  influm oi% %  him  may b e , e& ethev m oreover th e y  a r e  i n t e r n a l  o r  e x t e i m l ,  h ie  a c t io n  i s
T h is  o o m p lic s ted  q u o ^ tio n  o f  TVIX m d  I tm e e n o e  ra% t be d e a l t  
w ith  l a t e r ,  th e  m l n  p o in t  h e ro  i s  t h a t  Rant i n s i s t s  upon th e  
" r e s p o w i b l l i t y "  o f th e  " F lo a tlv e "  W ill f o r  R a d ic a l a v i l ,  and  
l a t e r ,  t r i e s  to  say  t h a t  t h i s  same " e l e c t iv e ” W H  must p ro ­
duce ‘re fo rm " o f  c h a r a c te r  from  w ith in  i t s e l f .  Kant ad m its  
t î ia t  i t  i s  im posoiblQ  to  d e s c r ib e  bow an  e v i l  t r e e  o m  b e a r  
su ch  ood f r u i t ,  and F d m rd s would view  » u ^  a a  admis b ie n  as 
a  oomc^lote r e p u d ia t io n  o f i t e  t h e s i s .  r o r  vdv/ax'ds, th e  W ill
(1 ) Religion. 43.
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l8  ctlTînyp in  poaeession of acaae "eontant” , m<i I t  ie  th ie  
qontWBt which Wwa i t  Good or Bad. I f  i t  porfozw Evil, 
tha t lii, w ills i t ,  i t  ic  in :«a&o6ftioa of iTvll, and i t s  S e ll 
ooatont ic proof of ito  "inability" to w ill Good.
The pro#ant section hae attempted to deal with the ’•tnd lffer- 
anoe" of the Will as that te rm  jstonda re la ted  to Kant’s 
D@f moc of Freedom* The dl*e«o»ion hae bad to sove In a 
very re s tr ic ted  area because th is  problem aaict arise  in  e ther 
section© of th is  work* However, i t  i s  d if f ic u lt ,  in  th i#  
lim ited area, to see how Kant can eeoape the charge of "in­
difference* of the Will as u ttered  bty Determinism. I t  
Tidght be argnsd th a t too much emphasis has been put upon 
Kant's smalysis of ifee "sleotivo" w ill; y e t, in  reply to 
such an argument, i t  must be in sisted  that th is svêoûm of 
the "Elective* Will ctOKds rooted In Kant’© e th ica l syetem, 
and tMt: e th ica l system can be preserved csily as th ie  type 
of FreedOTi i s  etresiiOd, Kant brings tbo^o two factor# to­
gether in  a passage whlWi cpitomisee h ie  moral philosopi^j-
"H ityz Thou sublim e and m ighty m m  ti^at d o s t  e o tm # #  n o th in g  c h a W n g  o r  l a e ln u a t in g ,  h u t r e q u i r e e t  s # -  m is s io n , and y e t  s e o k e e t n e t  to  move th e  w ill hy  th rm e t-  cn lg g  ought t h a t  wouM  a ro u se  n a tu r a l  a v e r e iw  # »  tm m o r, b u t aerely h o ld e s t  f o r t h  a  law td iloh  o f  i t s e l f  f in d #  e n tre n o e  i n t o  th e  mlixd, and y e t  g a in s  r e lu c ta n t  r e v e r -  eeuçe (though not alw ays o b e m e n c e ) , a law  b e fo re  # h i #  a l l  i n c l i n a t io n s  a r e  dunh , even though ih m  s e c r e t l y  couater*w ork  i t ,  lA a t o r ig in  is  th e re  w orthy  o f th e # ,  and Wzere i s  to  be fo und  th e  ro o t  o f  th y  z m l e  d e e o m t which prm xdly r e j e c t s  m il k in d re d  w i # t h e  in c l in a t io n # ;  a  ro o t  to  be d e r iv e d  from  Which i s  th e  in d ls p a a s a h le  o m a d itim  o f  th e  only w orth  which a m  c an  give th e m e lv e e .*(1)
In  th is  pase##^, Kent sees rea l Morality and rea l Preedcm,
There &re signs that he tr ie d  to .olve th is  problem by seeing 
tha t the w ill of man i s  "determined” by the Moral law Whi^ 
is  given by the 8 e lf , but there is  olear evidaaie tha t Kaat 
was not sa tis f ied  with th is  solution. This fact might be 
true of some ideal s ta te , but actual sxm 1» capable of bei%%
(1 ) iL p. V# m i.
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govemod by aUbjeotive memlm, and h is rea l "moral morth” 
Qooalfeta not only In hiu giving hinaelf the Moral like, bat 
in  hla "aaoeptix% ' tho Moral Lae, end aooepting i t  eithoot 
the heteronooy of Inelim ation, e r  of Diviae preasure, or 
evm of the ooopulaion of the "Rational” « i l l .  tW e la  
Ksnt H suprema problem, but i t  ia  not only hi© problem# I t  
ie  the problem of a l l  e th iea l etrivimg* 8 t. Paul earn the 
problem when he wrote*- "for I  delight in  tho law of Ood 
a f te r  the inward man, but I  aee another low in  ay mentarc, 
warring against the law of my mind, and barlQging m  in to  eap- 
t iv l ty  to the law of ein w h l^  1» in  sy wwObera«"(l) The 
Founder of the Chriatian Faith aaw i t ,  and perhapL tha t la  
eOiy He sa id :- "Behold, l  atand a t  the door and tenooh, i f  
any men hear ay voioe and open the door, I  w ill oame in#” (2)
To oonclude th is  ra ther lim ited diseuaelon of the ” Indif ferenee" 
of the G ill, i t  Bdght be poaelble to sum w  Kant’e toaobing 
in  the followlhg mamneri-
(1) Ha begina hi# e th ica l dlecuealon with the conoept of the 
"Good” w ill whi(A ia  teneed "Good" not beoauae of whet he 
aueoeed# in  doing in extem al action, but because i t  la  d i­
rected to  action by Beeson# Further, the "geodneK.s” of the 
"Good" Will ia  not perfec t, beoauae i t  acta under duty or 
obligation# Thi# ie  doe to the foot tha t the "Good" w ill 
has to  contend with subjective hindrances, and to be good 
i t  must act mder the commend of Beaeon. In  th is  early  
section of Kant’s eth ioal disousslom, there i^ no dlstinetlom  
between tho "Rational" and the "Elective" will# in  fa c t , 
because there ia  no d is tin c tio n , Kant i s  q u ilty  i^omotlmea of 
using the term "will" in  two d iffe ren t aaaninga# However, 
i t  ia  quite olear th a t he msana "Reason" to bo token ew the 
"Rational" W ill, and the "Good" w ill to  be taken as the 
"mectivo" Will.
(1) Bcmaoa# Jh.7# w .  22,
(8 ) Ch .c. V. 2 6
. Z (8) Latex, Kant makes th is dl&tineti@n between the "Ratienai* 
the "m #etW * W ill, wet, when he ha# and# th ie  d ie- #
 ^ T..  ^‘ tin tttian , Kant eweae to  look upen the % ational” w ill a# ^
' " ite a llv ” fMM. omS t h .  " a iM tlW  « t i l  M "iwtuaUy" f»M .rr -% n e w e r ,  w n  h ew , M  t# r e W tw t  t*  «ajr th a t the "BlM ttv.*
W ill ie fre e  to  ehoose fo r  ox hgainet the "Rational" Will#
Wuxthex, although he hae mode the ’’mational» w ill belong to  )j 
; the enpexemwible, he ia e ie ts  th a t tw a le o t lv e ” W ill a# ^
has a  feupeseemdhle aspect# anpixioally , i t  might ep- 
V peax to  have Fxeeden fox md agaioet the Ww, hot «oaoxdüig
-Sy
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to  i te  mpexeeneible aepeot, th ie ie  net so. Wet, i t  ie  
quit# obeioua th a t the "Sleetiwe** w ill i#  gaining a  new and 
v i t a l  xolo in  mexal deoielone. Further, even in  i t e  e a r l i ^  
oategexy of n&e "Good” w il l ,  i t  ie  deoieive fox neking enb- 
jeetiwe maxim in to  ebjeotiwe piinhii^Mn* Mgwewex, in  th ie  
eegond pheee, the "Kleotlvw” w ill ie  denied tha t power to  act 
"agatoat" the Imu I te  mdn poxpoee appeaaw to be to  ©up- 
pxeee eubjeotive in olln a t iepe and to  "aoeept the hm under,
What Kant hae teemed, eome aammt of " in te lieo tu a l ooatmleim” 
by the pxootieal Boaeen which ie  another to rn  fox the "Rational”# 
% ne, Kant think# he hae earned the righ t to  repudiate aay 
#ar@ e of the "indiffexenoo” of the w ill , and thexw oan he 
l i t t l e  doubt th a t ,  eo fa r ,  he hae kept h ie  teaohiag ooneietont 
M th  awoh a ropudlation.
I f  Kant had kept to  th ie teaehlng upon the xeepmtiw# taehe 
the «’Baiional** mû the "aleetive” W ill, he would hare had 
a  f a ir ly  etrogg oaee fox Ineietlng th a t the "Meotiw#” W ill,
^  hie eyetem, could not pooeibly come within the oategosy 
of "Indiffexenoo” . l e t ,  Kant worOd hare l e f t  a  beet of me- 
f  aolved problem in  h ie”Befenoe”of fxeedem, nod Bd«axde would 
. have elaimed th a t  hie ooooept ef the "Rational” w ill ,  i n  be­
ing an momeed eourwe of m xal and Rational (hmhwt wae, in  
ene eeneo, another form of DetexmWeo, and in  m ethex, gwilty
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of being obaxged with "Zndifferenoe", in  tha t i t  was « eid te
"obooee** the Good without any p rio r purpOi.« or oauee fo r muàk
a ehoiee* aw ever, Kant, lik e  most serious student# of
e th iea l eondnet, was deeply eweemed with the "dual" in te r -
p re ta tloa  of Morality* In  one sense, Morality means to  do,
or to be determined to , the Good* That i s ,  to  ant in  a
manner which ie  ooneistent with moral values* In  another
acmes, Moralily means not merely to do the Good, but to
"ahoose" to  do the Good* That i s ,  to ohooee to do the Good
O Fby a decisive rejeo tictt W  the B vll. Kartsuwn, lik e  Kant, 
sees th is  problem of Morality. Be t;peaks of a  #111 which 
i t  more "fixed" towards v irtu#  os having g reater moral vmlne 
th m  a Will WhlA, in  acy single case, hae to  moke a  "free” 
decision. Tbt, he fasteoe upon ^ e  other aspect of
Morality in  which the w ill i s  "free” to choose between a l­
ternatives of Good and S v il as f in a lly  end fu lly  'te ro l"*
This i s  the problem Which ham ts serious e th iea l thought, 
md Kent was not able to avoid i t s  discussion*
(3) Therefore, Mhen he i s  c s n fm te d  with the concept of 
Radical E vil, he has to make a few amendment# of h is former 
teaching upon Freedom and Morality* H ra t , the oentxe of 
importance b eg to  te  move from the "Rational" to tho "Elective” 
Wills fo r , he has to have some pertcnal and positive basi# 
fo r  Radical B vll, and he omnct place th is  ia  the "Rational" 
w ill, #0 , he gradual ly  boilda up the "Elootiv#* W ill as the 
cause and centre of th is  Radical Evil. Mew, having tokm  
th is  important step , th a t i&, of making the "m ective" w ill  
crucial to  h is  teaching upon th is  LUbjeet; he i s  compelled 
to  make another step* geconjL* Kent is  unable to  re s t  in  a  
pessim istic view of hoaon natu re , he must indicate the nature 
of tho "bad" p rin c ip le , but he must also indicate the triusph 
of the "good" principle*
(1 ) Ethics* Vol*3, Page d i.
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The "BaUonaX" Will ie  in  poeeeeeion of the Moral Xav, mA 
rameine imoorrupted in  the preeenoe of Hadioai 9vil« There­
fo re , i t  ie  not rea liy  reepw eible fo r the existence of 
Redioal Evil. I t  ie the "Eleotive” W ill which ac tually  
makes a man Bad, and i t  mmt be the "Elective" w :ll ehioM 
actually  mokes a man Good, so, Kant co lls on thl& W ill not 
only to  r e s is t  the subjective Inclination^, hut, by an I m- 
mutable resolution, to put on the nee men of Morality* He 
knows perfectly  w ell th a t by teaching suoh a  d œ trine  he has 
se t himself insoluble problems* Mow con Good come out of 
Svil? Kfiw cm  th a t which was the sole, responsible source 
of BsAa#6s became the ^ource of Goodnms? Kmt t r ie s  to  say 
th a t the origin of both Good end Evil is  inecru tib le , but he 
does suggest tha t i t  might be explained as the sc rip tu ra l 
doctrine of the "Hew B irth". Yet, he re s is ts  any Theological 
doctrine of Divine Grace. God might help a mon, but the 
f i r s t  and supreme e ffo rt m s t come from the man’s own W ill, 
th a t ik , h is "free Elective ' t i l l .  Bow, i t  i s  ju s t a t th is  
point that Kmt corrects mudh of h is e a rlie r  t c a ^ to ;  tha t 
the "m ective" W ill, by resis tin g  the m olinationg, indicated 
only a "negative" type of Freedom, For, i t  i s  now cenceived 
as being crucial to  accepting the Bad and the Good princip le , 
md i t s  Freedom i© positive in  that i t  has th is  v i ta l  p a rt to  
play in  making the gelf tru ly  "moral"* Yet, i t  i s  at th is 
point th a t Kant opens himself quite c learly  to the efaarge ef 
"Indifference" in  the "Elective" W ill. He makes h is  p o s itim  
muh more susceptible to such a <Aarge because he seems to 
teach tha t the "Bleotive ' W ill, a lth o u ^  g u ilty  of making a 
decision to  follow the Bad p rincip le , rea lly  remains tmecm- 
tamiaated by the "Badtoess" of the p rincip le , and, a t i t s  am  
"free" choice, oan turn  to  the Good prineip lo , For Bdswds 
th is  i s  s ta tin g  Ind ifference" in  i t s  grossest form. For Mm, 
the Will imist have some content, mû th is  content makes i t  
Good or Bad* To postulate a  Will which can "handle" Good and
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E vil, without being poss#s»#d by them, le  to  postulate e  Will 
%AiOh is  fundammtolly "ind ifferen t” to  Good md E vil.
Edwards in s is ts  th a t the w ill re jec ts  the oomemd because i t  
i s  possessed a  "contrary principle" to the command. I t  
i s  possessed of E vil; and how a w ill possessed of E vil, can 
eapty i t s e l f  of Evil in  the ahtcnee of Divine Grace i s ,  fo r 
Edmards, u tte rly  m thinkehle.
Thus, Kant, by sh ifting  the centre of v i ta l ,  Moral Freedom 
from the "Rational” Will to  the "Elective” W ill, has compli­
cated h is Defence of Freedom, as s u #  a Defence stands re­
la ted  to  Determinism. Further, he has cexplicated the problem 
of "Autonemy”. in  which o rb it of being, "Rational" or 
4aOLeotiv@” W in, docs ree l personality ex ist?  Where i s  a  
man tru ly  and f in a lly  himself? I s  i t  when he i s  under the 
domlnaticm of "Rational” Will? I f  so, how doe# he y  fe e t , 
w ithin himself I mch a  dominatlen? A© already observed, moot 
of the teaehiiig of Kant places "AUtonosy" in  the "Rational" 
W ill hy Which a man possesee# ?r@e#m to  perform the "moral 
law" of # io h  the "Rational" w ill i s  the mithor, and d isre­
gards subjective Inclinations as almost non-existent. The 
«%leotlvo" W ill simply holds in  check, or sweep# aside these 
In d in a tia n s , and the "Rational” Will then f u l f i l s  i t s e l f  ixs 
almost an automatic mecmer. Here, the centre of "Autonomy" 
is  plainly  placed In the primacy of the p rac tica l Reason, and 
the whole matter i s  s tra i# t-fo rw a rd . Yet, when Kant gives
such a v i ta l  role to the "m ectlve" Will in  h is teaching upon 
Radica l E vil, he begins to  s h if t  thi# cagtre of v i ta l ,  de­
cisive ac tion , or "Antonocy" to the «Elective" Will, and the 
"Rational” W ill appears to have the ro le  of simply "holding 
fo rth  the Law”. In  other words, the "Rational" W ill stands 
a t  the door of the c itad e l of hiamwi personality  knocks, 
and i t  i s  only as tho "Elective" w ill opens the door, th a t 
re a l morality begin# to have memiing* This is  the problem 
of the "Indifférence" the w ill .  The w ill con now allew
. ' ) T? vs'i^ ':--.”
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W l  0 » Good to  m to r . i t  om  bo i^oooomA of oAthw tho 
#0#  ## # 0  Good potmoW## omd# fo r  M n rd o , th is  1« th# 
Aostruotimi of a l l  rool «nsOyoio of th# w ill ,  * 3  th# #A  
#3 mil Ffwm&m. mwovor# thor# otmO# tho problem, «nd i t  
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CHAP T B B  8 ZX
UMkm uA Wfft t n
f r —dom and M otlg
"This feeling (reverence. sentiment) which we c a ll the moral feeling is  therefore produced slngply hy reason* I t  does not serve for the estimation of actions nor fo r the founda­tion  ef the objective moral lav  i t s e l f ,  hut merely as a motive to  make th is  of i t s e l f  a maxin. But what name could we more suitably apply to  thigsingular feeling which cannot be coaq^ared to  any pathological feeling? I t  i s  of such a peculiar kind th a t i t  seems to  be the disposal of reason only, and th a t pure p ractica l reason.”
(Kant. The Critique of the P ractical Reason. Sect. 201)
"What ascetic systems do, i s  to  sharpen the antagonism to  a point a t  idiioh reason appears as ju s t the negative of passion. So, with the S to ics, passion is  said to  be s/k: jMjQiggl, i . e .  i t  i s  treated  as a mere foreign intruder in to  tne man, who is  e ssen tia lly , In h is own nature, reason. Passion, therefore, has to be absolutely expelled, tha t reason may be one with i t s e l f  by i t s  own lav and end.Xaht has in  common, with these systems the idea of the moral law as absolutely excluding from i t s  motives the operation of natural desire , which according to him is  essen tia lly  desire fo r pleasure and for objects as means of pleasure; and he has in  common with them also the idea of a pure self-determ ination of reason as the only true source of moral action.
(Caird. The C ritica l Philosophy. Toi.2. Page, 200)
"Perhaps Kant himself was net cœiseious th a t he wpears to  be speaking of two d iffe ren t kinds of motive. 6 e  word ’motive* is  i t s e l f  ambiguous. A motive i s  what moves us; and many people seem to  assume tha t i t  must therefore be something th a t, as i t  wore, pushes or shoves us from behind, as a feeling may be said to  do. They forget tha t we may also be moved by something th a t pulls or a ttra c ts  us, as perhaps the idea of the law m i# t be said to  do."
(Paten. The Categorical Imperative. Page 47)
"How i t  i s  ju s t the same with the feeling of the numinous as with tha t of moral obligation. I t  too i s  not to  be derived tram any other feeling , and is  in  th is  sense * unevolvable ’. I t  i s  a content of feeling th a t i s  qualita tively  sui  gyaeris . yet a t the same time one tha t has numerous analogies with others, and therefore i t  and they may reciprocally  excite or stimulate one another and cause one another to  appear in  the mind.”
(Otto. The Idea of the Holy. Page ^5)
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There le  a preliminary problem In any dlaouaalon of motlva- 
t i w ,  and th is  oonalata of the fac t th a t the term Motive can 
be used In , a t le a s t, tvo vays* f i r s t ,  i t  can be used to  
describe any in te rn a l stimulus vfalch, consciously, or even 
unconsciously, prompts or prevent# a particu lar course of 
action. In  th is  sense, i t  i s  usually termed "impulse" or 
might even be described as some instinctive  reaction. Hero 
the emphasis i s  obviously upon the "feeling" of the agent, 
•econd, the term Motive can be used to  describe a "per­
ceived" influence idiioh proepts or prevents any particu lar 
course of action. In  th is  sense, the te rn  Motive i s  used 
as "intention"; and the emphasis is  upon the "thought" 
aspect of the ag«it*8 v ill in g . T.fl* Green uses the term 
Motive in  the la t te r  sense idien he v r i te s t-
"A motive again being an idea of an end, idiioh a se lf -  conscious subject presents to  i t s e l f ,  and which i t  s triv es and tends to re a lise ."  'T /
This particu lar section of the Kantian Defence of Freedom 
would be much simpler i f  i t  could be claimed tha t Kant used 
the term Motive consistently in  e ither of these two possible 
ways. However, th is  i s  not the case, and thus Kant compli­
cates the discussion of Motivation as i t  stands rela ted  to  
h is Defence of Freedom.
The task of attempting to in te rp re t the Kantian conception 
of Motive would also have been made much easier i f  Kant bad 
been more positive in  h is treatment of Smpirical Psychology. 
As already sta ted , Kant had very strong reasw s for re je c t­
ing the conclusions of such a Psychology as such conclusions 
stood rela ted  to  moral values; but he never takes the
(1 ) Prolegommna to Sthics. Page 92.
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necessary time and space to  c la rify  such reastms or th e ir  
implications. I t  i s  rather fu t i le  to express the wish th a t 
Kant had w ritten a "Critique of Psychology"; yet, h is pro­
found and continuing in te re s t in  th is  aspect of experience 
seemed to  have merited some such work. However, in  the 
absence of such positive treatment of th is  branch of know* 
ledge, i t  might be profitable to attenqpt a very lim ited 
outline of what Kant meant by the term Motive; and the 
following analysis might be accepted as generally correct. 
(A) Motive might be conceived as an Impulse of which the 
agent is  not conscious but which nevertheless drives the 
agent to  perform soomi action. Kant speaks of the possi­
b i l i ty  of the agent f la tte r in g  himself by fa lse ly  taking 
cred it for a noble motive — "idiereas in  fac t we can never, 
even by the s t r ic te s t  examination, get completely behind 
the secret springs of a c t i o n . I t  appears th a t, 
in  such a passage, Kant is  thinking of Motive as a secret, 
hidden drive to  action, working in  the subconscious s e lf ,  
and quite beyond ra tio n a l recognition. (B) Then i t  is  
possible to  think of Kant regarding a Motive as a "desire" 
fo r consciously formulated "end" which the agent seeks to  
rea lise . Here, he seems to  come to the recognition of 
Motive as put fo rth  by Green. However, the end to  be rea­
lised  is  "particu la r" , and the part played by Reason is  
s t i l l  lim ited. Perhaps the following passage supports th is  
fu rther view of Motive j— "The appetitive faculty  which 
depends on concepts, in  so fa r  as the ground of i t s  deter­
mination is  found in  i t s e l f ,  not in  the object, i s  called 
a faculty  of doing or fpfhaai-lne as m  o l.aM ."(2)
(C) Again, i t  is  possible to  perceive in  Kant another 
gradation in  h is view of Motive which might be stated as a 
general principle of action, or a general maxim of action. 
I t  i s  with th is  aspect of Motive tha t Kant i s  most engaged.
(1) Qd. 29.(2) M. d* S. In tro . 11.
1
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He gives many examples of i t s  influence snd speTation.
His well-known instances of the man who dospalrs of l i f o ,  
of the man who borrows money, of the man who tr ie s  to  make 
himself oblivious of his surroundings, and of the man who 
is  se lfish  in  h is prosperity. All these, Kant oonoeivos 
of as acting %q>on Motives which are ra tiona lly  ecnceivod 
princip les, or in  h is own terms -  "subjective maxims".d)
Kant advances many arguments why a l l  such "subjective prin­
ciples or maxims" are inadequate for the purpose of re a l 
Morality. The present discussion of Motive cannot concern 
i t s e l f  with the v a lid ity  or otherwise of such arguments, 
but perhaps the following ex tract indicates^ best why Kant 
thought tha t Motive, in  th is  particu lar sense, was in su ffic­
ien t fo r e th ioal values.
" I f  the w ill seeks the law which i s  to  determine i tampdwr. .1 » . than to  th . fltM sa «T I t .  mudM to b .universal laws of i t s  own d ic ta tion , consequently i fi t  goes out of i t s e l f  and seeks th is  law in  thecharacter o f o f  i t s  objects, there always resu lts  h .t.rw iam r." ':)
Here, and in  many suoh passages, Kant gives the reason why 
he cannot accept th is  kind of Motive, in  the three aspects 
already considered, as adequate for the purposes of Morality. 
% erefore, he passes to  what might be termed his highest 
ooncepticn of Motive (D), ^diich is  a general principle of 
action, purely formal, not based upon Desire, but which 
determines the Will absolutely according to  the Moral Law.
Much e a r l ie r , Kant had discussed d ifferen t aspects of the 
term "Imperative". In a sense, Kant's use of the Hypo­
th e tic a l Imperative covers the th ird  aspect of the term 
Motive, and is  inadequate for the needs of Morality. He saysi-
"F inally , there is  an imperative which commands a certainI t  ' "  -ir  purpof _     „ ___  ___tive is  Categorical. I t  concerns not the matter of
conduct imamdiately, without having as i t s  condition any othe se to be attained by i t . This isq>era-
the action, or i t s  intended re su lt , but i t s  form and the principle of which i t  i s  i t s e l f  a re su lt , and idiat i s  e ssen tia lly  good in  i t  consists in  the mental disposition, l e t  the consequence be what i t  may.. This imperative may be called th a t ef Morality." '3 )
1) Qd. 50.2) Qd. 72.3) Qd. ho. J
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Later, Kant sees i t  is  not enou^ to  declare the existence 
of such a Categorical Inoperative. He must try  and re la te  
i t  to  the human consciousness; and he comes to  the question — 
"How the moral law provides an in terest?" Although he is  
convinced th a t be cannot "explain" how th is  i s  possible, yet, 
h is description of the "Moral Motive" is  an e ffo rt to  des­
cribe how i t  Bight be possible.
However, the f in a l and convincing argument as to iridat Kant 
meant by the term "Motive" must come from his careful analysis 
of what he terms:- "The Motiv##L cdT ft**»
which occupies a large and important place in  "The Critique 
of the P ractical Beascm". I t  is  here th a t Kant comes to 
grips with th is  question of Motivation, and, i t  i s  enly as 
th is  section of his discussion of Freedom i s  emphasised th a t 
a proper appreciation of h is contribution to  12ie very d i f f i ­
cu lt subject can be made. Therefore, i t  is  proposed to  deal 
with th is  section of the Motives of the Pure P ractical Beason 
as Kant's central teaching upon how he conceived of Motive 
as rela ted  to  Morality; and the following, general divisions 
of h is analysis might prove acceptable.
(1) Kant begins by making i t  quite clear th a t he intends 
to  discuss actions idiioh have "moral worth". This i s  im­
portant for any understanding of Kant's analysis ef Motiva­
tion . In th is  section, a t le a s t, he is  not concerned with 
a mere "psychological" investigation of Motivation. This 
decisive, and perhaps, dogmatic departure from usual methods 
of inspecting "Motives" might be viewed with dismay by those 
who are  in terested  only in  the "facts" of Knqxirical Psychology. 
However, there i s  l i t t l e  than can be said a t th is  stage to 
ju s tify  or condemn Kant's deliberate re jection  of the "facts" 
of Psychology as a basis fo r Morality. Later, Edwards, a 
very enthusaistio exponent of "Empidcal Psychology" must be 
given an opportunity to challenge Kant's analysis of Motivation.
(1 ) @d. 97.
w 2 1 2  -
Here and now, an attaiiipt mist bo stade to  understand i t .
Having made i t  quite clear th a t he proposée to  discuss actions 
of moral worth, Kant then proceeds to say th a t, fo r any 
action to  have such moral worth, the Moral haw must deter­
mine the Will d irec tly ; i f  the determination of the Will 
takes place in  conformity to  the Moral Law, but only by 
means of a "feeling", no matter of what kind, then, the 
resulting  action is  Legality rather than Morality# This 
exclusion of "feeling" as a possible determination of the 
WiU indicates Kant re len tless  opposition to Empirical 
Psychology, tha t i s ,  as a basis for morals.
Nov, Kant, makes a statement which indicates h is "ethical" 
handling of the term "Motive"#-
"Now, i f  we understand by mo^ve (or spring) (e la te r animi) the subjective ground of determination of the w ill ofa being whose reason does not necessarily con­form to  the objective law, by virtue of i t s  own nature, then i t  follows, f i r s t ,  tha t no motives can be a t t r i ­buted to  the Divine W ill, and tha t the motives of the human w ill (as well of tha t of every created ra tiona l being) can never be anything else than the moral law, and consequently tha t the objective principle of determination must always end alone be also the sub­jectively  su ffic ien t determining principle of action, i f  th is  is  not merely to f u l f i l  tM  le t te r  of the law, without containing i t s  s p i r i t ." H )
The main point of the ex tract is  that Kant is  in sisting  upon 
"purity* of Ifotive as essen tia l to rea l moral worth, and th is  
i s  in  keeping with the whole of h is teaching of Ethics.
He goes on to say th a t man must not seek for Motives to  
determine h is Will except the Motive of the Moral Law i t s e l f ,  
and he puts the task of th is  section in  these wordst- 
" hence nothing is  l e f t  us but to determine carefully  in  Mha% 
way the moral law becomes a motive, and what e ffec t th is  has 
upon the faculty  of d es ire ."(%) This is  the central purpose 
of th is  particu lar section of the discussion of Motivatien 
by Kant.
I t  is  only as tills  fac t i s  appreciated th a t there is  any 
hope of solving the supposed Sdualism" in  Kant between
ÏU L  p. T. 195. X. p. T. 19».
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Reason end Desire, Many w riters have taken Kant to  task 
upon th is  subject, and have insisted  tha t Kant repudiates 
Desire as u tte rly  unworthy and incapable of affecting a moral 
and ra tiona l b e i n g . Y e t ,  there are grounds for thinking 
i tha t th e ir  c ritic ism  consists of an over-sla^ liflcation  ef 
the problem faced by Kant, In short, there are two major 
considerations which must be borne in  mind when any commen­
ta ry  on Kant is  attempted upon th is  particu lar question. 
F i r s t . Kant is  dealing with Ethics, end not with Psychology, 
He is  talking about what "ought" to  be, and not what actually  
ex is ts . Be w rites under the sign and sp e ll of the Cate­
gorical Imperative, and h is analysis of human nature is  
conditioned by th is  universe of discourse. 
geoomd. i f  Kant appears to  give too l i t t l e  meaning and 
purpose to  Desire, i t  is  because mere Desire as a Deter­
minant of the Will ceases to have any meaning for him when 
found in  a moral and ra tio n a l being. Even Desire cannot 
remain unaffected by the "activ ity" of the moral principle 
in  man. At le a s t, he, d iffe ren t from the animals, i s  
"conscious" of h is Desires, and th is  very awareness prevents 
them from being mere impulsive Determinants of the Will.
In addition to th is  awareness of Desire, Kant conceives of 
man as being continually challenged by h is  very "authorship" 
of the Moral Law. In man the Moral Law is  always present, 
and would be omnipotent but for these recognised "Desires".
As already observed, in  the discussion of the "Indifference" 
of the W ill, Kant progressed in  his conception of "Subjec­
tive Hindrances" to the Moral law. His negative view of 
Freedom tended to make them mere isq>ediment8 to the Law, but, 
la te r ,  these subjected hindrances become po ground of 
Radical Evil. In any case. Desires and Inclinations ef the 
subjective se lf  are never viewed by Kant as mere "empirical 
fac to rs". They are always viewed from within the context
(1) S. Gaird, The O ritiea l Miilosophy. Vol.2. Page 200.J . Watson. Outline of Philosophy. Page 216,
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of nan's moral and ra tiona l nature. Of oouiae, i t  might 
v e il be tha t Kant pays too scant a tten tion  to  them in  one 
aspect of h is system, and then becomes too morbid or hostile  
in  another. Be th is  as i t  may, Kant never looks a t Desire 
except through the eyes of aAf#Mmhs#mbm#!#Bmmhs# of Morality. 
He is  quite incapable of viewing i t  as an im partial psycho­
logical investigator.
(2) I t  cannot be stressed too strongly th a t the supreme 
purpose of Kant, in  th is  particu lar section, i s  "to deter­
mine carefully  in  what way the moral law becomes a Motive, 
and what effect th is  has upon the faculty  of Desire". This 
i s  not an empirical investigation of Motive. Bather, i t  i s  
an investigation of Motive from the point of view of Morals. 
I f  th is  is  f a ta l  to Kant's conception of Motivation, then, 
there is  nothing further which can be said . I t  i s  true th a t 
Kant cannot avoid psyehologioal terminology, but the re su lt 
of such a "psychological" analysis must be something quite 
d iffe ren t from tha t upon which Determinism based i t s  argu­
ments. However, no serious student of human nature who 
grants th a t man is  a moral and ra tiona l being can repudiate 
completely the terms of reference Kant has se t for h is in ­
vestigation. As Kant so often reminds h is readers, i f  man 
is  merely a creature of wants and desires then he ought to 
be a creature of "instinct" rather than the possessor of 
Reason. Kant takes his stand upon the re a l ity  and primacy 
of man's "p rac tica l reason", which is  only another way of 
saying tha t the deepest meaning of man can be understood enly 
by an investigation of h is ra tiona l and moral nature, and 
i t  i s  with th is  se t purpose tha t Kant proceeds to investigate 
"in  what way" the moral law can become a Motive.
He denies tha t i t  i s  possible to e3Q)laln how the Moral Law, 
of i t s e l f ,  can d irec tly  determine the Will of man. This i s  
an insoluble problem, and complete ezplanaticai i s  impossible, 
but Kant intends to  "describe", in  the most oareful terms, 
how the Moral Law can become a Motive.
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Kant toaiata  th a t he la  speaking about a "free" Will find­
ing it#  sole and au ifie ien t Determination in  the Moral Lav 
without any help from the subjective feelings and inolina- 
tions, yes, even to  the cheeking and re jection  of such 
feelings " if  they are opposed to  the moral law". Now, he 
makes the point tha t a l l  Inclinations and every sensible 
Impulse are founded upon "feeling". Further, i f  these 
subjective factors are in  any way influenced the subjective 
resu ltan t i s  also a "feeling". Therefore, i f  Desire i s  a 
feeling , and Desire is  affected in  any way, the re su lt ef 
th is  reaction to the influence is  another type of feeling . 
For instance, says K ant,let i t  be assumed th a t man is  con­
scious of the Moral Lav; then, th is  Moral Law, being a 
product of man's moral and ra tiona l s e lf ,  must stand opposed 
to  h is subjective Inclinations. Therefore, the impact of 
the Mbral Law upon subjective Inclinations w ill not re su lt 
in  making them as tlie Moral Law because w e i s  the product 
of Reason and the other i s  the product of "feeling". The 
subjective Inclinations w ill not be transformed in to  Reason, 
but, as they are affected by ^ e  impact of the Moral Lav, 
a new type or quality  of "feeling" arises. I t  Is  thus tha t 
Kant makes h is point tha t Inclinations, Wants and Desires 
are not iwrely "these things", when they are found in  the 
context of a moral and ra tio n a l being. They con be merely 
"these things" in  animals, but in  man they cannot escape 
"iiQ>act" with the Moral Lav, and th is  "impact" leaves these 
very subjective elements with a new quality  of existence. 
Again, Kant in s is ts  th a t a l l  the subjective feelings can be 
brought together under we central concept, tha t i s ,  "happi­
ness", or, as he says in  th is  section — "Self-regard".
Row, the >k)ral Lav, in  i t s  deepest meaning, is  opposed to  
th is  "subjective" view of happiness. I t  i s  true tha t i t  
has i t s  own quality  of happiness, but i t  i s  something quite 
d iffe ren t frcm tha t based upon "subjective" Inclinations. 
Therefore, the f i r s t  re su lt of the isgpact of the Moral Lav
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upon tho Inclinatlonfi Is  a "feeling" of Pain. I t  Is  caused 
by the fru s tra tio d  of the subjective Xnellnatlens. They 
cannot have th e ir  own way with Base and Pleasure, therefore, 
says Kant, there is  produced th is  feeling of Pain, and th is  
feeling of Pain is  very important because i t  is  the f i r s t  
indication, although a "negative" indication, of the "a 
priori" character of the Moral "Motive". Kent, now looks 
a t th is  feeling of Pain fr<m another aspect. A ll the 
Inclinations reach out for Happiness, but, from another 
point of view, a l l  the Inclinations constitu te a "feeling" 
which might be termed "Self-regard". Therefore, the funda­
mental urge of man is  to conserve and enhance th is  S elf- 
regard; and Kant would find many modem exponents ef 
psychology who would agree with th is  statement, Kant then 
goes on to show tha t th is  Self-regard can be viewed as 
having two aspects, or, of expressing i t s e l f  in  two ferns; 
that i s ,  Self-love and Self-conceit.
Kant now makes statements l ithout su ffic ien t explanation.
He In s is ts  tha t the Moral Law confronts th is  central feeling 
of Self-regard with two differing resu lts . I t  strikes 
down Self-conceit, and checks, or keeps within "reascoable" 
lim ita tions, Self-love. Kant does not explain why th is  is  
so, tha t i s ,  ^Ay Self-love is  checked, and Self-conceit 
struck down; but i t  i s  quite obvious th a t h is e th ica l 
system has no place for "arrogantia", but i t  has a place fw  
what he terms "ra tional self-love". However, the main 
point i s  th a t the subjective Inclinations have ceme in to  
d irec t contact %rit2i the Moral Lav, and the re su lt has been 
Pain by modifying Self-love and strik ing  down Salf-eonceit. 
Kant proceeds to  make cm  of his most important points.
I t  i s  tha t the Moral Law hos "caused" th is  "negative" fee l­
ing, Pain; therefore i t ,  the Moral Law, oust be viewed as 
a "form of in te lle c tu a l causality", and th is  view ef the 
Moral Law as in te lle c tu a l Causality re su lts  in  i t  being an 
object "Respect". This concept of Respect, er Msvereoee,
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plays a very important part in Kant's analysis of Motivation, 
and i t  would not be ju s t to suoh an analysis to  mark too 
carefully  th is  particu lar aspect of why man has respect fo r 
the Moral Law. I t  is  due to  fa r more than i t s  being a kind 
of in te lle c tu a l Causality. However, th is  matter must re­
ceive more careful atten tion  la te r . For th is  "feeling" of 
Reverence is  fa r  too eonqtlioated to  be explained by ene root 
or ground, and already Kant points out tha t i t  stands linked 
not only to the in te lle c tu a l Causality of the Moral Law, bat 
is  intim ately rela ted  to  the "negative" feeling ef Pain a t  
the strik ing  down ef Self-conceit. Self-conceit l ie s  
fa ta lly  wounded by the impact with the Moral Law. As i t  
ex ists in  i t s  native and subjective form, i t  can receive no 
"mercy" from the Moral Lav. Yet, in  i t s  humiliatien and 
death, th is  feeling of Self-conceit gives b irth  to a feeling 
which Is a true element of Respect. I t  might be termed 
"negative" S elf-feeling , depreciation of the S elf, or, in  
Kant's own words — " in te llec tu a l seIf-depreciation"#(^)
The present analysis of Kantian Motivation is  not cencemed 
with the ten ab ility  of the analysis, but i t  cannot be ignored 
that i t  has much in  common with the "Idea of the Holy" se t 
fo rth  by Dr. Otto in  the work of tha t name. The primary 
difference lie s  in the insistance of Kant upon th is  "in­
te lle c tu a l causality" of the Moral Law.
(3) Kant now proceeds to look a t the Moral Lav, and th is  
feeling of Respect from another aspect. He has already 
made i t  plain tha t i f  the Will is  to be determined by the 
Moral Law, i t  must be deterlned "only" by the Moral Law; and 
s t i l l  more, i t  must not be thought of being determined by 
any fooling "prior" to  th is  Moral Motive which is  the Moral 
Law. He does not deny tha t the subjective Inclinations do, 
in  themselves, ex is t p rior to the consciousness of the Moral 
Law, but he does deny tha t they constitute any quality  ef 
feeling (moral feeling) p rior to  th e ir  inqpaet with the Moral,
(1 ) K. p. r .  199.
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which might moke the fu lfilm en t of the Moral Lav more con­
ducive. In fa c t ,  far from fosaessing a fee lin g  conducive 
to  the fu lfilm en t of the Moral la v , these subjective Inc lina­
tions jo in t ly  constitu te a sta te  of a ffa irs  which stand op­
posed to the Moral Law. That i s ,  l e f t  to themselves, they 
put forth  "maxims" quite u n fit for un iversal le g is la t io n ,  
wliich i s  the basic requirement of the Moral Law. In Kant's 
own language»-
"this p r o p e n s ity  t o  make ourselves in  the subjective determining principles of our choice serve as the ob­jec tiv e  determining pr incip le of the w i l l  generally may be called se lf^ o v e , and i f  th is  pretends to  be le g is la t iv e  as an unconditional p rac tical p r incip le , i t  may t .  o a lM
I t  i s  here tliat Kant gives the reason wiiy the Moral Lav can 
make no compromise with S e lf-co n ce it . I t  i s  a "Pretender" 
in  the f u l le s t  meaning of that term in  that i t  seeks to  put 
forth  "subjective princip les" aS the objective pr incip le fa r  
the Determination of the W ill. Here, too , Kant i s  beginning 
to  reveal the roots of h is  doctrine of Radical S v il . Thus 
the Moral Law, or consciousness of the Moral Law, cannot 
view S e lf-lo v e  and S e lf-con ce it  in  an im partial manner*
They are not mere D esires, or "natural" factors of the Self*  
They are fundamentally and tru ly  ’ un-natural" in  that they 
tend, or have the propensity to "usurp" tlie true nature and 
destiny of man. They cannot stand side by aide with the 
Moral Law and remain "innocent" and natural, but they most 
be affected  in  a most p ositive  manner. S e lf-lo v e  becomes 
lim ited , or transmuted to "rational" S e lf- lo v e , and S e l f -  
oonoeit i s  humiliated and, both, in  th is  new s ta te , become 
the ground of Respect. a s  already noted, Kant w i l l  allow  
no tru ly  "moral feeling" for the Law to e x is t  in  these twin 
aspects of Se lf-regard, that i s ,  in  i t s  own r igh t, and prio r 
to  th is  isq>act of the Moral Law. In fa c t ,  i f  h is  inferences
(1 ) K. p. V. 198.
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are given log ical eonolusicais, Self-regard contain# a l l  the 
elements of "imneoral" feeling aa regards the Moral Lav.
(4) Kant is  most anxious to  "isolate" th is  factor ef Res­
pect in  the human consciousness, and he spares no pains to  
reveal i t  in  a l l  i t s  various aspects. In a previous chapter. 
In " lb . Qrltlau* at th .  P rac tica l g»Mon", b . had r .rw M 4  
to  his dictum th a t, prior to the impact of the Moral Lav 
upon the se n s ib ili t ie s , there is  no case for assuming the 
existence of a moral feeling conducive to the fulfilm ent 
of the Moral Law, In fa c t, he had gone fu rther, and said 
th a t, p rior to th is  impact, there %ras no true knowledge of 
Good and Evil. Therefore, according to  Kant, the subjective 
sensible Self i s  completely without any ground for produc­
ing a "Motive" for the rea lisa tion  of the Moral Lav. I t  
is  impotent to  produce any "in terest"  in the Moral Law when 
i t  is  le f t  completely to  I t s e l f .  Kant had two objects in  
making th is  matter beyond dispute.
F i r s t , the #diole of h is e th ica l teaching stands rooted in  
the claim th a t the Moral Law must determine the Will without 
the help of the subjective Inclinations. At f i r s t ,  th is  i s  
stated as a moral claim; now Kant makes i t  a "psychological" 
fac t. That i s ,  according to  h is "psychological" view of 
the nature of man, there is  no possible ground in  nan to  
a s s is t the Moral Lav to i t s  fulfilm ent. To be determined 
by sensible Inclinations, t>iat i s ,  In order to  f u l f i l  the 
Moral Law, or to  be p artly  determined so, is  not only morally 
wrong, but i t  i s  "psychologically" impossible, because there 
is  nothing in  the subjective Inclinaticm s, as suc\;. or in  
th e ir  native s ta te , upon #Aich the Moral Law can find any 
possible footing.
Reoond. Kant wished to  prove tha t i t  was the Moral Law, and 
i t  alone which was capable of providing a "Motive" f i t te d  
to  i t s  own fulfilm ent.
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"Thus the respect for the law is  not a motive to morality, but is  morality i t s e l f  subjectively considered as a motive, inasmuch as pure p ractica l reason, by rejecting  a l l  the r iv a l pretensions of se lf-love, gives^authorityto the lav whicli now alone lias inilueuce." '
He goes on to say that Respect is  not so much a feeling as 
i t  i s  the "effect" upon a feeling , and arises from the very 
sen sib ility  of ra tiona l creatures. Further, th is  Respect 
is  an In d ica tio n  of th e ir  being " fin ite " . Therefore, to  
fee l Respect involves being a ra tio n a l, moral, f in ite  being, 
and endowed with sen sib ility ; and i t  is  important to  bear 
in  mind tha t a l l  these a ttrib u tes  of "human" nature contribute 
th e ir  respective and d iffering  elements to  make th is  cosH 
posite "effect" Respect. God, according to  Kant, not 
possessing subjective lim ita tions, cannot be said to have 
th is  "aui generis" feeling of Respect.
Kant is  most anxious to  discover a true "moral feeling" for 
the Lav, and, with care and sensitive touch, he offers the 
following analysis. The impact of the Moral Lav upon the 
subjective Inclinations re su lts  in  Fain or "Dhpleasantness". 
However, th is  feeling is  not only"nsgativ»,"it is  also 
"pathological" as opposed to  "moral", and therefore, in  i t s  
f i r s t  form cannot be termed true "moral" feeling . l e t ,  i t  
is  the re su lt of the Moral Lav which is  a supersensible Cause, 
therefore, i t  i s  not merely "pathological". Further, th is  
feeling belongs to  the person who is  in  possession ef the 
Moral Law. In other words, i t  is  not the "pathological" 
reaction of an animal. Therefore, Kant feels ju s tif ied  
in  celling th is  feeling more than mere Pain or Unpleasant­
ness, i t  i s  "Humiliation", and Humiliation is  a feeling 
which can be experienced only by a moral and ra tional being. 
How, Humiliation cannot ex is t merely as a feeling in  i t s e l f ,  
i t  nust i r p ly  some Cause for i t s  existence; that i s ,  a —n 
cannot fe e l Humiliation and le t  the matter re s t there.
(1 ) K. p. ?. 200.
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He omet try  and discover the source or the Cause of the 
Hunlllatlon. Whan i t  is  known that the Moral Lav is  the 
supreme and sole Cause of th is  feeling, even, Humiliation 
ceases to  be Humiliation, and Respect for the Moral Law is  
the positive reaction of th is  feeling* a l l  th is  oareful 
analysis on the part of Kant indicates how importantly he 
views th is  question of Motivation. His rather isgpolite re f­
erences to "Empirical" Psychology, and h is scanty a tten tion  
to i t s  resu lts  become somewhat more tolerable as he atteiqpts 
to se t fo rth  idiat m l^ t be termed a system of "moral" psyehelegy 
How far a l l  th is  is  an answer to Eighteenth-century Deter­
minism must be examined a t a la te r  stage, but, here and now, 
i t  i s  quite obvious tha t Kant is  constructing his Defence of 
Freedom with very great care and commendable s k i l l .
According to  Kant, therefore, the sensible Desires, upon 
Isqpact with the Moral Law, cease to  be mere sensible Desires. 
Further, the Pain of th is  checking of th e ir  natural tenden­
cies is  not merely Pain, or pathological "Qhpleasantness" 
because i t  is  Pain within the context of a ra tiona l and moral 
being. Therefore, i t s  best description is  Humiliatlaa, 
which is  the capacity of Bespect for th a t which hum iliates, 
because i t  i s  the same Self which gives the Law as i t  i s  the 
same Self idiioh feels the impact of th» Law. I t  i s  the 
same Moral Lav which humiliates and elevates.
(5) Kant has a great deal noie to say concerning th is  
"sentiment" of Beapeet, but much of i t  cœieems the applica­
tion  of th is  "sentiment" to  Life. Yet, there are a few 
Important points worthy of note conoeming Respect as a 
Motive, and might be stated in  the fol].owing terms.
(a) This sentiment of Respect must not be considered as mere 
Admiration. I t  has in  i t  an element of Admiration, bat 
there is  also the element of Awe. Again, i t  is  fa r from 
being described as a "pleasant" feeling , for i t  stands rooted 
in  Self-hum iliation, (b) Further, Respect is  not a sen ti­
ment which man gladly accepts. Kant says there is  an element
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of Reluetanoe in  granting Respect to  the Lav, or to  perscos
whose coiic'uct agrees \ / i th  th a t  Lsw. (a) I t  i s  a sentim ent 
which i s  almost i r r e s i s t i b l e .  I t  oaimot ha held back, a l ­
though given re lu c ta n tly . In  a seuso, i t  overwiielias the 
sub jec tive  fee lin g s  of 3 e li- lo v e  ruad U elf-concQ it, and oompels 
racn to  grrcit Respect in  sp ite  of h is  sub jec tive  In c lin a tio n s .
(d) This Respect i s ,  as h sn t has alr*ea<xy sa id , M orality 
su b jec tiv e ly  considered. I t  i s  the f";nd;.ment .-.1 stratum  of 
fee lin g  ava ilab le  to  a iian who i s  a uoral ?Jid ra t io n a l  being. 
Upon Respect r i s e s  an " In te re s t" ,  ani tM s " in t  re s t"  i s  
productive of a Maxim. Of course, Wien liruxt uses Maxim 
in  th is  p a r t ic u la r  con tex t, he i s  chinlcing of tho sub jec tive  
I43j:d.ir. which ag.eos w ith the ob jec tive  p r in c ip le . That i s ,  
t i l ls  Ivjixiio now becomes a Law of Duty. (o) hanb fe e ls  th a t  
th is  Law of Duty i s  the h ighest \-rtiich can be expected from 
m ortal man. He argues th a t  th is  i s  the r e a l  meaning of 
Love to  God and ^nan. That i s ,  receiv ing  D uties as Divine 
Comiuands. lie declines the orthodox view of C hristian  Love 
as encouraging Fanaticism . Man is  under a "d isc ip lin e"  of 
Reason. He does not do h is  Duty g lad ly , b r t  dons i t  be­
cause of Respect, ?.n element of which i s  H irrd liatlon . The 
re luctance bo admit a tc d lia tio n  is  alcir. to  the reluc tance  to  
do the Law.
Here, then , i s  ICant's o ra l psyciiology as such a psychology 
stands re la te d  to  M otivation. He claims to  have described 
the r e a l  Motive which u n d erlies  a l l  "moral" a c tio n , and 
claims to  have c o n stitu ted  or "discovered" such a Motive 
which i s  qu ite  independent of cotaaojily accepted p rin c ip le s  
o f "iâu^irioal" Psychology. Perhaps the follow ing e x tra c t  
b est sums up iiis  p o sit i e n t -
"Such is  the natu re  of the true  motive of pure p rac tica l reason; i t  i s  no o ther than the pure moral lav i t s e l f ,  inasmuch as i t  makes us conscious of the sublimity of our supersensib le  e x is te n ce , and su b je c tiv e ly  produoes respec t fo r  th e i r  h igher nature  In  men who are  also con­scious of th e i r  sensib le  existence and of the ocoaequent dependence of th e i r  p a th o lo g ica lly  very susceptible nature."
(I) K. p. T. 21».
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Before attempting to challenge th is  system of Motivation hy 
the opposing system of Determinism, a word must he said in  
appreciation of the task lAlch Kant has performed*
F ir s t  ^ there can be l i t t l e  doubt tha t Biq^irioism neglected 
the Implications of mtti's moral and ra tio n a l nature* B utler, 
to  some degree, had pereeived th is  pr$Alem vhen he wrote#-
"There are two ways in  which lâm suhjeot of morals may be treated* Otae begins from inquiHng in to  the ab­s tra c t re la tions of things# the othwr from a matter of fa c t , namely, what the particu lar nature of man i s  * ...^
Butler pr oceeds to  discuss e th ioal values in  man from the 
point ef view ef what he terms "a matter of fac t" . Yet, 
svu^ a discussion i s  haunted by the "Categorical Iiqperative."
"Truth, and re a l good sense, and theroukh in te g rity , carry along with them a peculiar censoioiisness of th e ir  omn genuineness I there i s  a feeling belonging to , them, which does not aocempany th e ir  coim tetfeits . . .* " (* /
Hume began h is discussion of morals by defining Mcral Phil­
osophy as the science of human nature, and he means by human 
nature those fac ts  which are available in  h is  extrema 
Aqpirieisa* However, not even Bums can avoid saying#-
" le t  a man's in sen sib ility  be ever so great, be must e f tw  be touched with the images of lo ÿ tt and Vreng* and l e t  h is prejudices be ever so obstinate , he must observe th a t others are susceptible ef like  i^ ^ esg en s* "
However, Heme a tte n g ^  to  explain th is  oensciousness of 
Right and Wrong by the feeling or sentiment ef "Taste"; yet, 
tdum he i s  asked to  describe Taste, he confesses th a t i t  i s  
H \  something givw  by Cod to  man to  baffle  p h ileso i^ rs*
Again, Edwards admits th a t "moral" Beoessity might be i l l u ­
s tra ted  by a man being cmiscious th a t he i s  bound by t ie s  ef 
Duty from which he cannot escape* l e t ,  in  sp ite  of these 
glimmerings of the "Bategorieal Iinperative", the exponents 
of B apiricim  never take time and space to  come to  grips with
1) Author's Preface to  Sermons. 1729, '2; germcsi* 10.(3) Bsqbiry. 2. Sect. 133*(e) Bnquiry, 2* Sect. 216.
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th is  Inqplleation of the xooral and ra tiona l nature of man* 
Seaend. another feature which seems to  be a support to  Kant's 
system of Motivation is  th a t he is  a competent student of 
Empirical Psychology* Kant often gives the In^ressicn th a t 
be is  oontemptuotts of Empirical Psychology* Yet, th is  
apparent eontempt must not be assumed to  be based upon ig­
norance* No student of Kant i s  able to ignore the fac t tha t 
when Kant re jec ts  the conclusions of E # ir ic a l  Psychology, 
th a t i s ,  as such eonolusioos stand rela ted  to  Morality, Kant 
knows what he i s  talking about*
Perhaps Dr* Paulsen r ig h tly  expresses Kant's a ttitude  to  
Bmplrioal Psychology when he saysi-
" Psychology according to  Kant i s  an experimental science, and as such, therefore, does not belsmg to  j^ le sep h y  in  the proper sense of the word* Indeed, i t  cannot even be called a science in  the proper sttsse* like  physics, which i s  based upon matnematical principles* Psychology i s  only a ceU eoticn ef purely empirical fac ts , something like  chemistry, only i t  i s  in  a s t i l l  worse position wan the la t te r  in  th a t i t  is  restM cted to observation, and oannet employ experiaant*"
Such a statement can be accepted as summing up Kant's a t t i ­
tude to  Empirical Psychology, but i t  oust be bcame in  mind 
tha t such an a ttitu d e  is  based upcn two other facts* (a) Kant 
knew vbaX Empirical Psychology was, and reached opposition 
to such a science only a f te r  long and careful deliberation 
of i t s  meaning and nature; (b) Kant knew what was meant by 
Morality* His moral system might be subjected to consider­
able critic ism  and modification, but few thinkers suppass 
him in  moral analysis and e th ica l Insight. In other terms, 
Kant knew idiy he rejected psychological cenelueicns as a 
basis for moral ocnsideraticns, and h is reasons cannot be 
ignored by any serious student of Psychology or Morals* 
a great deal of time and space would be saved in  
critic ism  of Kant, i f  agreement could be reached upcn the 
fac t th a t Kant, in  a l l  h is expositions of Morality, is  
u tte r ly  " rea lis tic "  in  h is approach to , and analysis of 
"human nature"* In fa c t , th is  point might be expressed by
(1) Immanuel Kant* Page 287*
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the## "three" gradations.
(1) Kant is  quite convinoed that men desire to be happy.
As Dr. Faton rig h tly  ind ica tes, Kant very often speaks too
much about human happiness.
"To be happy is  necessarily  the wish of every f in ite  ra tiona l being, and th is  therefore i s  inevitab ly .a. determining principle ef i t s  faculty  e f desire."
The language of the above ex tract is  carefu lly  chosen, and 
must not be taken as expressing, what Kant denies, th a t the 
subjective Inclinations culminating in the concept ef 
Happiness, actually  "determines" the Will of a moral and 
ra tiona l being. Rather, Happiness is  a determining prin­
ciple of the faculty  of "Desire". Xat, such a statement 
does reveal Kant's r e a l is t ic  concession to  Empirical 
Psychology.
(2) Having se ttled  th is  basio issue tha t maaoL pursues
Happiness as one of the fundamental lavs of h is nature as a
f in i te  creature, Kant goes on to  make h is position s t i l l
more clear by saying#-
"Man is  a being who. as belonging to  the world of sense, has wants, and so fa r  as h is reason has an office which i t  cannot refuse, namely, to  attend to the in te re s t ef h is sensible nature, and to  form p rac tica l amxias, even with a view to  the happiness o f .th is  l i f e ,  and i f  possible even to  tha t of a fu tu re ." '3 /
Here, Kant i s  r e a l is t ic  enough to  bring in  Reason to  guide 
man in  the supplying of h is "natural" wants; and a l l  th is  
i s  but another way by which Kant draws atten tion  to  the 
re a lity  of Hypothetical Ziqperatives. Kant, in  no place, 
denies the actual existence of such Hypothetical Imperatives. 
They aie counsels of s k i l l  or prudence, and h is knowledge 
of human a ffa irs  was su ffic ien tly  wide to  recognise tha t 
such Imperatives covered a ccauLLderable part of human conduct.
(1) The Oategorioal Imperative. Page 59*
(2) K. p. T. 133.
(3) K. p. T. 1S1.
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(3) Yet, Kant Is quite eonvlnoed tha t the rea l purpose o£ 
Reason cannot be defined in  any f in a l matter by making i t  
the servant of human wants; and the "Hypothetical" Ixqwra- 
tive  by i t s  very nature, points beyond i t s e l f  to  a "Cate­
gorical" Xsq>eratiTe« In other words t-
"But he is  not so coxapletely an animal as to  be in ­d ifferen t to  what reason says on i t s  own account, and to use i t  merely as an instrument fo r the sa tisfac tion  of h is wants as a sensible being* For the possession of reason would not ra ise  h is worth above th a t of the brutes, i f  i t  serve him only for the same purpose th a t serves in  them." d )
This is  Kant's problem, and i t  i s  the problem of "moral" 
Philosophy, th a t i s ,  what purpose i s  served by man's moral 
and ra tiona l nature? Hume had said th a t Reason was im­
potent to  produce a Motive for action, but he admitted th a t 
Reason was capable of d irecting the impulses to  serve "use­
ful" purposes* For Kant such a view of Reasoi^ means a t 
most only a"Hypothetieal" Imperative and i s  the end of 
moral and ra tio n a l questions* I f  Beason i s  but the ser­
vant of the subjective Inclinations, then, there m i^ t be a 
s ta te  called "Legality", but there never can be a s ta te  of 
Morality.
"In tha t case the w ill does not give i t s e l f  the law, but only the precept how ra tiona lly  to follow patho­logical law; and the maxim which, in  such a case, never contains the universally leg is la tiv e  form, notonly produces no obligation, but i s  i t s e l f  opposed to the principle of a pure p ractica l reason, and, there­fo re , also to  the moral dispodtion, even theui^ th# resu lting  action may be conformable to  the law ." '* /
The present discussion of the Kantian conception ef 
Motivation has reached the stage when an attempt must be 
made to  OQ&q»are and challenge such a conception with the 
type of Motivation found in  Determinism; and the burden
of suoh a challenge must come from the system of Idwards*
In the previous analysis of h is system, reference was made 
to  h is views on Motivation, but, in  the in te re s ts  of 
c la r ity , i t  i s  necessary to res ta te  h is defin ition  of Motive,
(1) K. p. ? . 181*
(2) K* p. ▼* 146*
J
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"By motive, I  mean the whole ef tha t which moves, excites, er inv ites the mind to  v o litio n , whether th a t be one thing singly, or many things ccnjunctly.Many particu lar things may concur, and unite th e ir  3treng#i, to induce the Bind: ana when i t  is  sc,a l l  together are as one oca^lex motive." '1 /
Idwards follows th is  defin ition  by saying the following 
things, (a) Every motive, rig h tly  termed, has some ten­
dency or "advantage" to move or excite the mind or W ill.
That i s ,  Motive i s ,  by i t s  inherent nature, f i t te d  to 
move or influence the mind. The Inference of th is  s ta te ­
ment is  tha t i f  the Motive is  "feeling", then there i s  an 
aspect of the mind idiich can be influenced by feeling.
This f i t s  in  with the description of the "Qaderstanding" 
given by Edwards as "including the whole faculty  of per­
ception or apprehension, and not merely what i s  called 
reason or judgment." This i s  lsq>ortant for the follow­
ing discussion, because Edwards can see no contradiction in  
the p o ssib ility  ef "feeling" affecting and evwi "deter­
mining" the Bboderstanding, th a t i s ,  in  h is  use of the term 
in  th is  large sense. (b) The motive, therefore, anst be 
"extant" to  the Understanding, or i t  must be im the "mind's 
view". I t  would be wrong to  read in to  th is  statement a l l  
the implications of a "ra tionally  recognised" Motive, fo r , 
the perceiving faculty  i s  much more than the merely "rational". 
I t  might be termed also the "sensing" facu lty  as fa r  as 
Edwards is  concerned. Therefore, Edwards can be in te r­
preted as thinking of "Motive" as Ijmpulee and Intention, 
and h is description of the bnderstanding i s  f u l l  to
include the influence and the determination of both.
(c) Edwards i s  quite sure th a t there must be a multitude ef 
Motives in  the sense in  which he has given, but they have 
one thing in  ccmaon, th a t i s ,  i f  they succeed in  exciting , 
inviting  or moving the mind, and tha t i s  th e ir  pursuance ef 
the apparent Good, or the Agreeable. In another place, 
Edwards says, man cannot actually  desire h is B vil,er Misery.
(1) The Freedom ef the W ill. P t.1 . Beet. 2.(2) a # a « • 1. " 2 .
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However, in  th is  section, Bdvards hastens to  say idiat he 
means hy the "Good", th a t is  the "apparent" Good, and i t  
is  th is  which is  "Agreeable" or "pleasjjig tOL tM  Ada#".
He i s  quite incapable of thinking th a t man pursues the 
Good in  i t s  high #ethioal" meaning, and th is  fac t w ill 
have important implicatlcns in  the disouasien of "Freodem 
and Moral Evil" a t a la te r  stage of the Kantian Defeaee 
of Freedom. (d) Edwards now says tha t the "Will" can 
hskesoribed as "the apparent Good" or as tha t whioh is  
most agreeable. He hesita tes about saying tha t tb» Will 
i s  determined by the "apparent" Good or agreeable "because 
an appearing most agreeable to  the mind, and the mind's 
preferring, 'seem scarcely d is t in c t '."  This reference 
to  Will in  the context of the discussion of Motive i s  no 
mere accident; for the whole system of the Determiaimm 
of Edwards pivots on the intimate re la tio n  of Motive,
Mind and W ill. Further, i t  is  of the greatest importance 
to  observe th a t Edwards can see no rea l d istinc tion  be­
tween a thing being agreeable to  the Mind, and the Mind 
"preferring" th a t thing. For Edwards id en tifie s  "prefer­
ence" and "choice" in  a most conclusive manner. He com­
plains against h is opponents that they are a l l  gu ilty  ef 
creating an a r t i f ic ia l  "vacancy" between the "preference" 
of the Mind, and lAe "deteradnaticn" of the W ill. Further, 
he can see no meaning in  the argument th a t the Mind is  
able to "choose" i t s  own lo tiv es , for the Mind i s  always 
in  possession of a Motive, the pursuance of the "Agree­
able". This chain of Motivation is  a l l  welded t o g e ^ r  
by h is ococepticn of Causation, and the following ex trac t 
Indicates the natw e and operation of Causatim and 
Motivation.
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"There Is nothing in  the world more constantly vary­ing than the ideas of the mind; they do not remain precisely in  the same s ta te  fo r the le a s t perceivabletime   The involuntary changes in  the sueeessienof our ideas, though the cause may not be observed, have as mush cause, as the changeable motions of the motes that f lo a t in  the a i r ,  or the continual, in ­f in ite ly  varions, successive ohanges ef the ua- evennesses on tho surface of the w ater,"(1/
As already observed, Edwards w ill not grant th a t there can 
be any re a l "choice" of Motives, For instance, he sayst- 
"An act of choice or preference is  a oan^arative a c t, 
wherein the mind acts with reference to  two or more things 
tha t are compared, and stand in  cempetitica in  the mind's 
view."^^) He then goes on to  argue th a t i f  the mind, 
c oof rented with such a coeq^etitioa, cheeses th a t which i t  
thinks is  in fe rio r in  the comparison, then, i t  chooses 
without a Motive or inducement. There i s  a certain  
amount of conviction in  such an argument when i t  i s  boame 
in  mind th a t Edwards has already said th a t the Mind has a 
"preference" fc r  the pursuance of the Good idiieh i s  an 
unalterable tendency of the Mind, Therefore, from his 
point of view, the Mind simply cannot choose the in fe r io r , 
or weaker Motive, because, by i t s  very nature, i t  i s  con­
s titu ted  only to  pursue the Good, or the "most" pleasing 
to  the Mind,
Having drawn a ttw tio n  to th is  facto r in  the system of 
Bdwards, the discussion now moves to  examine hmv h is  system 
ef Determinism challenges the Kantian conception of Motive, 
and the following points w ill reveal hmr these opposing 
systems in te rp re t the supreme task isq)osed th e ir  res­
pective systems, th a t i s ,  to  s ta te  what "determines" the 
W in,
F i r s t , from an examination of the contending systems ef 
Kant and Edwards, i t  i s  obvious th a t they are both in tensely  
in terested  in  one supreme question — "What dete^^pgg 3 ** 
sz^ i t  i s  because they both regard th is
(1) Tbs Freeden of the W ill. P t.2 . Gect.6.
( 2) " " " " " " 2. " 10.
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question as in^w tant tha t the present section upon Motive 
becooes v i ta l  to  th e ir respective systeiüâ. Yet, i t  is  
also obvious tha t Kant is  much more iutei*ested in  another 
question — "What ought to  determine the Will?" anû i t  
is  Kant's absorbing in te re s t in  th is  question idiioh marks 
h is system as d is tin o t from, and opposed to , tha t of 
Edwards. Of course, Edwards is  also in terested  in  the 
question "What ought to  d@termine the Will?" end hie 
great worke on Theology and Morals make impressive atteaq^ts 
to answer th is  question but, here, in  h is systms of Deter­
minism, he claims tha t the f i r s t  question is  alone impor­
ta n t, and naast he answered in  accordance with the facts 
available in  "empirical" Psychology. In h is Theological 
expositions, Edwards argues tha t the Sovereignty of Qcd 
primarily and f in a lly  determines the Will of man, but as 
already observed, th is  aspect of h is Determinism i s  kept 
within reasonable bounds while he i s  discussing i t s  psycho­
logical im plications. In  h is work on Morals, he argues 
tha t man ought to  love th a t which lias the greatemt possible 
"Being In general"; th a t i s ,  he is  commanded by the law 
of r e a l  Morality to  love God sqpremely and fu lly . How­
ever, these are questions of Theology and Morals; and, 
in  the view of Edwards, merit separate treatment from th a t 
of Psychology. In a very rea l sense, Kant would agree 
with Edwards on th is  d istinc tion  of Morality from Psychology, 
and, i t  is  for th is  very purpose, he had se t out open the 
task of finding a "moral" Motive as d is tin o t from a 
"psychological" Motive. However, Edwards would in s is t  
tha t Kant was involving liXs system of Morality in  a hope­
less ccntradloticn. For, although Kant was repudiating 
the conclusions of "en^irioal" Psychology as a basis fo r 
Morality, he #as s t i l l  involved with "e i^ iriea l"  men; and 
he would view Kant's d istinc tion  of the "neumenal" and 
"phenomenal" in  man as the flu tte rin g s of a vain hepe te  
find an escape from the burden of th is oppressive "Eatural- 
ismP*. Fev Edwards, natu ral nan, in  spite of a l l  h is
i
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supposed rs tlo n a l aud moral a ttr ib u te s , Is  la  the "Flesh" 
and is oaraal, stupid and blind. Only one thing oan 
determine h is Will and tha t is  tlie pasoloa of "private" 
Happiness; and enly one thing can redeem him, and th a t 
i s  a Rev B irth , given by d(CD«
Edvards is  a competent student of Psychology. Zn fa c t ,
1U.8 works, "3urvjrlalne ConTorginog* (1736), "Thm..ht« 
on BsYlval". (17^-0), and "Hellgloua A if.cttqne* (17%) 
oonstitutd one of the greatest e ffo rts  of Christian 
thought in  psycho-analysis; and place Edwards in  the 
f i r s t  rank of Christian thinkers upon th is  subject. In 
other words, Edvards is  perhaps the most astu te  inventi- 
gator of "human nature" in  the whole ef Christian thought. 
This fac t is  ef v i ta l  lag^ortance in  the present diseussion 
because Bdwards and Kant appear to stand fo r tve d is tln e t 
and opposing views of human nature. Both claim to have 
examined the data available for an ünierstanding of mem, 
and both provide ample evidence of th e ir  diligemee and 
competence in  th is  d irection . Yet, both provide eon* 
elusions upon the nature of man which are d irec tly  eppesed; 
and, upon th is  major question — "What detay i^^a  
the subject of Motivation, both give rad ically  d iffe ren t 
answers. An attempt has been made to  understand S an t's  
in te rp reta tion  of Motive, and now th a t in te rp re ta tion  
must be challenged by the Determinism of Edwards# The 
feUowing points Indicate the depth of th is  challenge. 
yeocnd. Bdvards would regard Kant's description, e f  a 
"moral" Motive in  "natural" man as l i t t l e  short o f fsm- 
ta s tie ;  and he would be inclined to write i t  o ff as a 
vain attempt to  superimpose upon human nature the im p li­
cations of a to ta lly  fa lse  Idealism, He would argue th a t 
such a view of human nature requires th a t man sh a ll he a 
"Saint", whereas in  tru th  and in  fa c t, man is  a "Blmnei*". 
This objeoticKi by Bdwards most not be dismissed as th ee- 
log ieal prejudiee. I t  i s  fa r  tee  isqpertant to  be put
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a s id e  as mere dogm atism , b ecau se Kant nust f in a lly  o< 
fa c e  to  fa c e  with t h i s  fac t of "R adical Bvil"; and, «hea 
he d o e s , i t  w i l l  be obser-^/od th a t  t h i s  objection of Bdwards 
i s  no Liera b e a t in g  th e  a ir . Kant puts off th is  analysis
of R adica l E v i l  to  the end o f  his eth ioal disoussions, 
but there can be l i t t l e  doubt th a t t h i s  conospt hamitad 
a l l  he w ro te on M o r a l ity , and, when i t  is  flxwd^r esnfranted, 
gives new lig h t upon h is moral teaching# Bdwards is  
quite well aware o f  what is  meant bj re a l Morality, and 
his description of the e th ica l ideal i s  very sim ilar to  
Kant's. The followirg ex tract indicates how much they 
had in common upon th is  important subjectt-
**It i s  agreeable to  the sense of man, in  a l l  nations and ages, not only th a t the f ru i t  or e ffec t ef a good choice is  v irtuous, but tha t the seed oheiee its e lf#  fmm whence th a t e ffec t prcceew , i s  se; yea, also  the antecedent geod disposition , temper, er affection  ef mind, from whence proceeds tha t good eheice, i s  eirtuous# This is  the generml netlon, not tha t principles derive th e ir  geedaess from actions, but, th a t actions derive th e ir  feed- ness from the principles idienoe they preoeed; se th a t the act of choosing %Aat is  geod, is  ne farther v irtuous, than i t  proceeds from a good mrineipls, or virtuous disposition of the mind*"'1/
This is  the basic teaching of Bdwarda upon moral values, 
and, in  content, i t  i s  id en tica l with tlm t of Kant#
In  ether words, Bdwards i s  saying to  Kant — "I am per­
fec tly  aware of what i s  meant by rea l m orality, and I  
agree with you coupletely upcn the nature of the moral 
ideal. Yet, X cannot agree th a t, because th is  moral ideal 
i s  a fac t of general approval, or even a fac t of human 
oensciousness, you are ju s tif ie d  in  saying that such an 
"Ought" in  human nature necessarily implies a "Gam" or an 
"Ability" in  human nature to  f u l f i l  th is  Ought#" Further, 
Bdvards would agree th a t the Moral Lav "Ought" to  deter­
mine the Will of man# Man "Ought" to be motivated by a 
purely moral spring, but, he would argue, the p la in , sisqplm, 
and stubborn fac ts  of l i f e  declare tixat man is  motivated by
(1) Original Sim# Ft#2. Oh. 1#
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a very d ifferen t spring. £dvards confirms th is  argument 
by quoting the fo llow ing extract from Locke
'*Were the w i l l  deteritined by the views of the good, as i t  appears in  coateaplatian, greater or less to  the understanding $ i t  would never get loose tr ta  the in f in ite  e te rn a l joys of heaven, enoe proposed, and considered as possib le: the eternal conditionef a future s ta te  in f in ite ly  outweighing the ex­pectation of r ic h ^  or honour, or any other worldly pleasure
Ih is , says Sdvards, i s  what would happen i f  the Will e f  
man was determined by the Iloral Law, or acted upon a true 
"moral"^  ilo tive, and Edwards regrets th a t i t  i s  not so* 
Rather, he finds that man i s  motivated in  a rad ically  
d ifferen t mana#/*. Hare i s  h is doscription e f Motivaticn 
in  human nature:-
*The in fer io r  pr incip les of s e lf - lo v e , and nature]Sp e tite , which were given cniy to  serve, being one. and l e f t  to  themselves, of course, heooas Igning principles# having no superior princlp]Pilate or control them, they become absolute masters of the heart* **\2)
al ,reigni iples regu e t a t:
Why a l l  th is  is  so relevant to  the present discussicn Is  
due to  the fac t th a t, when Kant comes to discuss Radical 
E v il, he appears to  agree completely with Edwards in  h is 
diagnosis of human nature*
Later, i t  w ill be observed hcer Kant handles "Radical Evil". 
Here and now, i t  i s  su ffic ien t to note th a t h is deseriptiSB 
of th is  feature of human nature i s  equal in  depth of "Evil" 
to  anything said by Edwards* (a) I t  i s  rad ical badness 
and corruption* (b) I t  i s  age-lcng and universal*
(c) I t  makes impossible the establishment of re a l Msrality*
(d) I t  CLnnot be explained in  terms of man*s lim ited, or 
physical nature* (e) I t  i s  free ly  accepted Evil* ( f)  I t  
l ie s  in  asONish in  Reason, the very c itade l ef human per­
sonality. A ll these elements within Radical Evil make 
Kant fe e l tha t one must turn "away his eye from the conduct 
of men, le s t  he should f a l l  in to  another vice, namely,
(1) Original Sin.
( 2) « •
Pt*1• Ch*1* Sect. 6* 
Pt*V* 0h*2.
-  23*» -
mlsaatbropy. »(1) FurtbeT, he seems to  agree with Edwards
even in  h is  diagnosis of human nature:-
"Consequently a man (even the best) i s  bsid only Iqt t h is ,  tha t ha reversas the moral order of the springs in  adopting tliem in to  h is maxims; ho adopts, indeed, the moral lav  along with self-love; hut pereeiving that they cannot su b sist together on equal terms, hut th a t one must be subordinate te  the other as i t s  supreme condition, he makes the spring of self-love and i t s  in c lin a tion s the condition of obedienee to the moral law .
As a p o s s ib le  reply to Edvards upon th is  important point 
of Motivation, i t  might be argued th a t a l l  Kant i s  doing 
in  th is  particu lar section "Of the motives ef Furs P racti­
cal Reason" i s  arguing for an ideal s ta te  of Motivation 
for the tru ly  moral man. In  other words, Kant i s  saying 
th is  i s  how man "Ought" to be Rtotivatod i f  man wants to 
be a trul^’' e th ica l being; and therefore, Edwards and Kant 
are talking about two very d ifferen t o rb its of human 
existence. Edwards i s  dealing with the "facts" of 
"Engpirioal" Psychology, and Kant i s  dealing with the 
"demands" of the Moral Lav. dance, there can be no rea l 
clash or conflic t between th e ir  d iffering  analyses and 
conclusions. Cbe is  speaking of the actual, and the 
other i s  speaking of the id ea l. Tnere i s  an element of 
tru th  in  such an explanation, but, unfortunately fo r th is  
d if f ic u lt  question of Motivation, i t  i s  not su ffio im t to  
ignore the challenge of Determinism. She simple fa s t  i s  
th a t, in  th is  section, Kant is  convinced th a t be i s  giving 
an explanation of how the moral Motive operates in  the 
actual man ef every-day experience, and th a t i s  why he 
thinks he i s  giving a f in a l reply to Efi^iricism. To deny
thiS/makes havoc of h is basic principles of Antancmy,
Respect, the (kitegorical Imperative, and Duty as opposed to  
"fanaticism?; %U ef which are stressed in  th is  section.
I f  fu rther confirmation were required on th is  point th a t 
Kant i s  rea lly  describing "natural" man, the following ex-
(1) msligion# 37.
(2) Religion, ko^
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t r a c t  would be suitable* Kant has bean describing hew a 
Motive evolves in to  a >iazii& lay way o£ an In te re s t, and in ­
s is ts  that a l l  three notions, Motive, In te res t and Maxim, 
can be applied only to f in ite  beings, and goes on to  sayt-
"For they a l l  suppose a lim itation  of the nature ef the being, in that the eubjeetive oharaeter ef his choice does not of i t s e l f  agree with the objective lav of a practical reason# they sunpeee that the being requires to  be labelled to  action by some- . . thing, because an internal obstacle opposes itse lf."
Edwards would fasten  upon the above admission " tha t the 
subjective character of his choice does not of itse lf  agree 
with the objective lav of & p ractica l reason"; and charge 
Kant with giving too l i t t l e  rea l eaphasis to the nature of 
th is  " in ternal obstacle". In other words, Kant i s  here 
attempting to describe the reaction of "natural" man te  
the Moral Lav, and begs the v i ta l  question of such a re­
action by a very ambiguous reference to "Moral In ab ility " . 
This is  an important point in  favour of Edwards and mast 
be looked a t  in  greater d e ta il later* Here and now, i t  
seems quite obvious th a t Kant, in  th is  particu lar seetiom 
on Motivation, intends his analysis of a moral Motive te 
hold true ef "natural" man, and th is  i s  important for the 
critic ism  of such Motivation by Edwards. The argumsnt of 
Edvards appears perfectly  siiq^le and atraightforward, and 
might be paraphrased in  these terms — "I have done my best 
to understand the nature of natural man. I have tvsmlnsd 
him in  the world, and in  h is general conduct in  seoiety.
I have ccm to  the ccnelusion that natu ral mam is  domimated 
by the principle of self-love; end a l l  the ermsmsnts of 
his c iv ilisa tio n  are but the working out of th is  primeipXs 
of self-love. In th is  natural s ta te , he is  incapable ef 
even feeling a regard or respect for the Moral Law. I t  is  
only as ho becomes a new creature, by the Grace ef CM, that 
he can begin to  fe e l respect for God and His Law. X have 
noted carefu lly  the reaotiems of persons who have passed
<1) K* p. T. 206.
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th ro u g h  t h i s  " s p l r l tu & l"  e x p e r ie n c e , àc’id a l l  lay ev idence  
conv inces ine t h a t  uy e s t i n a t lo n  o f " n a tu ra l"  laan i s  correct* 
F u r th e r ,  a l l  th e  d a ta  a v a i la b le  in  Ps^ciiolOLy confirm  ay 
a n a ly s is*  T h e re fo re , I  do n o t need to  a p p ea l to  Theology 
to  expound T îeto rtdn lsm ; f o r ,  th e  p la in  f a c t s  of Psychology 
afford a most co n v in c in g  p ro o f  o f m o i»s n a tu r e ,  and o f  h i "  
i n a b i l i t y  to  escape  from  h i s  qim c h a r a c te r  ‘«rhich i s  
a c tu a l ly  seJX -cen tred*  **•
low,has Kant any roply to  th is  critic ism  by DatarmiaisB 
tha t h is selecticn. of a "moral" Motive discusses, in  an 
a r t i f ic ia l  manner, the subject of l^ tivation? The snXy 
reply th a t Kant could give to  such a critic ism  has already 
been given* I t  i s  centred in  h is particu lar in te rp ré ta - 
tied  of Psychology, and th is  view of Psychology i s  main­
tained i n  a ocnslstent manner i n  the C ritica l Philesophy*
In other words, Kent's re s tr ic tio n  upon psychological 
Tenability is  not merely a "moral" restric tion*  That i s ,  
he does not disregard Psycholog^^ simply on moral grounds; 
rather h is lim ita tion  upon psychological Ju s tif ica tio n  
goes much deeper* For Instance, the following ex tract 
taken from "The Critique of Pure Reason" indicates how 
deeply Kant f e l t  upon th is  n a tte r of Psychology:-
"How are we to regard empirical psychology, which has always claimed i t s  place in  mstaphysios, and from which in  our timms such great things have been ex­pected fo r the advancement of met#^hysics. the hope of succeeding by a p r io ri methods having oeen ahm- dcned* I  answer th a t i t  beloagi where the proper (enqpirlcal) doctrine of nature belongs, namely, by the side of jabUaA philosophy, the a p rio ri p rinci­ples of lA iA  are contained in  pure philosophy: i t  i s  therefore so fa r  oennested with applied phiiesephy, though not to  be confonnded with it*  Empirical psyuhelogy i s  thus completely banished from the domain of metaphysics; i t  i s  indeed already completely ex­cluded by the very idea of the l a t te r  science*In conformity, however* with scholastic usage wo must allow i t  same so rt of place (although as an episode only) in  metaphysics#"\^
Therefore, the critic ism  of Detenainism against Kant's 
particu lar view of Motivation goes much deeper than th is  
particu lar analysis under discussion* In  fa c t , i t  Is a
(1 ) X# r*  ?# A «M *
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a  o r i t i c i s m  a g a in s t  th e  whole C r i t i c a l  P h ilo so p h y , and 
Kant would be ooQq}olled to  abandon tho  whole o f  his t h e s i s  
on M staphysios i f  he w ished to  b r in g  h i s  view  of man In 
l i n e  w ith  t h a t  o f  Edwards* As a lre a d y  s t a t e d ,  for Kant, 
th e  p riiaa ry  wid supreme purpose o f  man c e n tr e s  in  h is 
ratlcttuJL and m oral n a tu re *  lie does n o t  deny the r e a l  
e z ls te iio e  of " p sy c h o lo g ic a l f a c t s " ,  b u t th e s e  things can 
have meaning o n ly  as th e y  a re  viewed a g a in s t  th e ir  proper 
background and w ith in  t h e i r  c o r r e c t  co n tex t*  Of ooerse, 
th e re  a re  Im p u lse s , D e s i r e s ,  and Motives arising  from the 
e m p ir ic a l  o r sensuous n a tu re  o f  man, b u t to  th in k  o f  
trie se "p sy c h o lo g ic a l phenomena" as  cap ab le  of deteimining 
th e  " t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f "  i s  f o r  Kant a  m e ta p h y s ic a l absurdity* 
I t  sim ply  c rn n o t happen* From th e  m oral peint of view, 
Kant i s  e q u a lly  enq )ha tlc .
The fo llo w in g  passag e  i s  o f p a r t i c u la r  i n t e r e s t  i n  con­
firm in g  th e  pi*©sent a n a ly s is  o f  th e  "m oral" M otive t -
"The heterogeneity of the determining prlmeiples (the empirical and ra tio n a l) i s  c learly  det ests i  by the resistance of a p rac tica lly  leg is la tin g  reasen against every admixture of inc lina tion , and by a peculiar kind of JEpiUjiaals which, however, does not preoeés the leg is la tio n  of tw  p ractica l reason* but* m  the contrary, i s  produced by th is  as a constrain t, namely, by th e  feeling of a respect such as no mam has fo r inclinations of whatever kind but fo r the law only; and i t  is  detected in  so marked and prosdnsmt a th a t even the most unlnstructod cannot f a i l  te  see a t once in  an example presented to  him, th a t empirleal principles of v d i t i c n  may indeed urge him to follow th e ir a ttrac tio n s , but tha t he can never he expected to jgbSK anything but the pure p rac tica l law ef reasem alooe#"(1)
I n  o th e r  te rm s , i t  ap p ea ls  t h a t  Kant i s  q u ite  «nahi* to  
a cc e p t th e  mere possib i^JL ty  o f th e  "Hind" being moved to  
a c t io n  by "M otives" w hich a r i s e  from  what he terms th e  
"E m p irica l"  S e l f .  Such a  view  o f "M otive" is  rnstam 
p h y s ic a l ly ,  m o ra lly  and even p s y c h o lo g ic a l ly , impossible*
I t  I s  m e ta p h y s ic a lly  im p o ss ib le  because Impulses etc* be­
long to  th e  phenomena o f  th e  "empirical" S e lf*  I t  la  
morally icq>o88ible because th e  Moral Law acts regardless
(1 ) X* p* V . 221*
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o r  th e  I n c l l i id t lo n s ;  and I t  i s  p sy c h o lo g ic a lly  Im p o ss ib le  
bocausG such Im pulses a ra  q u ite  in c ap a b le  o f be lo n g in g  to  
th e  r e a l ,  nounenal S e l f ,  and when th e y  a re  re c o g n ise d  by 
izaui, th e y  a re  "co n d itio n ed "  by tho  M oral Taw, and cease  t o  
bo r e a l  f a c to r s  in  M o tiv a tio n  ex cep t th ro u g h  t h a t  M oral I#w .
I n  a  l im i te d  way, T .E . Green can W s c id  to  be p u t t in g  
K a n t 's  argum ent on M otlvati(m  in  o th e r  term s whan he w r i te * # -
"The s e n s ib le  ev en t o r phenomenon, im p lied  in  th e  m o tiv e , i s ,  l i l ie  e v e ry  o th e r  e v e n t ,  determined ^  a n te c e d e n t events acco rd in g  to natural lev** The Motive i t s e l f  I though I t  too 1* i n  i t *  own mqr d e f i n i t e l y  d e te rm in e d , i s  n o t n a tu r a l l y  determined.I t  i s  c o n s t i tu te d  by an a c t  o f s e lf -c o n se lo u e n e * * , which i s  n o t  a  n a tu r a l  e v e n t, cn a c t  i n  which the ag en t p ie s e n t*  to  h im se lf  a  c e r t a in  id e a  ef himself, o f h im se lf  do ing  o r h im se lf  e n jo y in g , as an Idea . .o f  which th e  r e a l i s a t i o n  form s f o r  th e  time his ge@d*"t"#
I t  i s  upon t h i s  I n s is te n c e  o f th e  "m oral and r a t i o n a l  
re c o g n itio n "  o f  M otive tTiat K a n t 's  te a c h in g  i s  particularly 
s trong*  As a lre a d y  o b se rv ed , E dvards, to o ,  I n s i s t s  upen 
W tiv e  b e in g  e x ta n t  to  th e  Mind. However, he fa lls  to 
g iv e  t h i s  re q u ire d  em phasis, which i s  found in  K an t, t h a t  
th e  psychologiccJL f a c to r s  which e x c i te  and in v i t e  the 
Mind to  V o li t io n  a r e ,  by th e  v e ry  " re c o g n it io n "  a f  th o  W ad , 
tran sfo rm ed  from  m erely  human "d e te rm in an ts"  o f  the W ad 
to  b e in g  "determ ined" by th e  Mind.
T h ird . i n  a  f u r th e r  c r i t i c i s m ,  Edwards would argue  t h a t  
K a n t 's  d e f in i t i o n  and a n a ly s is  v as f a r  to o  " ra t io n a l" *
T hat i s ,  Edwards would contend th a t  K a n t 's  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
o f M o tiv a tio n  v as  b u t a new e d i t io n  o f  th e  o ld  thesis that 
th e  W ill i s  s u b je c t  to  th e  l a s t  d i c t a t e  o f  th e  IMerstend­
in g .  I n  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  s e c t io n  under re v ie w , Kent is  not 
v e ry  em phatic  upon t h i s  in h e re n t  " r a t i o n a l i t y "  ef th e  
M otive, b u t i t  i s  a  v e ry  d eep ly  ro o te d  f e a tu r e  of his doc­
t r i n e  o f  m o ra ls . F o r in e te n c e .  th e  fo llo w in g  extract is  
t y p ic a l  o f la rg e  s e c t io n s  o f K a n t 's  argum ent f o r  fu lfillin g  
th e  M oral L av t-
(1 ) Prolegoasna to Ethics* Fag# 99*
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"X v i l l  allow that no tntorosL urgoe ma to th is , fo r tha t would not give me a oategorloal imqperative. but 1 most JidiSft an in te re s t in  i t ,  and disoem  how th is  comes to  pass: for th is  *X ought* is  properly an*1 would* valid  for every ra tional being, provided tha t reason determines h is actions without any Ulndranca*"'
In  other words, for Kant, there is  only one Motive for 
moral actions, and tha t i s ,  being subject to  the d ic ta te  
of Reason through Respect fo r the Moral Law. Edwards 
argues that those yfio hold to  such a view of Motlvatlcn 
must give up speaking about the Freedom of the "Will".
Per, in  th is  statement, the Will i s  determined, not by 
i t s e l f ,  but by another aspect of the Personality, namely, 
the Reason or Ikiderstending. Edwards uses this argummst 
in  a convincing manner against his particu lar cppcoents, 
but against Kant i t  is  not very impressive b e c a u s e ; / a /  
Kant, the Will i s  only another term for the P ractical 
Reason; and therefore Kant escapes the charge ef allowing 
the Will to  be determined by a faculty  other than i t s e l f .  
However, the argument of Edwards, as already observed in  
h is defin ition  of Motive, in s is ts  upon viewing Motivation 
in  a iiuch wider sense than is  permitted by Kant. Of 
course, Kant is  speaking of a Motive for Morality, but, 
again, Rdvai-ds would stress  that th is  "rational" Motive i s  
an a r t i f ic ia l  re s tr ic tio n  on a discussion of Motivation.
In other words, says Edvards, i t  is  a l l  very well to  keep 
th is  re s tr ic tio n  on Motivation for the purposes of s ta tin g  
how moral and ra tiona l actions "ought" to  take place, but 
the vast number of human beings do not react to  the Moral 
Lav in  th is  way, and a fu l l  analysis of Motive must take 
into account how men behave as well as hear they "ought" 
to  behave.
Further, Edwards i s  not rea lly  ocaoemed about those who 
would iden tify  the Will with Reason or the Uhderstanding.
(1) Gd. w2.
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Â3 f a r  as h s  I s  concerned , th ey  can make suoli an Identi­
f i c a t i o n  w ith o u t to o  much o b je c t io n  from  h i s  syetaa# (1 )
However, h i s  a rg u n o a t goes izuch deojjor th a n  t h i s  and p ro b ­
a b ly  concorns Kant opofi one o f tho p rim ary  d o c tr in e s  of 
h is  F reedou  o f th e  W ill .
A c a r d in a l  f e a tu r e  of a l l  system s o f Dater,wLnism i s  tha t 
the a c t  o f V i l l  i s  a "n eo essa ry "  a c t ,  o r t h a t  the V ill i s  
" n e c e s s i ta te d " .  As Edwards says, i f  i t  i s  argued th a t 
the W ill fo llo w s  th e  l a s t  d i c t a t e  of the Onderstanding, m  
i s  even i d e n t i f i e d  w ith  th e  I& iderstand ing , then, i t  eeaaet 
be d en ied  t h a t  th e  "freedom " o f  th e  W ill  i s  given np, and, 
in  i t s  p la c e ,  i t  i s  ag reed  t h a t  th e  c.ct o f the V ill i s  a 
"neoeasary* act*
"For i f  th e  determinatiea. e f  th e  Will • . .  • feilews th e  l ig h t, oenvictien/vlev of the %denet ending, ceaceming the greatest good end evilieaA thin so tha t alone which movee the %rill . . .  then i t  is  necessarily  so, the Will aeoesuarily follevs th is  l i g h t  or view o f the Uhderetending • . . ." % « ]
Vow, t h i s  i s  a l l  Edwards ro q u iro e  o f any d ia o u se io n  of 
V i l l  to  coaclude th a t  such a d ia c u s s io n  i s  r e a l l y  a con­
f i r m a t io n  o f h i s  system  o f D eterm inism . There i s  oon- 
s id e r a b la  ev idence  in  tlie  w r i t in g s  oT ICant to  ooaolude tha t 
he was d eep ly  eo acem ed  w ith  t h i s  problem  o f  Secesslty, 
both i n  th e  p h y s ic a l and m oral sp h e re s . F u r th e r ,  oaoh ef 
his te a c h in g  i s  t h a t  a  m oral a c t  i s  a  "n ece ssa ry "  a e t  of 
V U l ,  and th e  fo llo w in g  e x t r a c t  i s  ty p i c a l  o f such a doetrlM t^
"Henee i t  comes to pass tha t man c la im s the peeseeeiea of a w ill whioh takes no aeommt of amytbing that eomes onder the bead of désirés and inclination#, end on the contrary conceive# aotiens as possible ta  him, nay, even as necessary, which can only be dene by disregarding a l l  desires and sensible im eliaatisas#" ^
i t tc h  a statement by Kant would be viewed by Edward# a s  corn- 
elusive tha t Kant taught a system  o f  Determinism# I t  might 
be a "moral" Determinism, or Determinism by the"objective"
(1 )  The Freedom o f th e  W ill#  F t .2 .  S e c t .  9# 
<a) " " " " P t# a . Beet. 9.
(3) dd# 9«u
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princip le , but i t  would be detennlnlsm, and Edwards would 
view as ineousistent any argument by Kant tha t h is moral 
systam was directed to an exposition or even a "Defence" 
of Freedom* Yet, on the other hand, Kant seems to  give 
great Importance to  th a t part ef Freedom which he terms 
"absolute spontaneity". The following i s  typical*-
«Fer in  refer« iee to  the auBerseyiM e oansoiousness >, (i.e . Freedom) the jtt&UHLttBli i s  bet a  single phenomenon , which, inssmch as i tef i t s  existeneeioontains merely manifestation# ef the mental di#- poeltien with regard to the moral lav  (i«e# of the character) mast se judged not aooordlng to  the physical necessity th a t belongs to  i t  as phenomenon, bet aooordlng te  the C oelute spontaneity of freedom."( 1)
Again, th is  inslstenoe, by Kant, of the absolute spontaneity 
ef Freedom is  no mere addendum to  his view of Freedom.
I t  is  woven in to  the very texture of his metaphysical 
structure , and idien he speaks of Freedom In "The Critiame 
of Pure Reason" i t  i s  th is  type of Freedom which he has 
in  mind.
"Reason creates for i t s e l f  the idea of a spontaneity which can begin to  act of i t s e l f ,  without requiring to  be determined to  action by an antecedent cause in  accordanee with the lavs of c a u s a l i t y .  " W
Therefore, on the surface, Kant appears to  have two d is tin c t 
conceptions ef a free ac t. (a) I t  i s  a necesary ac t of 
the Will which has fo r i t s  motive Respect and i s  involved 
in  the fulfilm ent of the Moral Lav. (b) I t  i s  a free ac t 
idiioh springs d irec tly  from the absolute spontaneity of 
Reason, and in  which Reason has no antecedent ground or 
Motive. However, deeper down In Kant's system, ü*ere is  
always a re a l e ffo rt to  explain th is  assumed contradiction, 
and the following ex tract is  on the examples of th is  effo rt* -
"Reason, from which alone can springa ru le lavelsiBg necessity , does, indeed, give necessity  to  th is  sre- eept (else i t  would not be an iaq>erative), but th is  i s  a necessity dependent on subjective conditions, and cannot be supposed in  the same degree in  a l l  g A jec ts ."
230.A.90. A.68. a.97*
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JCaat seems to  be saying th a t an act can be both free and 
neoeasary, and be tr ie s  to  explain tliat i t  i s  free because 
i t  springs frem Reason which is  absolute spontaneity, and 
i t  is  necessary because i t  Is  directed by the "Categorical" 
Imperative which i s  made "necessary" by subjective condition# 
This Bight be an escape fo r Kant frem the charge th a t he 
taught two conflicting doctrines of Freedom, but i t  dees 
not save him from a l l  responsib ility  fo r teaching ttm t, in  
the f in a l analysis, a moral act of Will i s  a "necessary" 
ac t ef W ill, and i t  i s  th is  aspect which in te re s ts  Bdvmrds 
in  th is  p articu lar section on Motivation.
Fourth, th is  suspicion th a t Kant is  expounding some form 
of Determinism is  not lessened by the fa c t th a t, in  the 
analysis of Motivation in  th is  particu lar section, Kant 
appears to  say th a t the Moral Law affects the Inclinations 
in  some "automatic" manner. I t  is  iiqiortant to  note tha t 
Kant speaks of the Moral Law as "thwarting" the Inclina- 
tien s , as "checking selfWUiass and strik ing  down s e lf -  
conceit". Again, he terms the Moral Law as positive, and 
as "an in te lle c tu a l causality" ; i t  i s  an "activ ity" of 
P ractical Reason, and be assumes tha t the Inclinations 
require to  be "impelled" to  action by something other than 
the Inclinations. All these terms tend to  present an 
impression of "compulsion" by the Moral Law as i t  stands 
related  to  the Inclinations; and th is  impression g*i«« 
force when Kant goes on to describe the sentiment of Respect. 
The Moral lav  "removes the resistance out of the way", tha t 
i s ,  the resistance of the Inolinaticais, and is  the "positive 
source of th is  humiliation" which is  Respect, The follow­
ing passage indicates the "Oausality" of the Moral Law con­
cerning Respect.
— ^ 3  ••
"For by the fac t th a t the cotxceptien of tho meral lav  deprive# eelf-Jave ef I te  Influenee, am# eelf-eeneeit of i t s  iU uslen , i t  lessens the obstaole to  pure preetioal reaeev, am# protueee the oeneeptlam ef the superiority  of I t s  objective law tc  the iapuXaes ef the eeaeiWLlity; am# thee, by reveving the oeenter- poise, i t  gives re la tiv e ly  greater weight to  the lav  in  the jwdgeent ef reaeen
Again, when Respect is  f in a lly  "produoe#", man only 
"reluotantly" gives way to  i t .  I t  i s  d if f ic u lt ,  i f  net 
impessible to  avoid thinking of the Moral Law as something 
which presses in  upon the Inclinations with almost i r r e ­
s is tib le  compulsion end sweeps them up or aside in  some 
automatic manner. The position of Kant upon such Netiva- 
tlom by the Moral Lav is  made a l l  the more complicated by 
the fac t tha t he draws a d istinc tion  between the "Rational" 
and the "Elective" m i l )  and i t  is  not altogether besides 
the point to  ask — "What part does the "Elective" Will 
play in  such a system of Motivation^ Is  i t  iden tified  
with the "Rational" W ill, or i s  i t  ju s t swept up cor aside 
by the Moral Law which is  the "Rational" WUl?"
Further, i t  has been noted th a t one of the pivots of the 
Determinism of Edwards is  the Iden tification  ef the Will 
with the Mind, th a t i s ,  as i t  stands re la ted  te  the "Agree­
able" or the "apparent" Good, Edwards w ill have no ta lk  
ef a "vaeazuqr" between the Mind's recognition of the 
Agreeable, or th a t which su its  i t ,  and the ac t ef the Will 
as Preference or Ohoice. No man can ever W ill d iffe ren t 
frem what the Mind rea lly  desires) therefore "Ind iffer­
ence") v o litio n a l deliberation, or nonccsssitment i s  ruled 
out as a figment of the Imagination. Of course, th is  
type of Determinism is  d iffe ren t from anything said by Kant, 
because th is  sysbsmof Determinism skpobndsd by Edvards i s  
motivated by the principle of "private" Happiness, or th a t 
which is  "Agreeable", in  a sensible moaning, to  the Mind, 
Edwards' view of Motive is  psychological and "sensuous* in
(1) &* p, ?• 201.
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th la  p&rtloular exposition of his Determinism, Yet, be 
would not change his defin ition  of Motive evcm when i t  i s  
applied to  his "Saved" nan. Man would s t i l l  be motivated 
in  somia "automatio" manner, except, of course, h is Motive 
now would be the Law of God. In fa c t, in  a la te r  critic ism  
Edwards, i t  w ill be seen tha t Edvards oocw 
ceives of the "S p irit of God" affecting the human heart in  
a manner almost iden tica l with Kant's descriptlsB ef the 
Moral Lav affecting the Inclinatioms. This i s  what he 
means by the " irre s is tib le "  Grace of God. l e t ,  i t  i s  
s t i l l  Deteraiinism, end the defin ition  of Motive given by 
Edwards s t i l l  holds good. Of course, in  the above analysis 
of a "moral" Motive by Kant, he speaks of "the moral lav 
presented for our obedience" ( ^  , and of a "free submissiom 
of the w ill to  the lav".^^^ Yet, there is  something In 
the following extract which would make Edwards conclude 
that he and Kent had nnch in  cosennt-
"There is  something so singular in  the unbounded esteem for the pure moral lev , epart from a l l  ad- ventage, as i t  i s  presented for our obedienee by the prao tieal reason, the voice of which makes even the boldest sinner tremble, and compels him to  hide himself from i t . "(3)
F ifth . Edwards has a very in teresting  argument upon the 
"strength" of Motives which is  crucial fo r h is system ef 
Determinism, and which must be stated in  re la tio n  to the 
Kantian exposition. Cbi the surface, Kant appears to have 
evaded th is  well-vom debate upon the "strength? of 
Motives, yet, beneath the surface of h is exposition of 
Motive, there i s  a clear indication tha t he has very de­
cided views upon th is  subject. Edwards argues th a t, 
although Motives cannot be measured in  an exact manner, 
there are such things as a weak and a strong Motive. 
Otherwise, there would be no conflic t of Motives. Edvards 
in s is ts  tha t the V ill is  always moved by the "strongest"
11) K. p. V. 205*(2) X. p. V. 2%.(3) E. p. V. 205«
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Motive, and th is  seems a mere tru ism  u n t i l  i t  i s  under­
stood what Edwards means by tho "streng th"  of a Motive.
His argument i s  tha t the Mind, or S elf, in  a l l  i t s  opera- 
tlsma, has, what he terms, a "previous tendency", which i s  
the Mind's view of i t s  "apparent" Good. That i s ,  the 
Self seeks what i t  believes to be i t s  Good, or what i s  
"agreeable" to  i t .  Now, not a l l  Motives serve th is  
"apparent" Good, but tha t Motive which su its  the previous 
tendency of the Mind has, in  th is  very "su itab ility "  to 
the Agreeable, tha t elemMit which can be tenasd i t s  
"strength". When Sdvaris is  challenged by h is opponents 
to  explain how i t  happens that sometlnes a "weak" Motive 
prevails over what Is  obviously a very"strong"Motive, ho 
answers that th is  seeming victory of a "weak" Motive over 
a "strong" Motive is  explained by the fac t th a t tho sup­
posed "week" Motive actually  prevailed because i t  had th is  
"previous tendency" of the Mind, tha t i s ,  i t  rea lly  oen- 
tained tha t facto r which was "Agreeable" to  the Kind* I t  
f i t te d  in  with the Mind's view of the Good. E arlie r, in  
h is eiq>ositlon of Determinism, he had said , "a man never, 
in  any instance, w ills  anything contrary to  h is desires, 
or desires anything contrary to h is willf"^^^ sad he fo l­
lows up th is  by saying, " i t  is  that motive, which, as i t  
stands in  the view of the mind, is  the strongost, th a t 
determines the w ill."  Therefore, he fee ls ju s tif ie d  in  
saying, " tha t the w ill always i s ,  as the greatest apparent 
good is ."  Of course, a l l  th is  means tha t the act of the 
m il  is  a "necessary" ac t. I t  is  not fre e  to  choose i t s  
own Motives. In  other terms, the Mind is  already "necessi­
tated" by i t s  view of i t s  "apparent" Good, seid only those 
Motives \thXoh f i t  in to  th is  already established order or 
urge can possibly prevail.
(1 ) The Freedom ef the M ill. F t.1 . Sect. 2 .
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This v low  of Motive i s  essen tia l to h is  system, and tha t 
is  why he was so  emphatic Iji his denial of the Liberty of 
"Indlfferenoe". The Mind or Will can never be in  such a 
s ta te  of "Indifference", for i t  is  always In tent on tha t 
w hich i s  Agreeable to i t s e l f .  For the Mind or Will to  
be a t Liberty to  choose i t s  own Motives would mean th a t, 
in  th is  supreme act of Choice, i t  would be making such a 
Choice without a Motive. This subject has already been 
discussed in  the section dealing with the "Indifference" 
of the Will; the main point hero and now is  to  re la te  
th is  view of Motive with tha t exj^ Teaseù by Kant. Again, 
on the surface, Kant appears to favour tlie idea tha t the 
Self can choose i t s  own Motivest-
"A man may use as mich a r t as he likes in  order to  paint to himself an unlawful act th a t he remembers, as an unintentional e rro r, a mere oversight, such as one can never altogether avoid, and therefore as something in  which he was carried away by the stream  of physical necessity , and thus to  make/out ianeoent, yet he finds tha t the advocate who speaks in  h is  favour can by no means silence the accuser w ith in , i f  only he is  conscious tha t a t the time idian he did th is  wrong he was in  h is senses, tha t i s ,  in  possession of h is freedoc'."'
Obviously, such a passage i l lu s t ia te s  the p o s s ib ility  e f  
the Will choosing to  be determined by a "Physical" Motive, 
or by a "Moral" Motive, and, as already indicated, there 
i s  much of such teaching in  the Kantian expositicn o f 
Freedom. However, th is  apparent "Indifferenoe" of the 
Will in  Kant has already been balanced by the other aspect 
oi h is teaching, tha t i s ,  tha t tho Will can be Determined 
only as a "moral" W ill, by the Moral Law. Yet, i t  is  
perfectly  clear th a t, i f  th is  second aspect of Kant's 
teaching is  chosen as rea lly  fundamental and essen tia l to  
his system, Kant seems to  be coming near again to  teaching 
seme form of Determinism.
A&ut does not lessen th is  agreement with some form of 
Determinism when he asks how men become c<m#cieus of the
(1 ) K. p. ? . 230.
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Moral lav and ersvera, "by attendlnr to  the necessity v lth  
which reason prescribes them."( D
However, in  the section of Motivation nov under discussicn, 
there is  one passage where Kant seeiiis to ineet Xdwerds face 
to  face, and the oruclaJ. aspects of th e ir  disagreement are 
brought into correct focus. Kant is  discussing what he 
terms "c<mp&rative freedoo", and tliere can be l i t t l e  doubt 
tha t he is  coming very near to wliat Edwards ca lls  "Froniee?. 
The argument i s ,  le t  i t  be assumed that a zian commits a 
wrong ac t, a " tiieft" . Now, says Kant, i t  can be argued 
that he did such an act as a "necessary re su lt of the 
determining causes in  preceding time". In fa c t, according 
to tho understanding of such causes and lavs, i t  was im­
possible tha t h'zLs act could not liave happened. Kant 
believes th a t, in  sp ite  of a l l  these fac to rs, a moral 
judgment can be uttered joncernJjig th is  wrong ac t. I t  
"ought" to  have been (omitted). Kant then goes cn to  say 
tha t some argue th a t, even faced with these factors e f  
physical Necessity, the z»an who eonBultted the "thefV  had 
Freedom, a t le a s t, he had what is  termed "comparative" 
Freedom. Edwards would add, yes, in  tha t he did what he 
wanted to  do, and what he did was "pleasing" to  him to  do. 
Kant says t!iis notion of "comparative" Freedom is  based 
on the argument tha t there is  in  the agent what is  some­
times called a "free e ffe c t, the determining physical 
cause of Which lie s  within In the acting thing i t s e l f ."
Tlxat i s ,  the free e ffec t is  like a p ro jec tile  which con­
tinues on i t s  way in  "Freedom? because i t  is  urged by 
nothing, a t tha t moment external to i t s e l f .  d r, i t  is  
like a clock which has Freedom to i t  a hands " itse lf* '.
Then, ho says something which describes in  f a ir ly  eocurete 
terms the view of "Proedœi? ezpmmded by Edwards*
(1 ) K. p. T. 14@.
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"Bo although tho actions of laan are n eoessarlly  dotom iooa by oausoa whioh precede in  tim e, we yet c a ll  them fr e e , beoauee these eaueee %re idee# pre- dooed by our own fa e u lt ie e , whereby d esires are evoked on oeeasion o f eirottnstanoes, and henee . . æ tie n s  are wrought according to  our own pleasure."
In h is exposition  of Determinism, i t  i s  th is  view e f  
Liberty which Edwards expounds as a genuine theory e f  
L iberty, in  fa c t , i t  i s  the only theory of L iberty lA idh  
i s  compatible w ith a l l  the evidence ava ilable . Feihaps, 
these two ex tra c ts , Edwards gives the c lea rest idea o f 
what he means by such Preedent-
"Let the person cone by h is  choioe any hoar, y e t, i f  he i s  a b le , and there i s  nothing in  the way to hinder h is  pursuiag and executing h is  w i l l ,  the man i s  p erfec tly  fr e e , a c co r d in g ^  the primary and oommsn nation o f freedom."
"tAwa a thing i s  fre^ a man, in  tha t sense, tha t i ti s  frem h is  w i l l  or choice, he i s  to  blame for i t ,  because h is w i l l  i s  in  i t ,  so far a s,th e  w i l l  i s  in  i t ,  blame i s  in  i t ,  and no further."v3)
A i s  a l l  sounds very reasonable, unless i t  i s  borne in  
mind th a t, for Edwards, the whole process o f Choice i s  
linked together w ith the previous tendency of the Kind, 
and th is  chain o f cause and e ffe c t  i s  unbreakable and un­
a ltera b le . Y et, says Edwards, th is  i s  the on ly lib e r ty  
p o ssib le , tha t i s ,  "the Liberty o f doing as yea lik e" .
Kant ocndemis th is  "çfyp^^tiv e " freedem, and charges i t s  
expammits w ith p etty  word-jugglery resu ltin g  in  "a wretched 
subterfuge". This "oonqparative" Freedom, says Kant, 
might be termed "psychological" Freedom, but i t s  fa ta l  
weakness i s  that i t  stands grounded in  "physical E eoessity" . 
That i s ,  an end less chain o f lin k s o f cause and e ffe c t .
I t  i s  aga inst th is  spurious idea o f Freedom tha t Kant puts 
h is idea of "transcendental" Freedom which i s  independence 
o f everything Em pirical, and be fe e ls  tha t such a Freedom 
i s  Him on ly rea l ground far resp o n s ib ility . Therefore, i t  
appears qu ite obvious from the above "clash" of viewpoints
K. p. V._ 226.The Freedom of the W ill. F t .1 . Beet. 5 .(3 ) " m •  n n P t.4 . Boct. 1).
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Ith a t Edwards and Kant mean vary d ifferen t things when they 
speak of Human Freedom, and i t  appears quite obvious th a t 
Kant has said some very devastating things about such a 
Freedom advocated by Edwards. However, the re a l trouble 
always begins when Kant attempts to  give a "positive" 
in terp retation  to  h is idea of "transoendental" Freedom:-
"But the very some subject being on the other side osnsoious of himself as a thing in  himself, considers h i .  ezl.tenoe alao to  so fa r  « . I t  1 . M t»-ggBgltjdElâ» and regards himself as determinable laws which he gives himself through reason; and in  th is  h is  existenoe nothing is  ^ teoeden t to  the detormination of h is w ill
Edwards would reply to  such a passage, "every ac t of the 
w ill has a cau se ...# , i f  i t  has a cause, then, i t  i s  
necessary;"^^) and there the struggle must end fo r the 
time being.
flixth. there i s  an ind irec t critic ism  of Edwards ooncexning 
Kant's exposition of the "moral" Motive which ought to  
receive appropriate atten tion . I t  i s  a phase ef a more 
general critic ism  of Kant, and might be put in  the follow­
ing terms. d l l  Kant's e th ica l esqiositions appear to  be 
more than mere moral analyses; many of them are , in  fa c t , 
passionate preaching of concepts which are inherent in  
re lig ion . Kant seems to  have carried forward a system of 
transvaluation. That i s ,  he has moralised re lig io n , and 
sp iritu a lised  M o r a l i t y . ^3) xn th is  particu lar section on 
"moral" Motive, th is  tendency i s  most apparent# Edwards, 
or any Theologieal Determinist, would have charged Kant 
with expounding a defin ite  "religious" experience under 
the guise of a moral analysis. He would have in sisted  
th a t the tone and content of th is  particu lar section on 
Motivation are nothing more or less than those which rea lly  
belong to Religion, and to  Ee%ion only. In h is  theo­
log ical works, Edwards devotes much time and care to  a
(1) K# p . 7 . 228.She Freedem ofSee Paton# The Categorical Imperative. Page 63.^2j ^  the W ill. M .2 . 8 ec t. 13#
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sim ilar type of Motivation, bat vitli tliis  differenoe. He 
makes suoh llotivatian relig ious in  content and implication. 
That i s ,  he thinks of the Lav of Oed exercising the 
>mmAn heart th is  majesty and ova which are so evident in  
the Kantian analysis. The Causality of the Moral Law as 
e3Q)r88sed by Kant, i s ,  by Edwards, conceived as the Holy 
S p irit bringing to the human conscioasDOSs the inexorable 
command of God, and the reaction to  such a Causality is  
the Christian doctrine of the "conviction of Sin".
Further, th is  conviction of Sin, or as Kant terms i t ,  
" in te llec tu a l self-depreciation", resu lts  in "conversion", 
or idiat Kant terms — "Respect". These two expositions 
have so much in  comnon th a t i t  Is also i#q>oesible to  avoid 
the conclusion th a t they are describing the one and sas# 
experience. i s  already sta ted , Kant was perfectly  aware 
of th is  Impressive "theological" system ef Determinism 
se t fo rth  by Augustine, Luther and Calvin; and the 
Pietism in  which he was trained was saturated with th is  
theological in te rp re ta tion . I t  is  d if f ic u lt  to  ignore 
these factors in  any appraisal of Kant's exposition of the 
"moral" Motive, and the question i s  idiether Kant, oenscions- 
ly  or otherwise, i s  borrowing a central doctrine ef Theo­
log ical Determinism to  give support to a moral doctrine ef 
Freedom. This question i s  a l l  the more pertlm wt because 
ef the fac t tha t when Kant rea lly  cones to  grips with 
Motive in  h is analysis of Radical Evil, he takes refuge in  
the theological doctrine of "Conversion".
In order to  indicate the importance of th is  point ef 
critic ism , i t  i s  necessary to glance a t the manner in  which 
Edwards oonoeivos the woric of the H plrit of Ged upon the 
human heart, and the following phases of such a weA might 
be noted in  th is  order*-
(a) Edwards conceives of the S p irit e f  Sod operating upem 
the heart regardless of the Inclina ticps. As already bb- 
served,this i s  the so t of the " ir re s is tib le "  Grace of Ged
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la  providing SaXTaticn; and tills laaans tha t the Lav of Qod 
is  proflcnt to  tho human donsciousnoss with ovorwbolming 
power end majesty. Edvards is  spealdng of tho action of 
tho S p irit of God as i t  brings before tho human mind, the
Divine If r a th ,  the  Divine Glory, and the Divins Love, and 
irrites t-
"Human n a tu re , whioh is  as the grass* & shaking lo a f, a voak vitharing flovor, should to tto r  nodor ouch a disdovory. Eueh a bubble is  too weak to boar a weight so vast# Alas, what is  man th a t ho should support himself under a view of the awful wrath, or in f in ite  glory and love of JSHOVAH. lo  wooder therefore i t  is  said . . .  'No man can see me and l iv e '."( 1)
Kant speaks of the majesty of iStua Moral Law whioh "makes 
the boldest sinner tremble, mad cosqpels him to  hide him» 
se lf  frem i t " ;  and he also speaks of the Moral Law "before 
which a l l  the inclinations are dumb."^^)
(b) Edwards, in  another work, goes on to describe 
of the "practical" resu lts  of th is  presence of the S p irit 
of God:-
"Go th is  new sp ir itu a l sense is  not & new faculty  of understanding, but i s  a  new foimdaticn la id  in  the nature of the soul, for a new kind of exsreiso ef the same facu lty  of understanding. So th a t the new holy disposition of heart tha t attends th is  new sense, i s  not a new faculty  of v U l, but a fommdaticm la id  in  the nature of the soul, for a new kind of exercise, for the same faculty  of w ill#"U )
J  Kant's d istinc tion  of the "Rational" and "Elective" V ill
i s  not original* This dichotomy of Volition i s  as old as 
S t. Paul; and Augustine, Lather and Calvin make reference 
to  th is  conflic t within the S elf, Edvards gives the above 
explanation of the origin of the "new" Will in  man. I t  
i s  cQQceming th is  "new" V ill tha t Edwards could agree with 
Kant when he says — "The ra tiona l V ill, which i s  directed 
to  notiling but the lav only, cannot be called e ith e r free 
or u n f r c e " . T h e  only difference being th a t Edwards i s
CD Thoughts on Revival. P t.1 . Sect.2. (a) K. p. T. 215*Religious Affections. P t.3 . d e o t.l. d. S, In tro . 28.
V»/
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more o oae isten t than ICant in  expounding euoh a system ef
Determinisiu.
(o) A further re su lt of the aotion of the S p irit of Oed 
upon the hwmsn heart i s  the fac t of"Ruailiatioa"t —
"But the essenee of evangelical hnw jllaticn consistsin  euoh hum ility  as becomes a c rea tu re  in  i t s e l f  exceedingly s in fu l, under a dispensation ef grace,co n sis tin g  in  a mean esteem of liim solf, as in  him­se lf  nothing, and altogether contemptible and odious#.."
Yet, th is  i s  not txia f in a l  r e s u l t  ox the impact of the 
B ^ i t  of God upon the human h e a r t . Edwards i n s i s t s  th ere  
i s  another aspoot to  such an impact: —
"Whenand persons have been oxereisod w ith  e x t r a s  te r ro rs , then there i s  a sudden change to  lig h t and je ^ .y
He a lso  regards as f in a l ly  con trad ic to ry  to  h is  view of 
R eligion th a t  persons should be Good out of "a s la v ish  fear
of H e ll ." ^3)
In order to  appreciate the f u l l  force of these slsdLlarities 
in  Kant and Edwards two facts must be borne in  mind,
(1) Kant never rea lly  got away from the theologieal baok- 
groond in  which the Christian doctrines of Ocaversion, 
Sanotifioaticn and Election lay embedded. I t  i s  true tha t 
h is e th ica l emphasis was original and passianate, but i t  
i s  also true tha t h is "%eology" was the trad itio n a l type. 
There is  nothing in  Kant of "natural" Theology which denies 
f la t ly  the very basis for such doctrines. Kant i s  con- 
Tineed tha t these Christian doctrines are r e a l i t ie s ,  but 
tha t they stand in  need of more "rational" ju s tif ic a tio n , 
and th is  he attesqpts in  h is  work "Bsligien within the lim its 
of mere Season". In other terms, Kant conoeivea h is work 
as fu lf i l l in g  rather than destroying these cardinal features 
of the Christian re lig ion ; and, as already sta ted , he 
does not do th is  in  order to  pose as orthodox, but because
(1) Beligious Affections. Ft#3. Sect. 6.2) Narrative of Conversions. Sect. 3#3) Beligious Affections. P t.3 . Sect. 9.
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he believes profoundly in  their fimdeiasiitel re a lity .
(2) Further, i t  wuat be boxne in  mind, that Edvards, In 
addition Lo gathering up in to  h is system a l l  the great 
heritage of Tlieologioal Determinism, has welded i t  a l l  to­
gether in  the flame of an ardent Mystioism. Edwards is  
a P ie t is t ,  as w ell as boing a Thaologioal D e tem in ist;  
and ills  emphasis upon "practical" üh r istian ity  i s  as 
impressive as Kant's. In fa c t , he makes the same carefu l 
d istin ctio n  as Kant between "Legal" and "Moral" values, 
except that Edvards terms "Moral" values as "Evangelical"$ 
and both agree that Goodness must conie from a Good pr incip le  
of W ill, and not from supposed "Good" Actions.
I f  there are reasooahle grounds for assuming th a t Kant 
was ihfluenced by these crucial doctrines of Theologieal 
X^terminisiQ, and tha t th is  influence resulted in  h is giving 
a defin ite  relig ious experience under the guise ef a moral 
analysis, then, the implications of such an assumption are 
important. (a) Suoh an assumption strengthens the argu­
msnt th a t Kant's system of Morality and Freedem stands 
v ita lly  rela ted  to  some form of Determinism. (b) His 
cen tral doctrine of the "Autonomy" of the W ill, as th a t 
doctrine eiq^ounds "authorship" of the Moral Lav amst be 
received with considerable qualification . (o) His lack 
ef emphasis upon the place and operation of the "Elective" 
Will in  th is  particu lar section on Motivation oannet be 
attribu ted  to  mere oversight, but must be viewed as a 
fa ilu re  to  f i t  i t  in to  a scheme of things which was to ta lly  
foreign to  i t s  content and function. In other words,
Kant f a i l s  to give the "Elective" W ill any rea l value in  
th is  particu lar analysis of Motivation because this system 
of Motivation was taken over from an expositicn ef Theo­
log ical Determinism in  which such a W ill could find me 
possible place and function. The present discussicn of 
the Kantian Defence of Freedom cannot attempt a dogmatic 
solution to a l l  these d iff ic u ltie s  of Kant's exposition of
1
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Motive as such an exposition stands conf ronted with Deter-
lainism, put there can be no doubt about th eir  ezistenee, 
and Kant was qu ite aware of the imperfect oharaeter of his 
analys is. For he c lo ses such an analysis with these words#
*’I t  may be sa id  .that the so lu tion  here proposed in» wolves ^ a t  d iff icu lty  in  i t s e l f ,  and i s  sceroely suscep tib le of a luc id  exposition* Dut is  snr other solution th a t has been attempted, or tha t maybe attempted; eas ier  or more in te l l ig ib le ?   .........I f  science i s  to  be advanced, a l l  d if f ic u lt ie s  must be la id  open, and we oust even search for t hose th a t are hidden €n the other hand, i f  tbm d i f f i ­c u lt ie s  are in ten tion a lly  concealed, or merely re­moved by p a llia tiv e s , them secoaer or la te r  they burst out in to  inourable m ischiefs, which.bring science to  ruin in  an absolute scepticism#"
I t  ibight w e ll be that the Kantian exposition of a "moral" 
Motive ra ises many more d if f ic u lt ie s  than i t  solves, yet, 
such an ejqposition was needed by serious e th ica l thought, 
and i t  i s  extremely doubtful whether the whole of e th ica l 
thought conteins a more praiseworthy attempt tiien. i s  found 
in  Kant. However, i t  cannot be said that th is  expositicm 
has strengthened the Kantian Defence of Freedom, and i t  
might w ell have revealed some of i t s  most important weak­
nesses.
C l)  M. p* V* 235*
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"Moreover, 1 find i t  d if f io u lt to excite myself very muoh over rig h t and wrong in  praotioe. I  have no clear idea of idiat people have in  mind when they may th a t they labour under a sense of sin; yet I  do not doubt th a t, in  some oases, th is  i s  a genuine experience, which seems v ita lly  important to  those who have i t ,  and may rea lly  be of profound e th ica l and metaphysical significance#
(Dr* Broad. Five Types of Ethical Theory. Preface.)
"This method of averting one's atten tion  from e v il , and liv ing  simply in  the lig h t of good is  splendid as long as i t  w ill work. I t  w ill work with many persons; i t  w ill work fa r more generally than most of us are ready to  sup­pose; and within the sphere of i t s  successful operation there is  nothing to  be said against i t  as a religious solution. But i t  breaks down impotently as soon as melan­choly comes; and even though one be quite free  from melan­choly one's s e lf ,  there is  no doubt tha t hsalthy-ednded- ness is  inadequate as a philosophical doctrine, because the ev il facts idiich i t  refuses positively  to  account for are a genuine portion of re a lity : and they may a f te r  a l lbe the best key to  l i f e 's  signincanoe, and possibly the only openers of our eyes to  we deepest lavels of tru th ."
(James. The V arieties of Religious Experience.
Page 1 6 3 .)
"The new w ill wliich I  began to  have was not yet strong enough to  overcome th a t other w ill, strengthened by long indulgenoe. So these two w ills , one old , one new, one carnal, the other sp ir i tu a l , contended with each ether and diituroed my soul. I  understood by my own experience what I  had read, 'f le sh  lu s te th  against s p i r i t ,  and s p ir i t  against flesh* • I t  was myself in  both w ills , yet more myself in  tha t which I  approved in  myself than th a t which I  disapproved in  myself. Yet i t  was through myself tha t habit had attained so fierce  a mastery over me, because I  had w illingly  come whither I  willed not."
(8 t. Augustine. Oonfessions. Book 8. oh.
"For g u ilt s ign ifies authorship, and indeed not th a t of some guiding power above or behind the person, but author­ship exolusivsly on the part of the person himself. ..........Here the person comes forward as a id tness against himself, accuses himself, struggles against h is own most v i ta l  In te re s t. How could he do w is ,  i f  there were not another reason for i t  in  him self, i f  in  aim as a person there were not something of greater import, something d is tin c tiv e  of him, which demanded th is  negation and v io la tion  of l i f e ,  precisely in  order to preserve his in tegrity?"
(Hartmann. E th ics. V o l.3 . Pages 173 end 175*)
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I t  Is quite impossible to  press forward with the discussion 
of Kant's Defence of Freedom in  the work — "Religion within 
the lim its of mere Reason" — without making sons attempt 
to  ju s tify  Kant's in trusion  in to  the "Tfaeologloal" sphere*
She important question i s ,  why did Kant enter upon th is  d i f f i ­
cu lt task of analysing Radical Svil? and, in  order to  answer 
th is  questlcn^it i s  necessary to  ask, a t le a s t ,  three sub­
sid iary  questions, ( a )  Vas such a discussion necessary?
(b) Vas Kant sincere in  suoh a discussion? (c) Vas Kant 
ooBQ>etent to  carry on such a discussion? The outcome of 
suoh questionings must have considerable bearing upon the 
v a lid ity  of the Kantian Defence of Freedom in  the realm of 
re lig ion .
( . )  Wm  »uch B ai»ou»»loo
To appreciate the importance of th is  question the following 
facts must be borne in  mind.
(1) Kant had made i t  very clear tha t Bthics was a s e lf -
contained system.
"A system of E thics, therefore, needs no Religion, neither objectively to  aid man's w ill ,  nor subjectively, as respects h is a b i l i ty , to  aid his power; but stands, by force of pure p rac tica l reason, se lf-su ffic ien t and independent."\1)
This statement is  lsg)ortant because i t  sums up the whole of 
Kant's teaching upon the independence of e th ioal discussion 
over against the stq>posed intrusion of Theology in  matters 
pertaining to  Morality. Kant insisted  upon Freedom from 
Theological presuppositions in  his analysis of ^ e  Moral Law. 
His contempt for "heteronymous" principles in  the Determina­
tion  of the V ill indicates the depth of h is opposition to
(1) R e ligion. Frefaoe. Trans, by Sesqile.
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what he thought was a type of "theological” tyranny.
That t^ils is  a rea l and v i ta l  part of the Kantian teaching 
1# ooofinued by one of his most serious exponents*^
Of course, Kant modifies the above statement by saying th a t 
Bthios issues into Religion, but the reason he gives for 
such a modification is  not very impressive. That i s ,  such 
an issue safeguards man's "chief end", the union of goodness 
with happiness•
Dr* John Calms does not welcome such an explanation :-
" . . .  th is  is  t\ym rad ical defect of Kant's religious scheme, th a t re lig ion  is  by him subordinated to  morality, as God is  only required as an upholder  of the oaanectioQ between the moral lav and hi^piM Ss, and la not d irec tly  revealed as a Lawgiver*"'*^
Ho competent Theologieffi would accept Kant's explanation as 
adequate because i t  would be argued that the concept of God, 
once aooepted as an in teg ra l factor in  any system of Bthios, 
must condition, rather than be conditioned by, sueh a systoa 
of a th ics. The argument of the ! •  too
ancient and disreputable to comnmnd serious consideration. 
(2) Another argument for doubtlag the adv isab ility  of 
Kant's discussion of Radical Xvil is  contained in  the fac t 
tha t he had already, in  h is system of Rthios, an in te rp re t 
ta tio n  of Evil which was a t  le as t consistent with h is ex­
position of phsnemsna. In his c lassica l reference to  the 
nature and operation of the "Blective" W ill, Kant gives a 
view of Evil which has been mentioned in  the discussion of 
the "Indifference" of the Will. However, the following 
extract gives the required esqkhasis a t th is  po in ti-
"Freedom in  re la tio n  to the inner leg is la tio n  of the reason is  alone properly a power; the p e s s ib i l i^  of deviating from th is  is  an impotence."v3/
Here is  a view of Moral Evil as " inability" or "incapacity"
which is  p6%fectly ocnsistent with a considerable area of
Kant's teaching on Moral Freedom. Further, i t  would have
been consistent with his Platonic leanings in  Metaphysics,
(1) Hartmann* Ethics. ?ol*3* Page 263*(2) Ghbelief in  the Eighteenth Century, Page 220. see also Fischer* Kant, Page 130*(3) Zntre* to  the Mstaphysic of Morals* Eeet.28*
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end his 3toio tendencies in  Morality. Moral Evil in te r­
preted as "ignorance" appears to be the log ical sequence to  
Kant's theory of knowledge tha t the re a l nature of "the thing- 
In -itse lf"  is  unknowable. Again, his supposed disdain for 
a serious analysis of the inc lina tions, and emotional l i f e  
of man would appear to  ju s tify  an in te rp reta tion  of Moral 
Evil as "imq*otcnce".(^^ These facts appear to  ju s tify  the 
question, lAy did Kant ignore the log ical sequence of h is 
system, and abandon a feasib le doctrine of Moral Evil fo r 
an in te rp re ta tion  of Radical Evil which involved an in trusion  
in to  a realm in  which he was i l l  a t ease, and for which he 
seemed ill-prepared? Bom attempt must be made to  reply to 
th is  question. However, before such an atteaqpt is  possible, 
i t  is  necessary to glance a t the second of the subsidiary 
questions*
<k) M.. . l o c r .  In â«ah .
In asking th is  question, i t  i s  not proposed to  deal with the 
rather insip id  suggestions tha t Kant %rrote upon the subject 
of re lig ion  to  sa tis fy  public opinion tha t he was tru ly  
orthodox, th a t he was rea lly  nostalgic to  h is P ie tis tie  tra in ­
ing, or th a t he wished to  supply Lampe with a God. A ll such 
questions can be asked only in  an atmosphere which is  com­
ple tely  hostile  to  h is in te lle c tu a l greatness and moral 
seriousness. The d ifficu lty  which prompts the above questdom 
is  found in  Kant's "Religion within the lim its of More Beassn", 
in  which he appears to advocate the view tha t any ojqpenent of 
a religioiis system is  ju s tif ie d  in  having a "private" and an 
"o ffic ia l"  in te rp re ta tion  of any TWologioal doctrine under 
discussion.
This "hermeneutical" doctrine is  mentioned by Gtuekenberg as- 
having caused considerable critic ism  of Kant's 
theological m a t t e r s . f u r t h e r ,  Kent gives the impression, 
in  h is in te rp reta tion  of Ohristian doctrine, tha t he is
(1) Caird. The C ritica l Philos<^hy. Vol. 2* Page 602.
(2) Stuekenberg*s Life of Kant* Page *
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making a rea l e ffo rt a t being to lerant about sometiiing which 
rea lly  coes not matter in  the le a s t to him as a person*
This a ttitu d e  of detachment, even patronage to  important 
aspects of re lig iw s  dogma is  calculated to  create the im­
pression th a t Kant %ras expounding what might be an "o ffic ia l"  
in terp reta tion  of relig ion  without permitting h is private 
convictions to intrude in to  tho debate* Zet, however strong 
may be the evidence from th is  point of view, i t  is  obvious, 
from a careful survey of Kant's theological discussions, 
th a t he was profoundly sincere in  his handling of theological 
qusstions* His work — "Religion within the lim its of Mere 
Reas cm" brought M^on. him more acute critic ism  than any 
other of h is works. From the S ta te , the Church and the 
Public he received the most solemn warnings of disapproval* 
Yet, he declined to  withdraw his in terp reta tion  of Christian 
doctrine*( There is  no doubt about the fa c t tha t his 
reputation suffered by h is deliberate in trusion in to  the 
theological sphere and h is refusal to conform to  the point 
of view which was held by the majority of thinkers on such 
topics. ▲ contemporary, and rather contemptuous c r i t i c ,  
charged Kant with daring to  extend his metaphysical and moral 
theories in to  the realm of religion*
Kant was pained by such c r i t ic is m , but was quite unrepentant. 
His purpose i s  quite c lea r, i t  is  to discuss the meaning and 
purpose of re lig ion  from the point of view of "Reascn", but 
the term "Beasw" must be kept within i t s  s t r ic t ly  Kantian 
defin ition . I t  is  not mere Rationalism or Naturalism that 
Kant is  applying to Religion, rather i t  is  Reascn with a ll 
i t s  implications of Freedom and Morality. Therefore, i t  
sews reasonable to propose tha t th is  particu lar in terpre­
ta tion  of Radical E vil, with which th is  discussion is  mainly 
eeneemed, can be accepted, with minor qualifications, as
(1) James Ward. Â Study of Kant. Page 190.
(2) Preface to Second Edition of "Religion".
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JU nt's most careful and sincere appraisal of that aspect of
Theology. As Kant himself says*-
"Much tha t 1, indeed, think with the clearest eonvletlsn and to  my great sa tisfac tio n , 1 sh a ll never have the courage to say;X do not thinks  but I  sha ll never say anything th a t
Further, his very searching paragraph upon S ln ee ritr  con­
tained in  the work under discus sicn could hardly have been 
w ritten by a man who was saying one thing and meaning a n o t h e r (2)
(o)
Appreciation of Kant's genius in  Metaphysics and Herals can­
not be the f in a l argument concerning his competency te  d is­
cuss theological questions. From the evidence which is  
available, i t  appears th a t his knowledge of Theology was very 
lim ited, and one of his contemporaries w rites t-
"He (Kant) was, however, en tire ly  ignorant of the mew investigations of bemler, iSmesti, Noesselt, and others. .S is theological knowledge scarcely reached to  1 7 6 0 ."^
Further, any informed appraisal of Kant's handling of the 
central doctrinea of the Christian Faith must re su lt in  de­
ciding th a t, upon many v i ta l  dogmas, Kant was hopelessly in - 
ecmsistent, i f  net fa ta lly  publie. For instance, h is ia te r -r
preta tico  of the Deity of Jesus Christ i s  superfic ia l to the 
la s t  degree, and makes no advance upon the eldest and most 
discredited in terpretations available in  Christelogy. Dr.
J*A. Dormer, probably the greatest C hristo legist ef noderm
times, and a careful end sympathetic student of Kant, w ritest-
"Whatever re la te s  to  the h is to rica l C hrist, Kant leaves unconsidered, nay more, by reducing the h is te r ie a l element in  Him to  a dead mass, ha makes i t  altogether questionable, and is  unable to give the dogma of the . . .  Person of Christ any other than a syobelieal meaning."'^'
Dr. Dormer goes cm to  point out that Kant made Christ the
perfect fulfilm ent of the Moral Law^^\ and th is  as an MÈÊÊÜ
(1) Stuckenbcrg's Life of Kant. Note 133. Bsligicm. Zk. CcnelusioQ.Stuekenberg. Pag© 359*Peracm ef C hrist. Div.2* Tel.3* Page 39*
(2) £ H>« mMl i
( 5 )  Religion. 3k. 2. Apotomc 2.
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h is to ric a l fa c t , and than goes mi to say tna t the "h is te riea l"  
persw  does not rea lly  matter. Further, a l l  th is  i s  done 
a f te r  Kent lias solemnly assured his readers th a t Redioal Bvil 
can never be dealt with effectively  unless there is  an "aotnal" 
replacement of the Evil by trie Good in  human life*  Further, 
Kant is  w illing to  admit tha t the b irth  and departure ef 
Christ w ere "olraclas"; and yet persis ts  in denying any rea l 
"h isto rical" importance to  such events, and even to  sueh a 
l i f e  which was cen tral to such happenings*
Dr. 5n il liruonor puts h is finger upon th is  cen tral defect in  
Kant's handling of Christian Doctrine when he sayss-
"In the Christian re lig ion  'Eaivation' i s  always ind is­solubly connected with an h is te r ie a l fac t; with the fac t of the Incarnation of the Divine Word, with thefac t of the itenemmait by Jesus C hrist................ .In i t s  essence a revelation which, by i t s  very mature, can only take place once, d iffe rs  absolutely n*as a revelation which, also by i t s  very nature, cam , .necessarily  be repeated an indefin ite  numser of tim *."'
Kant denies the "fin a lity "  of the Revelation in  Jesus C hrist, 
and he also denies the positive worth of i t s  h is to ric a l 
" fac ts" . There is  a fu rther defect in  Kant's handling of 
"Religion". I t  is  quite clear from the work under d is ­
cussion tha t Kant i s  se t upon an exposition of nothing less 
than "A Philosophy ef Religion". In other words, he is  
w illing to  accept C hristianity  as an agreed centre for 
examination of what i s  of permanent worth in  a l l  religicm s.
This is  a most commwidable undertaking, and i t s  developmmit 
in  modem thought has been of great importance and bemeflt. 
Hevever, Kant se t fo rth  upon such a task with very l i t t l e  
re a l knowledge of the te rr ito ry  he was to  survey. His know­
ledge ef world relig ions was p rac tica lly  n i l .  Kis a ttitu d e  
to  other aspects of relig ious fa ith  was painfully in to le ran t, 
end his dogmatic assumptions concemlr.g Judaism were indica­
tive of a mind th a t seems never to  have progressed beyond the 
most elementary Christian catechism.
(1) Tiie Mediator. Page 24^  & 25,
dee also , H.H* Maokintesh. Person ef Jesus Q hrlst,Page &9*
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These defects in  Kent's handling of relig ious questions mist 
be granted, ye t, they do not constitute the f in a l w##m, nor, 
perhaps, the most important word which can be said ooneextting 
Kant's theological contribution.
Without lessening in  the s lig h te s t degree the foroe of the 
above critic ism  of Kant, i t  is  perfectly  obvious th a t no ex­
ponent of modem Theology, who is  aware of the basis p rino i- 
ples ef Kant's relig ious and moral teaching, w ill deny th a t 
he did W fe s t a revolution in  the realm of Ohristian apolo­
getics; and the following points might be noted as factors 
in  such a revolution, (a) £y h is moral seriousness, Kant 
brought his generation to a more careful and adequate recog­
n itio n  of moral values as they stood rela ted  to  re lig ion .
(b) He began the erection of a bridge between Rationalism 
and Religion, and he made i t  possible to  bslieve in  what 
might be termed Rational Mysticism* (e) He brought the 
"super-sensible" in to  the midst of actual l i f e ,  and his 
w phasis yjspoa the "practical" nature of Reason was, in  fa c t , 
a type of "incarnation" which helped to save Philosophy from 
perishing, (d) I f  modem C hristianity  is  more to leran t of 
other forms of relig ious fa ith , th is , to  a great degree, is  
due to Kent who Wave the f i r s t  inq^etus to research in to  what 
was essen tia l to  religion* (s) I f  the many "Xdves" of Christ 
which followed Kant's work in  Religion, such as Strauss,
Renan, e tc . ,  are essen tia lly  "Rational", they are also 
essen tia lly  "reverent". This is  largely due to Kent who 
put a very high value upon tlie "ethical" significance of 
tbs Person of Jesus and His teacliing* For Kant, Jesus was, 
a t le a s t, the "moral" Lord of Life.
This expression of appreciation of Kant's contribution to  
Religion provides the background against which can be answered 
the principal question of th is  preliminary discussion of 
Freedom and Radical E vil, tha t i s ,  why did Kant enter upon 
th is  d if f ic u lt  task of analysing Radical Evil? The following 
reasons might constitu te a possible reply*
— 2Ô2 -
F i r s t . Dr. G.D. Broad co^iplains about uL&t ha teraafii- 
**Ka:at's no ra l f a n a t i c i s m " . H o w e v e r ,  Dr. Rroad appear# 
to  f a l l  to  app recia te  tlic fa c t  th a t ,  i f  such a description 
is  c o rre c t, the cause of such moral fanaticism i s  due to 
Kent having tra n s fe rre d  to  e th ic a l  d iscussion  the fervour of 
e re lig io u s  crusade. Kant uses moral concepts such as Duty, 
Moral laV; Reverence, Freedom and R esponsib ility  with a new 
quality  of mnening end fe e lin g . Hot even Butler, who v#s 
Tieving M orality from a d is t in c t ly  " re lig io u s"  point of v isv , 
exceeds Ksnt th is  sens s .
Further, Dr. Broad in d irec tly  gives the reason for th is  nsv
quality of moral app recia tion  In Kant when he w ritest-
"Kant, on the o ther hand, holds th a t the fundaeeatal laws of morality are the same for every ra tio n a l being, whether man, angel cr God, since tho ultimate eritericA  of rightness is  daducible from the concept ef a ratlennXbeing as s u c h . "(2)
%n other words, the Kantian system of Morality i s ,  by i t s  
very nature, inclusive of God and man. Morality fo r Kant i s  
met with Hume — the science of human nature; or with Batler — 
acting according to human nature. Rather, with Kant, M orality 
includes the Divine and the human, and the re su lt i s  th a t i t  
ia  d if f ic u lt  for any student of Kant to draw a clear lin e  e f  
demarcation between the Religious and the Moral in  h is teach­
ing. Even Kant is  not always aware of th is  
in  which he has involved h is teaching; yet, i t  i s  th is  very  
fac t which made liim say tha t Ethics could be independwit e f  
Religion. Ethics was h is Religion. Row, th is  elev a tion  e f  
moral analysis, th is  passionats preaching of e th ica l p r in ci­
ples is  important in Kant because i t  leads d irec tly  and in^ 
evitably to an analysis of "moral ia i la re " . Kent did not need 
to go outside h is system of Morality to  discuss "Moral Evil". 
This concept haunts his e th ica l teaching as the inseparable 
shadow of the moral principle upon which he shed so much lig h t. 
Having given cen tra lity  and o rucia lity  to  the "Good" W ill,
(1 ) Five Types of S th ica l Theory. Page 53*
(2 ) " " * " " Page 114.
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Kant could not have avoided the discussion of i t s  logical and 
moral opposite; and i t  is  not pedantic to  observe tha t 
7.K* Abbott has shown rare insigh t into the rea l meaning of 
Kant's e th ica l teaching by including an important section on 
Radical Evil as an essen tia l part of Kant's "Ethics". I t  
ia  obvious tha t Kant would have saved himself from consider­
able misunderstanding i f  he had never l e f t  the sphere of 
Ethics in  his discussion of E vil, and i f  he had entered the 
sphere of Religious Dogmatics having dealt with Radical Evil 
as an essen tia l part of his own system of Morality. For 
Kant makes a d istinc tion  between the concepts "Bin" and 
"Radical Evil". 81n is  the "theological" in terp reta tion  of 
"Radical E vil", and Kant never uses the word "8in" except to  
point out i t s  rig h t and lim ited meaning. This is  an added 
reason why he should have dealt with the concept "Radical 
Evil" within i t s  natural context.
Second. The present discussion of the Kantian Defence of 
Freedom is  an attempt to  indicate the v a lid ity  of Kant's 
handling of th is  concept of Freedom in  the thought ef the 
Eighteenth-century. Whether tills attempt is  successful or 
not cannot rea lly  affect the fact that Kant is  one of the 
most serious students of human Freedom in the history  of 
Philosophy. His pa tien t, sometimes ponderous, analysis of
human Freedom has given th is  concept a new meaning and dig­
n ity  in  human thought. His clear repudiation of fa lse  
theories of Freedom, h is making Freedom the key-stone of his 
moral and metaphysical systems, his refinement of the concept 
from a l l  tha t was gross and sensuous; a l l  th is  meant tha t
human Freedom was being exalted to  a plane never before wit­
nessed in  human e ffo rt. Yet, a l l  th is  could not take place 
without Kant becoming acutely aware of the fac t of human 
"bondage". For i t  was only as Kant saw the re a l meaning of 
human Freedom th a t he saw the rea l meaning of human slavery. 
Kant had made h is concept of Freedom too elevated and clear 
to  ignore the chasm which separated the ideal from t te  actual.
— 26V -
The price of ixuicsn Froedom was too costly end precious, in  
the eyes of Kant, to  allow him to accept superfic ia l and 
spurious explanations of human " in ab ility " . As already ob­
served in  the discussion of Kant's in terp reta tion  of Motiva­
tio n , the working of Kant's e th ica l system demands a quality  
of character comparable to  an Ideal being, and i t s  v io la tion  
resu lts  in  nothing less than a being of "Radical Evil".
Ô0 , in  th is  concept of Freedom, i t s  very refinement demanded 
in  i t s  log ical opposite a quality of "defilement* not avail­
able in  the ordinary theories of human shortocsdnf • By h is 
doctrine of phenomena and the causal se rie s , Kant bad already 
shut the door upon an explanation of human "inability" as 
being explicable in  terms of tiie natural and the f in i te .  
Further, h is doctrine of the p ractica l and dynamic character 
of human Freedom made i t  inqpossible fo r him to  re s t  in  the 
theory th a t human fa ilu re  was mere "impotence". In short, 
Kant's view of Freedom demanded frma man the qualities of a 
re a l tiaint, and i t s  opposite constituted man a re a l "dinner", 
therefore, i f  Kant had not discussed "Radical Evil" he would 
have le f t  h is system lop-sided and incomplete, and i t  would 
have evaporated by i t s  own supra-human idealism. For a 
durable "categorical imperative" is  an "awareness" of the 
ideal and the actual, therefore, i t s  command "thou shalt" 
oust be balanced by the command "thou sha lt not", and height 
and depth must be registered .
Thir^i the above argument for the in e v ita b ility  of the 
Kantian treatment of "Radical Evil" in  the presence of a 
serious view of human Morality and Freedom is  streng^iened 
somewhat by the fac t th a t "bare" Determinism, sc ien tific  or 
psychological, has l i t t l e  or nothing to  say about such a cca- 
oept. Collins, Hartley and iban have no rea l contributicm 
to make to  the appraisal of human fa ilu re . th is  is  seen in  
th e ir  ta c i t  refu sa l to  discuss any re a l doctrine of "Sin"; 
and th e ir  laok of werthmhile waphasis upon punishment.
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J .8 ,  MtXl puts tlis case of such Detersdnlsts In the follow­
ing terms*-
" If  we believe we sha ll be punished fo r doing wrong, i t  i s  because the b elief has been taught to  us by our parents, and tu to rs , or by religi(m , or i t  is  generally held by these lAe surround us, or beoause we have our­selves eone to the oeoolusion by reasoning, from the experiœiee of l i f e .  This is  not OonsoionmMSI t  is  no t. therefore, the belief tha t we sha ll be made accountable which can be deemed to  require or pres##pese the free-w ill faypothesis."( >)
Therefore, "psyohelogioal" Determiniam says th a t Desert, or 
▲ocountability is  not a fa c t of Consciousness, but a b e lie f 
or "fooling" which is  the product of empirical geaeralisatioa* 
However, fo r Kant, desert, accountability, g u ilt and punish­
ment are a l l  Intimately re la ted , and form, what a i ^ t  be 
termed, the basis for a re a l and serious conceptiom of Moral 
Evil. Of course, most psychological or sc ien tific  Deter- 
minists believe in  some form of E vil, but i t  is  usually 
termed "Social" Evil; i t  is  never "Radical" Evil as out­
lined by Kant.
The ease is  d ifferm it with ** theological" Deteaaainism.
Augustine, Luther, Calvin and Edwards have very elaborate 
systems of "Sin" interwoven with thoir systems of Determinism, 
and they make a v e ry  isq ire ss lv o  case  for i t s  ac tiv ity  in  * 
a ffa irs . However, i t  i s  obvious from a study of these system# 
of Determinism th a t the concept of moral Evil does not a rise  
naturally  from the icqplioatloas of th e ir  Doterzainism, but is  
superimposed upon such Deteralnisxa by th e ir  theological pre­
suppositions. This ra ther a r t i f ic ia l  linkage of moral Evil 
with theological Determinism must have been clear to  tb» mind 
of Kant, and i t  is  probable th a t th is  knowled#e constituted 
a reason for h is emphatic and profound treatment of "Radical 
Evil." However, i t  must be observed th a t, although theo­
log ical Determinism does re la te  moral Evil to i t s e l f  in  a 
somewhat awkward manner, i t s  doctrine of "Ein" is  no a r t i f ic ia l  
system in  i t s e l f .  I t  is  believed th a t the following d is -
(1 ) Rsmmjmaticn of Hamilton's Philosophy. Page 571»
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eusslon of "Radical Evil" w ill reveal tha t Kant iiad a supreae 
task before him in  answering these closely reasoned system# 
of moral Evil.
I f  the above arguments a s s is t  in  answering the principal 
question of th is  preliminary enquiry into "Radical E v il" , 
they also tend to c la rify  an important point which must be 
made a t th is  stage of the discussion* I t  is  the fac t th a t 
Kant's analysis of "Radical Evil" is  vastly  supexier to any 
other section of his "theological" teaching. I t  is  true 
tha t Kant ignores considerable area# of the Ohristian doctrine 
of "Ein", but h is sure tomoh upon th is  subject of "Radical 
Evil" compensates for any neglect of dogma. As already 
sta ted , th is  is  due to the fac t that an analysi# of the 
violation of the Moral Law is  an essen tia l development of 
h is e th ica l system. In dealing with Moral F ailu re, he i# 
moving within an o rb it of which i# a supreme master, and he 
is  handling an aspect of tru th  upon which he ha# few equals. 
This is  no a rb itra ry  ru ling . I t  i s  the considered judgment 
of h is theological c r i t i c s ,  and the two following ex tracts 
are typical of a vast amount of tribu tes upon th is  point.
Dr. John Cairns, who puts Kant dcwn as ono of the "unbelievers" 
of the eighteentli-century, puts Kant in  quite a d iffe ren t 
category with regard to  "Radical Evil".
"He preaches a much more Scriptural doctrine of human depravity than almost any philosopher. . . . . . . . . . .This deeper view of Kant, as Julius Muller has said , has given great offence io the defenders of hnmen goodness, as a ,k ^ d  of apostasy of the philosopher from himself ." (IT
Further, Soil Brunner, a more modern and much more severe 
c r i t ic  of Kant, is  compelled to  put Kant's treatment ef 
"Radical Evil" upon a much higher level than the re s t  of his 
"theological" speculations.
(1 ) Qaibelief in  the Eighteenth-Oentury. Page 220.
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Kant, segrs Brunner, Is  net preaching the "Ohristiam" Seetrlme 
of Sim, and he ought to have gems much further then he i l i  
in  his analysis ef "Badieal Evil". Ih t, B raner i s  reedy 
to  admit th a t, upon th is  partieu lar aspect of Kent*# teaehiag, 
there is  eause for a great degree «T rea l satisfaetlem . I t  
is  helievel as the analysis ef "Radieal Evil" preeeedi tha t 
J te t  w ill be sheM to  have grasped i t s  essen tia l features 
with rare a b ili ty  and insight*
In the present diseunsin» ef th is  siA jeet, i t  i s  thmght 
advisable te  disenss tM  dee trin e  of Sin as held by thee- 
le g ie ia l Detemsiniam alsng side of Kant*# "hadleal Evil"»
That i f ,  the deetriae ef Sin as e:^ )e%saded by ESwaNm. Ha is  
the only B etem inist of the Eighteenth* eantVEjr mhe attempt# 
to deal id^th th is  problem in  any serious manner# fn hi# 
"Freedem of th a  «Ü1" he has elear and emphatie statemmts 
to make upon ^ lis  p articu lar aspoot of theelagy, but hi# 
mere oarefnl and orueial treatment is  found la  inethar seetie#  
ef his verlts, th a t i s ,  in  hi# formidable "ine^vi## of #1»#. 
Therefore, to a l le r  Edwards the fu l l  feree ef his reply te  
the arguments of Eent's "Eefd&oe" ef Freedom, a ttsn tien  anst 
be paid to his more detailed  study ef the EeatHae e f Sim.
(A) Kant begins v ith  a dissussien whether the world is  be­
coming b etter e r  worse* fie remarks th a t , J |i i ^ ,  there has 
always been a considerable body of eplmiem w hl^  i s  oeaviaeed 
th a t things are getting so bed th a t the end ef a l l  thing# i s
(1 ) The Mediator. Page 1b2.
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a t  hand. Yet, ffeeond. th e re  have been those who thought 
th ings are g e ttin g  much b e t te r ,  more so , in  recan t tim es, 
Influenced no doubt by the teaching of Rousseau a to . Kant 
observes th a t th e re  i s  a tendency to  optimism in  human a f f a i r s ,  
end from a purely  "physical" p o in t of view, th is  might be 
ju s t i f i a b le .  However, th ere  ia  a Thirjft possib le  po in t of 
view, and th a t  i s ,  the In a b i l i ty  to  pass judgment of Good or 
E v il upon tiiC fa c ts  of experience, because the  r e a l  springs 
o f Good and E v il are  hidden from observation . Kent seems 
in c lin ed  to  favour the idea  th a t  the world i s  g e ttin g  worse, 
but he accepts th is  idea %rith many m odifica tions. Undue 
optimism about the in e v ita b le  progress of human natu re  i s  
sharp ly  h a lted  by a c a re fu l analysis  of man in  h is  savage 
s t a t e , h is  c iv i l is e d  s ta te ,  and h is  in te rn a tio n a l s ta te .
Here, the p ic tu re  i s  very d is tu rb in g , and although the  end of 
a l l  th ings might not be a t  hand, there  are  very  r e a l  grounds 
fo r  solemn ooncem. K ant's d e sc rip tio n  of in te rn a tio o a l 
s t r i f e  and d iscord  i s  very  modem, and h is  p lan  fo r  in te r ­
n a tio n a l Peace, in  another sec tio n  of h is  w ritin g s , i s  a 
c le a r  in d ic a tio n  how deeply th is  aspect of "Radical E vil" 
a ffec ted  him*
(B) However, K ant's r e a l  concern i s  w ith  human natu re  l a  a  
very  personal sense , and th is  f a c t  ought to  have warned a 
th in k er l ik e  Brunner from sensing a d e fec t in  K ant's t r e a t ­
ment o f "R adical E vil" as being ra th e r  "non-personal".  ^  ^^
Kant presses on to  ask whether Man i s  e s s e n t ia l ly  Good or 
E v il, o r even wliether ho i s  n e ith e r  these  extrem es, but ju s t  
a mixture of Good and I)v il. Kant sees qu ite  c le a r ly  th a t  
he w il l  have to  take a decided stand upon such an issu e  even 
i f  i t  r e s u l ts  in  h is  being c la s s if ie d  as a "R ig o ris t" , in  
wliich t i t l e  he i s  qu ite  prepared to  re jo ic e . However, he 
i s  c a re fu l to  give h is  reasons why man must be e ith e r  Good 
or E v il , and never a mere mixture of both; ahd h is  reasons 
a re  very re le v an t to  h is  an a ly sis  of "R adical E v il" .
(1 ) The Mediator. Page
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"That freedom of w ill has the p ecu lia r characteristlo  th a t i t  cannot be detenoined to action by any spring except onlr as f a r  a» th* num has i t  u p  In ta  him    only in  th is  way can a spring whatever  amay be. c o -e x is t w ith the absolute spontaneity  of the w il l  ( freedom ).” (1)
This i s  a very Im portant sta tem ent, end K ant's emphasis in­
d ica tes  h is  recogn ition  of i t s  irç)ortance. Here, again, is  
sigh ted  th a t  very complicated problem of tlie "Ind ifference" 
of the I f l l l  before i t s  commitment to  Good or StI I .  However, 
Kant avoids such an "Ind iffe rence" of the W ill in  th is  secticn 
by a very strange tw is t to  h is  argument. I t  i s  a very dan­
gerous tw is t as w ill  become obvious l a t e r  on. Kant t a c i t l y  
repud ia tes the n e u tr a l i ty  of the W ill "p rio r"  to  the a c t  of 
Choice by in s is t in g  th a t  the  W ill, by i t s  very  n a tu re , cannot 
be empty of content p r io r  to  the ac t of Choice. His words 
are h igh ly  s ig n if ic a n t  fo r  h is  Defence of Freedom.
"How i f  the law does not determine a n an 's  w ill in  respect of an action vhioh has reference to  i t ,  an opposite spring oust have influence on his w ill; end since by hypowesis th is  can only occur b^ the man taking i tin to  his maxi,» — i t  follows tha t h is disposition inrespect of the moraJ. i s  never in d if fe re n t  ( i s  always <mo of the two, good or bad)." (2)
This e x tra c t could bo used to  in d ica te  th a t Kant, in  th is  
p a r tic u la r  con tex t, repudiated tlie "Ind ifference" of the W ill 
in  most c le a r  and emphatic language. l e t ,  considerable 
caution  must be observed in  rebelling such a conclusien.
What does Kant meanV I i  he repudiates any p ossib ility  of 
"Ind iffe rence" of the WiH 'prior" to  tW  a c t of Choice, he 
i s  agreeing v i th  Edvards to  a rem arkable, but nevertheless, 
f a ta l  degree. Edwarcs lias very c le a r  notions upon th is  im­
p o rtan t p o in t, and xiis teachi^Ag upon human " In u t i l i ty "  is  
s tr ik in g ly  s im ila r  to  th a t  found in  the above extracts* I t  
i s  worthy of c a re fu l n o tic e .
(1 ) R elig ion . 2Ç.(2) " 25.
o'!"
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"Moral In ab ility  consists not In a&y of tboaa thing#; bat a lth ar in  the vaat odT ia c ltn a tim , or the #t#m gtk of a contrary in o liaa tio a , or the want of su ffla iaa t iMtlvaa in  vi#w to  indnoo and inolto  the aot of # #w ill, or tho atrangth of apparent motive# to the ecntfatp»*( 1)
Edwards Imd boon arguing against "vulgar" views of phlXo- 
sophioal looossity , vhioh holds tha t human nature is  eonpoUed 
by some form of eompulslon to aet in  the manner i t  does; or 
to act in  a manner other than i t  rea lly  "%flU#"# Be oea- 
tends tha t th is  idea of Beeesslty is  fa lse ; men ha# lib e rty  
to  obey the Lav i f  lie "w ill" , but be cannot w ill to  obey the 
Law because his Will is  already determined by another type 
of Motivation. In other words, moral in a b ility  to f u l f i l  
the Law is  brought about not by some abstract Necessity ex­
ternal or in te rna l to  man, but is  brought about by his lack 
of " in ab ility ” to  have adequate motives for the fu lf i l l in g  
of the command* This is  why Edwards re jec ts  the "Xndlffer- 
once” of the Will as a possible explanation of human Freedom# 
Man is  never without some kind of Motivation* He i s  never 
a motiveless vacuum* He is  always in possession of some 
inclina tion , some tendency of the Mind, some prevailing 
preference* A blank Will is  as Inconceivable as a blank 
Mind* Mind or Will always has some content, and the oommaad 
of the Law always is  addressed to  a Mind with some content*
The very fac t tha t i t  i s  a "command" indicates tha t I t  i s  
addressed to a person, and snoh a person is  always In 
possession of some psychologioal "content"; and is  generally 
in  conflic t with the command which is  addressed to  i t s  Will*
Is  Kant to  be assumed as accepting such an explanation as a 
repudiation of the "Indlfferwuoe” ef the Will? I f  he i s ,  
then, there is  very l i t t l e  hope of his being in  a position 
to r e s is t  the logical iinpllcaticsis of the D eterm iain ef 
Edwards. The present discussion of the Kantian Befenoe of 
Freedom is  convinced th a t there is  a clear d is tin e tlea
(1) tbs Freedom ef the W ill. Fart 1* Beet ^
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the points of view of Kant and Edwards, and i t  is  a d is- 
tinetioQ which is  a l l  important to sueh a Defence.
The d istinc tion  between Kant and Edwards upon th is  isq>ortant 
peint might be se t fo rth  in  the following terms. 
both Kant and Edwards agree that there is  a re a l, positive 
p o ssib ility  of the human Will not accepting the commend ef 
the Law. Second, both agree that the human Will most be 
e ith er Good or Bad as the re su lt of i t s  reaction to th is  
command* Man cannot be a mixture of Good and Bad* Kant 
and Edwards are most clear and emphatic upon th e ir  Deter­
mination to  r e s is t  such a cosqpromise upon such a v i ta l  matter 
of morals. The Will i s  e ith e r for the Law, or against i t .
Both agree th a t "Indifference", or "Neutrality" a t th is  v i ta l  
point is  quite impossible, and both agree th a t i f  sueh 
"Neutrality" was assumed, i t  would be "Immoral".
Kant says repeatedlyt-
"For I t  i s  law only th a t involves the conception of an uaocmftiticnal soA objective necessity . . .  , .* , and commands are laws whidi anst be obeved, tha t is .,m w t be fellewed, even in  opposition to  inclination ."  ^  ' /
idwards agreest-
"Fer the and of laws is  to  bind to  one side, and the end of commands is  to  turn the w ill one way **. . . .* No th a t the w ill ,  having a b ias, through the influence of the binding law la id  upon i t ,  i s  not wholly l e f t  to  i t s e l f ,  to  determine i t s e l f  which way i t  w ill, without laflnanee from w ithou t." '* '
f a s t  areas of the teaching ef Kant on Morality would agree 
with every word u ttered  by Edwards in  the above ex trac t, and 
a very strong ease oeuld be made out th a t th is  i s  the cen tral 
teaching of Kant. Yet due consideration would have to  be 
given to  Kant's careful d istinc tion  between the "National" 
and the "Elective" Will in  man. However, whatever might be 
the teaching of Kant in  ether d irections, here, in  the analysis 
of "Radical E vil", he makes a very important d istinc tion  which 
saves th is  particu lar aspect of h is system from being id en ti­
fied  v ith  th a t of Edwards. StiJDlf th is  d istinc tion  is  th a t
(1 ) Gd* b l .
(a) the freedom of the W ill. Part 3* Nect b .
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tha maa, himself, must deliberately  talw wp 
th is  qppoalftn motlT# to  the Iw . As already observed, b n t  
Is  very emqihatle upon th is  point* I t  is  a deliberate aot 
of Will vhioh opposes the Moral Lav. I t  i s  not merely the 
presence of opposing Inclina tion , or the blindness or pre- 
oooiq>aticn of the sensuous se lf  that prevents the fulfilm ent 
of the Lav. I t  is  deliberate ohoioe of "opposition"*(D 
th is  stand by Kant on the essen tia l "Freedom" of the Will 
in  the doing of Evil w ill be found to  be the consistent theme 
of his treatment of "Radical Evil" * I t  ra ises a host of 
very d if f ic u lt  problems vhioh cannot be discussed a t  th is  
stage of the analysis. Some have been noted in  the d is­
cussion of the "Indifference of the W ill", but i t  i s  very 
doubtful whether any degree of f in a li ty  can be reached upon 
th is  coiqplicated section of the Kantian Defence of Freedom*
The ii^portant fac t i s  th a t Kant makes such a deliberate ac t 
of Ohoioe basic to  h is system of "Radical E vil", and, vhat- 
ever the ccnsequenoes for other aspects of h is teaching, he 
maintains i t  to  the end of th is  particu lar section* I t  i s  
here tha t he d iffe rs  from Edwards in  a very v i ta l  and f a r -  
reaohing manner. Edwards agrees with Kent upon the presence 
of the positive "opposing" Motive or Inclination to the Command 
However, his whole system revolts against any suggestion th a t 
thi* opposing Motive i s ,  i t s e l f ,  th . « .s a lt  of a d* lilw rat. 
act of W ill. He agrees with Kant upon the general depravity 
of human nature, but Edvards sees such a s ta te  of depravity 
as a d irec t re su lt of what he terms "original" Ein. Kant 
w ill have much to say upon the value of such a concept, and 
there are indications th a t he comes very near to  agreeing 
with Edvards upon th is  basic bias towards Evil. However, 
here and now, i t  must be noted that Kant in s is ts  upon a "prior" 
act of Will as the cause of human "Inability" which re su lts  in  
such human depravity. I f  he can maintain th is  point of view
(1) K* r* f .  A*555. Qd* 8 9 . K. p* T. 236. Beligion. 5 0 .
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In a consistent manner, be has don# nuoh to  strengthen hi# 
Defence of Freedom in  the face of a very c r i t ic a l  encounter 
v ith  Determinism. Only further investigation into Kant's 
analysis of "Radical Evil" can decide such an issue.
(C) Kant, now turns his a ttention  to an analysis ef hwan 
nature, and in  clear reference to "Radical Evil". Ke thinks 
th a t man can he viewed under three aspects. (1) ànimallty;
(2) RozBanity; (3) Personality. Kant points out th a t there 
are In s tin c ts , or capacities which accompany each of these 
divisions. I t  does not affec t the main current of h is argu­
ment tha t his analysis of such capacities might be ia  e rre r. 
The main point is  tliat Kant teaches tha t each and a l l  ef 
these capacities in  themselves are neither Good nor E v il, but 
th a t they can be the ground of Good and Bvil by being used 
or abused by the human W ill.
Kant's analysis of human nature is  very in te restin g , but i t s  
re a l importance lie s  In the following statement*-
"The idea of the moral law alone with the respect la -
spring, th is  seems to have a subjective ground addltlcmal to personality, and so th is  »ound seems therefore to deserve the name of a capacity belonging to personality»"
The f i r s t  part of the above extract appears quite clear. I t  
is  Kant's insistence tha t there is  no rea l "moral" feeling or 
capacity in  man "prior" to  h is awareness of the Moral Lav, 
and tha t the re a l centre of h is personality revolves around 
the Moral Lav. However, I t  Is the second part of the above 
ex tract which needs to  be c la rified . That i s ,  man's de­
cision to accept the Moral Lev, upon the basis of respect for 
I t ,  in to  h is maxim. The translation  of th is  passage by 
Segple is  important in  th a t I t  goes Into more d e ta il and re­
veals a d ifficu lty  experienced by Kent*
(1 ) Religion. Sect. 30.
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"That va ara able to adopt th is  revaranoa in to  oar maxims, tbaraby I t  a spring, must re s t  upon soms sab*jeotiva ground; and th is  voaM seam to bo somsvhat additional, siqwrinduoed on oar personality , sad th is  jggQlJng Is  vhat may be f i t l y  termed a predlspesltsn to* ward, and fo r behoof of, our moral personality.*
I t  is  not proposed to  deal with th is  d iff icu lty  of in te r­
pretation  a t th is  stage, but i t  is  raised to indicate th a t 
Kant is  making desperate e ffo rts  to  see the whole of the tru th  
involved in  h is analysis of "Radical Evil"# Edwards would 
see in  such a passage a rea l opening for his Doctrine of 
"Divine Grace", and Hartmann must Imve liad in  mind such a 
problem when he propounded liis theory of the "Plus" of 
D e t e r m i n a t i o n # ^ Ho w e v e r ,  la te r , i t  Is hoped to allow 
Kant to speak in  more decisive terms upon th is  ii^o rtan t point.
(D) Kant takes up tha discussion of "Propensity" or what 
Sanqple terms "Bias", and tills Is the "tendency to Evil" found 
in  human nature. Here Kant Is  d iligen t to make h is meaning 
clear. By propensity to S v il, he means "the subjective 
source of p o ssib ility  of an inclination". He indieates th a t 
the order of bias night be propensity, in s tin c t and Inclina­
tion . Propensity i s  not exactly "innate" in  the sense of 
a capacity, but i t  might be acquired for Good or fo r Bvil.
When the propensity is  B vil, i t  is  "the subjective ground of 
the p o ssib ility  of a deviation of the maxims from ttie moral 
lav ."
(B) Kant does not commit liimself to  a statement th a t there 
is  a decided propensity in  hutuan nature to perform E vil, th a t 
i s ,  not a t th is  stage* Yet, he goes on to produce evideaoe 
which makes such a verdict truly inevitable. F irs t ,  he notes 
the exietenoe of human " f ra i l i ty " ,  tha t i s ,  in  tha presence 
of the A'ioral Law. He quotes St. Paul as giving a perfect 
example of intending one tiling and doing another. Second, 
he notes another fac t of human nature, tliat i s ,  isqpurity, azid, 
by th is  term, Kant simply means the mixing up of Motives to  
find su ffic ien t power to  perfomm the commands of the Xmv.
(1 ) E th ies. ?el«3# Fage 75*
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Third, ha comas to M s most serious defect iu  huioaa nature, 
that i s ,  tlie tendency to "pervert” the very foundations of 
the iioxal Lou. I t  i s  here that liant puts h is fjjiger upon 
the roal ocnro o f "Radical Ho w i l l  return to  i t
repeated ly, and he always speaks of th is  tendency with heax^  
f e l t  d isgust. With ca io fu l log io  and rare psyohological 
Ir s ig h t, Kant has tracod Lhe form tion  of "Radical Bvil" from 
i t s  apparently harmless beginnings in  human " fra ility "  through 
i t s  deeper stra ta  o f hLmiAU "impuidty" down to  i t s  roots in  
human "perversity"; and th is  la s t  sta te  might also be termed 
"Hypocrisy". I t  i s  hare that Kant says that "Radioal Bvil* 
reveals i t s  S ï t i  nature, and perhaps there is  no more devastat­
ing statement in  e th ica l discussion than that uttered by Kant 
on th is root o f "Radical Evil”.
"This disiam esty in  imposing on ourselves which hinders the establlshsmnt of i^nnlae moral principle in  %m. extends i t s e l f  then outwardly also to  falsehood and deception of oWwrs v h i^ ,  i f  i t  i s  not to  be called badness, a t le a s t deserves to be called worthlessness, and has i t s  root in  the radical badness of humsn nature, which (inasmuch as i t  perverts the moral judgment in  respect of the estimation to  be formed of a man. and renders inmutation quite uncertain both in te rn a lly  and externally) constitu tes the corrupt spot in  our nature, which, as long as we do not ex tirpate i t .  hinders the source of good developing i t s e l f  as i t  otherwise would*"( 1)
There are two points worthy of ewpliasis in  ^&e above ex trac t.
(1) Tnare i s  nothing in  such an extract which required Kant 
to go outside h is e th ica l system to discover. His analysis 
o f "Ranleal Bvil" i s  moral, not theological, and th a t i s  why 
in  a gi'oat degree i t  has the backing of h is Bthios#
(2 ) The basic root of "Radical Bvil" is  deliberate self-de­
ception. I t  i s  an ac t of W ill whidh perverts the moral order, 
and tha moral nature of man. I t  ia  a c lear instance of man's 
misuse of h is  Freedom.
(1 ) Religion. Sect. 4^ 3.
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(2) xl&h Itenli on "MBKal M l" -
There are etlX l a<xae impertant points of Kant's analysis of 
"Sadioal Evil" vhioh merit discussion, hut i t  i s  necessary to  
keep the discussion in  i t s  lim ited o rh lt, th a t i s ,  the re­
la tion  of Kant's idea of Moral Evil to  tha t iden tified  v ith  
the Eighteenth-century Determinism. As already sta ted ,
Edvards is  the only Determinist of tha t period who makes a 
reascnahle attempt to  deal v ith  th is  prohlem vhioh is  re la ted  
so intim ately to  any "serious” discussion of Liberty and 
Eeoessity.
(A) Edvards would agree with Kant iqjcn many of the points 
which have been already raised . However, h is fundamental 
theme is  ”Ein” , rather than "Moral E vil. That i s ,  he views 
"Moral Evil” as something directed against God, and therefore 
i t  i s  "Ein", although he is  also aware of i t s  corrupting 
influences in  human re la tio n s. Ha would agree with Kent 
th a t human experience provides azqple evidence of the prepcn- 
derance of Evil in  the world. Further, ho would agree tha t 
th is  tendency to  "Moral Evil" cannot be explained as mere 
"impotence" ; or due to  the lim ited or f in ite  nature of man.
I t s  roots are much deeper than mare physical circumstances, 
or "psychological" incapacities. When one of his eppcnents 
argues th a t man performs as many "Good" deeds as EvU, and 
th a t a reasonable balance might he struck, making man a mixture 
of Good and Evil; Edwards points out th a t h is opponent deem 
not appear to  understand the nature of Evil. The Moral Law 
cannot make any compromise with E vil, and a Good vhioh is  con­
taminated with Evil oeases to be a worthwhile Good. Edwards 
makes an important point when he says th a t only the rea lly  
"Good" person can perceive the depth of Evil. That is  why the 
testimony of "Haints" is  most valuable in  the appraisal of 
E vil.
(B) He comes very near to  the Kantian conception of the Moral 
Law when he says#-
» *77 •
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"Therefore there must have hew a regard to  God and His duty implanted in  him a t hi# f i r s t  exiateno#; otherwise i t  is  ce rta in , he would have done nothing from a regard to  God and his duty, no# not so much as to re f le c t and consider, and try  to  obtain such a disposition. The very supposition of a d isposition to  rig h t action being f i r s t  obtained by repeated rig h t action, is  grossly inconsistent with i t s e l f ;  fo r i t  sijqpposes a course of rig h t action, before there is  d isposition to  perform any rig h t ac tion ."U ) a
I t  is  hardly an exaggeration to Say th a t in  th is  statement 
there i s  enough controversial content to merit a f u l l  chapter. 
As th is  i s  not possible, the important points must be noted 
in  rather lim ited terms.
F ir s t . Sant would have agreed h ea rtily  with the suggestion 
th a t men's o rig inal endowment consisted of a regard to  God 
and his duty. This basic "awareness" of the Law and Duty 
i s  pivotal to  a l l  tha t K^nt wrote on e th ica l questions.
Without th is  o rig inal endowment, Kant Would have no rea l 
foundation for h is system of Bthios.
Kant would have agreed with the statem m t th a t 
"repeated" Good actions cannot make a Good disposition.
This w ill become clear vtum, the present discussion considers 
Kant's cure for "Radical Bvil".
Third, without cossoitting Kant to  a l i t e r a l  b e lie f in  the
existence of the "F irs t Adam", i t  is  obvious th a t h is general
teaching upon th is  subject i s  ^%&t the "original" man was
innocent, and th a t every " fa ll"  in to  Gin is  a f a l l  from sueh
"innocence" in to  Bvil. In other words, he would maintain
tha t the B iblical account of ths F a ll might be held as "true"
not beoause i t  happened to Adam, but because i t  happens toisevery man, every day. However, i t / j u s t  here tha t iiqiortant 
points of d ifferw ce must be noted between Kant and Edwards,
(1) Kant maintains tha t i^an fa l ls  from a s ta te  of "Innocence* 
in to  Bvil, but h is view of Innocence is  quite d ifferen t from 
th a t of Edwards. For Kant the term Innocence means what i t  
says I i t  is  a non-moral s ta te  of existence in  which man oan-
<t) Original Ein. P t.2 . Sect. 1.
<2) Baligion. 53»
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not be termed Good or Evil. However, Edvards in s is ts  th a t 
the term "Izmoeenoe", be regarded as synonyaous with the term 
"Righteous". The point %mde by Edvards is  very important 
beoause i t  i s  eentrml to  h is whole dee tr in e  of Determinism.
I f  he is  r ig h t, then the way is  open for him to in s is t  th a t 
essen tia l Morality is  not a product of man's Relf-Determinaticn; 
or man's "moral" E fforts; ra th e r, i t  i s  the Gift ef God, as 
i t  was orig inally . Edvards is  very keen upon pressing th is  
important point because his c r i t ic s  have charged him with 
making man's Morality a r t i f ic ia l  and useless as i t  i s  con­
ditioned by the power which comes from a source outside man's 
rea l S elf. Edwards rep lies tha t these "theological" c r i t ic s  
are inconsistent because they maintain th a t "Adam" was 
created by God , and tha t be was endowed with a d ispesiticn  
which was SûSâi th is  was not a resu lt of h is own Self- 
Determination, but was the sole Gift of God. Therefore, the 
demand to  use the term "Innocence" as synonymous with R i^ teous- 
ness or Goodness is  no mere indication of pedantry. I t  i s  
v i ta l  to the Determinism vhioh Edwards is  expounding. Kant 
saw the far-reaching implications of th is  dogma, and repudiates 
any additional meaning to  Innocence than tha t inherent in  
the term.
AS already sta ted , Kant possessed a penetrating insight in to  
the systmm and implications of "theological" Deteradnism, 
and nowhere is  th is  insight so evident as in  th is  p articu lar 
refusal to grant to i t s  system th is cardinal point. the 
words of Kant are clear and they are crucial for h is Defence 
of Freedom#
"When i t  is  said he is  created good, tha t can only mean th a t he i s  created fo r jytflA, and tne orig inal ccn stita ticn  in  man is  good; but th is  does not yet make the man him­se lf  good, but according as he does or does met adopt in to  h is maxim the springs which th is  constitutiom ccn- te ins (which must be l e f t  altogether to  h is own free  choice) iie makes himself good or bad."v1)
However, Edwards in s is ts  th a t the "original* man was JSUSBt be­
cause he was capable of Good or Evil. th a t i s ,  he was a
(1) R e ligion . Beet. 50.
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moral being, oonscioua of moral obliG atiw s. He knew his 
duty to God and the Lav, and, Edwards points out rather 
shrewdly, the orig inal man did not f a l l  "a t onee" in to  Sin 
a f te r  his oreation. For a time, a t  le a s t ,  he was well- 
pleasing to  God, indicating h is essen tia l Goodness; and his 
" fa ll"  in to  Bvil was "deliberate"; th is  fa c t of "Delibera­
tion" is  hardly consistent with the bland, almost "blank" 
moral s ta te  supposed to  ex is t in  the term "Innoowoe", which 
is  advocated by Kant# A ll th is  may appear remote from the 
cen tral theme of Kant's Defence of Freedom, but i t s  re le ­
vance w ill become clear in  ths concluding section of the 
present discussion.
(2) A second important point of contrast between Kant and 
Edwards upon th is  "original" act of Bvil i s  seen in  the 
"Cause" of man's f a l l .  Both would agree th a t the rea l 
"origin" of Bvil i s  unknowable, and, on the surface of th e ir  
statements, both appear to  agree in  a most remarkable manner 
upon the reasons which led to man's downward step.
The statement of Kant is  important*-
"Consequently a man (even the best) is  bad only by th is ,  that he reverses tho moral order of the springs in  adopting them in to  h is maxims; he adopts indeed the moral law along with th a t of se lf-love , but perceiving tha t they cannot subsist together on equal terms, but that one must be subordinate to  the other as i t s  supreme condition, he makes the spring of self-love end i t s  inclinations the condition of obedience to  the morallaw How i f  there is  in  human nature a pro­pensity to  th is  ,.then there is  in  man a natural pro-pmasity to  e v il , and since th is  propensity i t s e l f  must ultim ately be sought in  a free wiU. and therefore can be imputed, i t  is  morally bad."v1)
This is  Kant's description of the " fa ll"  of man, and is  true 
fo r the B iblical and the SBq>irical analysis. This is  what 
always happens to man, whether a t the beginning of h isto ry , 
or in  every-day experience of Bvil.
Edwards appears to agree with Kant upm. th is  analysis of the 
F all in  the following terms t-
(1 ) B e lig ion . Beet. bO.
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"Whan Crod made man a t ^ I r s t ,  he implanted in  him tvo kind# of prinoipXes. There vas an in fe rio r klnd| vhiohmay be called natural —» such as se lf-love ..............therewere the superior principles — wherein consisted theimage of God. and tuan*s righteousness y and true hoUness#..............Man's love to  h is own honour, separate in te re s t,and private pleasure, which before was wholly subordinate unto love to  Qod, and regard to  h is authority and glory, now disposes him to  pursue toose objects, without regaxu to God's honour or law#" \
However, there is  a d is tin c t difference between Kant and 
Edwards as to the "result** of such a Fall# Both agree th a t 
there existed two kinds of principles in  man, and both agree 
tha t the F a ll was caused by a wrong subordination of principles# 
Yet, Kant maintains th a t, as k re su lt of such a perverse sub­
ordination, man s t i l l  possesses these "superior" principles 
which only requires an e ffo rt of w ill to have them made 
supreme once again# Bdvards repudiates th is  explanation, 
and in s is ts  tha t man lo s t these "superior" principles in  the 
very act of subordinating them to the natural principles#
"The immediate consequence of which was a fa ta l  catastrophe, a turning of a l l  thing# UMide down, and the succession of a s ta te  of the most odious and dreadful confusion#  #is when a subject has once renounced his Issrfulsovereign, and.set up a pretender in  h is stead, a s ta te  of enmitv.and war against h is r ig h tfu l king necessarilyensues#"%2)
This v i ta l  difference of the resu lts  of the F a ll of asm is  
ifiq>ertant« For i t  oust be borne in  mind th a t Kant rea lly  
believes in  a "Fall" of man, and th is  does met mean tha t he 
is  to  be in terpreted as holding tha t he believed in  the B ibli­
ca l doctrine of the F a ll, but tha t the F a ll of nan was a fa c t 
embedded in  human experience# Kant accepts such a f a l l  as 
a moral and ra tio n a l fa c t , and his whole system of sSadioal 
Hvil** is  quite untenable without such a fact# In the con­
cluding section of th is  analysis, i t  is  hoped to  make clear 
how v i ta l  a l l  th is  i s  to h is "religious" Defence of Freedom.
(1) Original Sin. Part 2. Oh. 2.(2) « " « 2. " 2.
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(S) i^fore turning to  tlio «lore positive aspect of Kant's 
analysis of "Radieau. E v il", there is  another feature in  the 
systems of Kant and JCdvards which must receive atten tion .
This is  th e ir  conoeption of human "Depravity". Kant has 
already given clear indications of what he means by th is  dogma, 
but there is  another statement which ought to  be noted as 
indicative of the serious view Kant held oa th is  question# 
Further, i t  is  only ju s t to  Edwards to give h is point of view, 
because there is  a rea l tendency to  exaggerate the "Galvin- 
is t ic "  in te rp reta tion  of th is  aspect of "Moral Evil"# Edwards 
is  soDSWhat more analy tical than Kant upon th is  m atter, but 
Kant's conception is  very important to the question under d is­
cussion# Kant has been making a rea l e ffo rt to  d istinguish 
his system of "Radical Evil" from tha t held by the S toics, 
and he Indicates the erro r inherent in  th e ir  conception by 
saying:-
"Rut those sturdy Gages mistook th e ir  enemy, who is  not sought In the n atu ra l, and, though undisciplined, s t i l l  openly displayed and undisguised, appetites of the sensory: for the inward Foe is  an inv isib le  occultenemy, lurking behind the ambushes of reason, and upon th a t account ju s t so much the more dangerous and deadly. They called on Wisdom to  make a stand against Folly, which allows i t s e l f  unawares to be inveigled and worsted by the sensory, instead of calling upon her to  wags Warh eart, which, by soml- saps and undermines the
This is  a passage which should be pondered by a l l  who imagine 
th a t the Kantian system of Morality is  only a refined form of
atoicism, and by those who charge Kant with providing only a
•one-way' explanation of Freedom.
Edwards is  also worthy of consideration in  h is view of De­
pravity# His opponent has charged Edwards with teaching
tha t "Sin" is  implanted by God as some kind of moral disease:-
( O  R e lig ion# Bk# 2# (Sam ple's Trans#)
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"Vihereas t r u l y  o u r d o c tr in e  n e i th e r  im p lie s  nor infers any such thing. Xn order to  account fo r a s in fu l c o r ru p tio n  o f  n a tu r e ,  y e a , a  to ta l n a t iv e  d e p ra v ity  of the h e a r t  o f  man, there i s  n o t  the le a s t need of svm- p o s ln e  any s v ll  quality  lafvis»!. jtolaavcd or vrmirt^t in to  the nature of man, by any positive cause, or in - fluence whatsoever, e ith er from Qod, or the creature, or of supposing, th a t man is  conceived or bom with af W A  0 ^  S T il  i u  h is  h e a r t ................... th e  absence o fpositive good principles . . . . . .  leaving the cossunnatural principles of self-love e tc . w ill certainly  be followed with the corruption, " n )
K a n t 's  view of "D ep rav ity "  m ight be view ed as more "positive"
th a n  th a t  o f Edw ards, and t h i s  c r e a te s  v e ry  g re a t  problems 
f o r  h is  th e o ry  o f  M oral R ecovery.
(3) aan«.Dti«n of H.cw.ry*< f r a .  »an.i«Ai ihrii».
In attempting to  in te rp re t Kant's formula fo r Moral Recovery 
there is  re a l danger of over-sim plification of the whole pro­
cess unless three basic facts are borne in  mind in  such an 
interpretation*
F i r s t , there is  Sant's c lear insistence upon "personal" effmrt* 
He kncsrs too much about the system of" theologioal"Determinism 
to f a l l  in to  the trap of making God the prime mover in  human 
regeneration. He does not deny tha t Qod might have some 
part to play in  such a reformation of Morals, but h is con- 
t lBttlng u l M  is  .armnrthln» ..iiirtnii fwiaiM b. OMt da. o tm  
and àbarm moral gaaAmt. In cirimr to  mmhm Mmmmlf; aOTMt-
o«d. la  mm  * wm^htp ot th .  P .ity .» U ) a .
does not deny th a t Qod might a s s is t man in  his e ffo rts  to  
make himself a new man, but he In s is ts  tha t the f i r s t  and 
primary source of man's recovery from "Radical Evil" oust be 
put fo rth  by man. Qod might rewaxd man's moral e ffo rts , or 
even a s s is t them, but the whole pivot of man's regeneration 
must be based upon man's free Will.
MSlS9Sâf the greater part of the work "Me^Ugicn vi±h±n
were Reason" is  devoted to  man's moral recovery.
(1 )  O iig ln a l  S in . P e r t  k-. Ch. 2 .
(2) Religion. Bk. k. (Sample's Trans.)
J
~ 204 -
The whole of the Ohuroh doctrine and ordinances are brought 
In to guide and safeguard man's figh t for "self-regeneratlan". 
Everything, in the Church's creed or conduct, which does not 
d irec tly  a s s is t in  such a process is  put aside by Kant as 
ido latry  or superstition* The Church, the Sacraments,
Prayer, the Clergy, are a l l  foramd into one great "Ethical 
Soolety" whose sole purpose lie s  in  i t s  a b ili ty  to help men 
to find a Self-detenniiied Sal/ation* Therefore, to  enter 
upon a detailed discussicn of Kant's In terpretation  of these 
factors can have but one result,and th a t i s ,  they are a l l  
mere "Aids" to  man's woridng out of his own Galvation*
Third. Kent's conception of the range and extent of men's 
Meral Recovery is  se t fo rth  in  plain terms in  a l l  h is E thical 
works, th a t i s ,  the duraticn of man's Moral Reoovery.
His postulation of Immortality is  a d irec t outcome of h is 
convietions upon th is  qwestion*
"How the perfect accordance of the w ill with the moral law is  holiness, a perfection of which no ra tional being of the sensible world is  capable a t any moment of h is existence. Since, nevertheless. i t  is  required as p raetioally  necessary, i t  can only be found in  a ggoggesa jn  towards thi;t Dcrfeet aecordanee,an o o n tE e y rim S  of pure p rac tica l reason to  assume such a p ractica l progress as the rea l object of the will*"<1)
I t  is  against the permanent background of these three fac ts  
tha t i t  becomes possible to proceed with an analysis of Kant's 
formula for Moral Recovery, and such an analysis might be viewed 
in the following terms#
(1) Kant ia  firmly convinced tha t he is  confronted with a 
t i ta n ic  task in  attempting to se t fo rth  a way of Moral Salva­
tion  for a being who has fa llen  so deeply in to  "Radical Evil", 
and he qualifies a l l  he is  about to say with th is  statemmati-
"Now how i t  is  possible tha t a man natu ra lly  bad make himself a good man, transcends a l l  our coneeptloast for how can a bad tree  bring fo rth  good f ru itÿ '(2 l
(1) K. p. 7 . 262.
(2) Religion. 51*
MÊS
In ether weed#, e# the reel erigin of Bvll 1# ineewtahle,
#e the reel erlgln ef OoodneM is In the eeme eetegery. 
Beeevery in epite of this ohfleui linltetloay Kent I# net 
prepared te take reft## in Hiraterar, and threw# dean the 
pMtlet to ell fovea ef ■theelegteal* Deteradaiam tor aeping 
meet yphatleally ... "Mhet nan ia or oofht to be in e msvel 
aaoaoy ha mat mb# or mat hare mad# of tilwaelf." Kant baa 
earned the right to make anoh a atetonant upon hmaon eaodnoa# 
beeaaae he bore the fell impHoetiona of amah a dletmm ia 
hia analyaia of boman "BaAleal Boll". Bvll ia e aelf- milled 
"eppoaltioa" to the Morel lew# deodnea# meat be aelf- milled 
"eoafeamlty* to the Mhral lew.
(2) Kety hew eon man find one reel apot ef gremad within 
the beg ef hia radically evil nature fbom whlA be begin 
amah ccnformltyt Kant inalata thety in aplte of hia apparent 
hepeleaa Depravltyy he haa never loot that inherent "aware- 
neaa" of the Moral law. (a) Man la never tee degraded to 
lea# the wlah to be better, (b) If man mna totally empty 
of this moral "awaroneaa", he weald oeaae to be a many and 
beeoan a W^wll. "For notwlthatanding that Pally the eemand 
Hm onght to baonaa bettor nan* reaoonda with madtmtiiithed 
fore# in ear aonla".
%la inalatenee by Kant la vital to hia Defenoe of Preadom, 
and it la a perfectly logloal reault ef hia analyrU of 
"Kadleal Bvll", bat It ralaea prehlena which the thbelegieal 
detevmdnlat eoold not aller to paaa mnohallanged. It ia 
hoped to ralae amah prohlema in the eonolmdtng aeetlon of 
the preaont dlaomaaieny but, here and newy they eon be hinted 
at# Xont aaaonasthat the "poreP* pvmetleal Beaaon contiwmea 
in man with mndlBdirtJhad foree and "Purity" in apita of the 
fact that "Kadleal Bvll" had node guah deadly iareada inte 
hia aenl. da already atatad, Jtat admlta that thie "wiehad 
meaa" liee in ambmah in the wary Beaaon of many and yet he 
malntalna that Ita original "purity" ia mnaffaoted. Boon If 
thia ia grmntedy the qpeatlon oanearning Vm "pvaetieal"Beaaon
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the "Eational** W ill o f  man o u s t  cone up f o r  aaas dlsoussian» 
Again, i s  i t  p o s s ib le  tiiat trie "E loctive* ' W ill of uan, givoa 
over in  a deliberate iianner to  th e  perform ance o f "Radical 
E vil", can remain unaffected? Edvards would strongly deny 
the logic of such a position. However, th is  matter must 
receive actention within i t s  proper se ttin g .
(3) Kant presses on to say tha t man's Moral Recovery cannot 
be affected in  any way by man performing mere moral ac ts .
That i s ,  he denies th a t man becomes Good by performing Good 
actions. Rigid conformity to the Moral Lav by acts can never 
produce tha t quality of Mind which lie s  a t the very foundation 
of re a l Morality. In Morality, a t least,man never begins to  
be "moral” by doing "moral” things. The re a l force of Kant's 
insistence upon th is  point is  lo s t i f  i t  i s  not homo In »iws 
th a t he was repudiating a principle of dogma common in  many 
of the Christian sects of h is day. These advocated the per­
formance of good deeds as a basis for good feelings, end the 
fascination of such a doctrine has continued long beyond the 
generation of Kant, I t s  peculiar charm lie s  in  a re a l per­
version of the Kantian formula "Do your Duty, and ignore your 
Feelings" « Kant deals with such a perversion in  a most 
effective m a n n e r , ^ H e  in s is ts  th a t such a performance 
might re su lt in  Legality, but i t  can never produce Morality,
His firm stand upon th is  issue indicates h is refusal to  find 
an easy way out of the d if f ic u lt ie s  he has created by h is 
serious view of "Radical Evil",
(k) Kant is  s t i l l  haunted by the problem.. .  " If  a man is  
eomq>t in  the very fondation of i i is  maxims, how is  i t  possible 
th a t he should e ffec t th is  revolution by h is own power and 
become a good man of himself?" His previous analysis of 
Motivation provided a way of Salvation for man which was rea­
sonably sound from a "psychological" point of view, but th is  
i s  a type of Salvation which presupposed th a t the impact of
(1 ) R e ligion. 53*
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th» Moral Law upon tho sensuous nature was successful.
Then, the sensuous nature, tru ly  subordinated to the Moral Lew, 
could be "elevated" to being directed to  the Good by i t s  
r ig h tfu l reaction in  producing the great factor of Beverenee 
fo r the Lav, Nov, however, the whole situation  is  changed.
The sensuous nature is  no longer in  tha t s ta te  of submissive 
"awareness" of the Moral Law, but has become "radically" Evil 
in  tha t i t  has subordinated the superior principles to the 
sensuous, and has implicated the "Will" i t s e l f  in  such a 
perversion of man's true nature.
Kant makes a desperate e ffo rt in  a "Foot-note" to s t i l l  find 
some so lid , moral ground within th is  sphere ef"moral"Corruption 
upon which he can begin to build the Moral Recovery of man*
He takes as his starting-po in t the factor of Love, and say# 
i t  can be divided in to  two d is tin c t aspects. One is  Self- 
Love, and the other is  Complacency, or, what he la te r  terms 
"Rational" Self-Love. He tr ie s  to argue tha t Self-Love, 
in  i t s  natural form, cannot possibly be that "germ" of deed 
upon which a moral reformation can be erected, because i t ,  
in  i t s e l f ,  is  the re a l cause of the beginniig; of nmn's moral 
Corruption. He then turns to "Rational" Self-Love, as the 
only possible spot in  the corrupt nature of man upon which 
can provide a basis of Gelf-Beform. However, i t  is  obvious 
tha t Kant's heart is  not in  th is  arguzaent because i t  is  too 
■neh like the system of B u tler's  "Cool-Gelf-Love", and th a t 
might land his whole system of Ethics back upon a sem i- 
empirical foundation.
This p a tien t, almost passionate probing of Kant for seem 
so lita ry  point of leverage in  the moral quagmire of man's 
nature is  one of the indications of his profound desire fo r  
an explanation of human Freedom based Vi^ oa rea l fa c ts , and, 
i f  i t  appears tedious, i t  is  because Kant saw th a t he mnst 
move with extreme cautien along a path which was very near the 
system of "theolegieal" Determinism.
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(5) At l a s t ,  Kant f in d s  t h a t  th e re  is  o n ly  one f i n a l  so lu tlea 
for man's M oral R ecovery , and th a t  i s i -  "he must he bo m  again”*
"He can o n ly  become a new man by a  k in d  o f new b i r t h ,  a# i t  were by a  new c r e a t io n  (John  3 . S. compared w ith  Gem 1 .2 * ; and a change o f h e a r t ." v 1 )
This is  a  statement to which the whole of his system of E thies, 
and his analysis of "Radical Rvil" inevitably lead, and i t  
i s  a statement which the "theelegieal" d e tem la is t venld in ­
s i s t  undermines the whole idea of Kant "lAat man eaa work out 
h is own salvation"* Edwards would agree meet h eartily  with 
such a eonolusion, fo r i t  f i t s  in  perfectly  with h is ideas of 
Original d in , h is Determinism and the "Oraee" of God* He 
has put his own oenviotioas in  language sim ilar to th a t of Kant*
" I t  appears from th is , . . . .  tha t i t  is  most certain  with respect to  every one of the human race, th a t he can never have an in te re s t in  Ohrist, or see the Kingdom of God, unless he is  subject to th a t Ahanm# in  the temper end disposition of h is heart . .  . .# ,  and unless he has the o ld  heart taken away, and a new heart and s s i r i t  givm s.jpd puts off the eld man, and puts enw e new man"v2)
This i s  exactly the conclusion to  which Kant has a t la s t  come. 
The very terms are s im i l a r ,  and the whole purpose of the 
language is  alatost id en tica l. Has Kant then rea lly  given up 
the struggle fo r Relf-Determinaticn as hopeless? Has his 
insistence upon the depth and "rottenness" of "Radical B ril" 
i n  human nature resulted in  bogging down the fu ti le  f lu t te r -  
ings of human aspirations fo r Self-Reformation? Has i t  a l l  
resulted in  calling in  Qod to  create a new l i f e  upon the ashes 
of the old? This is  the f i r s t  impression obtained from the 
above admissions by Kant, and "theological" Determinism would 
not hesita te  to charge Kant with foolishly  prolonging a 
struggle against s tem  facts and, a t la s t ,  capitulating in  
ambiguous terms. Even modem theologians, who are not rig id  
determ inists, charge Kant with begging the whole question of 
"Radical Evil" by in sis tin g  upon 8elfmReformation*^^^
(1) Religion* 53*
(2 ) Original Sin* Part 3* Gh. 2 .
(3 ) Emil Brunner* The Mediator, Page 611.
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Yet, Kant refu ses to  Lubmit to  what appears to  be the in ­
ev itab le  conclusion of Iiis ov^ n uundssijns. iio th a t
iTtxm must be the r e a l  author of Kls Sa3.vation. h is  words arc 
clear and firra .
"The only way th is  d iffic u lty  can be got over i s ,  tha ta revolution is  necessary  ............tha t i s ,  whena man reverses the ultimate principles of his maTri.ms by which he is  a bad man by a single immutable reeolutien ."
The task is  now to discover whether Kant is  ju s tif ie d  in  such 
a stand*
(4 )  A C ritica l AppraiBal o f  Kant»s «H adinal a n i »  ""«1"^
Mssassï''
In order to  keep the concluding sections of th is  discussion 
within reasonable lim its , i t  w ill be necessary to s ta te  the
sa lien t points in  somewhat dogmatic terms. However, i t  i s  |
Ihoped tha t wough evidence has been produced in  the preceding j
discussion to  permit of such dogmatism.
F ir s t , the implied charge of Dr. Domer tha t Kant's Defence '
of Freedom in Religlor. must be regarded as a type of 
Pelagianlsm( cannot be sustained, and th is  for the foUcwlng 
reasons. (a) Pelaglus moved within the s t r i c t  lim itations of
a theological creed. Ho was an exponent of a type of "theo­
logical" Freedom, which was most commendable, but i t  was a 
type of Freedom which depended upon the crucial fac t th a t the 
"Grace" of God was indispensable to  man's rea l Salvation.
I t  is  fo r th is  reason th a t Augustine found i t  comparatively 
easy to  involve Pelaglus in  charges of" theological" incon­
sis tenc ies. (b ) Pelaglus had given l i t t l e  i f  any thought to  
the consideration of E thics. In his teaching, there are 
traces of e th ica l Philosophy which belong to the systems o f 
Plato and A risto tle , but th e re  is  not the s lig h tes t indication 
of Pelaglus being an orig inal and creative worker in  such a 
sphere. Oa the other hand, Kant comes to  the discussion o f
(1) msligion. 53*
(2 ) Dom er, the Person of Jesus C hrist. Vol.3# D iv .2 . Page
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freedom, w ltliln  th e  " th e o lo c ic a l"  s e t t i n g ,  by hav ing  f i r s t  
given ample ev id en ce  o f b is  a b i l i t y  as a  c r e a t iv e  th in k e r  in  
Ethics, and o f  hav ing  ex»iiiined th e  f a c t  o f  "R a d ic a l Evil" In 
a manner im p o ss ib le  to  P e la g lu s . In  o th e r  w ords, I t  i s  
quite im p o ssib le  to  s i le n c e  Kant by th e  charge  o f being  
P e la g ia n  because such  an attempt misses the whole point tha t 
Kant was a  m aste r o f  e t h i c a l  S c ien ce  whereas P e la g lu s  was 
but an am ateur i n  such  m a tte r s .
Y e t, t l ie re  a re  p o in ts  r a i s e d  i n  t i l l s  d eb a te  betw een Augustine 
and P e la g lu s  upon th e  Freedom o f  th e  W ill w hich must receive 
soioe c o n s id e ra t io n  i n  t h i s  p re s e n t  d is c u s s io n ,  because the 
fundam ental fac ts o f th e  " th e o lo g ic a l"  D eterm inism  of E dvards 
a re  tak en  from  th e  argum ents o f  A u g u stin e , and these fac ts are 
f a r  from  be in g  t o t a l l y  i r r e le v a n t ,  to  th e  p o s i t io n  assumed by 
K a n t 's  D efence o f  Freedom,
Second, mention has already been made of the fac t tha t almost 
the greater part of Kant's work "Heljglgn the H a lts
of here Reason" is  concerned with man's recovery from "Radical 
Evil". Further, i t  has been stated tha t i t  is  far from 
necessary to discuss a l l  the points raised by Kant in  th is  
more positive aspect of his work. Yet, there are tvo points 
upon which ambiguity might be dangerous. These are Xant*s 
theory of Ju s tif ica tio n  and Atcneemnt. (a) Even in  his 
Ethical works, Kant has a strange, i f  not a strained argumsmt 
upon the neéd for Qod regarding "mankind as Holy" th a t i s ,  
when mankind has accepted the authority of the Moral Law.
I t  is  d if f ic u lt  to  see the point of th is  argument in  his 
E thical discussion, and, when i t  is  introduced into h is "re­
ligious" Defence of Freedom, i t  appears to  have no rea l purpose* 
The rea l tru th  seems to be that Kant is  trying to make room 
for the "theelogic€Ll" dogma of "Justifica tion" which might have 
an academic in te re s t, but has no rea l value for man's Moral 
Recovery*
(1 ) le lig ic n . Bk. 2. C.
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(b )  Kla In tr o d u c tio n  o f  éux srÿX cn a tlo ii o f  tho Atoaonont ia  
8t i l l  lass fortunate.(  ^ Kant's arguiiant that the 'Good" 
aan s u f f e r s ,  and , in  such  undeserved s u f f e r in g ,  **a tones"  for 
his past x&iscoDduot is  l i t t l e  short of nonsense, that i s ,  
from the point of view of being adequate substitu tes fo r these 
central Christian doctrines* They never have, and never eaa 
be accepted as "rational" in terpretations of Ju s tifica tio n  
and Atoauement, because they miss the important point tha t 
these doctrines are centred in  the work and person of Jesus 
Christ vhioh Kant emphatically denies.
Yet, the point Kant wishes to  make in  such "ra tional" , and 
to ta lly  "untheological", i f  not "un-Christian" in te rp re ta tio n s, 
is  that man's primary Moral Recovery must "exclude" any possible 
help from the "Grace of God". Han, by his act of free sub­
mission to the Moral Lav i s ,  by that very ac t, " justified" 
before God as holy. Han, by his continued submission to  the 
Moral Lav in  the faco of d ifficu lty  and suffering, which, by 
his essen tia l Morality, are no longer linked as cause and 
e ffec t, now "atones" for his past Evil. therefore, msn 
"morally" earns Ju s tifica tio n  and Atonement. They are the 
d irec t re su lt of his own un-aided exertions. All th is  is  
Kant's way of saying God might reward men's Morality, but He 
cannot "jatiSt* him moral.
Jg&jAg, the discussion must now return to what might appear a 
tedious question; "the f a l l  of man in to  rad ical ev il" . This 
question seems to l ie  embedded in  theological abstractions 
and appears irre levan t to a ra tional discussion of e th ica l 
p rincip les. Yet, Kant has raised i t  in  a v i ta l  and fa r -  
reaching manner in  his discussion of "Moral Evil" and "Recovery", 
and i t  must receive here the attention of which Kant deemed 
i t  worthy.
A3 already observed, Kant, and the exponents of "theological" 
Determinism, differed over th e ir  respective views conoemiag
(1 ) Religion. Rk. 2. G.
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the original constitution of the f i r s t  Alani, For the purpose 
in  hend, i t  does not scatter whether there  /as  such a f i r s t  
Adam, or whether the B iblical story is  fac t or fic tio n .
Kant has made such questions unimportant by saying that the 
" fa ll  of man" is  a fac t of every-day experience, and, what is  
more, a fac t v i ta l  to  h is in terp retation  of "Radical Evil".
In other words, there is  a rea l point a t which man becomes a 
"sinner". Now, the Important question fo r the present d is­
cussion ia , what was the "constitution" of th a t man ju s t before 
he became a sinner? I t  Is quite conceivable that Augustine, 
Luther, Calvin and Edwards would have fought to maintain th a t 
there was a rea l " f i r s t  Adam" who f e l l  in to  sin  according to  
a s t r ic t ,  l i t e r a l  in terp retation  of the f i r s t  compters of 
Genesis. However, i t  is  believed th a t, for the sake of argu­
ment, they would have aocepted Kant's view of man's "enpirioal" 
F all into Sin. So, the exact date, time and place of such 
a F all can be ignored in  order to  secure e. discussion upon an 
"actual" Pall- Now, the position of the above-mentioned ex­
ponents of "theologioial" DeterzidLnlsm is  stated by Edward# — 
tha t God made Adam a "perfect" being, that is  "GOOD", endowed 
with a l l  the qualities  of such a term. They deny tha t he va# 
"Innocent" in  the sense th a t he was unconaeious ef rig h t and 
wrong. They accept tiie term "Innocent" in the sense th a t 
i t  means Freedom from 8in or G uilt, but they in s is t  th a t the 
term must mean sooetliing more, tha t i s ,  "Righteous".
Bdvards puts the point in  speaking of the f i r s t  man#
"In a moral agent, subject to moral* obligaticns, i t  is  the same thing, to  be perfectly  jjanoQeijt, as to  be perfectly  rish teous- I t  must be same, because there can no more be any between sin  and righteeaine##,or between rig h t and wrong, in a moral sense, than there can be a medium between stra igh t and crooked, in  a natural s e n s e . 1/
In actual fa c t, Edwards quotes the tex t — "Qod made man 
upright", that i s ,  morally s tra ig h t, Now, although Sant 
denies what the theological determinists affirm , tha t the
(1 ) Original Bin. Part 2* Beet. 1.
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re su lt of Adam's F all meant tha t a l l  n.en were contaminated 
by original Sin; yet, he everywhere affiriiis tha t man Is  
constituted “s tra ig h t c-nd upright". In other words, i t  is  
a fac t that Kant teaches th a t the constitution of "natural" 
man is  Good. Consideration of the following facts w ill 
confirm such a statement.
(a) xlan is  in possession of "pure" p ractica l Reason.^
(b) }!an's Will has the power to ignore or overcome In e lln a tla n i^
(c) i-Ian has a c le a r  consciousness of the iloral Law and his 
Dut) to tliat Law.O)
(d) iian lias rea l Freedom from natural forces.
These are only a few of the features of the "original" endow­
ment of man as Kant saw them in man, even a f te r  the c r is is  of 
a F all in  B iblical terms. Now, the theological determiniets 
ask l i t t l e  mure fur tlie " f i r s t  Adam", than Kant asks for the 
natural man; and they would be in s is ten t tha t Kant had In­
volved Iiis argument in & f l a t  contradiction by saying tha t 
man always fa l ls  from a s ta te  of "Innocence" (in  his re ­
s tr ic ted  use of the term) in to  "Radical Bvil". They would 
in s is t  thc^t tho very possession of such moral qualities made 
"natural" man a “moral" being, rather than an "innocent" and 
a morally "neutral" being. These qualities demand tha t man, 
in  Ms "natural" sta te  has a disposition for the Right and 
the Good, tha t I s ,  he has a "bias" , by the very quality  of 
his orig inal endowment, for Good, and, in  the admissiez of 
such &"b ia s ," it  ia  absurd to define "natural" man in  terms 
of -"amoral" Innocence or "e th ica l Indifference".
AS already sta ted , a l l  th is  might appear remote abstraction, 
i f  not puerile speculation, but Kant saw the v i ta l  impertanoe 
of such a discussion; and ntueh of the inadequacy of modem 
discussions upon Freedom and Necessity arises fr«a the
(1) K. p . \ \  173.(2) K* p. V. 182.(3 )  K. p .  V. l4 4 .(Ç) K, p. ? . 156.
-  2)4 -
neglect of a l l  the factors which are Inherent in  th is  theo­
logical co n flic t.
When the theological determ inists in s is t  upon natural man, er 
the " f ir s t"  man possessing rea l moral q u a litie s , they are not 
in sis tin g  upon some abstract tenet of an obsolete theological 
creed. Rather, th is  insistence is  v i ta l  to  th e ir  Determinism. 
f i r s t , because i t  concedes tha t Qod must play an essen tia l 
part in  zsan's Morality. ^ao n ^ . because they wish to  empha­
sise  the actual existence of what they term — "necessitated 
goodness"; tha t i s ,  Goodness in  vhioh the free Will of man 
plays no p art. Kant was perfectly  aware of these crucial 
points in  theological Determinism, tliat is  why he cuts off 
his "natural" man from any possible re la tio n  to the "Grace" 
of Qod in  h is Moral Recovery. However, as already obserrsd, 
Kant's "natural" man has certain  moral qualities as an 
"original" endowment which must be viewed as giving him a 
character which ia  moral rather than "amoral", and which Kant 
himself admits contribute to h is performance of the Moral Law. 
Therefore, when he s in s , f a l ls  in to  "Radical Bvil", he f a l ls  
from SMBMMBSMB# rea l moral s ta tu s , rather than that of"Xnno- 
oence"or"moral Indifference;" and th is  is  a l l  th a t the theo­
logical determinists need to clinch th e ir  argument. Has Kant 
fa llen  in to  th is  well-prepared trap? Before f in a lly  deciding 
such a question, a tten tion  must be given to  another phase of 
Kant's analysis of "Radical Bvil". However, here and now, 
i t  must be admitted tha t there are obvious weaknesses in  Kant's 
system of Bthies upon th is  important point. f i r s ^ . when be 
is  discussing h is general theory of E thics, Kant appears to  
ignore the re a l i ty  of "Radical Evil". His general description 
of the Inclinations e tc . tends to give the isqpression th a t 
man can do no JCSftiL BvH* So much so, th a t Dr. Caird r ig h tly  
oonqplains tha t Kant's system of Ethics indicates Freedom to  
do the *»aight", but no Freedom to do the "Wrong", Second, 
when Kant comes to discuss "Radical E vil", Kant tends to  change 
the venue of his argument upon the moral qualities of man'#
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yAPkVnature. Now, he wants to # #  tha t these very moral qualities 
which provided the foundation for his doing of the "Bight" 
in FreedoQi, must he viewed as qualities which are "Innocent", 
tha t is,"m orally Indifferent". This is  Kant's general 
teaching, hut, as w ill be observed la te r ,  i t  is  not the f in a l 
and decisive teaching of Kant. Yet, i t  is  widespread enough 
to  put Kant's Defence of Freedom in rea l danger.
Fourth, there is  another general d ifficu lty  in  Kant's analysis 
of "Radical Evil" upon which the theological de tem in ist 
would fasten as indicative of Kant's inconsistency. This is  
the general fac t tha t Kant teaches that man's Will suffers no 
rea l degeneracy in  h is F a ll into "Radical Bvil". The follow­
ing extract is  important in  th is  contextt-
"Han (even the worst) does not in  any maxim, as i t  were, rebelliously  abandon the moral law. (and renounce obedi­ence to i t ) .  Cn the contrary, th is  forces i t s e l f  upon him ir re s is t ib ly  by v irtue of his moral nature, and i f  no other spring opposed i t  he would also adopt i t  in to  his ultimate maxim as the adequate determining principle of his w ill, tha t i s ,  he would be morally good."(1)
The above quotation raises a host of d if f ic u ltie s  and ind i­
cates Kant's i*eal struggle to free himself from the problems 
with which "theological" Determinism, and his own systma, had 
confronted him. I f  i t  were to be received as authentic of 
Kant's teaching on "Radical Bvil", than i t  would contradict 
large sections of his teaching on the same subject, tha t i s ,  
that man takes up in to  his maxim principles which are opposed 
d irec tly  and deliberately  to the Moral Law. Further, such 
a quotation confirms the point which has been already made 
that Kant's "natural" man is  "biassed" towards Good, and, 
therefore, is  not "innocent".
Again, i t  indicates Kant's return to his general theory of 
the "Rational" Will which seems " ir re s is t ib le " , except when 
hindered by sensuous principles. Kant involves himself in  
a l l  these d iff ic u ltie s  because he wants to prove tha t man, by 
his F a ll in to  "Radical Bvil", does not rea lly  damage his
(1 ) Religion. 39.
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natura l endcwment of “moral'* Good or the natu ral "power" to 
eradicate hlmaolf from "Radical Evil". Edvards in s is ts  
tha t "Moral Evil" corrupts tbs vary o itadsl of man's Personality, 
the Will; and he can conceive of a human being so given over 
to "floral Rvil" tha t he loses the power to le a s t of a l l
to w ill the Good. His idea of "Moral Svll" affecting the 
Will i s  taken from Augustine who replies to the "ethical" 
optimism of Pelaglus by saying#-
"Our present inquiry, however, is  about the man whom the 'th iev es ' l e f t  half-dead on the road, and vhe, being disabled and pierced through with heavy wounds, is  quite incapable of mounting up to the heights ef holiness with the f a c i l i ty  wherewith he was able to  descend therefrom ."'*/
There is  a great deal of ocamionsense in  the point of view of 
the theological determinists when they in s is t  tha t a serious 
view of "Moral Bvil" must involvo the "Will" of man in  some 
quality of degeneration, and Kunt appears to  be wanting the 
argument both ways. That i s ,  he wants a serious view of 
"Radical Evil", without serious oonsequonces.
Perhaps Kant's more fortunate and adequate In terpretation  on 
th is  particu lar point is  found in  the following quotation#-
"The dopravity of human nature, than, is  not so nyyM to be called jMlBfiifti I f  th is  word is  taken in  i t s  s t r ic t  sense, namely, as a disposition (subjective principle of maxime) to  adopt the bad, jw h a g , t s t e  one's naxias as a spring (for tha t is  devilish); but rather perversity  of heart, which on account of the re su lt, is  also called a bad ^ a r t * This may co­ex is t %rith a v m  good in  geM rai, and arises from the f r a i l i t y  of human nature."v2)
The translatoi' of the above passage notes tha t Kant uses 
"JsSLUdl” to  stand for "WILL". She word "JCLUâ" means the 
"Rational" W ill, which is  another term for "Pure" p rac tica l 
Reason; and Kant thinks i t  is  quite conceivable tha t "WlUe" ■ 
the pure "Rational" W ill, mi^ht oo-sxlst with an "Elective"
Will which has violated the law of the "Ratiœial" Will.
(1) The Anti-Pelagian Writings. Vol. 1. Page 276.
(2) Religion. ^1.
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However, th e argument ia  concerneci w ith  the term th e  •• Elective" 
Will, which Kant tenus • For i t  i s  the "Elective"
Will which Kant permits to  be free , and to be used in  th is  
moral "perversion" of p rincip les. The theological deter- 
minists would argue th a t in  man's "F all", he lo s t the facto r 
of "WlUe", but they are not always consistent in  such an 
assertion because they admit th a t fa llen  man can be appealed 
to by the Moral Law. Further, they seem to in s is t  th a t the 
"Elective" Will is  weakened, ta inted and diseased by i t s  re­
peated acts of "wilful" v iolations of the Moral Law, and 
ordinary human experience appears to be on th e ir  side , in  th is  
la t te r  contention*
However, Kant refuses to  agree to  both these points. The 
"pure" p rac tica l fieascn remains un-affected by man's v io la tioa  
of i t s  inherent and unalterable "Rightness"; and Kant goes 
on to  isq>ly th a t the "Slectivs" Will is  also un-affected by 
"Radical Evil", and th is  does not seem to carry the same amount 
of reasonable argument* Yet, th is  is  Kant's teaching, and 
the explanation offered in  the above ex tract is  tha t 
Depravity consists in  Perversity , rather than in  the "Rleotive" 
Will seeking Evil fo r e v i l 's  sake. In other words, the 
"Elective" Will i s  not "bad" or diseased in  the sense th a t i t  
w ills the Bad because i t  is  bad; but the im plieaticn is  tha t 
i t  w ills the Bad because "perversely" i t  seeks the Good.
Kant is  not to ta lly  unreasonable in  such an insistence, be­
cause Edwards admits th a t man cannot, by his very nature, seek 
tha t which is  f in a lly  destructive of iiis Happiness.
Kant's insistence upon the "incorrup tib ility" of the "Rational" 
Will and the Freedom of "Elective" Will in  man are v i ta l  to  
h is Defence of Freedom, and h is insistence is  strengthened, 
i f  not vindicated by the inconsistencies of Edwards upon these 
two major points. JEICJÜIt oa th is  matter o f ‘^ CLUiTi "Rational" 
Will, or "pure" p rac tica l Reason, Edwards involves his argument 
in  what seems to  be a d irec t co n flic t. In h is thesis "J^ 
SCUlaiLIlH"» b . d M lw .. tiia t n n ,  in  h i .  .na-fU ltB " s t a t .
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i s  in  possession of f u l l  moral q u a l it ie s , but tliat Ms 
"Pall" deprived him of these superior p r in c ip les , and that liis  
e sse n tia l corruption ocmslst# in  h is being l e f t  "alone" w ith 
his in fer ior  pr incip les of animal appetite e tc . However, 
when ha comes to  sta te  the case for man's "Responsibility"  
in  Ms th esis  "The Freedom of the Will", he presents a very 
d ifferen t picture of th is  supposed "fallen" man*
In th is  context, Edwards i s  repudiating the charge that h is  
system of Determinism reduces man to  the le v e l  of a machine, 
and he r e p l ie s : -
"Han i s  en tire ly , p erfec t ly , and unspeakably d ifferen t from a mere machine, in  tha t he has reason and under­standing, and has a facu lty  of w i l l ,  and is  capable e f v e litio n  «cl choice; and in  th a t his w ill i s  guided by the d icta tes or views of Ms understanding so th a t he has lib e rty  to  act according to  h is choice, and to do vhat lue p leases, and by means of thesethings, is  capable of moral habits and moral acts . . . . .worthy of praise e tc . or punishment."'
Here, i s  a type of "natural" man vMch seems to have i t s  
"pure" p rac tica l Reason in  a l l  i t s  o rig inal force and p arity . 
Edwards never resolves th is  conflic t between his Theology 
and his 'psycholo^^y", and, therefore, leaves Kant in  possess­
ion of th is  particu lar section of the struggle. Second, 
when Kant in s is ts  tha t the "Elective" Will i s  also un-oon- 
taminated in  tha t i t  is  "misguided", but never essen tia lly  
"bad"; he receives a great deal of confirmation from Edwards, 
whose system of Determinism work only upon the assumption 
that there is  always a "pievailing" preference in  the Mind 
of man. This prevailing preference, says Edwards, i s  for 
the "agreeable"I-
" I t  must be observed in  what sense X use the te rm gead. namely, as of the same import with agreeably. To appear good to the mind, as I use the phrase, is  the same as to apnear agps.abla. or sssa nlaaalnz to  tb . laind. Certainly, nothing appears Inviting or e lig ib le  to the mind, or tending to  engage the inc lination  and choice, c ^ i d . r . d  as . yA;.«ff . . . . .  To say «*h.r-wise, is  l i t t l e ,  i f  anything, short of a d irec t and plain contradiction."
( 1 ) Tho Freedom of the %LU. P a rt 4 . S e c t. 5 •
(2 ) " " * " Part 1. Sect. 2 .
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This i s  not iden tica l v ith  K ant's arguineiit th a t '"Radical i
Bvil" is  a porvorsiozi of noral values. Yet, Edwards seeias 
to  be saying tha t man cannot seek h is  aaisery, or self-des­
truction , because "natural" man seeks tlie Agreeable. There­
fore , the "Elective" W ill i s  never rea lly  Bad and hopelessly 
corrupt. Kant seems to  have von the b a ttle  on these tvo point# 
f in a lly , Kant appears to  be rig h t upon another im­
portant point in  his an a ly sis  of "Radical E vil". As already 
noted, there was a very strained linkage between the "psycho­
logical" Determinism of Bdvards and his " theological" Pre­
suppositions . ün the surfaoe, they appeared to  f i t  in to  each 
other with ease and adap tab ility , but deeper down there lie s  
a rea l oomiliot of which Kant is  not slow to  take advantage. 
"Theological" Determinism pivots upon the tenet tha t God's 
fore-knowledge implies His fore-ordination, or predestination. 
Augustine, Luther, Calvin and Edwards to i l  a t  th is  concept, 
and, by certain  manipulations, make i t  f i t  in to  th e ir  "psycho­
logical Determinism. However, there is  one great flam in  
a l l  th e ir  arguments, and th a t flaw is  oentred in  th e ir  ex­
planation of man's moral Responsibility for his " fa ll"  in to  
Moral E vil. In otiier words, accordiiig to th e ir  "theological" 
Presuppositions, Adam's F a ll was an event which was fore­
seen by God, and therefore fore-ordained by God. Yet, i f  
th is  is  a fa c t, how can they hold Adam rea lly  "responsible" 
for that act which was a re a l factor in  the plan of God?
The explanations of th is  d ifficu lty  are very numerous, but 
they are reducible to  one basic p rincip le , tha t i s ,  God made 
Adam "Free" to choose the Good or the E vil, and, although He 
knew Adam would choose the E vil, God le f t  him in  complete 
possessiw  of his Freedom to make th is  choice.
In spite of a l l  the attempts of the theological determinists 
to ejqplain away the oruoial nature of such "original" Freedom, 
the fac t remains tha t th is  "Adamic" Freedom undermines, i f  
not destroys, the foundations of th e ir  system of Determinism.
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Dr. Domer, an Informed and acute c r i t ic  of Kant, is  com­
pelled to admit the hopeless position of Determinism on th is  
point when he w ritest-
" Augustine teaches th a t in  Adam the whole human raoe was morally fre e , and tha t in  him a l l  have sinned, so that no wrong is  done to  any one when election passes him over and he is  l e f t  to  coodematien. Here, there­fo re , determinism takes up in to  i t s e l f  an element of indeterminism, a pre-existent act of freedom en thepart of a l l  in  Adam, whereby of course, the system of purely theological determinism is  shattered. . . . . . .I f  a breach has to  be made in  the determ inistie systemby going back to  Adam, and the freedom of man as found in  him, why should not the d istinc tion  between those who become believers, and those idio remain sn-believers be eaq>IaiDed without th is  reference to  Adam a t a l l ,  by holding th a t the freedom lAich he possessed is  enjoyed by every individual? Or, again, why should theological pre-determinism not be carried out in  earnest? Vhy should Adam's f a l l  be an exception?"'  1 ^
This is  exactly what Kant has done. He has conceived of 
every man as possessing "real" Freedcm, and capable of a 
"real" f a l l ,  and there is  nothing in  "theological" Determinism 
to  deny him such a position. Kant fastens upon th is  ad­
mission of inalienable, indestructib le and "incomprehensible" 
freedom in  man. He makes i t  the oruoial factor in  the "Fall" 
of man. Yet, he preserves i t  righ t through the re a l experi­
ence of "Radical Bvil" in  man, and, a t la s t ,  makes i t  the 
pivot of man's Moral Reoovery. He does not deny the eximt- 
ence of the "Grace" of Qod.
" I t  is  not essen tia l and therefore not necessary for every one to know what God does or has done for his aalvatlao. but i t  i s  .s s ro t la l  WifltlW.has to do in  order to  be worthy of th is  assis tanoe."VZ;
"Theological" Determinism le f t  man to  himself to  "F all" . 
Therefore, Kant demands tha t man be l e f t  to himself to  r is e .  
Man must enter upon a re a l struggle to become well-pleasing 
to Qod. Kant's verdict upon the " ir re s is tib le "  "Grace" of 
God is  as follows. I f  the "Grace" of God forces i t s e l f  
upon man, ( i t  may be the Power of God) but i t  is  not the 
"Grace" of God. Morality is  not a "real" struggle; and man 
cannot be "well-pleasing" to God. Upon th is  aspect of Kant's
(1) Christian E thics. Page 26?.
(2) Religion, déçt. 60.
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Defence of Freedom, there can be no doubt about hia having 
waged a great co n flic t, and perhaps secured a reasonable 
victory.
In ether terms, Kant has fastened upon an Inherent weakness 
in  "theological" Determinism which is  the postulation of 
th is  "pre-empirical" Freedom in man, tha t i s ,  in  the " f i r s t  
Adam"# I t  is  the one "dubious" link in  the chain which 
reaches from the Sovereignty on God, down to the FaU ef man, 
the Determination of men fay h is "natural" nature, and aleng 
the long road of "Election" up to the f in a l purpose of God 
in  a ll-c rea tio n , tha t i s ,  the fulfilm ent of His Will in  per­
fec t Wisdom, to His perfect Glory. The theological deter­
minists have no doubt concerning the "Heoessity" of th is  
chain, except tha t they also wish to clear God of a l l  "in­
justice" in  forging such a chain, and, to do th is , they 
postulate tha t "original" Freedom to account for "original" 
g in . Therefore, because of the abuse of th is  rea l "original"
Freedom, the F all becomes tru ly  d isastrous, because man loses
th is "original" Free Will, and th e ir  system of Determinism, 
as affecting fa llen  end natural man, becomes consolidated; 
both upon psychological and theological grounds. However, 
Kant declines to be put off by such an explanation of the 
F a ll. He in s is ts  that Freedom is  an indestructib le "Gift" 
from God to man, as man, not merely to the F irs t man. There­
fo re , the theological determinists would agree tha t Browning 
WM given a very good description of Adam, and the evidence 
of "Scripture" proves i t ,  when he wrote#-
"God, whose pleasure brought Man in to  being, stands away As i t  were a hand-breadth o ff , to give Reom for the newlynaade to  liv e ,And look a t him Arom a place apart,And use his g if ts  of brain and h ea rt,.Givm, indeed, but to keep for e v e r ." ' ' /
(1 ) Christmas Eve.
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Kant would in s is t  tha t th is  i s  a good daseriptioa of 
"JSrsryman*, not caily the "F irst" man, and th# evidano# of 
h is "ra tional and moral nature" proves i t ;  end here th is  
part of his Defence of Freedom must r e s t .  Yet, in  a very 
rea l sense, the discussion of some of the basic elements of 
Freedom and "Moral Evil" cannot end here, but must be 
carried forward to lAat i s ,  perhaps, Kent's most d if f ic u lt  
task , the Defence of Freedom as tha t Freedom stands eon- 
fronting God; and i t  i s  to th is  problem th a t the discussion 
now turns.
THE KANTIAN Dffî^ ENCE OF FBEBDOM
c h a p t e e  e i g h t
aOD and FHSaDOM
"Therefore the sovereignty of Ood doubtless extends to  th is  n a t t e r } e s p e c ia l ly  c o n s id e r in g , t h a t  i f  God should  le a v e  men's vo litions, end a l l  moral events, to  the determination and d i s p o s i t io n  o f blind unmeaning causes, or th e y  be le f t  to  happen perfectly  vithont cause: th is  would be no moreconsistant with lib e rty  in  any notion of i t ................But i ti s  evident I tha t such a providential disposing and determin­in g  of men's m oral a c t i o n s ,  though i t  i n f e r s  a m oral necessity of these actiouq yet i t  does not in the le a s t infringe the r e a l  l i b e r t y  of m ankind."
(iW vards. The Freedom o f th o  W ill. P t .4 .  3 e e t .9 « )
"The determ inistic scheme is  the natural prelude to  the C alvinistlc d o c tr in e  of a b so lu te  sovereignty and irreversib le  decrees, and is  developed in to  a cooslstmnt theology in  the woik of Jo im tiian  B dvards, but i t  oan never harmonise with a Religion whidh is  in  earnest with i t s  moral conceptions, and, in  t h e i r  tra n s c e n d e n t application, does not suffer them to  be crushed and paralyzed beneath the weight of infin itude and almightiness
(i4artin@ au. A d tu d y  o f R e l ig io n . / o l . 2 .  Bk«3. Ch«2«)
"To f ix  and define th is  idea of a Moral Governor of the world, i s  a problem proposed to us by the p rac tica l reason. What we are concerned about knowing is  not what the nature of God %my be in  i t s e l f ,  but what ho is  in  reforenoe to  us as Moral Agents."
(Kant. BeIigion-(Sezq)le*s Translation) -  page 186.)
"Ah a b so lu te  M oral la v  o r m oral id e a l  canno t e x i s t  in  m aterial th ings. And i t  does n o t exist in the mind of th is  or tha t in d iv id u a l .  (kily i f  we b e lie v e  i n  th o  existence of a Mind fo r which the true  moral ideal i s  already in  some sen se  rea l, a Mind which i s  the so u rce  o f 1#hatever is  true in  our own moral judgments, can we ra tiona lly  think of the m oral i d e a l  as no lo s s  r e a l  th a n  the w orld  i t s e l f ."
(Rashdall - quoted by W.R. Rorley, Moral Values and theIdea of God, p .34?.)
"The second antinom y c a r r i e s  th e  c o n f l i c t  over in to  the re­la tion  between man and D ivinity, as the ultim ate substratumof values.............  • Bthios i s  always conoemed fin a lly  withman, relig ions thought with Ood. His power, h is action, h is w ill, s e t  th e  standard, in  t h i s  world as in  the next.Men has only a subordinate place; fo r him th e  Good is  whatGod w i l l s    That anything whatsoever in  heaven orearth , even though i t  be God himself, should take precedence of Man. would be e th ica lly  perverted; I t  would not be moral; i t  would be treason to  mankind, which m a t re ly  open i t s e l f  alone."
(Hartmann. E th ic s . V ol.3 . page, 263#)
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The ooncluding section of th is  Kantian Defenoe of Freedom 
must a t te ijp t  to  deal v i t l i  what is  perhaps th e  gravest problem 
yet faced. This chapter has boen en titled  "GOD and FBSBDO^ P; 
i t  could be term ed "Divine Legislation and Human Autonomy", 
for i t s  problem centres in  eoni renting human Freedom v ith  
Divine Government. Kant saw the gravity of th is  problem 
quite early  in  h is analysis of Freedom, and, as already sta ted , 
i t  was a v i ta l  facto r in  the Determinisa of h is generation; 
and there can be l i t t l e  doubt tha t a l l  his e ffo rts  to  ejqiound 
Freedom were shadowed by th is  supreme problem. Kant puts 
the problem in  these voidst-
"There s t i l l  remains a d iffio u lty  in  the coehlaation ef freedom with the meohanism of nature in  a thing belong-lag to  the world of sense i a d ifficu lty  which, even a fte r  a l l  the foregoing is  a&pltted threatœis freedom with complete destruotivHi >
These are strong terms, but Kant knew tha t they were not too 
strong to  ejqpress the fear idiich had brooded over h is long 
and patiencd Defence of freedom. Even now, with so much 
te rr ito ry  gained, and so z,iany problems faced and solved, the 
whole structure of h is Defence could f a l l  Ikito cosq^lete ruin 
unless he was able to  provide a  reasonable solution fo r th is  
all-iiqzortant problem. Kant puts th is  proolsm of Freedom 
in  the following terms
"The d ifficu lty  i s  as follows — aven i f  i t  be admitted that the supersensible subject can be free with respect to a given action, although as a subject also belonging to  the world of sense, he is  under mechanical conditions witli respect to  the same action; s t i l l ,  as soon as we allow th a t Ood as universal f i r s t  cause is  also the cause of the existence of substance (a proposition which oan aeVer be given up without a t the same time giving jap the notion of God as the Being ef a l l  beings, and there­with giving up His a ll-su ffic iency , cm which everything in  theology depends ) i t  seems as i r  we must admit tha t a man's actions have th e ir  determining principle in  some-KWBPkr & s .t ,on «boa h is am eidstauo* «nd the vhol. é.term iaatlm i at h i .  e m ta llty  are absolataijr dapmd«tt«*(2)
(1) K p. r .  232.(2) K. p. T. 2 3 2 .
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Kaat could hare oxpresaod t i l l s  problem o f  h is  D cfonc» o f  
Freedom lu  fax cloarer terms, and ho need net have put the 
stress  of the d ii'iicu lty  upon *th e  causality  of God In the 
e x is te n c e  o f substcuce" , Of course, i t  i s  th a t, but that 
p a r t ic u la r  a sp e c t  of •che problem  need n o t liave been given 
TUif'UQ proLilaeaoe* .^ lo r^ever, the main point i s  th a t, for
Kant, God n ov seems t o  stand ever against human Freedom and 
tlireatsii i t s  very ex isten ce . As already observed, he saw 
t  *.à problem a t  th e  very commencement of h is  Dofenoo of 
Freodoii, and discussed i t  under the heading of "Eeteroaomy*, 
but he knew th a t  such an I n d ir e c t  discussion could not solve 
tiie problem, and i t  must be faced in  a d irec t and positive 
manner. When kant has stated the problem, he offers h is  
so lu tion , and h is  ai'guments are impressive, but i t  would be 
rather x titile  to  discuss such a solu tion  u n ti l  some attempt 
has been made to  provide even a lim ited background to  the 
problem which the Kantian Defence of Freedom feared so much.
In the anal)^sls of the Determinism of fidvards, i t  was noted 
that he made very l i t t l e  use of the "theological* aspect of 
h is systcii^, but tnat i t  was always there, clear and cer ta in , 
and ready to  be brought in to  action i f  the "psychological* 
aspect was in  danger of reih.tation. I^urther, i t  was noted 
that fidwai'de suatied up in  such "theological" Determinism a l l  
the r ich  her itage of Augustine, bother and Calvin, and i f  he 
used th is  heritage sparingly i t  vas not because he had the 
s l ig h te s t  doubt of i t s  te n a b i l lty . The cardinal doctrine 
of theo log ical Determinism l i e s  in  i t s  "absolute Sovereignty* 
of God, and Sdwards i s  sta tin g  the lo g ic a l im p lication of 
such a doctrine when bo sa y s i-  "The sovereignty of God i s  
h is  a b i l i ty  and authority to  do whatever pleases him; whereby 
he doth according to h is  w i l l  in  the armies of heaven.
amengmt the inhabitants of the eartht and none can stay hi#
hand, or say unto him, what ost thou;*( l)  As already sta ted .
(1) The Freedom of the W ill. F t.4 . d eo t.? .
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fo r IdvardSy th is  feature of h is  theological Determinism i s  
not an abstract doctrine, or a mere point of dogma, i t  is  
the foundation of an all-absorbing mystical experience#
Here, then, i s  the re a l c itadel of h is system of Determinism 
and of a l l  the theological systems of Determinism, and i t  vas 
the ToeOL upon v h i^  Kant feared tha t h is exposition of Free­
dom would b a tte r i t s e l f  to  complete destruction* Vow, there 
is  a fa ir ly  videpsread conviction in  some sections of philo- 
s<q>hioal th o u ^ t tha t Kant need not have troubled himself too 
Buoh with th is  crucial problem because he had rea lly  solved 
i t  in  h is repudiation of orthodox theology in  his "Critique 
of Pure Reason".
Concerning Kant's v i ta l  influence upon theological doetrlno 
there cannot be the s lig h te s t doubt* In fa c t, one important, 
modem School of Theology, the "Ritsohlian" can be said to  
have been Inaugurated and dominated by Kant's theological 
challenge* These fa c ts , and many otliers have succeeded in  
persuading a host of thinkers tha t Kant's substitu tion  of 
the "Moral" arguments for the existence of God has f in a lly  
and fu lly  ju s tif ied  h is  destruction of the "metaphysical" 
arguments for God; and tha t suWi "Moral" arguments for God 
remove completely any fear th a t the Being of God might threaten 
Human Freedom with destruction* The very le a s t which can bo 
said concerning such a conclusion is  tha t i t  suffers from an 
ovar-sim plification of the problem at issue. On the very 
surface of the question, i t  is  perfectly  obvious that the 
above extract of Kant, s ta ting  h is f in a l d iff ic u lty , would 
not have been made at a l l  i f  he vas convinced that he had a l­
ready solved the problem which haunted his Defence of Freedom. 
For, the above statement was made by Kant a f te r  hi# refu ta tion  
of the metaphysical arguments, and a f te r  he had expounded h is 
moral arguments fo r the existence of God, Further, in  h is 
attempted solution of the supreme d ifficu lty  stated in  the 
above ex tract, Kant does not emphasiae, he does not even
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nanti on the so lu tion  offered by the "Morel" argument# fo r Qod, 
but takes refuge in  the argument, viiioh i s  the abyss of a l l  
reasonable discussion , of the " th in g - ln - itse lf" . There I s  
a staterjont in  Hartmann *s interpretation of Kant whioh can be 
taken as t^qjioal of thj.s rea l misunderstanding of Kant's 
so lu tion  of the problem under disoussion* Hartmann w rites:*
"This process of detachment vas already accomplished in  Kant's th ird  antinomy# The all-oppressive ecneept of Qod, with i t s  metaphysical v e i^ t ,  vas excluded# I t  vas reduced from an an# re&lissimam to  the "ideal of pure reason". By tH ls ehfeeblexiant i t  ceases to  be dangerous# I t  has i t s e l f  beccma highly preblematioal# Kant lias turned the ta b les , Ho longer does the moral consciousness need to  protect i t s e l f  against an action of all-pow erful Prov id^ce: but the reverse i s  tru e ,i f  there be a t a l l  any certain ty  as to  the existence of such a Providence, i t  can rest  only upon the fac t of precisely tha t moral consciousness itself««V i;
This statement i s ,  in  many respects, a correct in te rp reta­
tion  of the tea<Aing and claims of Kant, but i t  i s  not the 
only possible in terp reta tion  of sucdi teadiing, and, even i f  
i t  vere the only possible conclusion from the teaching of 
Kant, i t  vould s t i l l  have to  be challenged by Determinism. 
There are reasonable grounds fo r thinking th a t Hartmann 
vould veloone sudi a conclusion as the fu l l  and f in a l teach­
ing of Kant upon th is  central d ifficu lty  of h is Defence of 
Freedom, and tha t i t  vas quite inviolate against the challenge 
of "theelogical" Determinism# For he seems to  desire to  make 
a complete break between Religion and Bthics, which again i s  
pushing Kant's d istinc tion  to  an extrema, and to  say some­
thing with which Kant would have found himself in  conflict#
"It (Ethics) is  Wiolly committed to  th is  l i f e  #••••#From the e th ica l point of view, the tendency toward the Beyond is  ju st as contrary to  value as, from the re lig ­ious point of view, i s  the tendency toward th is  world#I t  is  a waste of moral energy and a diversion of i t  away from true values and th e ir  actualisation , and on th a t account is  not moral# Moral striv ing  regards every­thing which transcends th is  l i f e  as a deceitfu l phamtcm."(2 )
tthios# Vcl.3# Page 3 3 . Bthics# Vol.3 # Page 263*
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There oan be no doubt about Hartmann's  ainoere and able 
in terp reta tion  of Kantian teaching, yet, without permitting 
the present discussion to  stray  too fa r from i t s  main current, 
i t  zBOst be said th a t h is f i r s t  quotation must be subjected 
to  considerable modification, and his second repudiated, i f  
the following extract from Kant is  received as authentic fo r 
h is  understanding of moral values.
"Thus without a God and without a world inv isib le  to  us now but hoped fo r, the glorious ideas of morality are indeed object of approval and admiration, but not springs of purpose and action# For they do not f u l f i l  in  i t s  oos^letsmess tha t end w hi^  is  natural to  every ra tio n a l being and idiich is  determined a p r io r i , y>d rendered necessary, by tha t same pure reason#"'
However, the main task  before the present discussion of God 
and Freedom is  to  attempt to  sket<di, in  broad outline, the 
Kantian view of God which might serve as a background to  the 
statement of h is d iff icu lty  wh«i God confronts human Freedom, 
and the following polmts might a ss is t such a task .
F ir s t , from an examination of Kant's "destructive" critic ism  
of the metaphysical arguments for  the existence of God, 
there are reasonable grounds for assuming tha t he did not 
think th is  oriticism  was as f in a l as many of h is in te rp re ters  
have concluded. The whole tone of such oritic ism  is  always 
ten ta tiv e , i f  not s l ig h t ly  hesitan t; and whan he comes to  
what he torms the "physico-theological" argument fo r the 
existence of God, ho i s  quite emphatic that i t  must be treated  
with rospect, and that such an argumant can have "the force 
of an ir r e s is t ib le  conv iction#"(2)
f a t ,  the main and important fa c t  i s  th a t, wlien Kant has said 
aû.1 ho has to  say ooncomlug the inadequacy of the meta­
physical argumenta for God, ho stands confronted with a 
d if f ic u lty , in  th is  very aotaphysical un iverse of disooursof 
which cannot be se t aside by cr itic ism  or exp ia iJ%d away cm 
account of some inherent contradiotion. I t  i s  a d iff icu lty
(1) K. r .  ▼. A.G13.(2) X. r .  T. A.623*
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which does, to  a degree, inqxinge upon Kant's^Woral" arguments 
fo r the ezistenoe of God, but Kant sees very clearly  tha t I t  
stands rooted in  the very centre of metaphysical thought about 
God.
"This highest formal unity , whidi re s ts  soXeiv on con­cepts of reason, is  the purposive unity  of things.The speculative in te re s t wT xeason makes i t  necessary to  regard a l l  order in  the world as i f  i t  had originated in  the purpose of a supreme reason# 3uch a principle opens out to  our reason, as applied in the fie ld  of ejqperienoe. altogether new views as to  how the things of the world may be connected according to  te leological laws, and so enables i t  to  arrive a t th e ir  greatest syster«ttie unity . The assumption of 2 supreme in te l l i ­gence, as the one and only cause of the universe, though in  the idea alone, can therefore always benefit reason and can never in jure i t ." (1 )
Kant goes on to  say th a t th is  "idea" of reason must be quali­
fied by the fact that i t  must be used as a "regulative" 
princip le, and not as "constitu tive". Later, he makes h is 
position upon th is  point s t i l l  more emphatic, when he saysi- 
"Bven in  th is  theo re tica l re la tio n  (purposive unity) i t  can 
be said that I  firm ly believe in  G o d . " (2) The point of 
th is  f i r s t  argument is  tha t Kant never rea lly  got away from 
some amount of "metaphysioal" ju s tif ica tio n  for his postula­
tion  of the Being of God.
Further, th is  rather re s tr ic ted  inference of God upon meta­
physical grounds would sa tis fy  the requirements of Bdwards, 
th a t i s ,  fo r the sake of th is  particu lar argument. He uses 
a sim ilar te leo logical argument, but does not put too great 
an emfdiasis upon i t s  value.^^^ However, he vould consider 
Kant's admission in  the above extraot as indicative of the 
"metaphysical" in a b ility  to  think away, in  any f in a l and 
sa tisfac to ry  manner tiie existence of God.
Gegandt when Kant comes to  h is exposition of the "Moral" argu­
ments for the wAstenoe of God, he begins by saying th a t, 
whenever he opens a book which purports to  "demonstrate away"
(1) K. r .  V. A.686#(2) K. r# T. A.826*(3; file Freedom of the Will# Fart 2# Sect#3#
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Freedom, Immortality and the existence of God, he knows 
before-hand tha t such an undertaking is  impossible, not be­
cause he is  in  possession of conclusive proofs of these 
existences, but because "as reason is  incompetent to  arrive 
at afiii'sa tive  assertions In tt^ds f ie ld , i t  is  equally un­
able, Indeed even less %ble, to  establish any negative con­
clusion in  regard to  these questions".(1) His key argument 
for the "coral" existence of Crod is ,  of course, the required 
linkage of Morality ann Hfcpplr.ess, arid i t  is  an argunmut 
which few hfntian in terp reters vould agree expressed the rea l 
genius of Kant. Yet, involved in  th is  key, “moral" argument 
fo r the existence of God, there i s  a lesser argument the im­
portance of Tdiich Is  often overlooked. Kant sta tes i t  in  
these wordsI-
"Hence also everyone regards the moral lags as eemmands; and th is  the moral laws could not be i f  they did not connect a p rio ri su itab le consequences with th e ir  ru les, and thus carry with them promlsfs and th rea ts . But th is  again they could not do, i r  they did not reside In a necessary being, as the supreme good, w hi^  alone oan make such a purposive unity  possible*
In suoii a statement, K&iit makes God not only the reocnoiler 
of Morality and Hsq>plnes3, but the supreme Moral Governor of 
the universe, and th is  is  no isolated example of Kant's view 
of God's s ta tu s . Again, Edwards would agree upon sudh #oral 
authority being predicated of God, and again, he would wonder 
how Kant could possibly escape the fu l l  signifioanoe of s u ^  
admissions »
Hhen Kant hdS postulated uod upon moral grounds, i t  miglit be 
thought that ne would allow the matter to re s t ju s t there , 
tha t i s ,  leaving in  vague outline the moral character of God. 
However, Kant is  not sa tis f ied , and presses forward to  des­
cribe the 'nature'* of th is  Moral Governor of the universe, 
and ne does so in  the following termsi-
(1) K. r .  V. A. 753*(2) K. r .  V. A. 810.
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"This Divine Being m ist be omnipotent, in  n rJer th e t  the whele of nature and i t s  re la tio n  to  morality in  the world xaay he sub ject to  h is  v slll; o im iscion t. tht^t He nay know oar innermost sentiments and th e ir  moral worth; omni­p resen t, th a t  He jüay be im e d la te ly  a t hand for tiie sat­isfying of every need which the highest good demands; a to rn a l, thc.t t ii is  Iiarci'^ay of na tu re  and freodom may never fa il" .\1 ^
The terms omnipotent, oaniscient, omnipresent end eternal are 
terms vbich mean "metaphysleal" a ttrib u tes in  Cod. I t  i s  
true tha t Kant hss postulated them in God upon purely moral 
grounds, but he has made thim “essentiel" in  God, because, as 
he says, su«* a ttrib u tes  are the product of his "moral" theol­
ogy which req ^ ro s  "a so le , all-perfeo t and ra tiona l p r i­
mordial being". In other words, without those "metaphysical" 
a ttrib u tes  in  Qod, Kant's whole e th ical system fa l ls  in to  
ruins, or, in  h is own words, "belief in  God and in another 
world is  so interwoven with my moral sentlnent tha t as there 
is  l i t t l e  danger of my losing the J^ tto r, there is  equally
l i t t l e  cause for fear th a t the former oan be taken away from me.'(2)
At th is  po in ta it i s  of inqzortanoe to  observe tha t there i s  
nothing "original" in  Kant postulating the existence and 
nature of Qod upon "moral" grounds* She "moral" argument for 
Qod is  very old, and was used by most cogqzetwt theologians 
of the Church. However, the "moral" argument was used by 
them as one among meaiy, and Kant's o rig in a lity  consists in  
h is putting aside a l l  other arguments, and putting the f u l l  
burden of "proof" on th is  so lita ry , "moral" argument. Further, 
he is  orig inal in  the im plicatiw s of th is  "moral" argument 
as w ill la te r  be seen. Edwards also makes use of th is  "moral" 
argument in  a most orig inal manner in  h is th es is , "God's 
<diief and in  Creation". He iso la tes what might be termed 
the "categorical iz^erative" by saying:
"That end %fhioh is  sought fo r the sake of i t s e l f ,  and not fo r the sake of a further end, is  an ultim ate mid; there the aim of the agent stops and r e s ts ."(3)
(1) K. r .  f .(2) 1 . r .  T.( 3) Qod s cai
A. §15.A. 829.Chief Bid in  Creation. In tro .
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He think» of God having th is  u ltim ate end when he created the
world, and thus In fers h is e sse n tia l "moral" character which
he describes in  these term s:-
"As he i s  every way the f ir s t  and supreme, and h is  ex­ce llen cy  i s  in  a l l  respects the stq^eae oeauty and g lory ,the or ig in a l good, and fountain of a l l  good « Andas he i s  Oed over a l l ,  to  lAcm a l l  are properly sub­ordinate, and on whom a l l  depend . . . . .  so he i s  f i t  th a t he should be regarded by a l l  v1)
In other words, God, for Edwards, i s  the supreme "moral" being 
in  the Q hiverse, and His "Sovereignty" i s  founded upon His 
essm itia l M orality. Ho tha t Edwards and Kant would agree 
tha t Hod i s  an " a ll-p e r fec t, ra tion al and primordial" Being, 
and th is  i s  very important.
EhiH^# now Kant stands confronted with a very rea l d if f ic u lty  
which*might be sta ted  in  these term s. H is "moral" theology
has led him to  postu la te a "moral" Being with e sse n tia l meta- I
Iphysical a ttr ib u tes , and th is  Being has taken on a l l  the 
ch araeter istios of the CM o f "traditional" or "speculative" | 
theo logy. Further, Kant i s  p erfec tly  aware th a t, by such am 
a ll-p e r fe o t , ra tion a l and primordial Being, he has created, 
upon "moral" grosmds, a p ossib le  "heteronocMus" centre o f op­
p osition  to  h is  Human Freedom. In other words, he i s  bask 
to  the problem which ho wished to  avoid, tha t i s ,  confronting 
Human Freedom w ith an "original" cause o f a l l  ex isten ce , and, 
what i s  more iiq>ortant, confronting Human Freedom with a "moral" 
Ruler and Imw-Giver whose w i l l  must be supreme. Kant knows 
tha t h is  e th io a l system oaanet work on the supposition tha t 
Qod i s  a "lim ited" Being, lik e  man, struggling for "moral" 
v a lu es. l e t ,  h is  e th io a l system seems doomed to  fa ilu re  i f  
Qod i s  conceived of in  t%rms of the God of orthodox theo logy, 
th a t i s ,  so le  Q iver o f the Moral law. Bo Kant resorts to  a 
rather stra ined device to  keep the lo g ic a l resu lts  o f h is  "moral" 
theology in  complete agreement with the lo g ic a l resu lts o f h is  
e th ica l system , and h is  argument i s  important : -
(1 ) God's Chief End in  Creation. Gh.1.
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"Bat when p rac tical reason has reached th is  goal, namely, the ecneept of a so le  prim ordial being as the si^reme good, i t  most not presume to  think that i t  has ra ised  i t s e l f  above a l l  em p irieal oonditions o f i t s  ap p lica tion , and has atta ined to  an immediate knowledge of mew ob- je e ts , and can therefere sta r t from th is  ecneept, and earn dedaoe from i t  the moral lavs th «aselves. For i t  i s  these very laws th a t have led u s, in  v#tm e of th e ir  inner p ra e tiea l n e c ess ity , to  the postu la te o f a s e l f -  H fTX ciont cause, er o f a w ise Baler e f  the world, in  order that th rou ^  such agenoy e ffe c t  may be given them.we may n o t, th erefere, in  reversal e f such proeedore, regard them as acc idental and as derived from the mwe w ill  o f the B aler, e sp e c ia lly  as we have no ccneeptiom  of such a w i l l , except as formed in  accordance w ith these  lawsTÎHlT
In other words, Kant i s  saying — I do b e liev e  in  Qod, in  
fa c t , I b e lieve in  an omnipotent, omnipresent, om niscient, 
and etern al Qod, and I b e lieve such a Oed to  be the moral Baler 
of the Universe who w ill  f in a lly  un ite Virtue and BaMplnsss, 
and u ^ o ld  a l l  the in p lio a tio n s of the Moral Law. However,
I  do not b e liev e  that my knowledge of such a Qod i s  grounded 
upon revela tion  or in tu itio n , but rather upon the n ecessity  
of my p rac tica l reason. X have "found" Oed by means e f the 
Moral Law w ithin m yself. I  cannot, th erefore, deny th is  
inner, human, personal "authorship" of the Moral law, fo r , 
w ithout th is  very "authorship" I would never have known tha t 
there was such a Being as Oed*
Is suoh an argument v a lid t Gan Bant have the argument both 
ways? That i s ,  oan he have a Oed to  servo, or "save" h is  
eth io a l sy stc# , and then get r id  of such a Qod when the im p li­
cations o f Ills "moral" ezLstenee become too oppressiveT 
There can be no doubt about the fa c t that both Bdwards and 
Bant believed in  the "moral" Sovereignty of Qod, but the  
isqzortant question i s  — whi(Ai d ealt with the concept in  the  
most lo g ic a l mamest Upon the answering of such a question  
depends idiether Bant's Defence of Freedom i s  tenable, or 
whether i t  must meet with "eooqzlete destruction^ from the  
th eo log ica l Determinism of Bdwards; and, o f course, no answer 
to  the above question i s  p ossib le  a t th is  stage of the d is ­
cussion of Qod and Freedom,
(1) B. r .  V. A. 818.
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Here, then, is  the haekgreund to* Kant's great d lffleo lty  In
Sonen FreeAem, and I t  might be f i t t in g  to  allow Pisehar to
put the ease in  far clearer and more ecsqzetect terms than
ià r  given above#-
"The deetrine of freedom and the absolute supremaov o f the moral order o f the world, or the deetr ine of the  primaoy of p raetiea l reason, r ests  w ith Kent an firm  ground* The moral proof fo r  the existem ee e f  Oed stands or f a l ls  w ith th is  d eetr in e. Begarding the jB m gretieai dem anstrab ility e f  Oed^s enistem oe, Kant held «Q BSrenv views a t d ifferen t stages of h is pnilosophioal inquiry*In h is  p re-O r itieal period he samght to  resta te  these  proofs and give them new eoganoyj in  the, "Pure Bengen he net on ly denied, but refut#AeneAifrafed their iapeesibilityt and in the
*5eSstcm , but, in  p erfect agreemea t w ith i t ,  dednees, using the well-hneem and evident arguments, from n eeess ity  o f the moral order e f  the world, Idie n eeessity  o f the moral ground e f  the world, er the esistam oe e f  God. deoerdihg ly, in  whst oaneexns the questima e f  theaafflaa^’^ ss.^ ars-ATg.';lo g le a lly  eem sistent advanee. But, however d iffe re n t ly  he Bugr have on th is  poin t, namely, the bus»'ablemess e f  Oed, ^ e r e  was not a moment in  the pm r ie  W  Uké fevelQ^Boat o f h is  phileeophioal oeev ietien s whenhe denied, er even dombted, the r e a lity  o f 0ed«"%1/
I t  is  with su(di a background that i t  becomes possible to
appraise Kant's d iff icu lty  idien he now says, "there s t i l l  re­
mains a d iff icu lty     which th rea tw s freedom with com­
plete destruction*" Barl i e r ,  in  the gritigua of P rae tieal
Reason, Eant has put th is  d iff icu lty  in  o12ier ta rn s t -  "To 
look, however, on a l l  rewards and punishments as merely the 
machinery In the hand of a higher power, idiich is  to  serve 
only to  se t rati<mal creatures striv ing  a fte r  th e ir  f in a l end, 
(Happiness), th is  is  to  reduce the w ill to  a mechanism des- 
tiu c tiv e  of f r e e d o m * "  ( 2 )
There was much in  "traditioeial" Theology which supported th is  
view of God and human Destiny, and Kant tre a ts  such a view 
with unconcealed oontenuzt. l e t ,  as already observed, h is  
own doctrine of Qod is  not completely free  from such inp liea- 
ticns* After a l l ,  there i s  in  Kant a very clear referenee 
to  Divine re trib u tio n . I t  i s  tru e , tha t th is  retributicm  i s
(1 ) KUno F isohe^  A Critique o f Kant, page b)*( i)  X* p* V* •
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"moral"; and does not operate in th is  world, that i s ,  in  any 
perfect manner; bnt^when i t  is  laid down tha t God fin a lly  
"rewards" f lr tn e  with Happiness, even by some "moral" process, 
i t  is  hard to  see how such a doctrine can f a l l  to  inflneaaoo 
those Wio would be "moral", Farther, i t  i s  almost impossible 
to  think of God "rewarding" any one without thinking of Him 
as punishing those who have not qualified fo r such a "reward"; 
even though such punishment be "negative" in  character.
However, the main purpose a t th is  stage of the discussion i s
to  attempt to  understand how Kant sets about solving th is
d ifficu lty  wdilch nov confronts and threatens Human Freedom.
AS already observed, Kant is  not very fortunate in  the s ta te ­
ment of his d if f ic u lty . He attempts to  say tha t God "th rea t­
ens" Human Freedom because He must he conceived as "the cause 
of the existence of substanoe". This is  tru e , but behind 
th is  Divine Causality, Kant is  rea lly  worried about a kind of 
"moral" despotism in  God which is  a far more serious typ# ef
Divine Oausality, However, Kant deals with th is  " f irs t"
cause d iffic u lty  by saying, (a ) I t  %rauld reduce man to  mere 
automatcm. (b) Self-coneclousness would not save him frem 
sucdi a fa te , i t  mifiit make him a "thihki.ng" aatomatom, but 
the essen tia l fac t of "spontaneity" would be absent, and 
ielf-cornscicusness is  a poor substitu te  fo r Freedom, (a) Only 
comparative Freedom vould be possible, for the f i r s t  and f in a l  
cause would be in  another sphere, (d) Only these who regard 
thlngs-in-themselves as iden tica l with phenomena could f a l l  
in to  su(A an erro r, and i f  th is  dlvlsbn between th lngs-ln- 
thenselves and phenaaena is  not kept fatalism  is  inevitable#
(e) This absence of division or d istinction  of nOumenal and 
phenomenal obscures the essen tial Causality of Qod. Qod ean- 
not be the "Creator" of phenomena, ra ther, He must be oonoeived 
as the Creator of things-in-themselves • I f  th is  solution i s  
rejected, than, the idea of God in  re la tion  to  a ffa irs
must be handed over to  Spinosism, id ii^ , in  Ka&t^a view, is  
fa r  mere reasonable in  deduction than "traditional#  Theology#
•  3 l5  •
thus Kant attempts to  so lve th is  supreme d iff ic u lty , but h is  
so lu tion  i s  hurried and imoonvinoing beoause he has declined  
to  faoe the rea l oore of the problem. Bant oould have ig ­
nored th is  particu lar phase o f the problem of Qod and Bonn  
Freedom by the argument used by Bum th a t, d isoussion o f  
Divine C ausality, in  th is  restr ic ted  m aning o f C ausality, 
i s  quite beyond the oapaeity o f the human mind to  sp ecu la te, 
and, therefore, un-produotive of any rea l eontribution to  
knowledge. The C ausality o f Qod in  regard to  substance i s  
not the rea l problem o f Bant, nor i s  i t  th e rea l d iff ic u lty  
which threatens Human Freedom, and no one knows th is  b etter  
than Kant. He has tr ied  to  avoid the rea l issu e , and there­
fe r e , h is  subsequent d iscu ssion  o f Freedom i s  haunted with  
the "real" d iff ic u lty ;  and the fo llow ing d iscu ssion  must 
attempt to  fo llow  Kant as he moves and weaves among h is  eva­
s io n s. file  question i s ,  does Kant precede to  invo lve him­
s e l f  in  h ^ l e s s  contradiotion beoause of sudh evasicnsT  
Feshaps the foUewing observations can provide an answer to  
such a quastiont-
(1 ) Later, Kant comes face to  face w ith th is  problem aga in, 
that i s ,  the problem e f  God's "moral" rela tion sh ip  to  mam, 
and he sa y s i-
"fhe In fin ite  Being, te  whom the condition of tim e i s  nothing, sees in  # i s  to  us end less succession  a whole of acccrdanee w ith the moral law; and the h e ll mess which H is command inexorably req u ires, in  order to  be true to  His ju s tie e  in  the share whien He amsims# to  each in  the ap p ana bom»  i s  to  be found in  a s in g le  in te lle e tu a l iu u w tion  of the whole ex isten ee e f  ra tion al be ings*"(l/
Here, Qod i s  seen , not on ly as the linkage between F lrtae  
and Happiness, but as the Ihipreme Custodian o f the Moral Lav 
whose Moral Law inexorably commands h o lin ess , and i t  i s  d i f f i ­
cu lt to  see how Kant can reooucile such a view  of Oed w ith  
the previous statem ent that Moral Laws cannot be eeneeived 
as derived from the mere w ill  of the Bu ler. Xbt, even i f
(1 ) K. p . f .  263.
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th is  oan be explained in  a sa tisfa o to ry  manner, i t  i s  s t i l l
more d if f ic u lt  to  see what Kant means when he says:-
"Moreover, i t  i s  not meant by th is  tha t i t  i s  necessary  to  suppose the existen ce of God as a b as is e f a l l  human ob liga tion  in  general, (fo r  th is  r e s ts , as has been . .su ff ic ie n t ly  proved, simply on the autonomy of the w i l l) " '' /
How does th is  agree w ith "without a God, e t c . ,  the g lorious 
ideas o f m orality are indeed objects o f approval . . . . . .  but
not springs o f purpose and action"?^^^ Kant i s  try ing to  
say something of rea l value, but h is method of expression  
leaves much to  be d esired .
(2 ) As already sta ted , Kent i s  haunted by th is  d iff ic u lty  
which has i t s  roots in  "theological" Determinism and whidi 
confronts h is  b e lie f  in  Roman Freedom. He has evaded the 
rea l issu e  in  the previous d iscu ssion , but he cannot evade 
i t s  in fluence upon h is mind. He tr ie s  to  argue tha t i t  i s  
possib le to  postu la te God upon s tr ic t ly  "moral" grounds, and 
thus escape the d if f ic u lty  o f conceiving Qod as the Qiver of 
the Moral Law, that i s ,  in  the manner in  which i t  i s  held by 
"traditional" Theology. How, he tr ie s  to  find  support for  
th is  doctrine by a reference to  the C hristian F a ith :-
"M evertheless, the C hristian pr incip le of m orality i t s e l f  i s  not th eo leg io a l (so  as to  be heteronomy), but i s  autonomy of pure p ra c tica l reason, sin ce i t  does notmake the knowledge of God and His w ill  the foundation of these law s, but on ly o f the attainment o f the sumsum bonum. on condition of fo llow ing these law s, and i t  does not even p lace the proper spring of th is  obedience in  the desired r e su lts , but so le ly  in  the conception o f duty, as tha t of w h i^  the fa ith fu l efeeervanoe alone con stitu tes the worthiness to  obtain those happy con­sequences." (3 )
At la s t , Kant i s  coming w ithin sigh t o f sta tin g  the rea l 
d iff ic u lty  in  God which confronts Human Freedom. Here, in  
very ambiguous term s, l ie s  the oore of the threatened des­
tru ction  of a l l  Freedom, tmt again, Kant has sta ted  i t  in  most 
unfortunate language. I f  he had l e f t  the statement at the  
end of the f ir s t  c lau se, i t  would have been vague, but i t  would
(1) K. p. T. 267.(2) K. r .  T. A. 813.(3) K. p. V. 271.
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have been safe . However, whan he goes on to  say th a t the 
Christian Faith "does not make the knowledge of Qod and His 
w ill the foundation of these lavs", he is  not only mistaken, 
but he is  perverse. There is  not a compétent axpcnent cf 
the Christian Faith who oould agroe with such a statement.
In fa c t, i t  contradicts a l l  tha t is  central and crucial to  
the Christian F aith . Surely, the Founder of the Christian 
Faith is  sta ting  the heart of tha t Faith when He says, " th is  
is  eternal l i f e ,  th a t they might know thee the only true God, 
and Jesus C hrist, idiom thou hast sen t."^^2 The "knowledge" 
of Ood is  essen tia l to  Christian Morality, and a l l  tha t Kant 
might argue in  opposition is  pure prejudice. l e t ,  in  the 
same section, Kant makes reference to  the distincticm  between 
"Oeamands" and "Sanctions", and such a d istinc tion  may be of 
assistance in  seeing the point of view fo r idiich he is  so 
persis ten tly  contending. However, consideration of th is  
must come la te r .
(3) How, Eant seems to  say something which brings him in to  
complete agreement with the Determinism of Bdwards. As a l­
ready observed, Bdwards grounded his theological Determinism 
upon the Sovereignty of God, and he works out the implications 
of such Sovereignty in  a most impressive manner. Further, 
he supported th is  theological Determinism by writing a separate 
th esis , "God's Chief End in  Creation" in  which he teaches th a t 
Ood can have but one, f in a l, ultim ate and in  suoh a creaticn , 
and, tha t i s ,  in  the words of Bdwardst-
"Thus, i t  appears reasonable to suppose, tha t i t  was God's la s t  end, th a t i t  might be a glorious and abundant eman­ation of h is in f in ite  fulness of good  tha t a d is­position in  God, as an orig inal property of h is  nature, to  an emanation of h is own in fin ite  fulness, was what excited him to  create the world, and so, that the comnation i t s e l f  was aimed a t by him as a la s t  end in  creaticm ."'2 ]
( 1 ) The Gospel of S t. John, ^ .1 7 , v.3«
(2) God's Chief End in  Creation. Ch.1. Sect.2.
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Such an extract reveals how deeply the roots of Divine 
Sovereignty in  Edwards rea lly  went. Kant, in  an ea rlie r  ob­
servation, see the logical implications of suoh a b e lie f , and 
dismisses i t  under the term of Spinoslsm. However, when 
Kant is  asking a sim ilar question to  Edwards — "ISiea we ask 
what is  God's ultim ate end in  creating the worldt", he can 
hardly avoid the ccnclusicn of Edwards, and w ritesi-
"Therefore those idio placed the end of creation in  the glory of Oed (provided th a t th is  is  not oonoeived anthro- pouorphioally as a desire to  be praised) have perhaps h it  upon the best expression. For nothing g lo rifies  God more than tha t which i s  the most estimable thing in  the world, respect fo r His command, the observance of the holy duty tha t His law imposes on us, when there i s  added thereto  His glorious plan fo r crowning avuh a , beautiful order of things with corresponding happiness." '^ '
Has Kant f in a lly  given up the struggle fo r Human Freedcn?
From such an extract Edwards would conclude th a t the b a ttle  
is  over, a b a ttle  which Kant has waged with rather pathetic 
evasions and endless ccntradictions • At la s t ,  Kant appears 
to  have succumbed to  the inev itab le , and Oed has become a l l  
in  a l l .  At the beginning of th is  analysis of Qod and Freedom, 
Kant seemed to  have created Ood for the purpose of the "har­
mony" and "glory" of man. Qod was something like  an append­
age to  a moral system which found i t s  rea l centre in  man.
How, i t  appears tha t Kant has gone over to  the other extreme, 
and man becomes lo s t in  the Qlory of Qod, and a l l  h is  moral 
striv ings were but ripples on the waters of an in f in ite  con­
sciousness, and had no re a l purpose but to  be lo s t in  the 
depths of Qod*8 own ir re s is t ib le  and f in a l purpose. His own 
Qlory.
I f  the evidence considered is  accepted as an accurate des­
crip tion  of Kant's conception of Qod and Freedom, then, the 
discussion ought to  end a t th is  point, and a l l  tha t would re­
main would consist of a careful tying up of the arguments a l­
ready put fo rth . I f  the discussion did cod a t  th is  point,
(1) K. p. T. 273.
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there can be l i t t l e  doubt about the conclusion being tha t 
Kant has fa iled  to  asQzound a reasonable Defence of Freedom 
against an aggressive Detonoinism, and i t  has fa iled  beoause 
Kant was unable to  reconcile th is  v i ta l  issue of God and 
Hunan Freedom. The God who, in  Kant's teaching, began as 
an appendage to  Morality has grown out of a l l  proportion te  
the status of such a ro le , and He has beeoae the b e-a ll and 
nad-all of a l l  existenee. The above reference in  Kant to 
the "metaphysical" a ttrib u tes  of Deity, and the coi^rehensive 
grandeur of the "Qlory" of Qod, these things are not acci­
dental to  Kant's teaching, fo r he observes th is  a ttitu d e  righ t 
to  the end of h is  discussion of "Beligion".
"Cogitated ccnfonaably to  th is  s###tical neeessity ef cur reason# the True Catholic Religions Relief must 1 eanlained^e be the b e lie f in  Oed# f i r s t ,  as the Qmni-e n, be xBlai Qo O i­potent orcator of heaven and eartn , i*e# morally as a Holy Lamgiver; Aeooodly, as the Preserver ef the human race, i . e .  th e ir  bawl giant Qovennor and Moral Onardisn; Thirdly, as the JAnMuistrator of h is  con Holy Lams, i . e .  as the R i^teons Judge « ^1 /
This i s  the Qod of "orthodo]f Theology, and the Oed of "theo-
logieal" Determinism, and i t  i s  useless fo r Kant te  say th a t a l l
th is  "Rorereignty mast be conceived 'm orally '", fc r there
never was a teacher of the Church who did hot make the "Moral"
Rature of Qod fundamenta l  to  a l l  His a c tiv i tie s , from such
a persis ten t deseripticn of Oed, Edwards would rig h tly  ecn-
clude tha t he and Kant had nothing to  d if fe r  about ccneemlng
the "moral" and "metaphysical" a ttrlb n tes  ef Oed, and he would
in te rp re t Kant as supporting the logical conelusicn of sneh
teaching by agreeing:-
" I t  i s  represented often in  Eoripture# th a t Oed, mho made' sonptar o  the world fo r himself, and created i t  for h is pleasure, would in fa ll ib ly  obtain h is  end in  the creation, and in
(1) Religion, page iQd (Sample's translation}
(2) The Freedom of the W ill. F t .2 . 8eot.11.
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This/the bed-rock of the Determinism of Edwards, and, from A 'the evid^oe so fa r available, there is  nothing that Kant Is  
able to say to  evade suoh a oonoXuslon* f e t ,  in  sp ite  of 
a l l  the facts available, I t  is  f e l t  that Kant is  able to  say 
something which escapes th is  eocqzlete destruction of 
Freedom.
F ir s t , the discussion must look again a t Kant's central prin- 
aiple of Morality and Freedom, that i s ,  the principle of 
Autsnoisy. For, Whatever Kant says about "moral" and "meta­
physical" a ttrib u tes  in  God, he never withdraws or modifies 
th is  fundamental concept of h is teaching. Is  i t  possible 
th a t Kant, in  th is  autonomous princip le, i s  saying smwthing 
which, in  sp ite  of a l l  i t s  apparent tw istings and evasions, 
stands upon solid  and unmcveable ground? The foUewlag ex­
tra c t i s ,  perhaps, one of Kant's best descriptions ef idiat he 
means by Autonomy :-
"Leoking back now on a l l  previous atteaqzts to  discover the principle ef morality, we need not vender wl^ they aim fa ile d . I t  was seen tha t man was bound to  w e laws of duty, bgt i t  was not observed tha t the laws to  which
As already observed, such a statement must be put against the 
background of a t least two other aspects of Kant's teaching, 
(a) Red is  eeneeived as the supreme Lawgiver, (b) Oed is  
conceived as the ultim ate Judge, that i s ,  of the correct re­
la tion  of Virtue to  Happiness. Yet, when th is  background 
is  fu lly  appreciated, Kant i s  s t i l l  found in sis tin g  th a t these 
facts do not cancel out the supreme fac t th a t men gives hi»- 
se lf  the !&>ral Law to  which he i s  subject. I t  seems tha t 
what Kant is  trying to  say is  — "I know Qod is  the ultim ate 
foundatlcn of a l l  Moral Laws. Yet, there is  a rea l sense in  
which I  an the author of such Moral Z^ ws for myself. Oed 
oan leg is la te , but I only can ' execute ' such Moral Laws.
U ntil they find actual and rea l ' awareness' in  me, these Moral 
Laws are mere abstractions ; and, What is  more, i t  i s  only as
(1 )  Qd. 61.
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I  accept these  Moral Lavs as r e a l  fo r  o y se lf  th a t  they poasest 
r e a l  "moral" va lue . T herefore, la  tho w idest and deepest 
aeaoiag of the te rn , I  an the "author" of these Moral Laws.
Of course, th e re  i s  a sense in  which such Moral Lavs are 
"given" by God. In f a c t ,  I  f in d  then inheren t in  the very 
r a t io n a l  and moral c o n s titu tio n  of ry  being, as & man. In 
tha t sense, I  do n o t give myself the Moral Law, in  f a c t ,  the 
Moral Lav i s  given to  me. Yet, on the o ther hand — explain 
i t  as you w il l  — 1 take an “in te re s t"  in  tho Moral Law.
1 reoo0 cifid i t s  "Primacy". X know and aooept th a t i t  re a lly  
“belongs" to  me. This surely i s  some kind of "anthership" 
of the Moral Law. S t i l l  fu rther, ^ e n  I  "decide" to  f u l f i l  
th is  Moral Law, i t  is  "I" who make tha t decision. Z thereby 
make i t  my own. Sorely th is  i s  a very rea l "authorship" ef 
the Moral Law?"
In very general terms, th is  paraphrase seems to  contain the 
important features ef Kant's principle of Autonomy as regards 
the Moral Law. Is  i t  a reasonable argument, and dees i t  
contribute any durable element to  Human Proedon? Before 
answering such a question, i t  i s  necessary to  investigate 
whether Edwards has anything to  say about th is  question of 
"authorship". As usual, Edvards has not missed th is  possible 
argument for Freedom, and he tre a ts  i t  .in tills  way. Kis 
opponant has argued that Praise and Blame can be attribu ted  
only on the ground that the person involved as "the cause or 
the author of the deed". Edwards rep lies that "being a cause 
or author of a deed" are ambiguous terms. Mhat dees h is  
opponent mean? Does he mean that a man is  the oaose ccr authcor 
of h is deed, in  th is  case, "an act of w ill" , by being the 
voluntary, designing cause of tha t act of w ill, or, th a t the 
man is  the author of h is  act of w ill by being the cause by an 
antecedent cheioe? I f  h is  appoaeat means by th is  "authorship" 
then, says Bdwards, i t  has been proved beyond any shadow of 
doubt that man can never possess su<di power. How, says 
Bdwards, i f  being the "author" means "being the immediate
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agent, or th@ being tha t acted, or in  the exeroise of th a t act; 
i f  the phrase of being the author. Is  used to  signify th is ,  
than, doubtless ooouaon sanse requires men being the authors 
of th e ir  own acts of iriU , in  order to  th e ir  being esteemed 
worthy of praise or blanie, on eccount of them#“(D  
Further, ü^dvards i s  quite w illing to  grant, without any quali- 
fioation , that men are the “authors" of th e ir  "external" 
actions. Yet, he w ill have no ccnçroiüiSG with th is  central 
fac t, men are not the authors of th e ir  "antecedent" acts of 
tho Will. On the other hand, Kant, in spite of a l l  h is un­
fortunate terminology, means by "authorship" th is  very "ante­
cedent" act of the W ill.
"Thus tiia w ill i s  not subject simply to  the Law, but so subject tha t i t  must be regarded as i t s e l f  siwins t ^Law, and on th is  ground only, subject to  thë_ÿw (or wmich i t  can regard i t s e l f  as the au thor).* '^ /
Here, Freedom and Determinism stand facing each other in  i r r e ­
concilable combat.
Seccndt th is  irreconcilable ocnfllot between Kant and Deter­
minism Is I llu s tra ted  further by Kent l i f t in g  the "autcnamous" 
principle to  a s t i l l  hlgjiar level; and indicating the re a l 
centre of the d iff icu lty  which threatened his Defence cf Free­
dom with ocmplate destruction. I t  i s  a common feature of 
Kant's doctrine of Autonomy, tha t the Will, to  be a tru ly  
"moral" Will, cannot be determined by subjective Impulses.
In fac t, there are ample grounds for concluding th a t Kant 
thought such Determination not only wrong morally, but 
ra tio n a lly  impossible. However, the main point i s  th a t , i f  
the Will is  determined by the Impulses, then, a s ta te  of 
Heteronomy re su lts . Now, Kant widens th is  doctrine to  in - 
clndo everything tha t Is "external" to  the rea l "moral" fps 
"rational" S elf. That i s ,  Autonomy Is Self-determination, 
and Determination by anything else is  Heteronomy. Kant fee ls 
tha t th is  is  a rea l discovery in  Bthics.
(1) the Freedom of the W ill. Ft.b>« Seot.1.
(2) Qd. 60.
1
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" I t  explains a t cnee the occasion of a l l  the mistakes of fhllosophers with respeot to  the supreme principle of m orals. For they  sought fo r  an ob ject of tho w ill which they could make the matter and principle of a lav (which ocnsoqucntly could not dctormine tho w i l l  d ir e c tly  but by means of th a t object referred to  the feeling cf plea­sure or pain ) : whereas thoy ought f i r s t  to  have searchedfor a law th a t would determine the w ill a p rio ri and d ir e c t ly ,  and aftorw crds dotornino the ob ject in  accor­dance with the w ill . Row, whether they place th is  object of p leasu re , which was to  supply tho supreme conception of goodness, in  happiness, in  perfection, in  moral ( f e e l in g ; ,  or in  the w ill  of,God, th e i r  p r in c ip le  in  every ease ioqzlied h e te rcn cm y ^  /
I t  Is tAe la t te r  part of the quotation which Is  Important fo r 
the present discussion* For here, Kant sta tes  the rea l 
danger v h i^  ^ireatens Freedom and Morality* I t  i s  Heter- 
onomy, and such a Heteronomy oan centre in  Qod. fixerefore, 
fo r Kant, in  a very rea l sense, Qod can be a danger to  Freedom 
like  the subjective Inclinations. As already stated , Kant 
never modifies the f in a li ty  of th is  "antenoscais" princip le, 
and he never withdraws h is endless opposition to  Heteronomy 
regardless of i t s  p articu lar (diaracter. He has already hinted 
a t the destruction of Morality because i t  i s  conceived as a 
system of rewards and penalties in  the hand of a "higher 
power". Later, he offers an explanation of why Qod can be a 
source and centre of Heteronomy. I t  is  th a t even i f  mankind 
were possessed of "perfect" Reason or Insight Into the nature 
of things, there would always be the danger of the subjective 
Inclination seeking Happiness, and using Reason to  secure 
such an end. Sven i f  mankind had th is  "perfect" Reason, 
Happiness vould s t i l l  bo the "perfect" end th a t man would seek, 
and, fu rther, th is  "perfect" insigh t, of I t s e l f  would not imply 
the "categorical" Imperative, fo r the Happiness principle 
would be in  complete control.
"But instead of tlie conflict that the moral disposition has now to  carry on with the inc lina tions, in  which, though a f te r  some defects, moral strength of mind may be gradually acquired. Q ckI  and e te r ^ ^  with th e ir  awful majesty would stand tmoeaslngiy before our eyes.nTfc#U^at be can prove perfectly  is  to  us as certalZ as th a t of whidb we are assured by the s l ^ t  of our eyes).
( 1 ) K. p. T. 1#».
0 3  k . f , .  V x ‘jif
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** Transgression of the law would, no doubt, bo aroidod; what i s  ooBBsandod would bo donof but tho mental d is-  position, from idiioh actions ought to  proeede, cannot be infused by any ooonand, and in  th is  case the spur of action i s  over active and ex ternal, so tha t reasons has no need to  exert i t s e l f  In oi^er to  gather strengWi to  re s is t  inclinations by a liv e ly  representatiom of the dignity of the law; hence most of the actions th a t conformed to the law would be done from fear, a few only from hope, and none a t a l l  from duty, and the moral worth of actions, on which alone in  the eyes cf supreme wisdom the worth of tb# person and even that of the world depends, would cease to e x is t .’* ' ' /
Here, Eant i s  expressing in  mere fortunate terms why Qod can 
be a danger to Human Freedom. E arlie r, he has said the 
Moral Law oommands tha t the highest good be made the ultim ate 
object of conduct, but th a t th is  Cannot be possible, in  any 
f in a l sense, "otherwise than by the harmony of my w ill with 
th a t of a holy and good author of the world."(2) Ruoh a 
statement, le f t  to  i t s e l f ,  and without careful a tten tion  to  
what Eant has in  mind, could be used to  suggest that h is 
point of view on Qod and Morality was the same as that of 
Bdwards, but Kant means by such a statement something quite 
d iffe ren t from anything said by Bdwards. What Kant i s  saying 
i s ,  "X sha ll never be fu lly  good or happy u n ti l  my w ill i s  
in  harmony with Qed's w ill, but I have to  work out th is  har­
mony by the process of moral co n flic t. X have to  accept 
the Moral Law as an essen tia l part of my own "moral" and 
"rational" Mature. X cannot accept i t  merely because i t  i s  
a cwsssnd of Qod. I  must work out my own salvation with 
"fear and trembling", but such "fear and trembling" must be 
my own, inner reaction to  the Moral Lav which I  have given to  
myself. I f  my "fear and trembling" come from anything out­
side my "authorship" of the Moral Law, even i f  thbse things 
come from Qod, my actions, done on account of such "fear and 
trembling", cease to  be "moral". When I have fought th is  
t i ta n ic  b a ttle  within myself; whmi I  have declined to  be 
" fri^ ten ed "  in to  Qoodneas; whan I  have f in a lly  accepted the 
Moral Law as my law, then, X know I sha ll be in  harmony with 
Qod *8 w ill."
1
(1 ) X. p. T. 29>f.(2 ) X. p . T. 272.
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Third» Kant in s is t s  upon, and p ers ists  in , these im p lications 
of "Autonomy", and h is arguments overflow in to  h is work, 
"Religion within the L ia its of Mere Reason" • E arlier, i t  
was observed tîiat Kant drew a d istin ctio n  between “Commands" 
and "Sanctions". The d is tin ctio n  Is f in e , even to  ha ir­
s p l it t in g , but i t  Is a d istin ctio n  wiiich Is all-im portant to  
Kant's d iscussion of Qod and Freedom. He i s  w illin g  to  
recogn ise a l l  duties os "Divine Coomamds", but he w i l l  not 
allow that they s lia ll be "Sanctions" ; and by th is  term he 
means, "arbitrary ordinances of a foreign w i l l  and contingent 
in  themselves".(1) To appreciate wiiat Kant i s  try ing to  
say invo lves oareful appreciation of a l l  that he means by 
"Autonomy". An attempt has been made to  sta te  suoh Autonomy 
in  as many aspects as p oss ib le , but there i s  s t i l l  another 
statement by Kant which oontributes to  i t s  understanding.
"A Law (a  moral and prac tica l lav) i s  a proposition which eontains a eategorioal lim erative (a eoneaad). He who
1
g yes commands by a law (Impersns) i s  the lawgiver (leg ls -  to r ) .  He i s  the author lauotor) of the obligatiem isqzesed by the law, but not always the author of the lew.
proceeding from the w ill of a Supreme Lawgiver, th a t i s  of one who has only righ ts  and no duties (namely, fromthe Divine w ill) . But th is  only involves the idea of a moral being whose w ill i s  14w fo r a)JL, without hisbeing conceived as the author of i t . " (2)
Kant speaks of the Moral Lav being "graven" upon the heart, 
and although he spoaks of man being oojiqiellad to  "regard 
another thsn himself as tne judge of h is  ac tion s, i f  he i s  to  
avoid contradiction;"Ô ) he a lso  id e n t if ie s  th is  "judge" with 
the saae s e l f  as g ives the Lav.^^) Later, he defines Oon- 
science as "our self-judging moral understanding"( ^ . i l l
these features Indicate how profoundly Kant viewed "Autonomy"!
th ereb u t /is  s t i l l  aiiotlier extract which a ss is ts  c la r ity  upon th is  
question.
"And although sta tutable divine laws be admitted (which oan be recognised as obligatory, not of themselves, but only by dint of a revelation of the divine w ill) sw ill the pure moral leg is la tio n , whereby Oed's w ill i s
1) K. p. T. 271.;2) M« d. g . In tro . 293) Preface to  Metaphysical Klements of Hthios, 29^ < e j Ke^gion, page 2 ^ .  (geople's transla tion ).5) R eligion, page 291.
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e r i g i n a l l y  engraven  on onr U a a rt. i s  n o t  on ly  th e  i n ­d e fe a s ib le  condition preoSdent o f a l l  genuine relig ion  w h atso ev er, but i s  j u s t  t h a t  w herein  t h i s  l a s t  p ro p e r ly  ecnsiets, and toward which the sta tu tab le  ean only work . .as  c o n ta in in g  a  mean o f i t s  p ro p a g a tio n  and advancement" '  1 /
This d istinc tion  between "statutable" and "moral" Lava must 
not be ignored, and i t  i s  obvious that Kant places th is  Moral 
"autonomous" Law upon a much higher level than the mere 
"statutable" Law, idiich might be termed a "divine sanction".
Kant presses on with the implications of th is  principle of 
Autonomy by a tta in tin g  to  re s ta te  one of the cardinal features 
of "theological" Determinism, namely, th a t of the doctrine of 
Blection. He admits th a t there is  a sense in  which we are 
"elected" beoause we are created by Qod — "but reason cannot 
by any means cosqprehend how any being should be so created as 
to  be endowed with the free use of h is powers". In other 
words, he admits creation by God, but he s t i l l  clings to  Free­
dom even though these two terms cqppeer to be beyond compre­
hension. Later, he is  more emphatic and saysi-
"Wa are consequently to  be regarded as Free Agents already extant, called* not bv any natural dependency arising out of our creation, but iUkI2LMt by a purely moral co-action, agreeable t o  Laws of Freedom............Our vocationis  consequently, quite c lear| but, speculatively,the p o ssib ility  o f such a  ca ll i s  an impenetrable m yste^."
Here, there is  a concealed challenge to  "theological" Deter­
minism, especially tha t of Rdwards. Kant i s  saying, "You 
agree tha t the metaphysical a ttrib u tes  of Ood are subordinated 
to  h is "moral" nature. Further, you in s is t  upon your cardinal 
dogma of election as a primary support of your Determinism; 
yet, I  in s is t  upon taking Ood's Morality seriously, and oan 
in te rp re t "Election" only upon"MoraT terms, I ts  speculative 
in te rp re ta tio n  is  beyond comprehension, but i t s  "moral" 
in terp reta tion  is  capable of reasonable explanation."
F inally , Kant sends fo rth  a ringing trunqzet b last of defiance 
to  a l l  forms of Heteronomy^ and which proclaims in  clear tones 
h is claim to Autonomy. At le a s t, here, he had no doubts about 
h is Defenoe of Freedom.
j  Religion, p . 1)2.R elig ion,p .190, (Bemple's translation)
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"The id e a  v i r t u e ,  on Uie c o n t r t r y ,  i s  e_&cu3.pte< ,^ in  most prom inent r e l i e f ,  on every  human s o u l .  Saoh man b ears  I t  f u l l y  about v i th j j i ,  îiovever i t  may f o r  a ifb l le  be p a rtia lly  submerged; nor does i t  need like  the re­ligious id e a ,  to  bo a r r iv e d  a t  th ro iigh  any ch a in  of ra tioc ination . In  the august magnificwiee of i t s  purity , a ro u s in g  co n sc io u sn ess  fo r th w ith  to  th e  d isc o v e ry  of an otherwise quite unsuspected energy, eiq^eirerlng man to  sm ite  down overth row  th e  g r e a te s t  p o s s ib le  obstacles within; in  the dignity  of his nature which mankind has to  uphold  in v io la te  ; in  o rd e r to  re a c h  that moral des­tina tion  a f te r  which he s triv es; in  th is  recognition of h is  e x c e lle n c y  «uid puz-lty , th e re  d o e s , I  say . l ie  seme- thing as soul-exalting, yea, heavenwards wafting, placing mankind as i t  im re in  th e  p resen ce  o f th e  D g ity , wno merely by h is holiness and leg isla tiv e  guardianship of virtue is  an object o f a d o ra tio n , t h a t  ev e ry  man, even though as yet fa r removed from giving th is  idea any m otive-pu ro iiase  on h i s  maxims, g la d ly  onto  t a in s  i t  in  h is thoughts, as i t  then fu lly  reveals to  him, and stamps on lilm , th e  f e e l in g  of th e  o r ig in a l  n o b i l i t y  and s ta te  o f  his rank.
"How d ifferen t are the inward phennmsna whtts th is erdar is  inverted, the Idea of à supreme governor, imposing upon us duties by h is law, . . . . . . . .  godliness i s  exm-posed to  the r isk  of slid ing  in to  an abject, s e rv i le ,.and adulatory submission to  the w ill of a despot•*
What is  Kant saying in  th is  f in a l b last of defiance a t the 
theological implications of Determinism, and in  th is  f in a l 
stand for Human Freedom? From a l l  which has gone before, he 
seems to  be saying, "1 have proved, as carefully  and con­
scientiously as X know how, tiiat tlie God of 'theo log ical' 
Determinism stands rooted in  metaphysical arguments which 
are quite incapable of ra tiona l demonstratica. I  admit tha t 
my 'moral' proof is  not perfect or complete, fo r reason, i t ­
s e lf , seems to demand scam ground of purpose and unity in  
existenoe. However, I  am convinced tha t no rea l advance oan 
ever be made along the road of a mere "rational" proof or in ­
vestigation of God, and I  give up the attempt, and I  defy 
any one else to  vindicate suoh an attempt. However, I  cannot 
re s t content with 'negative ' criticism , for i t  ends in  
'scep tic ism '. I moMt try  and make sense of the facts of my 
•ra tiona l' and 'moral' Consciousness. For here, 1 find a 
law which is  quite d iffe ren t from the law which I  observe in 
the world. I t  i s  a lav which speaks unfEntering and uncom­
promisingly of what 'CXJ(SiS* to  happen, even though i t  has
(1) Religion, page 2^6, (Seoqple's translation)
1
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n e v e r happened, and m ight n o t  oven happen . T h is  Ought i s  
d i f f e r o n t  from  a l l  im p e ra tiv e s , in  t h a t  i t  i s  a  'C a te g o r ic a l*  
Im p e ra tiv e , and a s ,  i n  a  v e ry  r e a l  s e n se , I  am beh ind  t h i s  
'C a te g o r ic a l*  Im p e ra tiv e , I  f e e l  j u s t i f i e d  in  say in g  t h a t  I  
am i t s  'a u th o r* ,  end to  a  c e r t a in  d e g re e , 'ju d g e ' o f i t s  
f u l f l lm o n t .  A l l  t h i s  c o n s t i tu to s  a  Law which i s  i n  c o n f l l s t  
w ith  th e  Law o f ' t h i n g s ' ,  and i n  c o n f l i c t  w ith  th e  Lav which 
works i n  my n a tu re  as  a  mere an im a l. T h e re fo re , I  am a t  
war w ith in  m yself b u t I  know which i s  th e  ' t r u e '  S e l f ,  f o r  I  
would n o t have known a  c o n f l i c t  b u t f o r  th e  Law g iven  i n  my 
' t r u e '  S e l f .  Of c o u rse , i n  a  s e n se , God gave me t h i s  Lev 
as  an endowment o f  my manhood, b u t i t  I s  a y  Lav because I  have 
acknowledged i t s  'p r i o r i t y '  f o r  m y se lf . However, i f  God 
gave me th e  Lav, He, to o ,  must be 'm o r a l ',  b u t n o t qpiite i n  
th a  sen se  i n  w hich I  am 'm o r a l ',  f o r  He does n o t r e q u i r e  t o  
p a ss  th ro u g h  t h i s  'm o ra l ' c o n f l i c t .  f i i i s  'm o ra l ' c o n f l i c t  
i s  th e  s e a l  o f my M o ra lity  and Freedom . I  b e l ie v e  i n  Oed, 
b u t n o t th e  Ood o f  D eterm inism  who th re a te n s  o r  'm anoeuvres' 
me in to  obeying H is W ill .  God must s ta n d  back from me, and 
l e t  me use  H is ' g i f t s '  o f Freedom, t h a t  X m ight d e c id e  f o r  
m y se lf, w ith o u t f e a r s  o r b r ib e s ,  to  be G o o d .d )  F o r Freedom, 
i n  i t s  d e e p e s t s e n se , i s  'In d ep en d en ce ' o f H appiness and even 
o f God. duch ' Independence ' g iv es  me a  sen se  o f Awe and 
âev e ren o e , and I  f e e l  th e  'p re s e n c e ' o f God, and t h i s  i s  what 
I  mean by R e l ig io n ." I s  Kant say in g  something o f  i n f i n i t e  
va lu e?
What i s  th e  r e p ly  o f  Edwards t o  a l l  t h i s ?  Ferhaps th e  f o U o v -  
in g  p a ra p h ra se  o f h i s  argum ents w i l l  a s s i s t  in  d e c id in g  t h i s  
q u e s tio n  — ' I  f in d  I  can make no sen se  o f  e x is te n c e  ex cep t 
t h a t  1 s t a r t  from  th e  s o v e re ig n ty  o f God, b u t to  i n t e r p r e t  
such  S o v e re ig n ty  as mere d esp o tism  i s  i r r a t i o n a l .  God i s  a 
'm o ra l ' L e in g , and th e  fo u n t o f a l l  Goodness i n  e x is te n o e .
He b ro u g h t fcsbhthe w orld  and man ou t o f H is v e ry  goodness.
1
(1 ) See Oaird. The C ritic a l Philosophy, T o l.1 . Page, 71.
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H« iras th e  F i r s t ,  and He most be th e  L ast o f a l l  e x is te n o e ,
Qod made o r ig in a l  man capab le  o f  r e a l  "ohoico*, b u t man 
chose B r i l ,  and th e  r e s u l t s  o f  such a teholce* i s  th e  F a l l  from  
h is  o r ig i n a l  d ig n i ty  and p u r i t y .  God ‘p e rm itted *  n o t  ‘vlllsd* 
t h a t  man shou ld  F a l l ,  end iiov man i s  in  r u in s .  God m is t 
ag a in  s t a r t  v i t h  a  ’Hew* c re a t io n  o f  nan , and a g a in , Hs viH  
c re a te  a cco rd in g  to  H is Wisdom and Goodness, t h a t  i s ,  Be 
w i l l  " s e le c t* ,  Tflth D iv in e  Freedom, th e  o b je c ts  o f H is 'Bev* 
c r e a t io n .  T h e re fo re , u n le s s  and u n t i l ,  Ho ch o o ses , no man 
can be sav ed . T h is i s  n o t more ’despotism * b u t th e  disposal 
of D iv ine  wisdom. Man l a  in. a  * f a l l e n  * s t a t o .  He does 
n o t know th e  *truo* Good, n o r can he p o s s ib ly  fo llo w  i t .  All 
ho knows i s  what i s  ’ag reeab le*  to  h is  mind, and I  have 
proved , beyond any re a so n a b le  shadow o f doubt t i ie t  when he 
chooses th e  * A greeable* he i s  D eterm ined by h is  own nature; 
b a t ,  beeauso i t  i s  h e , h i a s e l f , idio a c tu a l ly  makes th e  *Qholoe', 
he h as t h a t  (p ia l l ty  o f L ib e r ty  whida makes him responsible, 
and w orthy  o f  P r a is e  o r Blame. There i s  a v e ry  r e a l  sen se  
i n  which God does s ta n d  ’a p a rt*  from f a l l e n  man, and permits 
him to  work ou t h i s  own d e s t r u o t ic n .  t h a t  i s  idiy fled cannot 
be h e ld  re s p o n s ib le  f o r  M an's B in . T his B in o r 'm oral* Bvll 
i n  h&n i s  so  deep t h a t  i t s  cu re  l i e s  beyond man’s 'aatoral* 
c a p a c i ty . Btriwe as  he w i l l  t o  s a t i s f y  h i s  'perverted* sen se  
o f  th e  Good, he  o n ly  b lu n d e rs  on iri h o p e le ss  c o n fu s io n . Of 
c o u rse , he  h as l im ite d  glim iucrlngs o f  what he 'Oug^t* t o  be. 
A fte r  a l l ,  th e re  i s  enough *m o ra l’ example in  th e  w orld t o  
ch a llo n g e  th e  w o rst o f  men, and even Qod does n o t r e s t t i o t  
th e  ’g e n e r a l ’ o p e ra tio n  o f lU s B p i r i t  to  th e  good p eo p le  alone, 
t-an i s  D eterm ined because he i s  a B in n e r, and he oen be saved  
on ly  by a  Hew B ir th ,  and t h i s  Hew B ir th ,  l i k e  th e  First Birth, 
w i l l  be th e  ’ g i f t ’ o f God. khen a  man i s  ’saved* , h e  is  
s t i l l  D eterm ined, bu t now by D iv ine  G oodness, and n o t  by th e  
’human A g reeab le ’ . T h e re fo re , God must have H is Way w ith  
H id C re a tio n , and t o  be D eterm ined by God i s  t o  be "gedlike*# 
This i s  real freedom  and r e a l  Morality.** Is Bdwerds saying 
something ef in fin ite  valnet
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Zn c lo s in g  t h i s  d is c u s s io n  o f  th e  K an tian  Defsnae o f Frsodom, 
th e  m ajor q u e s tio n  i s  n o t  w hether Kant and a iw ards have s a id  
som ething o f g re a t  v a lu e , r a t h e r  i t  i s  which has t r e a te d  h i s  
r e s p e c t iv e  p o in ts  o f  v iew  w ith  g re a te r  c o n s is te n c y ?  T here­
f o r e ,  some a tte ia p t must be made t o  sum up th e  ev idence  id iich  
i s  a v a i la b le  and t o  p u t f o r t h  some p o s i t iv e  v e r d i c t .
F i r s t , The C a u s a li ty  o f  Freedom
H ere, I t  appears, Kant le a v e s  his p o s i t io n  open to  grave 
a ttao Jt from  D eterm in ism . He adm its t h a t  th e r e  I s  such  a  
thing as a  •Froedoirf" C a u s a l i ty ,  and d e n ie s  t h a t  such C a u s a li ty  
i s  • la w le s s * , b u t I s  s u b je c t  t o  laws o f  a  s p e c ia l  k in d .
Beyond t h i s  he  i s  n o t p rep a red  t o  go, t » t  ta k e s  re fu g e  in  th e  
i n t e l l i g i b l e  w orld  which i s  r e a l l y  u n - i n t e l l i g l b l e .  To ex­
p la in  a n y th in g  i s  t o  b r in g  I t  u n d er th e  c a u s a l law s o f  n a tu r e ,  
and t h i s  would be a f a t a l  p r ic e  t o  pay f o r  an adequate  ex p lan a­
t i o n  o f how Freedom w orks. I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  Kant sough t o n ly  
t o  c o n s tru c t  a **DGf©nco” of Freedom, b u t h i s  "D efence" i s  
b u i l t  up o n ly  on one s id e .  The r e a r  a sp e c t o f h i s  Freedem -
f o r t r e s s  l i e s  v id e  open to  a  v a s t  u n d io r te d  and , acco rd in g  to
Jtu it, fo re v e r  unohartab3e  t e r r i t o r y .  lie iiu s t n o t eom plain 
i f  ]3ci'-rarcs in s i s t s  upon f i l l i n g  up th is  e p ls te a o lo g io a l  vacuum 
r l t h  God anc! la v  laid o rd e r .  Zant has s a id  — “ Our re a so n  i s
not ] 11:0 i\ in i'l r . l t c ly  f a r  -extended, the l l r i t s  o f which
Ixiovf la  a ganoral vuy only, bu t must r a t h e r  be compared 
to  L nphero, th e  radius o f vtilah can be detoi'-dned from  th e
;:urvaturo of th j  arc c f i t s  suz’faoe . . .  “ (1 )  T his i s  th e
argumt.nt of Edvards, but h is  ar^iuiiont n-rtciids beyond mare 
QXfiürionc'j. I t  includes the whole u n iv e rs e  of U n iv e rsa l B eing, 
and he tî*i jC to  mal.e meet, smd ha i s  convinced t h a t  th e y
must moot fo r ,  although, ho perçoives a i ly  a fragm ent o f  R e a l i ty ,
lie cwr... I ouf.cc.lvG '.hat tL.j whole cf h c a l i ty  v l l l  c o n t r a d ic t
t h a t  frag.ie^t which i s  perceived . I'lic whole cosmos i s  an  
orderly  aiid unite*, viiol^, f o r  th e  God of o rd e r  pervades th e
<1) K. r .  ?• A. 762.
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w h o le . In tho  T liird Antinomy, Kant a d id ts  t lik t t h i s  con­
c ep tio n  o f  tho ü iiivcrs®  has r a t io n a l  j u s t i f i c a t l< x i ,  and he 
has boan unable t o  sa y  any th in  2; which sui^::e3t s  tha t h is  own 
th eo ry  o f  a d iv id ed  U n iv erse  is  s-aperior fo r  Reason or fo r  
Freed ora.
geeendt Freedom end Morality
Kant's central theme is  tha t fo r human Morality to  be re a l i t  
mast be imputed. That i s ,  nan most hold himself responsible 
fo r his ac ts , Good and Evil. Farther, he argues th a t sueh
responsib ility  is  inoonoeivable unless i t  i s  b u ilt upon Free-
/ /  / /dom. Yet, when he cos&es to  discuss th is  c itadel of Freedom, 
he is  hopelessly ambiguous# Svidmice has been submitted 
tha t he eonoeives of the human ¥111 as the core of human 
Personality, but the question a rise s , what does Kant mean by 
the human Will? He makes frequent reference to  a "Good" Will, 
a "Pure" Will, a "Rational" Will, an "Elective" Will, a "Bad" 
Will, a "Holy" Will. Even i f  a l l  these are reduced to  the 
two terms "Willkuhr" Elective Will, and "Wllle" Rational Will, 
the question s t i l l  p e rs is ts , in  v^ JLch Will doaa 
rea lly  rest?  There are times when Kant gives the impression 
tha t only the "Elective" Will is  rea lly  free , yet, h is  prin­
cipal teaching centres in  making Freedom iden tica l with the 
noumenal world, the pivot of which is  the "Rational" W ill.
I t  i s  not enough to  say, as Dr. Paten says, tha t th is  d i f f i ­
culty  can be explained or overcome by agreeing to  look a t man 
from two d iffe ren t points of viev.^D  I t  i s  th is  v i ta l  
question of responsib ility  which is  a t stake, and without 
which the whole e th ica l teaching of Kant would be in  ru ins.
Is  the act cf Freedom something 'idiich takes place within 
human experience, tha t i s ,  ^ e  Kantian phenomenal; or i s  i t  
an act which takes place outside human experience, tha t i s ,  
the Kantian noumenal? From the evidence available, i t  must 
be oencluded tha t Kant taught tha t th is  act of Freedom takes 
place in the noumenal world; and Dr. Ewing rig h tly  asks —
(1) The Categorical Isq>erative, page 27V.
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"How can a tlJaeless, purely rational se lf  be oonoelved ## 
acting Immorally, and I f  i t  never acts Immorally, how can w# 
be said to  be responsible fo r immoral action?^ 1  ^ I t  la  with 
very great reluctance tha t th is  present examination of the 
Kantian Defence of Freedom agrees with the c<mclusion arrived 
a t by Dr. V.R. «orley he writes — "Kant speaks of the 
free Volition as an act out of time, an act which forms the 
oharaoter which functions in  time. In th is  way he cuts i t  
off from our experience, which is  in time; h is Freedom i s  a 
non-temporal act, and l i t t l e  more can be said of i t , "(2)
Third, Moral Evil and Human A bility
The greatest attack of Kdwai’ds upon Kant would centre upon 
the Kantian dictum, "I ought, therefore I  can" • Edvards 
would have agreed tha t Kant could have claimed oonsistmioy 
in  such a dictum i f  he had never entered upon a discussion 
of Radical Evil as smbethlng positive end personal* Kant 
puts the question in  these words — "But i f  a man is  corrupt 
in  the very ground of h is maxims, how can he possibly bring 
about th is  revolution by h is own powers, and of himself be­
come a good man?"(3) Kant replies to  th is  question bysaying 
tha t Duty bids us do i t ,  and Duty demands nothing of us 
whidi we cannot do. However, Edwards would be fa r  from 
sa tis f ied  with such a reply . He would want to  know what Kant 
meant by the term — "corrupt in  the very ground of h is maximp". 
Kant obviously means th a t the "Elective" Will i s  corrupt, 
and Bdwerds would view the dilemma with which Kant i s  faced 
as consisting of the following. (a) I f  the "Bleotive" H ill 
is  corrupt, then, i t  is  the rea l ew tre  of human decision and 
responsibility* Here, too, is  the c itade l of rea l Human 
Freedom, Freedom of the supposed "Rational" Will i s  but a 
figment of the imagination. I f  th is  corruption of the 
"Bleotive" Will is  meant in  any serious manner, i t  must mean
(1) Kent's Treatment of Causality. Page, 220.
<2) Moral Values and the Idea ef Qed, Page, ^37,(3) Religion, (Translated by Greene & Hudson, page V3>
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com ipticîi nf I ts  liibersnt ^'oedam. I f  th is  Eunan Freedom 
Is corrupt, how can I t ,  of I t s e l f ,  inaugurate a new, d ecisive  
end or ig inal act of Freed cm? (b) I f  Sant aseans that tho 
"Elective" Will i s  corrupt, but the d ec is iv e , or ig inal act 
of Freodon comes from the "Hationiil" W ill, then, he i t  in -  
voJ.ving h is argument in  some very grave contradictiema •
F ir s t , the Freedom of the "Rational" W ill i s  rea lly  a "non- 
morel" Freedom, for i t  was never involved in  eny "moral* con­
f l i c t .  Second, the "Elective" W ill, the core of "moral" 
R esponsib ility , i s  ‘'determined" by something external to  I t ­
s e l f ,  nnd tide crumot bo a basis for Kantian "moral" recovery. 
Third, for Kant to  argue that tho "Elective" Will can become 
corrupted while the "Rational" W ill romains uncontaminated Is 
to  make a hopeless dualism in  human personality , and coaatraot 
a gu lf which nothing can bridge. F in a lly , i f  tho Will Is 
that "princip le of th% mind which chooses", then, the "Elec­
tive" Will i s  the only real source of Choice, and th is  being 
corrupted, the situ a tion  for S e lf-sa lva tion  i s  hope less, 
fa t ,  after f u l l  consideration has been given to the criticism 
by Edwards, i s  not Kent, by h is  de liberate dichotomy e f  the 
human W ill, saying something which i s  true of human experlenoet 
Is  tlxore not clo^r evidence in  human l i f e  of an end less con­
f l i c t  between the two solves? Is  not the fac t oi conscience 
somotliing which demands some wuch explanaticm as offered by 
Kant? Edwards would Interprut coriscicnco txie "general" 
action of the Sipirit o f  God upon hun*ui i f  fa ir s , and he vonlA 
in s is t  that fundament a lly  a "split" personality i s  ua-psyohe- 
lo g io a l aud imzioral. l^atover \/e do, vu do with the pre­
ponderance of preference, Vc never rea lly  desire one thing 
end do the opposite. Cur better s e lf  i s  but & figment of the 
imagination, that i s ,  i f  such a s e lf  i s  eoncwivod as a Idjal of 
"Raticnal" S e lf which i s  our "tinie" personality . The voice  
of conscience i s  tho voice of God commanding us to f u l f i l  the  
Law, I t  i s  not our vo ice , or our Lav leg is la ted  by our own 
Reason. Mien we sin, it is because the prevailing preference 
ef our whole personality i s  behind that act of Sin. Ve have
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vio la ted  and oTfoiidad the oomnu-jid of God in  ourcelves, and 
tho corruption uîolch fo llow s a ffec ts  the whole of cur per­
son ality . We cannot derive the c lig jitost sa tis fa c tio n  from 
the thought that the "Rational" W ill w ithin us remains umcom» 
taiainatad. Total depravity does not moan that we have suak 
to  the depths of every possib le  "moral" E v il. Rather, i t  
means that the \^iolo of the personality has been Involved in  
the act of "moral" E v il. In other vords, Edvards voul4 
charge Kant vath being "IialT-hearted" in  h is  description of 
"Radical" I 'f i l  and in  h is analysis of "moral" value# and 
"moral" reformation. One-half of hu.nan personality never 
r ea lly  enters upon "moral" co n flic t , knovra nothing of "morel" 
fa ilu re , and stands in  no need of "moral" reformation* Further, 
he would charge Kant with makirig a parody of the "Pall" of 
man. For, according to  Kant’s central teaching of the 
"Rational" IÆ11, man never r ea lly  f e l l ,  and never con r ea lly  
f a l l .  I t  i s  foared th a t, from a "theological" point ef view, 
Sant has no va lid  reply to  suclx daarges, and that h is  handling 
of "moral" E v il and %unarf* A b ility  leaves a very serious 
breach in  h is  Defence of Freedom.
Fourth, Qod and Human Freedom
An attempt has been made to  indicate that Ssnt was haunted by 
the trad itio n a l conception of Qod because sueh a ccneeptiom 
contained in  i t  one of the gravest sources of Hetercnony to  
human ÉSÊSlSM$t Shore can be no doubt tha t Kant made a very 
great e ffo rt to reconstruct the idea of Qod to  f i t  in to  h is  
system of E thics, In fa c t, he attempted to  reconstruct the 
whole system of Christian doctrine to su it h is  E thical #LLlesophy 
At f i r s t ,  h is new in terp reta tion  Religion was welcomed as 
another Reformation, but h is "theological" system has not en­
dured, and few c<s#etent theological thinkers would now be pre­
pared to  accept the teaching of Kant is  th is  realm of thought
as new or tru e , Kmt i s  always protesting against conceiving
/# **God in  anthrcpcmorphic terms, l e t ,  i t  i s  d if f ic u lt  to  see
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how "nan" oon ever concelvd of anything exospt In suoh tor##.
However, assuming that Kant’s protest upon th is  point i s  va lid ,
i t  i s  s t i l l  more d if f ic u lt  to  find anything in the realm of i* ftTheology isore anthropomorphic than Kant’s God. Kant’s Qod 
is  "pushed" around in  a Universe which He is  supposed to 
have made. Ue is  fenced in  by the large e th ica l claims of 
man, and is  pulled out of h is  enforced exile from "moral" 
a ffa irs  whoever Kant thinks that nan needs to  bo made per­
manently happy. He is  dressed up v ith  the metaphysical 
a ttrib u tes  of omniscience, omnipotence and oanlpressnoe, th a t 
i s ,  for State occasions when He is  required to reward self- 
determined v irtue  v ith  Happiness; then, He i s  relegated to 
obscurity when He is  like ly  to  protest that "moral" Bvll was 
an affront to  His person and dignity. Further, Kant is 
always in sisting  upon the "moral" worth of Respect; yet, no 
serious thinker upon Divine things can respect the kind of 
God Kant has evolved. For He Is a God who appears to  have 
no rea l convictions concerning "moral* HvH, and no re a l 
plans concerning i t s  treatment.
The Qod of Edvards is  a t leas t Master in  His own house.
His Hovoreignty might be a l i t t l e  out of date in  an age of 
over-confident democracy but, a t le a s t, He v i l l  not be ordered 
around in  His Universe, and He has powers and plans to bring 
the greatest offender to  account. Man might hate such a Qod 
or they might love Him, but one thing they oamot do, and 
tha t i s ,  to  ignore Him and the v aluesM  which He stands.
I t  might wall be tha t Kant has weakened h is eth ica l system by 
making h is Qod so l i t t l e  worthy of iteverence.
Therefore, i f  the above observations hare any value, the Kantlam 
Defence of freedom is  one ef the greatest e ffo rts  ever made 
by the hwsmn mind to  construct a durable fo rtress  against an 
aggressive Determinism; and, in  a very rea l sense i t  has fu l­
f i l le d  the purpose which Kant had in mind when he said — 
"nothing remains but defence, i . e .  the removal of the objections 
of those who pretend to  have seen deeper in to  the nature of
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things I and thareupcai boldly declare Fraedon impossible."(D 
Kant has forever halted a bold and flippant Detarmlnimm. 
However, against the Determinism of Jonathan Edward#,Kant 
leaves his Defence open to  very grave danger. In the eleaing 
pages of h is work on "Religion within the Limits of Mere 
Reason" , Kant has a word of contempt for the "Puritan and 
Independent in  Oonneotlcut", hut, even in  the highest flight# 
of imagination, i t  cannot be taken to  mean a d irec t reference 
to  Bdwai'ds. Yet, i t  was th is  Puritan end Independent in 
Connecticut wiio provided hunt with liis greatest opponent; 
and the struggle s t i l l  continues.
Some years ago, S ir William Hamilton wrote:-
"How tho w ill can possibly be free must remain to  ms, under the present lim ita tion  of our facu ltie s , wholly inoosgirohensible. We cannot ccnceive absoluia ns—onni Bent; we cannot, therefore, oonoeivo a free v o lit ic a .But as l i t t l e  can wo conceive tho alternative  an whichlib e rty  i s  denied, on which necessity is  ai'fiim cA .Tho champlom# of the opposite doctrines are a t «nee re s is tle s s  in  assault and ifiq>otent in  defence* Saeh is  hewn down, and appears to  die under the th ru st af h is adversary; but each again recover# l i f e  fr#m the very death tils antagonist, and. to  borrow a simile, both are like  tne heroes in  Valhalla, ready in a moment to  aioose th«nselves anev^ln tlie same bloodies# andinterminable ccnflio t
The above description of the struggle between Freedcm emd 
Determinism by S ir  William Hamiltcn suggests an a ttitu d e  of 
detachment which la most eoimnondable, but i t  is  net enough; 
a t le a s t, fo r th is  particu lar examination of the Xantiam De­
fence of Freedom. I t  i s  submitted th a t, from the evidenoe 
available, Kant has fa iled  to  give a decisive and cenvinoing 
reply to  the Determinism of Bdvards. Of course, he h#d made 
Freedom "thinkable" or "imaginable", but he has not made Free­
dom ra tiona lly  "conceivable". On the other hand, Edward# 
has given ample grounds fo r assuming tha t there is  no other 
possible explanation fo r God, Man, Morality and Freedom, then 
in  the terms of h is system of Determinism. She Sovereignty 
of Qod is not some Power, or abstract Neoeseity. In the full
(1) Qd. 94.
(2) Bxemlnation of Hamilton’s Philosophy, by J.8*MUL1,pege# SSf end 597.
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and f i n a l  a i ia iy s is  i t  i s  th e  dovoreigm ty o f a  suprom ely Mtoral
B eing . In  f a c t ,  i t  i s  th o  S o v e re ig n ty  o f th e  LOVE o f God
f o r  H is c re a tu re s  and c r e a t io n .  God w i l l  have I lls  Way; and
th e  words o f F ra n c is  Thompson e x p re ss  such a D e te ro ln isn t
"1  f l e d  Him, down th e  n ig h ts  and down th e  days;I  f l e d  down th e  a rch es  o f tdxe yeai'S ,I  f l e d  down th e  la b y r in th in e  wayOf my awa m in d ................ ............................But w ith  u n h u rry in g  ch ase ,And u n p ertu rb ed  p ace .D e lib e ra te  speed , m a le s t ic  In s ta n c y ,They beat#  and a Voice b e a t ,liore in s t& n t th a n  th e  F e e t . -  . .A ll th in g s  b e tra y  th a a ,  who b e tr a y e s t  Me." v*/
(1) She Hound of Heaven.
